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Abstract
GLEB TSIPURSKY: Pleasure, Power, and the Pursuit of Communism: Soviet Youth and
State-Sponsored Popular Culture during the Early Cold War, 1945-1968
(Under the direction of Donald J. Raleigh)
My dissertation investigates how the Soviet Party-state tried to build communism
through fun and leisure during the early Cold War. I explore organized cultural activities
for young people, including concerts, shows, dances, and cultural education–what I
collectively call state-sponsored popular culture. My research relies on archives,
newspapers and other official publications, literature, cinema, memoirs, and interviews.
Chapter 1 overviews state-sponsored popular culture from its early years to the
immediate postwar period. The next chapter illuminates the extreme politicization in the
officially recommended cultural activities during the anticosmopolitan campaign, 1947 to
1953. Chapter 3 traces the attack on western-style music and dancing in state-sponsored
popular culture in the same period, and the difficulties in fully implementing this policy.
In chapter 4, I explore how the more pluralistic cultural policies during the early Thaw,
1953-56, impacted organized cultural activities. The fifth chapter presents a case study of
the transformations in the Thaw by focusing on the novel institution of youth initiative
clubs. Chapter 6 provides insights on the Kremlin’s campaign to instill normative
aesthetic tastes among youth as part of a brief militant turn in late 1956 and 1957. Finally,
the last chapter traces the zig-zags in top-level cultural policy and its impact on youth
everyday life during the “socialist sixties,” 1958 to 1968.
iv
I conclude that a multitude of young people truly had fun in Soviet organized
cultural activities. State-sponsored popular culture, riven by tensions between a hard-line
and soft-line approach to cultural policy, opened up significant room for youth agency
and grassroots activism. This proved especially true during the Thaw, with the new post-
Stalin leadership seeking to build a socialist alternative to a western modern consumer
society as a means of constructing communism and fighting the Cold War on the
domestic front. For state-sponsored popular culture, this socialist consumer society meant
a combination of satisfying cultural consumption desires, shaping aesthetic tastes, and
eliciting initiative from below.
vDedication
This dissertation is dedicated to Agnes Vishnevkin, my life partner, with my boundless
gratitude for her care, concern, and support.
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Introduction
My dissertation explores how the Soviet Communist Party tried to build
communism through fun and leisure during the early Cold War, 1945 to 1968. Both
popular and academic writings traditionally depict Soviet official culture as drab, dreary,
and boring. Yet my research helps complicate this image by analyzing state-funded
organized cultural recreation for young people that largely took place in the widespread
network of cultural institutions known as clubs.1 These organized cultural activities,
which I collectively call state-sponsored popular culture, comprised music, theater, and
dancing, and had mass grassroots participation.2
The Party-state complex managed all of these activities, either directly through
the government or Party-controlled social organizations such as trade unions or the
Komsomol, the mass Soviet youth organization. Dedicated to socializing young Soviet
citizens, the Komsomol was open to all those between approximately fourteen to twenty-
1 Official discourse called this sphere kul’turno-massovaia rabota, cultural-mass work, and also kul’turno-
prosvititel’naia rabota, cultural-enlightenment work.
2 I define “popular culture” as any human endeavor with a substantial aesthetic component, made for the
consumption of ordinary people, as opposed to elites. For discussions of popular culture in the Soviet
setting, see Richard Stites, Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment and Society since 1900 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 1-8; Louise McReynolds, “Russia’s Popular Culture in History and
Theory,” in Abbott Gleason ed., A Companion to Russian History (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009): 295-
310; and Stephen Lovell, The Russian Reading Revolution: Print Culture in the Soviet and Post-Soviet
Eras (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 14-20. For the Soviet context in general, see Robert Edelman,
Spartak Moscow: A History of the People’s Team in the Workers’ State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2009), 1-9. For broader theoretical perspectives on popular culture, see Tony Bennett, “Introduction:
Popular Culture and the ‘Turn to Gramsci,’” in Tony Bennett, Colin Mercer and Janet Woollcott eds.,
Popular Culture and Social Relations (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1986). For a recent overview
of the field of popular culture studies, see John Storey, Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: An
Introduction (Essex: Pearson Education Ltd., 2009).
2eight years of age, with membership vital for those seeking upward social mobility,
university admission, and white-collar professional careers.3 The Komsomol played a
central role in organizing youth-oriented state-sponsored cultural activities that provided
the key public spaces for youth entertainment, socializing, play, relaxation, and romance.
Consequently, state policies on organized cultural recreation had a defining impact on
youth socialization, shaping not only young people’s everyday lives, but also the fate of
the USSR as a whole. Moreover, an analysis of state-sponsored youth popular culture
illuminates a project at the heart of the Soviet experiment: the effort to forge the young
into model communists and thus to build the utopia of communism. Specifically, the
Party intended organized cultural recreation to manage youth cultural consumption
desires, aesthetic tastes, social values, and leisure behavior, all integral parts of individual
identities.4 Despite the significance of state-sponsored popular culture, historians have
paid little attention to the developments in this sphere during the early Cold War years.5
3 Komsomol stands for the Vsesoiuznyi Leninskii Kommunisticheskii Soiuz Molodezhi, All-Union Leninist
Communist Youth League. For more on the Komsomol, see Allen Kassof, The Soviet Youth Program:
Regimentation and Rebellion (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 14-18.
4 I define “identity” as a concept encompassing an individual’s personal worldview and beliefs – their
selfhood or subjectivity. I will thus use these terms interchangeably. For criticism of the undefined use of
“identity,” see Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity’,” Theory and Society 29.1
(February 2000): 1-47.
5 We lack archive-based monographs on state-sponsored popular culture, but two historians have published
insightful articles on state-sponsored popular culture in the late 1950s and 1960s that touch on college
students. See Susan Costanzo, “Reclaiming the Stage: Amateur Theater-Studio Audiences in the Late
Soviet Era,” Slavic Review 57.2 (Summer 1998): 398-424; Costanzo, “Amateur Theaters and Amateur
Publics in the Russian Republic, 1958-71,” The Slavonic and East European Review 86.2 (April 2008):
372-94; Bella Ostromoukhova, “Le Dégel et les troupes amateur. Changements politiques et activités
artistiques des étudiants, 1953-1970,” Cahiers du monde russe 47.1-2 (January-June 2006): 303-25; and
Ostromoukhova, “KVN – ‘molodezhnaia kul’tura shestidesiatykh’?,” Neprikosnovennyi zapas: Debaty o
politike i kul’ture, 36.4 (September 2004), http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/ [Accessed December 31, 2009]. A
monograph published before the archives opened provides a useful broad overview: Anne White, De-
Stalinization and the House of Culture: Declining State Control over Leisure in the USSR, Poland and
Hungary, 1953-89 (New York: Routledge, 1990). A recent Russian edited volume, which lacks archival
evidence, is comprised of articles written by specialists in theater, music, and art rather than mainstream
historians, and focuses largely on cultural rather than political and social analysis: K. G. Bogemskaia ed.,
3Consequently, my dissertation helps fill an important historiographic gap, while
stretching the boundaries of existing literature by helping revise our perspective on
socialist official culture, political practices, identity construction, and everyday life.
Drawing on cultural, political, and social history, my study analyzes the formulation of
top-level cultural policy, the implementation of state initiatives in urban cultural
institutions, the shape of official discourse on cultural recreation, and the actual behavior
of youth in clubs. In the process, it engages with scholarly conversations about the nature
of the postwar and post-Stalin Soviet Union, and broader interdisciplinary conversations
about consumption, the Cold War, youthhood, agency, public and private, tastes,
modernity, and globalization.
Historiography
During the postwar Stalin years, 1945-53, the Soviet Union transitioned from a
total war environment to a peace-time setting, yet one characterized by a continued
mobilization of the population in an extensive, rapid, and exhausting reconstruction.6
Simultaneously, the Kremlin tightened ideological controls with its campaign against
“cosmopolitanism,” which targeted everything defined by the leadership as non-Soviet.7
By the mid-1950s, the situation in the USSR had changed, in some ways drastically. The
new top officials now placed more emphasis on consumption, rehabilitated many victims
Samodeiatel’noe khudozhestvennoe tvorchestvo v SSSR: Ocherki istorii, konets 1950-kh – nachalo 1990-kh
godov (St. Petersburg: “Dmitrii Bulanin”, 1999).
6 Elena Zubkova, Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957, Hugh Ragsdale
trans. and ed. (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 31-39.
7 On the anticosmopolitan campaign, see David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass
Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian Identity,, 1931-1956 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2002), 183-96.
4of Stalinist terror, encouraged public debates and grassroots participation in governance,
sought out “peaceful coexistence” with the US and western Europe, and even expressed
some tolerance for “western” cultural influence.8
The traditional historiographic paradigm emphasizes Stalin’s death in 1953 as the
primary factor that brought about this more pluralistic, tolerant period, one dominated by
conflicts between soft-liners who wanted to reform militant Stalinist policies, and
conservatives who wanted to maintain the hard-line status quo. The name bestowed on
this era, the Thaw, is meant to embody these shifts. This period lasted from 1953, through
N. S. Khrushchev’s tenure in office from 1955 to 1964, and ended under L. I. Brezhnev
in the late 1960s.9
Some recent publications, however, have cast doubt on the neatness of this
paradigm. Juliane Fürst, among others, questions the attention given to 1953 as a
monumental break in Soviet history, while still acknowledging the transformative impact
of Stalin’s death on some areas of Soviet life. This approach roots much of the Thaw-era
innovations in the postwar Stalin years, positing that they came to fruition in the mid-
1950s more as a result of broad processes such as the completion of postwar
8 I do not capitalize “western,” as doing so functions to homogenize a widely varied set of historical
experiences and makes problematic claims to an inherent separation between western and “eastern.” I am
informed here by Martin W. Lewis and Karen E. Wigen, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of
Metageography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Edward Said, Orientalism (New York:
Vintage Books, 1979); and Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1993).
9 For works supportive of this perspective, with various degrees of caveats, see Melanie Ilic,
“Introduction,” in Melanie Ilic and Jeremy Smith eds., Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev
(New York: Routledge, 2009), 1-8; Polly Jones ed., The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating
Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era (New York: Routledge, 2006), 1-18; William Taubman,
Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003); L. B. Brusilovskaia, Kul’tura
povsednevnosti v epokhu “ottepeli”: Metamorfozy stilia (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo URAO, 2001); P. L. Vail
and A. A. Genis, 60-e. Mir sovetskogo cheloveka (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1988); and Stephen F. Cohen, “The
Friends and Foes of Change: Reformism and Conservatism in the Soviet Union,” Stephen F. Cohen,
Alexander Rabinowitch and Robert Sharlet eds., The Soviet Union since Stalin (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1980), 11-31.
5reconstruction, than of policy shifts resulting from the ascendance of a new leadership.10
Refuting the pluralism and tolerance traditionally associated with the Thaw, Oleg
Kharkhordin argues that, under Khrushchev, the increasing power of official collectives
resulted in a higher degree of close surveillance, harsh coercion, cynical infighting, and
deep intervention into everyday Soviet life than Stalin’s hierarchical policing.11 Another
challenge to the traditional paradigm comes from Miriam Dobson, who expresses
skepticism over the significance given to the hard-line versus soft-line contest in
explaining the actions of Party-state officials during the Thaw. She contends that Soviet
bureaucrats changed their outlooks due to an evolving mixture of optimism and anxiety.12
Stephen Bittner similarly downplays the impact of conflicts between militants and those
more pluralistically-oriented, instead spotlighting generational struggles as playing a vital
10 See Juliane Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism, 1945-
56 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 20-29. For others holding a similar viewpoint, see Julie
Hessler, A Social History of Soviet Trade: Trade Policy, Retail Practices, and Consumption, 1917–1953
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 296-336; Juliane Fürst, Polly Jones and Susan Morrissey,
“The Relaunch of the Soviet Project, 1945–64: Introduction,” The Slavonic and East European Review 86.2
(April 2008): 201-07; and David Nordlander, “Khrushchev’s Image in the Light of Glasnost and
Perestroika,” The Russian Review 52.2 (April 1993): 248-64.
11 Oleg Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1999), 279-302. Other authors, while not necessarily endorsing
Kharkhordin’s specific arguments, also drew attention to the coercive elements of the Thaw. See V. A.
Kozlov, Mass Uprisings in the USSR: Protest and Rebellion in the Post-Stalin Years, Elaine M.
MacKinnon trans. and ed. (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2002); Brian LaPierre, “Defining, Policing, and
Punishing Hooliganism in Khrushchev’s Russia” (Ph. D. diss., University of Chicago, 2006); and Gleb
Tsipursky, “Citizenship, Deviance, and Identity: Soviet Youth Newspapers as Agents of Social Control in
the Thaw-Era Leisure Campaign,” Cahiers du monde russe 49.4 (September-October 2008): 1-22.
12 Miriam Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, and the Fate of Reform after
Stalin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 156-85, and Dobson“Contesting the Paradigms of De-
Stalinization: Readers’ Responses to One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich,” Slavic Review 64.3 (Fall
2005): 580-600.
6role. He also criticizes the term “Thaw” itself as having come to convey an excessively
liberal understanding of this period.13
An examination of organized cultural recreation enables me to scrutinize the
ruptures and continuities across 1953 as well as the multifaceted nature of the post-Stalin
years, and add nuance to the conclusions of some newer studies, at least in regard to
cultural consumption for youth. I find that new initiatives by the post-Stalin leadership
played a determining role in shaping state-sponsored popular culture. This conclusion
complicates the thesis advanced by Fürst, Julie Hessler, and other scholars that novel
Thaw-era policies primarily evolved organically from processes such as postwar
reconstruction than the coming to power of new top officials. Kharkhordin’s view of
intensifying coercion and repression associated with official collectives under
Khrushchev fits poorly with the everyday life experience of young people in clubs. While
agreeing with Kharkhordin that an expansion of club activities during the Thaw led to
greater official surveillance, my evidence demonstrates that youth had a great deal of fun
and pleasure in organized cultural events. This refutes the equation of all official
collectives with coercion and cynical strife, pointing to areas of agreement and
cooperation between Soviet governing structures and ordinary citizens. Finally, my study
confirms that the changes in the Kremlin’s cultural policy did, to an extent, result from
shifting mixtures of optimism and pessimism, as Dobson argues. However, in contrast to
her and Bittner’s conclusions, I argue that tensions between those favoring hard-line and
13 Stephen V. Bittner, The Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw: Experience and Memory in Moscow’s Arbat
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 1-13. For more discussion of the term “Thaw,” including how it
was perceived in the post-Stalin period, see Nancy Condee, "Uncles, Deviance, and Ritual Combat: The
Cultural Codes of Khrushchev’s Thaw,” in William Taubman, Sergei Khrushchev, and Abbott Gleason eds.
The Khrushchev Era: A Reappraisal (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 160-76.
7soft-line approaches also played a central role in defining state-sponsored popular culture.
Owing to my findings, I continue to use the term Thaw as the best way to convey the
quickening pace of change from the mid-1950s onward, while fully recognizing that this
decade and a half hardly represented an unvarnished period of liberalism.
My dissertation likewise casts new light on Soviet efforts to forge model young
communist citizens, New Soviet People, by expanding the chronological boundaries of
previous scholarship to encompass the two and a half postwar decades, and the thematic
boundaries by examining officially-organized cultural activities. Despite the prominent
place of young people in Marxist-Leninist ideology, Party-state policy, and Soviet
everyday life, historians are only now beginning to examine postwar youth in any
depth.14 So far, scholarship has focused on young people who engaged in alternative
cultural practices and also those who deviated from established political norms.15 While
14 For earlier works, which did not have access to archival sources, see Hilary Pilkington, Russia’s Youth
and Its Culture: A Nation’s Constructors and Constructed (New York: Routledge, 1994); John Bushnell,
Moscow Graffiti: Language and Subculture (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990); James Riordan ed., Soviet
Youth Culture (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989); Kassof, The Soviet Youth Program; and Ralph T. Fisher Jr.,
Pattern for Soviet Youth: A Study of the Congresses of the Komsomol, 1918-1954 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1959).
15 For postwar youth engaging in alternative cultural practices, see Sergei Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the
Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet Dniepropetrovsk (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2010); William J. Risch, “Soviet ‘Flower Children’: Hippies and the Youth Counter-
culture in 1970s L’viv,” Journal of Contemporary History 40.3 (July 2005): 565–84; Juliane Fürst, "The
Importance of Being Stylish: Youth, Culture and Identity in Late Stalinism" in Juliane Fürst ed., Late
Stalinist Russia: Society between Reconstruction and Reinvention (New York Routledge, 2006), 209-30;
Mark Edele, "Strange Young Men in Stalin’s Moscow: The Birth and Life of the Stiliagi, 1945-1953,"
Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 50.1 (March 2002): 37-61; Kristin Roth-Ey, "Mass Media and the
Remaking of Soviet Culture, 1950s-1960s," (Ph. D. diss.: Princeton University, 2003), 46-98; Gleb
Tsipursky, “Living ‘America’ in the Soviet Union: The Cultural Practices of ‘Westernized’ Soviet Youth,
1945-1964,” in Eva-Maria Stolberg ed., "Rivals of the Twentieth Century": USSR and USA. Two
Geopolitical Powers in Competition (forthcoming in 2011); and Tsipursky, “Coercion and Consumption:
The Khrushchev Leadership’s Ruling Style in the Campaign against ‘Westernized’ Youth, 1954-64,” in
William J. Risch and Kate Transchel eds., The Socialist Beat in the Soviet Bloc (Lanham: Lexington Books,
forthcoming in 2011). On youth political dissent, see Juliane Fürst, “Friends in Private, Friends in Public:
The Phenomena of Kompaniia among Soviet Youth in the 1950s and 1960s,” in Lewis H. Siegelbaum ed.,
Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 229-50,
and Ludmilla Alekseeva and Paul Goldberg, The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin Era
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1990). Several broader studies have come out, for example on student life and
8the scholarship has shed much light on alternative youth cultures in the postwar decades,
the cultural practices of the large majority of young people who did not openly deviate
from officially-prescribed norms remains largely in the shadows.16 This imbalance
implicitly reproduces the one found in literature on US and western European youth,
which excessively privileges nonconformist young people and, as a result, conveys a
slanted picture of reality.17 My investigation of organized cultural recreation therefore
opens the curtain on the central venue for the public cultural activities of the vast
majority of young urbanites, revising our image of Soviet youth cultural practices.
This study likewise engages with broader research on youth and generations. This
field’s models of analysis generally emerge from an examination of western contexts.18
politics in the Thaw. See Benjamin K. Tromly, “Re-Imagining the Soviet Intelligentsia: Student Politics
and University Life, 1948-1964” (Ph. D. diss., Harvard University, 2007), and L. V. Silina, Nastroeniia
sovetskogo studenchestva, 1945-1964 (Moscow: Russkii mir, 2004). One broad study of postwar Stalinist
youth is Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation. For such studies of youth in the interwar years, see Anne E.
Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia: Enthusiasts, Bohemians, Delinquents (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2000); Peter Konecny, Builders and Deserters: Students, State, and Community in
Leningrad, 1917–1941 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999); and Corinna Kuhr-Korolev
ed., Sowjetjugend 1917-1941: Generation Zwischen Revolution und Resignation (Essen: Klartext, 2001).
16 I do not use the term “subculture” due to this concept’s indelible association with homogeneous, tightly
bounded groups that practice class-based resistance: Andy Bennett and Keith Kahn-Harris, “Introduction,”
in Andy Bennett and Keith Kahn-Harris eds., After Subculture: Critical Studies in Contemporary Youth
Culture (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 1-18. In turn, the suggested models of “lifestyles” or
“neo-tribes” presented by advocates of the post-subcultural approach have been effectively undermined as
lacking adequate appreciation of local contexts: Hilary Pilkington and Richard Johnson, “Peripheral Youth:
Relations of Identity and Power in Global/Local Context,” European Journal of Cultural Studies 6.3
(August 2003): 259-83.
17 Michael Brake, Comparative Youth Culture: The Sociology of Youth Cultures and Youth Subcultures in
America, Britain, and Canada (New York: Routledge, 1985); Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson eds.,
Resistance through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-war Britain (New York: Routledge, 2006 [1975]);
James Gilbert, A Cycle of Outrage: America’s Reaction to the Juvenile Delinquent in the 1950s (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1986); and Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils & Moral Panics: The Creation of
the Mods and Rockers (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987).
18 See, for example, Jeffrey J. Arnett, Adolescence and Emerging Adulthood: A Cultural Approach (Upper
Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2001); John Springhall, Youth Popular Culture and Moral Panics: Penny
Gaffs to Gangsta-Rap, 1830-1996 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); Jane Edmunds and Bryan S.
Turner, Generations, Culture and Society (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2002); and Karl
Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, Paul Kecskemeti trans. and ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1952). Two recent works that draw on both socialist and western contexts are: Stephen
9By illustrating the evolution in the socially constructed meaning of youthhood and
generation in the socialist, authoritarian Soviet setting, I suggest the need to pay more
attention to governing structures in shaping such conceptions. Here, the change over time
in the official discourse’s presentation of what makes ideal New Soviet Women and Men
proves especially illuminating. Furthermore, I argue for the emergence of an empowered
post-Stalin generation, with its activist nature attributable in large part to top-level policy
and discursive transformations during the early Thaw.
My exploration of youth-oriented cultural consumption for the masses in the 1945
to 1968 period also offers a different perspective on Soviet cultural construction.19 To
date, scholarly works on this topic have scrutinized only the efforts in the 1920s and
1930s to inculcate culturedness (kul’turnost’), “appropriate” standards of culture and
behavior, in the Soviet populace, with a particular emphasis on elites.20 Extending the
reach of historical analysis into the postwar decades, this dissertation finds that the post-
Stalin state launched an unprecedented initiative to instill normative aesthetic tastes in the
young during the late 1950s, what I term a Thaw-era version of culturedness. By
Lovell ed., Generations in Twentieth-Century Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), and Claire
Wallace and Sijka Kovatcheva, Youth in Society: The Construction and Deconstruction of Youth in East
and West Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998).
19 My treatment of cultural activities as consumable products is informed by Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A
Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, Richard Nice trans. and ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1984), 466-85, and Simon Frith, “The Cultural Study of Popular Music,” in Lawrence Grossburg,
Cary Nelson, and Paula A. Treichler eds., Cultural Studies (New York: Routledge, 1992), 174-86. For the
use of cultural consumption in the historiography on the USSR, see Zhuk, Illusions of the West in the
Closed City, and Kristin Roth-Ey, "Mass Media and the Remaking of Soviet Culture, 1950s-1960s," (Ph. D.
diss.: Princeton University, 2003).
20 David L. Hoffman, Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917-41 (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press. 2003), 15-88; Vadim Volkov, “The Concept of Kul’turnost’: Notes on the Stalinist
Civilizing Process,” in Sheila Fitzpatrick ed., Stalinism: New Directions (New York: Routledge, 2000),
210-30; and Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in
the 1930s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 75-88.
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examining the nature and outcome of this initiative, my dissertation not only makes a
contribution to historiography on the Soviet Union, but also joins an interdisciplinary
conversation about the factors involved in the formation of popular tastes.21
An examination of youth cultural tastes in the context of organized cultural
recreation offerings in the period from 1945 to 1968 inevitably deals with the issue of the
impact of western cultural influence as an element of the domestic cultural front of the
Cold War. Historical scholarship has revealed how both the governments of the US and
the USSR actively deployed culture as a weapon in the struggle for the hearts and minds
on the domestic and foreign fronts, and this played a vital role in the eventual outcome of
the Cold War.22 The limited literature on western popular culture in the Cold War USSR,
such as jazz, rock’n’roll, and western dancing, has largely emphasized the state’s efforts
21 Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions (New York: The
Modern Library, 1934 [1899]), 68-101; Bourdieu, Distinction, 466-85; and Sarah Thornton, Club Cultures:
Music, Media and Subcultural Capital (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1996).
22 David Caute, The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy During the Cold War (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Penny M. Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows up the World: Jazz
Ambassadors Play the Cold War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Reinhold Wagnleitner,
Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the
Second World War, trans. Diana M. Wolf (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994); Uta
G. Poiger, Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War:
Raising the Iron Curtain (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003); Tony Shaw, and
Denise J. Youngblood, Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and Minds
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010); Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda,
Culture, and the Cold War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural
Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters (New York: The New Press, 1999); Mark Fenemore,
Sex, Thugs and Rock’n’Roll: Teenage Rebels in Cold-War East Germany (New York: Berghahn Books,
2007); Rósa Magnúsdóttir, “Keeping Up Appearances: How the Soviet State Failed to Control Popular
Attitudes toward the United States of America, 1945–1959” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, 2006); Margaret Peacock, “Contested Innocence: Images of the Child in the Cold War” (Ph.D.
diss., The University of Texas at Austin, 2008); Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Cold War: What Do ‘We Now
Know’?” The American Historical Review 104.2 (April 1999): 501-24; and Sabina Mihelj, “Negotiating
Cold War Culture at the Crossroads of East and West: Uplifting the Working People, Entertaining the
Masses, Cultivating the Nation,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 53.2 (forthcoming in 2011).
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to suppress this “bourgeois” influence.23 My project explores how Soviet authorities
during the Thaw consciously appealed to youth desires for fun cultural consumption as a
way to attract young people to cultural activities considered appropriately socialist,
instead of western. Furthermore, based on a close scrutiny of the youth culture of jazz
enthusiasts in the postwar Soviet decades, my research concludes that expressing
fascination with some aspects of western popular culture did not necessarily mean that
young people sought to emulate a western lifestyle or demonstrate nonconformism, a
finding at variance with much scholarship on the cultural Cold War.24 The impact of
American popular culture on the USSR can also be viewed as a case study in the
assessment of the globalization of US cultural influence in the postwar decades.25
In treating organized cultural recreation as an instance of cultural consumption,
this dissertation enters into dialogue with the burgeoning subfield of Soviet consumption
23 On jazz, rock, and western dancing in the USSR, see Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, until It
Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 158-237; S.
Frederick Starr, Red and Hot: The Fate of Jazz in the Soviet Union, 1917-1980 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1983); N. I. Nikolaeva, “‘Chuven’ klevaia Laba, chetyre saksa’ (molodezhnaia
subkul’tura 40-kh – nachala 60-kh godov XX veka),” in A. S. Maiorova ed., Neofitsial’naia zhizn’
gorozhan: Zapad-Rossiia-Vostok (Saratov: “Nauka”, 2007), 123-30; Yngvar B. Steinholt, Rock in  the
Reservation: Songs from the Leningrad Rock Club, 1981-86 (New York: MMMSP, 2005); Sabrina P.
Ramet, “Rock: The Music of the Revolution (and Political Conformity),” in Sabrina P. Ramet, ed., Rocking
the State: Rock Music and Politics in Eastern Europe and Russia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 1-14;
Timothy W. Ryback, Rock Around the Block: A History of Rock Music in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Thomas Cushman, Notes From Underground: Rock
Music Counterculture in Russia (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995); and Artemy
Troitskii, Back in the USSR: The True Story of Rock in Russia (Winchester: Faber and Faber, 1988).
24 One exception is Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, 158-237.
25 Sabrina P. Ramet, “Americanization, Anti-Americanism, and Commercial Aggression against Culture:
An Introduction,” in Sabrina P. Ramet and Gordana P. Crnkovic eds., KAZAAM! SPLAT! PLOOF! The
American Impact on European Popular Culture since 1945 (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
Inc., 2003), 3-8; and Rob Kroes, “American Mass Culture and European Youth Culture,” in Axel Schildt
and Detlef Siegfried eds., Between Marx and Coca-Cola: Youth Cultures in Changing European Societies,
1960-1980 (New York: Berghan Books, 2006), 82-105. For a non-European example, see Eckhardt
Derschmidt, “The Disappearance of the Jazu-Kissa: Some Considerations about Japanese ‘Jazz-Cafés’ and
Jazz-Listeners,” in Sepp Linhart and Savine Frühstück eds., The Culture of Japan as Seen through Its
Leisure (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), 285-302.
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studies, which has traditionally privileged the Stalin years and material consumption.26
However, recent works by Susan Reid, David Crowley, György Péteri, and others help
open the curtain on consumption, particularly of material goods, in socialist settings
during the 1950s and 1960s. Building on their insights, which show how the post-Stalin
Soviet Bloc governments endeavored to manage material consumption as a means of
competing with the US and finding a “socialist” and “modern” mode of consumption, I
suggest that something similar occurred in cultural consumption.27 Just as the American
version of modernity centers on pursuing happiness through a culture of individualized
consumption, my analysis of state-sponsored popular culture for young people
illuminates the Khrushchev Kremlin’s efforts to build a socialist version of a modern
consumer society, and therefore a particularly Soviet “multiple modernity.”28 The post-
26 See Jukka Gronow, Caviar with Champagne: Common Luxury and the Ideals of the Good Life in Stalin’s
Russia (Berg: New York, 2003); Hessler, A Social History of Soviet Trade; Sheila Fitzpatrick, “‘Middle-
class Values’ and Soviet Life in the 1930s,” in Terry L. Thompson and Richard Sheldon eds., Soviet
Society and Culture: Essays in Honor of Vera S. Dunham (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 20-38; and
Vera S. Dunham, In Stalin’s Time: Middleclass values in Soviet Fiction (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1976).
27 Susan E. Reid, “Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and the De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the
Soviet Union,” Slavic Review 61.2 (Summer 2002): 211-52; David Crowley, “Warsaw’s Shops, Stalinism
and the Thaw,” in Reid and David Crowley, eds. Style and Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in
Post-War Eastern Europe (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 25-48; Crowley and Reid, “Introduction: Pleasures in
Socialism,” in David Crowley and Susan E. Reid eds., Pleasures in Socialism: Leisure and Luxury in the
Eastern Bloc (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010), 3-52; and György Péteri, “The Occident
Within – or the Drive for Exceptionalism and Modernity,” Kritika 9.4 (Fall 2008): 929-37. For how other
Soviet Bloc states competed with western consumption, see Judd Stitziel, Fashioning Socialism: Clothing,
Politics and Consumer Culture in East Germany (Berg: New York, 2005), and Paulina Bren, “Mirror,
Mirror, on the Wall … Is the West the Fairest of Them All? Czechoslovak Normalization and Its
(Dis)Contents,” Kritika 9.4 (Fall 2008): 831-54.
28 On the concept of “multiple modernities,” meaning a polity that uses western Europe and the US as
referents for the traditional vision of modernity, while attempting to forge its own, unique path to the
future, see Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yitzak Sternberg, “Analyzing Our Time: A Sociological
Problématique,” in Eliezer Ben-Rafael with Yitzak Sternberg eds., Identity, Culture, and Globalization
(Boston: Brill, 2001), 3-17. For modernity and consumption, see Mike Featherstone, Consumer Culture
and Postmodernism (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2007). For more on modernity, see Arjun Appadurai,
Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1996).
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Stalin leadership perceived organized cultural recreation as especially important for
constructing a uniquely socialist vision of a consumerist modernity. This derived not only
from the inherently collective and culturally uplifting aspects of state-sponsored popular
culture but also from its potential to activate grassroots initiative, a vital marker that
differentiated socialist from capitalist modernity in the context of the Cold War’s cultural
competition. Nonetheless by tracing the evolution of organized cultural recreation from
1945 to 1968, my study reveals the obstacles posed to policy implementation by Party-
state institutions with different missions.29 In contrast to Stephen Lovell’s postulate that
consumerist market forces played an insignificant role in shaping official Soviet cultural
production before the late 1980s, I find wide-ranging tensions between ideology and
consumption within the system of state-sponsored popular culture already in the postwar
years.30 Setting the Soviet case within the broader literature on consumerism, this
dissertation emphasizes the role of the state in shaping consumption, a topic given short
shrift in models of consumption that emerge from analyzing western settings.31
29 On the significance of conflicts between different Soviet state institutions, see Kiril Tomoff, Creative
Union: The Professional Organization of Soviet Composers, 1939-1953 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2006), 1-10.
30 Lovell, The Russian Reading Revolution, 18.
31 For western historiography on consumption, see Paul Glennie, “Consumption within Historical Studies,”
in Daniel Miller, ed., Acknowledging Consumption: A Review of New Studies (New York: Routledge,
1995), 164-203; Grant McCracken, “The History of Consumption: A Literature Review and Consumer
Guide,” Journal of Consumer Policy 10 (June 1987): 139-66; Neil McKendrick, John Brewer and J. H.
Plumb, The Birth of a Consumer Society: The Commercialization of Eighteenth-Century England
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class
(New York, Pantheon Books, 1964). For interdisciplinary approaches, see Daniel Miller, Material Culture
and Mass Consumption (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987); Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday
Life, Steven F. Rendall trans. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Neva R. Goodwin, Frank
Ackerman, and David Kiron eds., The Consumer Society (Washington: Island Press, 1997); Kate Soper and
Frank Trentmann eds., Citizenship and Consumption (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); John
Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1958); Ragnar Nurske,
Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953);
and Tibor Scitovsky, The Joyless Economy: The Psychology of Human Satisfaction and Consumer
Dissatisfaction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).
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Likewise, my dissertation inquires into how young people behaved within the
cultural recreation network, shedding light on the potential for youth agency and room to
maneuver within official Soviet cultural settings. By speaking of youth agency, I do not
wish to convey the image of resistance and subversion, which fails to convince by
juxtaposing state and society in postulating an inherent rift between a genuine, everyday
culture and an official, state-managed one.32 Simultaneously, those scholars who treat the
USSR’s ideological apparatus as presenting only one legitimate version of the New
Soviet Person problematically assume a fully coherent Soviet ideology and discourse.33
The works of Anna Krylova and Kiril Tomoff, which point out that official discourse and
institutions lacked full cohesion and thereby left individuals with room to shape their own
subject positions, suggest a more fruitful analytical approach.34 My dissertation, informed
by their insights, underlines how young people maneuvered within official socialist
cultural settings. While restrained by the boundaries of this culture, youth negotiated with
32 Here, I draw on Lynne Viola, "Popular Resistance in the Stalinist 1930s: Soliloquy of a Devil’s
Advocate," Kritika 1.1 (Winter 2000): 45-70; Anna Krylova, “The Tenacious Liberal Subject in Soviet
Studies,” Kritika 1.1 (Winter 2000): 119-46; and Jochen Hellbeck, “Speaking Out: Languages of
Affirmation and Dissent in Stalinist Russia,” Kritika 1.1 (Winter 2000): 71-96.
33 For depictions of Soviet discourse as unified, see Jeffrey Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet
Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 3-18, and
Evgeny Dobrenko, “Socialism as Will and Representation, or What Legacy Are We Rejecting?,” Kritika
5.4 (Fall 2004): 675-708. For how this discourse produced New Soviet People, see Jochen Hellbeck,
Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), and
Igal Halfin, From Darkness to Light: Class, Consciousness, and Salvation in Revolutionary Russia
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000). My criticism is informed by: Anna Krylova, Soviet
Women in Combat: A History of Violence on the Eastern Front (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2010), 20-26; Choi Chatterjee and Karen Petrone, “Models of Selfhood and Subjectivity: The Soviet Case
in Historical Perspective,” Slavic Review 67.4 (2008): 967-86; Alexander Etkind, “Soviet Subjectivity:
Torture for the Sake of Salvation?” Kritika 6.1 (Winter 2005): 171-86; Malte Griesse, “Soviet
Subjectivities: Discourse, Self-Criticism, Imposture,” Kritika 9.3 (Summer 2008): 609-24; and Eric
Naiman, “On Soviet Subjects and the Scholars Who Make Them,” The Russian Review 60.3 (July 2001):
307-15.
34 See Krylova, Soviet Women in Combat, 20-26; ibid., "Identity, Agency, and the First Soviet Generation,"
in Lovell ed., Generations in Twentieth-Century Europe, 101-22; and Tomoff, Creative Union.
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authorities for pleasurable cultural consumption that satisfied their desires, particularly
during the Thaw. They exhibited and developed their agency–individual, self-directed
actions primarily motivated by personal interests and wants–regardless of whether or not
it fit officially prescribed models. Ordinary young people who did not seek to deviate
from the broad Soviet cultural field thus proved capable of shaping their environment in
minute ways to fit their interests. In doing so, these youth helped determine broader
historical processes.35
The multifaceted relationships between youth and the authorities contribute to
eliding the boundaries between the categories of “public” and “private.” Scholars such as
Vladimir Shlapentokh and more recently Kharkhordin have traditionally drawn sharp
lines between the public sphere, meaning everything associated with the Soviet state, and
the private sphere, referring to personal emotions and interests, pleasure, sociability,
friends, romance, family, and home.36 Lewis Siegelbaum and others, however, have
offered an alternative viewpoint, arguing for multiple and layered public and private
spheres in the Soviet contexts, with porous, shifting, and unstable boundaries.37
Supporting the latter perspective, my study brings to light the liminal spaces of club
35 This argument on youth agency shaping broader historical processes is informed by Lawrence Grossberg,
We Gotta Get Out of This Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture (New York: Routledge,
1992), 113-27. My understanding of agency, in addition to drawing on the works of Grossberg, Krylova,
and Tomoff, is most influenced by Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life. Steven F. Rendall
trans. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 29-42; and Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj
Žižek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (Verso: New York,
2000), 11-43.
36 Vladimir Shlapentokh, Public and Private Life of the Soviet People: Changing Values in Post-Stalin
Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), and Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in
Russia.
37 Lewis H. Siegelbaum, “Introduction: Mapping Private Spheres in the Soviet Context,” in Siegelbaum ed.,
Borders of Socialism, 1-21. For the public and private in the Thaw, see Deborah A. Field, Private Life and
Communist Morality in Khrushchev’s Russia (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2007), and Tromly, “Re-
Imagining the Soviet Intelligentsia.”
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events in the first postwar decades, where public and private life met and intersected.
Thus, “public” Party-state organs, in many cases quite deliberately, sponsored cultural
activities that encouraged the expression and development of what scholarship
traditionally ascribed to the private sphere: friendship, romance, pleasure, sociability, as
well as emotions and interests not directly related to communist construction. In fact,
youth communities, networks, and collectives, at least of that vast majority who did not
openly deviate from social norms, easily crossed the supposedly sharp divide between
public and private, having fun both at home and in clubs. Hence, activities traditionally
labeled public and private in many instances engaged in productive interactions that
served the goals of the Party-state leadership while enriching the lives of individual
citizens, a development often overlooked in the historiography on the USSR. In other
cases, particularly during campaigns for ideological militancy, the tension between the
masses of young people and the Soviet leadership proved more salient, placing club
officials and local-level Komsomol cadres in the unenviable position of negotiating the
vast gap between popular desires and top-level directives. Finally, an investigation of the
Soviet setting helps enrich the image of the public and private spheres developed from
scholarly work on capitalist democratic contexts by offering a case study where the state
fills the space traditionally occupied by the market in western settings.38
38 On consumption, see the introduction and contributions to Emma Casey and Lydia Martens eds., Gender
and Consumption: Domestic Cultures and the Commercialisation of Everyday Life (Ashgate: Burlington,
2007), and Victoria de Grazia and Ellen Furlough eds., The Sex of Things: Gender and Consumption in
Historical Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). On popular culture, see Jeremy
Gilbert and Ewan Pearson, Discographies: Dance Music, Culture, and the Politics of Sound (New York:
Routledge, 1999). For an extensive discussion of the theory on the “public sphere,” see Peter U. Hohendahl
and Marc Silberman, "Critical Theory, Public Sphere and Culture. Jurgen Habermas and His Critics," New
German Critique 16 (Winter 1979): 89-118.
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A Note on Sources
My project examines four interrelated issues. The first concerns the nature of
policy formation within central institutions most relevant to youth cultural recreation. For
this issue, the most informative data come from the federal archives in Moscow,
especially that of the Komsomol.39 There, I studied documents generated by the Central
Committee (Tsentral’nyi Komitet, TsK) Bureau of the Komsomol, the highest authority
in this organization, and the Komsomol Propaganda Department (Otdel propagandy i
agitatsii), charged with overseeing the realization of Komsomol cultural policy. I also
consulted the depository of the trade unions, which managed the trade union clubs, the
central places of urban mass cultural recreation.40 The Ministry of Culture (Ministerstvo
Kul’tury, MOC) also proved relevant, as this state bureaucracy helped shape the
guidelines for state-sponsored popular culture and directly managed a network of large
clubs across the USSR.41 Likewise, I mined the documents of the Party TsK, which
reveled top-level Party interventions and conflict mediation.42
By now, historians have realized that what happened in the Soviet Union cannot
be read simply from examining central proclamations, as policy execution frequently
clashed with federal intentions. Therefore, following Donald J. Raleigh’s call to engage
39 This archive is a branch of Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI,
Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History), fond (f., collection) M-1.
40 Its depository is in the Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF, State Archive of the
Russian Federation), f. R-5451.
41 Its documents are stored in the Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv literatury i iskusstva (RGALI, Russian
State Archive of Literature and Art), f. 2329.
42 For the years before 1953, see RGASPI, f. 17, opis’ (op.) 125. For post-1953 documents, see Rossiiskii
gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii (RGANI, Russian State Archive of Contemporary History), f. 5,
op. 34.
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in local studies, my second broad inquiry captures an aspect of the USSR’s geographic
diversity by a comparative investigation of the implementation of youth popular culture
policy at the regional and local levels, juxtaposing Moscow and Saratov.43 The latter, an
industrialized capital of a central Russian black earth oblast (province) located on the
Volga river, is representative of the lived experience of many young urbanites in the
Russian heartland. For each city, my approach involves examining the enactment of
youth popular culture policy by the local Komsomol, MOC, and trade union
organizations at the three levels of hierarchy within the Soviet system: the city level, the
neighborhood (raion)44 level, and in local enterprises and educational institutions.45
Along with exploring the citywide agencies, I chose one neighborhood in each city for in-
depth analysis. For Moscow, my dissertation explores the Krasnopresnenskii district, and
for Saratov, the Kirovskii district, both working-class neighborhoods with a number of
enterprises, colleges, and schools. The documents of several large enterprises and
universities in each city reveal policy enactment at the microlevel. The archival record
proved especially complete for the two universities central to my study, Moscow State
University (Moskovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, MGU), the flagship university of the
USSR, and Saratov State University (Saratovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, SGU), the
major university in Saratov oblast and one of the strongest regional universities in the
43 Donald J. Raleigh, “Introduction,” in Donald J. Raleigh ed., Provincial Landscapes: Local Dimensions of
Soviet Power, 1917-1953 (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 2001), 1-14.
44 The raion is referred to as neighborhood in cities, and as district in rural regions.
45 The Moscow Komsomol documents are in: Tsentral’nyi arkhiv obshchestvenno-politicheskoi istorii
Moskvy (TsAOPIM, Central Archive of Social-Political History of Moscow). The equivalent in Saratov is:
Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii Saratovskoi oblasti (GANISO, State Archive of Contemporary
History of Saratov Oblast). The Moscow MOC and trade union archives are stored in: Tsentral’nyi arkhiv
goroda Moskvy (TsAGM, Central Archive of the City of Moscow). For Saratov, see Gosudarstvennyi
arkhiv Saratovskoi oblasti (GASO, State Archive of Saratov Oblast).
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Soviet Union. A significant portion of the documents I tapped in both central and
regional archives had not previously been used by historians, enabling me to bring much
new primary source materials to the historical narrative.
The third broad inquiry concerns the depictions of, and disputes over, youth
organized cultural recreation policy in the official discourse. Tracing the evolution in this
rhetoric furthers our comprehension of the shifts in the official ways of thinking, talking
about, depicting, and understanding Soviet reality, which also played a powerful role in
constituting the worldviews and thus the subjectivities of young people. My dissertation
consults a range of Komsomol-managed and youth-oriented newspapers at the national
level, including the all-union Komsomol paper Komsomol’skaia pravda, and regional and
local papers in Moscow and Saratov.46 In addition, I rely on a variety of other relevant
public sources from these years, such as literary works, movies, musical pieces, radio
program transcriptions, and especially instruction booklets intended to guide officials in
managing state-sponsored popular culture.47
Finally, I seek to comprehend the widely varied responses of young people to the
Party-state’s popular culture policy. To deal with this topic, I draw on personal sources
such as published memoirs and diaries, and conducted a series of open-ended interviews
in Moscow and Saratov with fifty-five individuals in 2008 and 2009. My interviewees
46 I examine the Moscow Komsomol city committee organ Moskovskii komsomolets, the MGU paper
Moskovskii universitet, the Saratov Komsomol city committee paper called Molodoi Stalinets until
09/12/1956 and subsequently Zaria molodezhi, and the SGU paper, changed from Stalinets to Leninskii
put’ in January 1957. In analyzing press sources, I draw on Thomas C. Wolfe, Governing Soviet
Journalism: The Press and the Socialist Person after Stalin (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005),
33-7, and Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin!, 3-18.
47 These booklets range from 20 to over 400 pages, and usually constitute case studies of recommended
practices, whose promotion via publication by official presses gives them a strong stamp of legitimacy. For
how other scholars used such booklets, see Catriona Kelly, Refining Russia: Advice Literature, Polite
Culture, and Gender from Catherine to Yeltsin (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 312-93.
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include lower-level, mid-ranking, and top officials who participated in formulating and
enacting organized cultural recreation policy; youth cultural activists who engaged
extensively in state-sponsored popular culture; jazz musicians and their fans; and
ordinary young consumers of organized cultural recreation. These sources offer behind-
the-scenes insights on policy implementation. More than this, together with letters to the
press and reports on youth behavior, the interviews illuminate grassroots opinions on the
lived experience of organized cultural activities in Soviet clubs.
Each of these types of sources sheds light on different aspects of the Soviet
experience. Archives and official publications, which most clearly reveal the perspective
of officialdom, suffer from certain institutional biases.48 Oral history and memoirs
uncover everyday life, yet, like all memory sources, are inflected by the weight of time.49
By comparing the evidence from archival, published, and personal sources, my narrative
provides the fullest picture so far of state-sponsored youth popular culture in the period
from 1945 to 1968.
Chapter Summary
Chapter 1 gives an overview of state-sponsored youth popular culture in the
USSR from its early years to the immediate postwar period, 1917-46. Here, my study
48 A good discussion of the problems of Soviet archival documents is in Sarah Davies, Popular Opinion in
Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda and Dissent, 1934-1941 (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1997), 1-22.
49 In analyzing oral history interviews, I rely on Donald J. Raleigh, Russia’s Sputnik Generation: Soviet
Baby Boomers Talk about their Lives (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 10-12, and also
Wolfe, Governing Soviet Journalism, xiii-32. For the use of memoirs, see Krylova, Soviet Women in
Combat, 1-19, and Irina Paperno, “Personal Accounts of the Soviet Experience,” Kritika 3.4 (Fall 2002):
577-610. A work that presents a thoughtful balance of archival, published, and personal sources is Tromly,
“Re-Imagining the Soviet Intelligentsia,” 41-45.
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explains the nature and function of organized cultural recreation, and the tensions
between a hard-line and soft-line approach to this sphere.
The next two chapters illuminate the period of the anticosmopolitan campaign,
from 1947 to March 1953. Chapter 2 offers an in-depth look at the extreme escalation of
politicization in the officially recommended repertoires for club cultural activities, and
the consequences for noncontroversial cultural events. The third chapter traces the attack
on western music and dancing in the clubs, and the difficulties in fully implementing this
policy.
In chapter 4, I turn to the shifts in state-sponsored popular culture during the early
Thaw, 1953-56. This chapter illustrates how the pluralistic turn of the new leadership
impacted club activities in general, and western-style cultural forms in particular. Chapter
5 narrows in on Komsomol-managed youth clubs, spotlighting the impact of the novel
top-level encouragement of youth leadership and grassroots initiative in club activities.
Reacting to a perceived excess of youth initiative and western cultural influence,
the Khrushchev leadership briefly adopted a more militant cultural policy in 1957-58,
seeking to instill a Thaw-era version of culturedness, as the sixth chapter shows. Finally,
chapter 7 traces the shift to a more pluralistic approach to cultural recreation in the late
1950s and early 1960s, one that welcomed initiative from below and allowed a wider
range of western culture, despite opposition from hard-liners. Yet, in the mid-1960s, the
authorities turned again to militancy and suppressed youth autonomy, paving the way for
a growing gap between youth and the Soviet leadership.
Chapter 1
Ideology, Enlightenment, and Entertainment: State-Sponsored Youth Popular
Culture, 1917-46
A late 1945 Komsomol report on clubs in Moscow commended the fact that the
clubs “regularly show movies” and “hold evenings of youth leisure” (vechera otdykha
molodezhi), meaning youth-oriented events with dancing.50 In addition to such documents
meant for internal bureaucratic use, external Komsomol press rhetoric also praised fun
organized activities, such as dancing.51 Such official rhetorical statements may surprise
those familiar with the Stalinist leadership’s policy toward culture in the late 1940s and
early 1950s, which emphasized the need for a heavy ideological load and disparaged
nonpoliticized entertainment. However, the report and press article cited above do reflect
the Party-state’s approach to state-sponsored youth popular culture in the concluding
stages of the war and the immediate postwar period, lasting through the summer of
1946.52 During this time, the Kremlin followed a relatively permissive policy, and,
despite a stated preference for propaganda work in organized cultural activities, the
50 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 321, l. 57.
51 For example, “Za poleznyi i razumnyi otdykh,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, July 4, 1946. For the
significance of the difference between internal and external official discourse, see Donald J. Raleigh,
“Languages of Power: How the Saratov Bolsheviks Imagined Their Enemies,” Slavic Review 57.2
(Summer 1998): 320-49.
52 By using the term “Party-state,” I mean to refer not only to the government structures, but also to Soviet
social organizations formally independent of the state, but run by the Party, including the Komsomol, trade
unions, etc.
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authorities rarely censured events primarily aimed at satisfying young people’s desires
for fun.
Such an approach to cultural consumption for youth had its roots in the history of
state-sponsored popular culture in the early Soviet Union. The New Economic Policy
(NEP) years, 1922-28, had particular significance in determining the nature of, including
the lines of fracture within, this sphere of activities. These differences of opinion
regarding youth cultural activities formed part of a broader tension between an
ideologically militant, hard-line, and revolutionary vision of the path to the communist
future, versus a more tolerant, soft-line, and pluralistic effort to build a communist utopia.
In youth-oriented cultural activities, such fractures expressed themselves in debates over
how much youth agency should be permitted and over whether the Party-state should
focus on political-ideological work among youth, or satisfy their desire for entertainment,
including western popular culture. By the end of NEP, the militant position triumphed.
This led, on the one hand, to a period of close control by adult officials over youth
cultural activities, and on the other, to a stress on politics and ideology at the expense of
entertainment, at least in the first years after NEP. The first part of this chapter traces the
origins of state-sponsored popular culture for young people and its developments in the
NEP and prewar and wartime Stalin years, drawing largely on secondary sources. This
provides the historical setting for the second part of this chapter, which uses primary
sources to tell the story of state-sponsored popular culture during the final part of the war
and the first postwar year, from mid-1944 to mid-1946.
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The Roots of Soviet State-Sponsored Popular Culture
The antecedents of Soviet state-sponsored popular culture date back to the late
nineteenth century, when some Russian industrialists and progressive lower-level
officials, especially in government-funded sobriety societies, began to sponsor various
forms of popular culture for the urban population such as popular theater productions
with workers as amateur actors. They intended these offerings to promote what they saw
as healthy, appropriate, and modern leisure activities, instead of what they perceived as
the harmful working class tradition of drinking and fighting in taverns, or wasteful,
purposeless promenading on city streets. The educated, middle-class intelligentsia set up
popular theaters during those years as well, meant not only to supplant traditional leisure
forms, but also to inculcate “higher” cultural values and tastes among lower class
urbanites.53 Local governmental bodies and philanthropists likewise established a small
network of cultural institutions called People’s Houses (narodnye doma), intended for the
cultural “enlightenment” of the population.54 After the 1905 Revolution, autonomous
workers’ clubs sprang up in Russian urban areas, where more active and socially
ambitious workers gathered for cultural self-edification and elite forms of cultural
53 On popular theater, see E. Anthony Swift, Popular Theater and Society in Tsarist Russia (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2002) and Gary Thurston, The Popular Theatre Movement in Russia, 1862-
1919 (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998). For more context on Russian theater, see Louise
McReynolds, Russia at Play: Leisure Activities at the End of the Tsarist Era (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2003), 14-75; Patrick O’Meara, “‘All the World’s a Stage’: Aspects of the Historical Interplay of
Culture and Society with Myth and Mask in 18th- and Early 19th-Century Russia,” Kritika 7.3 (Summer
2006): 619-32; and Catriona Kelly, “A Stick with Two Ends, or, Misogyny in Popular Culture: A Case
Study of the Puppet Text ‘Petrushka,’” in Jane T. Costlow, Stephanie Sandler, and Judith Vowles eds.,
Sexuality and the Body in Russian Culture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 73-97.
54 G. G. Karpov and N. D. Sintsov, Klubnoe delo: Uchebnoe posobie (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1959),
13.
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entertainment, aided by intellectuals eager to assist them.55 Children and youth had fewer
opportunities for such organized entertainment, although liberal pedagogues did establish
several organizations that provided popular cultural activities for lower class young
people, funded by philanthropic support and a few local-level government bodies.56 A
few individuals even made efforts to offer fun recreational activities to juveniles
convicted for crimes as a means of socializing them into society.57
These initiatives, for both adults and youth, resulted from two key factors. One,
the perceived need to spread the intelligentsia’s cultural values among the population and
thereby turn the urban “masses” into cultured and modern citizens, involved efforts to
inculcate appreciation of “appropriate” cultural products, to wipe out illiteracy, to ensure
good hygiene, to instill manners, and, in some cases, to arouse civic engagement. The
other motivator for organizing cultural recreation centered on blaming problematic social
conditions such as the lack of popular cultural options for criminality. This represented a
novel approach advanced by liberal, progressive social reformers, who argued for a more
humane, less coercive means of social control. However, most imperial Russian officials,
demonstrating their conservative bent, dismissed these proposals, preferring to use
punitive methods of dealing with crime, and expressing concern that intelligentsia-
sponsored popular cultural activities might spread subversive ideas. The latter fear seems
to have had some legitimacy in regard to workers’ clubs, where the socialist
55 Victoria E. Bonnell, Roots of Rebellion: Worker’s Politics and Organizations in St. Petersburg and
Moscow, 1900-1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 328-34; and Karpov and Sintsov,
Klubnoe delo, 14.
56 V. A. Berezina ed. Dopolnitel’noe (vneshkol’noe) obrazovanie detei Rossii (Moscow: “Dialog kul’tur,”
2008), 10-11.
57 Joan Neuberger, Hooliganism: Crime, Culture, and Power in St. Petersburg, 1900-1914 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1993), 205-09.
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intelligentsia, including Bolsheviks, engaged with workers to pursue not only cultural
recreation and enlightenment but also undercover political activities.58 As a consequence
of such wariness by officials, efforts to sponsor popular culture for the population proved
relatively small-scale in imperial Russia, and did not make a deep impact on everyday
life.
The popular cultural activities that did exist mirrored and likely drew inspiration
from parallel institutions in western Europe during these years. If, during the eighteenth
century, British authorities sought to suppress the popular culture of the poor without
offering any enjoyable cultural recreation to replace it, the situation changed by the
nineteenth century.59 For example, Peter Bailey demonstrates that a group of committed
middle-class social reformers sought to offer what they perceived as fun, healthy, and
“rational” leisure to workers in Working Men’s clubs based on middle-class culture as a
means of weaning them away from traditional worker sociability in bars.60 During that
same period, as the concept of adolescence or youthhood as a separate stage between
childhood and adulthood spread among the middle class and later the working class in
western Europe and the United States, social activists promoted the need for organized
leisure activities for adolescents, founding organizations such as the Boy and Girl
58 Bonnell, Roots of Rebellion, 328-34.
59 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964), 401-08.
60 Peter Bailey, Leisure and Class in Victorian England: Rational Recreation and the Contest for Control,
1830-1885 (Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1978), 169-82. Also see Peter Borsay, A History of
Leisure: The British Experience since 1500 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). For worker leisure in
the US in the early twentieth century, see Gary Cross, Time and Money: The Making of Consumer Culture
(New York: Routledge, 1993).
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Scouts.61 The parallels between the efforts of Russian and western liberal reformers
during these years hint at broader congruencies between the visions of the ideal future
held by each. Both wanted all of society to share their middle-class cultural values and
engage in “rational” and “modern” leisure, instead of traditional free-time activities,
especially lower class ones, which they considered not only wasteful, but also conducive
to criminality. Yet these initiatives, lacking mass popular support or substantive
government backing, made only small inroads into the lives of the population in either
western countries or imperial Russia, though significantly more in the former than the
latter.
State-Sponsored Popular Culture, 1917-44
For Russia, the situation changed drastically after the October Revolution, when
the Bolsheviks built on their previous involvement in workers’ clubs to make state-
sponsored popular culture a major sphere of activity for the Soviet Party-state.
Combining propaganda with cultural recreation, these efforts had several goals: to instill
communist ideology, Party loyalty, Soviet patriotism, and concern with production in the
population; to transform everyday life into an appropriately socialist one, especially in
the sphere of culture, often termed cultural “enlightenment”; finally, to satisfy popular
cultural consumption desires for engaging, fun entertainment. Yet the stress placed on
each of these aims, and the methods used to achieve them, evolved significantly over the
history of the Soviet Union. In turn, controversies surrounding government-managed
61 Steven Mintz, Huck’s Raft: A History of American Childhood (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2004), 185-94; John R. Gillis, Youth and History: Tradition and Change in European Age Relations, 1770-
Present (New York: Academic Press Inc., 1981), 37-131; and John Springhall, Coming of Age:
Adolescence in Britain, 1860-1960 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillian Ltd, 1986).
28
cultural activities, particularly visible in the NEP years, laid bare fundamental tensions at
the heart of the communist project.
During the Civil War, the Party leadership emphasized the need for this field of
activity to instill communist ideology and Party loyalty. The clearest example of this
focus lies in Bolshevik celebrations, which, as James von Geldern argued, the state
intended to serve primarily propaganda purposes. These celebrations combined new
elements such as worker demonstrations with traditional fairground festivities, and used
customary genres of drama and spectacle to try to convey Bolshevik principles and to
convince the population to espouse them, though with only intermittent success, as von
Geldern highlighted.62 Nonetheless, with its resources devoted to winning the war, the
Party overall gave relatively little attention to the sphere of cultural recreation. This
opened up space for more autonomous grassroots initiatives. Individual factory councils
opened up workers’ clubs that strove both to convey official propaganda messages, and
also to transform the everyday lives of workers by creating innovative social and cultural
forms that reflected postrevolutionary society.63 Such clubs cooperated closely with an
organization known as the Proletkult (Proletarskie kulturno-prosvetitelnye organizatsii,
proletarian cultural-enlightenment organizations). This institution, which sprang up soon
after the October Revolution, had the mission of forging a uniquely “proletarian” culture
via worker amateur arts (khudozhestvennaia samodeiatel’nost’), which included music-
making, theater productions, and so on. The Proletkult had a considerably degree of
62 James Von Geldern, Bolshevik Festivals, 1917-1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993),
and Richard Stites, “Festival and Revolution: The Role of Public Spectacle in Russia, 1917-1918,” in John
W. Strong ed., Essays on Revolutionary Culture and Stalinism (Columbus: Slavica Publishers, 1990), 9-28.
63 Gabriele Gorzka, “Proletarian Culture in Practice: Workers’ clubs, 1917-1921,” in Strong ed., Essays on
Revolutionary Culture and Stalinism, 29-55. There were also some efforts made to establish village clubs:
O. Tumim, Zhenskii klub v derevne (Petrograd: “Nachatki znanii,” 1919), 19-31.
29
independence from official state institutions and relied heavily on activism from below,
although it cooperated closely with the Party.64 The Komsomol also established a
network of youth-oriented clubs, promoting both political propaganda as well as cultural
and social transformation.65 Throughout the Civil War, the Komsomol clubs, workers’
clubs, and the Proletkult experienced growing Party control and centralization, with the
accompanying marginalization of grassroots initiative and spontaneity.
The end of the Civil War and the transition to the NEP witnessed the growing
coalescence of these disparate activities into a mass cultural network that provided state-
sponsored popular culture for the population, one which would largely survive
throughout the rest of the Soviet period. This field of activities generally took place under
the oversight of trade unions and the Ministry of Culture (Ministerstvo Kul’tury, MOC),
which together constituted the Party-state cultural bureaucracy in charge of the sphere of
state-sponsored popular culture. This organized cultural recreation was largely based in
mass cultural institutions generically known as clubs. Urban clubs belonged, for the most
part, to trade unions associated with and funded by specific enterprises or economic
sectors. The MOC also controlled a network of clubs, with a MOC club institution
located in the capitals of most semi-rural and rural districts, as well as in towns and cities.
They had the mission of providing support and oversight functions for state-sponsored
64 Lynn Mally, Culture of the Future: The Proletkult Movement in Revolutionary Russia (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1990). For more on the Proletkult and its relationship to the Commissariat of
Enlightenment, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Commissariat of Enlightenment: Soviet Organization of the
Education and the Arts under Lunacharsky, October 1917-1921 (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1970), 89-109. For the Proletkult’s grassroots actions in one Soviet region, see Donald J. Raleigh,
Experiencing Russia’s Civil War: Politics, Society, and Revolutionary Culture in Saratov, 1917-1922
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 208-15.
65 Isabel A. Tirado, Young Guard! The Communist Youth League, Petrograd 1917-1920 (New York:
Greenwood Press, 1988), 117-43.
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popular culture in the locale, in addition to serving the population directly. The clubs
provided the space, resources, and equipment needed for propaganda, enlightenment
activities, and cultural entertainment, as well as cultural workers who managed these
activities. Unlike theaters and concert halls, which focused on producing professional
performances by the artistic intelligentsia, clubs aimed to promote amateurism and mass
participation in cultural activities. Clubs ranged from large, well-funded urban
establishments, frequently called palaces of culture or houses of culture, to smaller,
typically one-story buildings of a few rooms with a concert/movie hall referred to simply
as clubs, down to one-room “red corners” (krasnye ugolki), in dormitories, factory shops,
and large apartment buildings, run by volunteers or housing supervisors. Villages
typically had smaller, poorly supplied clubs, or even tiny reading huts (izba-chital’nia),
typically owned either by the MOC or kolkhozy (collective farms), though trade unions
also owned some semi-rural clubs.66 A club manager ran each club, hiring staff, planning
and managing events, and balancing the budget, with assistance from a volunteer club
council (pravlenie kluba), and oversight by officials from the trade union, enterprise,
MOC, and local Party cells. Such clubs hosted amateur art circles and evening events, the
major forms of state-sponsored popular culture.
Parks of culture and leisure (parki kul’tury i otdykha, PKOs) played a significant
secondary role in the cultural life of young people in cities from late spring to early fall.
PKOs provided entertainment that included stages for concerts by professional and
66 For an example of a large urban house of culture, see a 1947 report on the Gor’kii House of Culture,
owned by the bread-making trade union. This two-story building had a large hall for 1,000 people, a small
one for 300 people, one room for relaxation (komnata otdykha), three rooms for amateur art collectives, a
library, a foyer, a sports hall, and several secondary rooms such as a buffet. Its inventory includes a variety
of music, scene, movie, radio, and other cultural equipment, sufficient for its purpose, according to the
archival report. Fifty-six people worked in the House of Culture at the time, and its 1947 budget was
2,900,000 rubles. See TsAGM, f. 44, op. 1, d. ll. 24-25.
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amateur artists, dance floors, and room for mass celebrations, but did not host amateur art
circles on their own. Large enterprises and universities occasionally held state-sponsored
popular culture in workshops and lecture halls on a small scale, often managed by local
trade union cultural officials.
Amateur art circles consisted of amateur participants, mostly youth, who
voluntarily gathered together on a regular basis in a club or red corner to learn, practice,
and perform music, acting, dancing, and other artistic activities, usually with no fee
required. Participation in an amateur art circle, especially one that regularly put on shows,
counted as a lower-level social service on a Komsomol member’s official file, but did not
have nearly the same political value as giving lectures or exhorting voters to vote, and
thus drew youth interested in the arts rather than simply politically ambitious ones. In
some instances, depending on the officials in charge and the quality of the amateur art
circle’s performance, membership in a circle resulted in various benefits such as time off
work or delays for final exams; the better-quality circles, especially ones that advanced to
higher levels in amateur art competitions, occasionally had opportunities for state-
sponsored trips to perform their pieces around the Soviet Union. Each circle had a leader
with a variable degree of expertise in the relevant art form. The cultural organization
hosting the amateur art circle solicited volunteers to serve as amateur art circle leaders,
and many artists chose to offer their skills for free, sometimes based on their enthusiasm
for the art form, or to get credit for volunteer work, or for young graduates from art
programs to help build up their resume. In other cases, clubs–especially the wealthier
establishments such as houses of culture–paid for qualified professionals to lead the
circles. For the cultural institution, amateur art circles represented a necessary part of its
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function, as demanded in its by-laws, yearly plan, and higher-up officials. Club managers
had responsibility for establishing amateur art circles, finding leaders for them, providing
space for the circles to practice and instruments if needed, and serving as stages for
performances by amateur art circles, with the high-quality circles helping to fill club
coffers and increase the club’s prestige. Such quality amateur art circles frequently
performed in other venues besides their home institution, such as PKOs, other clubs,
theaters, concert halls, libraries, and movie theaters, as well as took part in various
official celebrations. Annual reports from clubs sometimes included the nuumber of
participants in amateur art circles, the type and number of circles, and how many shows
the circles put on, indicating that these served as key quantitative indicators that those in
charge used to evaluate the club’s work on amateur art. For qualitative evaluation, reports
often listed the names of pieces performed, and occasionally gave brief descriptions of
shows and concerts, and backgrounds of circle directors.67
Amateur art collectives frequently played at events called “evenings” (vechera).
This broad term encompassed events held in clubs and PKOs for all sorts of purposes,
from honoring the best workers, to meeting with elections candidates, celebrating
communist holidays, giving concerts, or dancing. To be admitted required either an
invitation or purchasing a ticket, depending on the event. In general, evenings had two
parts, the first more focused on politics and ideology, and the second on entertainment.
Before the event officially began, clubs sometimes organized entertainment in the foyer,
such as games or music. The evening typically kicked off with a lecture, speech, or
ceremony. Following that, the more entertaining part usually began with a concert that
67 For examples of this, see annual reports from the Gor’kii House of Culture in Moscow: TsAGM, f. 44,
op. 1.
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often in some way related to the first part. Then, dancing went on late into the night, often
accompanied by an amateur  or professional music group or a gramophone. Notably,
many lectures, discussions, and speeches occurred without the second, more fun and
entertaining part afterward. Occasionally, evenings had only the entertaining, fun part.
Some evenings specifically targeted young people. For these youth evenings
(molodezhnye vechera), local Komsomol cells frequently assisted the club administration
in the planning, organization, publicity, and ticket distribution, helping give a youth-
oriented stamp to the event.
As these forms of Soviet organized cultural recreation emerged during NEP, the
Party turned its attention from wartime imperatives to determining what a truly socialist
society should look like. Although Party leaders, ideologists, mid-ranking officials, and
the rank-and-file agreed on the ideal of a communist future, they disagreed on the best
path to reach this goal, leading to widespread debates in the context of the relatively
pluralistic, open environment of NEP. Party members had a range of different viewpoints
on the issues of the day, but eventually two positions coalesced on the appropriate way of
managing Soviet society and building communism, associated with the Right and the Left
factions within the Party. The Left faction, most closely linked with L. D. Trotsky,
favored a hard-line, militant path, with a rapid, coercive transition to communism, led by
an ideologically conscious vanguard that, regardless of the desires of the population,
forcefully shaped them into model communists. In contrast, the soft-line, pluralistic Right
faction, with N. B. Bukharin its most prominent representative, supported a slower,
gradual path to the same “bright socialist future,” one that relied more heavily on
persuasion over coercion, seeking to appeal to popular desires and elicit initiative from
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below as a means of achieving communism with broad-based support. Although these
tensions came to the fore in the NEP, conflicts between the Right and Left positions date
back to disagreements within the prerevolutionary Bolshevik Party, such as whether to
depend on an ideologically conscious but small revolutionary vanguard, or trust in broad-
based worker grassroots spontaneity and a more peaceful transfer of power.68
While some Party officials consistently favored either soft- or hard-line policies,
most stood closer to the center of the Soviet political-ideological spectrum. They shifted
from favoring either the Left or Right approach depending on the evolution of their
personal ideological perspective, the course pursued by the leadership, and the general
political, social, and economic situation in the USSR and abroad. Moreover, their
association with the Right and Left factions evolved over time not only owing to shifting
conditions but also to their tactical needs in competitions for power and influence, as well
as changing institutional positions and professional affiliations. As a consequence, the
Right and Left factions in the Party during NEP did not constitute fundamental, static
ideological-political camps, but rather loose, diverse, in-flux associations driven by both
ideology and power politics. These factions evolved in response to internal and external
developments, but maintained the basic difference between an ideologically militant or
pluralistic approach to constructing communism and shaping policy.69
68 For an in-depth insight into this issue, see the following discussion: Anna Krylova, “Beyond the
Spontaneity-Consciousness Paradigm: ‘Class Instinct’ as a Promising Category of Historical Analysis,”
Slavic Review 62.1 (Spring 2003): 1-23; Reginald E. Zelnik, “A Paradigm Lost? Response to Anna
Krylova,” Slavic Review 62.1 (Spring 2003): 24-33; Igal Halfin, “Between Instinct and Mind: The
Bolshevik View of the Proletarian Self,” Slavic Review 62.1 (Spring 2003): 34-40; and Leopold H.
Haimson, “Lenin’s Revolutionary Career Revisited: Some Observations on Recent Discussions,” Kritika
5.1 (Winter 2004): 55-80.
69 For ideological-political conflicts between the Right and the Left in the NEP see, for example, Lewis H.
Siegelbaum, Soviet State and Society Between the Revolutions, 1918-1929 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), 135-223. For the relationship between such conflicts and youth, see Michael
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The difference between the Right and Left found its reflection in the sphere of
state-sponsored popular culture, which became one of the battlefields in the struggle for
hegemony between these two visions of what constituted the best path to communism.
One principal conflict centered on whether officially-managed cultural activities need to
carry a heavy ideological load and emphasize political propaganda or focus on appealing
to the population by satisfying desires for entertainment. Clearly exemplifying that Party
factions did not constitute a cohesive camp, some officials who believed in a militant,
revolutionary path to communism expressed skepticism over devoting resources to state-
sponsored popular culture at all, while others on the Left strongly advocated for this field
of activities. Regardless of the extent of their support for government-organized cultural
events, Leftist-oriented officials held that state-sponsored popular culture needed to
primarily serve as a “transmission belt” for Marxism-Leninism, Soviet patriotism, and
Party loyalty. A more distant, secondary goal involved inculcating kul’turnost’ or
culturedness, meaning normative social and cultural values such as literacy, good
hygiene, appropriate manners, and, at least for those who sought upward social mobility,
appreciation of officially-approved cultural consumption. In presenting these qualities as
laudatory for the New Soviet Woman and Man, the drive for culturedness endeavored to
build the communist modernity, closely resembled the goals of many members of the
reformist prerevolutionary intelligentsia. It demonstrates the influence of these
antecedents on Soviet state-organized cultural recreation. At the same time, this drive had
similarities to the contemporaneous efforts by social reformers and even government
David-Fox, Revolution of the Mind: Higher Learning among the Bolsheviks, 1918-1929 (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1997), 83-132, and Igal Halfin, From Darkness to Light: Class, Consciousness, and
Salvation in Revolutionary Russia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 205-82.
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officials in western Europe and North America to instill literacy, hygiene, manners, and
cultural knowledge among their populations.70
Those officials and activists closer to the Right tended to support state-sponsored
popular culture with little reservation, agreeing on the necessity of devoting energy and
resources to this sphere. As for its content, their soft-line, pluralistic approach stressed the
need to satisfy the population’s desires for engaging and entertaining cultural activities,
with cultural enlightenment secondary, and political-ideological education last. They
suggested that appealing to popular desires would lead to organized cultural recreation
functioning as a more effective guide to communism, and emphasized culture over
politics when seeking to instill beliefs and values.71 Although many militant young
Komsomol activists tended to align themselves with the former perspective, many
ordinary young people preferred the latter.
The question of the extent to which foreign cultural influence had a place in
Soviet state-sponsored popular culture constituted an important element in the debate
over whether to emphasize politics and ideology or satisfy popular desires. In the
culturally permissive environment of the NEP, nightclubs and restaurants owned by
Nepmen hosted western popular culture, such as jazz music and foxtrot dancing.
Condemned by the more militant as ideologically subversive incursions of “foreign
bourgeois” culture, such music received little censure from those advocating a more
pluralistic approach. The latter depicted it instead as modern, progressive music, linking
70 David L. Hoffman, Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917-41 (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2003), 8-9.
71 On the tensions between entertainment and propaganda in clubs, see John B. Hatch, “Hangouts and
Hangovers: State, Class and Culture in Moscow’s Workers’ Club Movement, 1925-1928,” The Russian
Review 53.1 (January 1994): 97-117. For such conflicts in sports, see Robert Edelman, Spartak Moscow: A
History of the People’s Team in the Workers’ State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 42-68.
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jazz to its origins in African-American culture and thereby legitimating this music by its
association with the lower classes. Soft-line officials pressed for permitting state-
managed cultural institutions to host jazz and foxtrot as a means of appealing to those
who would otherwise go to Nepmen-owned nightclubs, and thus fall out of the sphere of
Party-state influence. Indeed, while at first confined to elite intelligentsia circles, jazz
spread throughout the NEP to urban middle-class audiences and even, to a lesser extent,
workers.72 Many youth expressed fascination with such western popular culture, and
large segments of urban young people listened to American-style jazz, danced the foxtrot
and tango, and even adopted flapper fashions. Ideological militants exhibited particular
concerns over the impact of such “bourgeois culture” on the young, demanding that state-
sponsored popular culture remove western culture from its repertoire for youth, with only
modest success until the end of NEP.73
A closely related battle sprang up over the degree of agency and initiative that
ordinary citizens should have within state-owned popular cultural institutions, one that
directly mirrored broader debates over consciousness versus spontaneity. Those favoring
a more revolutionary, militant perspective believed that officially-organized cultural
activities needed close control from above by officials in the cultural bureaucracy and
members of the cultural intelligentsia such as professional artists, musicians, and writers.
Initiative from below was welcomed only to the extent that it explicitly fit the agenda of
72 On conflicts over jazz and western dancing, see S. Frederick Starr, Red and Hot: The Fate of Jazz in the
Soviet Union, 1917-1980 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 37-78, and Richard Stites, Russian
Popular Culture: Entertainment and Society since 1900 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992),
48-49.
73 Anne E. Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia: Enthusiasts, Bohemians, Delinquents (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2000), 116-38, and Gorsuch, “Flappers and Foxtrotters: Soviet Youth in the
‘Roaring Twenties,’” The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies (Pittsburgh: University
of Pittsburgh Press) 1102 (March 1994): 1-33.
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the Left for a rapid, revolutionary transition to communism, and especially when such
initiative responded to directions from above by Left-leaning authority figures. Indeed,
despite appeals from some militant-oriented cultural officials to forge a “truly proletarian
culture,” they systematically rejected cultural products that, despite coming from
workers, did not fit the definitions of a “truly proletarian culture” held by such officials.74
Other officials and activists, while far from immune to preconceptions of what a
proletarian culture needs to look like, advocated for the notion that more of the initiative
for and direction of government-managed cultural recreation should come from below
and respond to popular interests. Much support existed during NEP for the latter position,
as Lynn Mally demonstrated in her study of amateur theaters.75
For youth in particular, the issue of whether youth-oriented state-sponsored
popular culture should be decentralized, encourage youth agency, and respond to youth
desires, or be centralized and directed by adults from above, represented a point of
conflict throughout NEP. This struggle formed part of a broader tension over the differing
visions of the Right and Left on what defined and how to forge model New Soviet
Individuals, especially relevant to youth who were assigned the task of constructing the
future society.76 The Right viewpoint tended to express a greater deal of faith in young
74 Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1992), 16-36.
75 Lynn Mally, Revolutionary Acts: Amateur Theater and the Soviet State, 1917-1938 (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2000). For a similar argument on Soviet amateur cultural activities in general during the
early Soviet years, see K. G. Bogemskaia, “Vvedenie,” in K. G. Bogemskaia and L. P. Solntseva eds.,
Samodeiatel’noe khudozhestvennoe tvorchestvo v SSSR. Ocherki istorii, 1917-1932 gg. (St. Petersburg:
“Dmitrii Bulanin,” 2000), 10-23. For more on workers’ theater, see Richard Stourac and Kathleen
McCreery, Theatre as a Weapon: Workers’ Theatre in the Soviet Union, Germany and Britain, 1917-1934
(New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 3-76.
76 As expressed by V. I. Lenin: Uchitsia kommunizmu, kniga 1. V. I. Lenin, KPSS: O partiinom rukovodstve
komsomola (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1982), 41.
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people, with the belief that the natural instincts of the young would guide them to
communism, and thus called for offering youth more autonomy and inviting young
people to exhibit initiative in participating in governance, including by criticizing overly
bureaucratic local officials, though within limits. While agreeing on the need for young
people to show initiative, the Left position delimited such actions to the very narrow
category of direct pursuit of unambiguously revolutionary goals, such as grassroots
efforts at agitation in workers’ dormitories or disruption of religious services. Overall, the
Left insisted that young people needed to exhibit disciplined, conscious behavior that
closely followed the directives of the Party hierarchy, expressed much wariness of youth
autonomy, and strove to delimit the independence of the Komsomol and did not welcome
youth criticism of bureaucrats.77
In relation to state-sponsored popular culture, this debate took its most concrete
institutional shape over the issue of whether government-managed cultural activities for
young people would take place primarily in Komsomol clubs and theaters with direct
oversight by Komsomol cells, or clubs owned by trade unions and the MOC, managed by
adult officials.78 Struggles on the degree of youth autonomy and initiative proved closely
intertwined with ones focusing on the content of state-sponsored popular culture. In
plenty of cases, when cultural officials permitted young people to have a considerable
77 For conflicting NEP-era depictions of ideal youth, see Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia, 12-27.
78 On NEP-era Komsomol clubs and conflicts with trade union clubs, see ibid,, 41-78, and Hatch,
“Hangouts and Hangovers.” On youth theaters, see Mally, Revolutionary Acts, 109-45, and Mally, “Igraia
‘Novuiu Zhenshchinu’: Komsomolka kak aktrisa i stsenicheskii obraz v sovetskom molodezhnom teatre,”
in P. V. Romanov and E. R. Iarskaia-Smirnova eds., Sovetskaia sotsial’naia politika 1920-1930-kh godov:
Ideologiia i povsednevnost’ (Moscow: Variant, 2007), 296-320. For NEP-era instruction booklets casting
light on these issues, see S. Dolinskii, Klub molodezhi v den’ 1 maia (Moscow: “Novaia Moskva,” 1925);
S. Dmitrovskii, Mezhdunarodnyi iunosheskii den’ v klube (Kiev: “Proletarii,” 1925); Molodezh’ v
rabochem klube (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1927); and M. A. Rastopchina, Kak privlech’ v klub massu
(Moscow: Izdanie G. F. Mirimanova, 1925).
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degree of autonomy and take initiative in organizing cultural events, youth chose
entertainment-oriented events, such as dances, jazz concerts, plays with a minimum of
ideological content, or ones critical of conditions in the USSR. As a consequence, a
position promoting the need for greater control from above usually intertwined with
support for a focus on propaganda of politics and ideology in clubs. Tolerance for a
greater degree of youth autonomy in effect meant advocating the satisfaction of popular
desires through more entertainment-oriented organized cultural activities.
Finally, the question of how to deal with perceived juvenile “delinquency”
divided the more ideologically militant from those backing a more gradual, softer path to
communism. The Left position generally wanted to utilize more coercive means of
dealing with those labeled “delinquents,” including hooligans, thieves, and drunks. In
contradistinction, those sympathetic to a more pluralistic position promoted the offering
of fun cultural recreation to fill up leisure time as a means of combating “delinquency,”
calling it a more modern and effective approach.79 This debate, in turn, demonstrates
parallels between the pluralistic and tolerant bureaucrats and cultural workers in the early
Soviet Union, and the liberal social reformists of the late imperial period, highlighting
how novel ideas, largely rejected by the conservative tsarist regime, came to be
appropriated and enacted by some Soviet officials.
As Stalin took the reigns of power in 1928, defeating Trotsky, Bukharin, and all
other opponents, he put an end to NEP and called for a campaign of ideological
revivalism and an all-out effort to drive the Soviet Union toward socialism, which came
to be known as the Cultural Revolution. This era, 1928 to 1932, witnessed a decisive turn
79 Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia, 41-95, 139-66, and V pomoshch’ klubnomu rabotniku goroda i
derevni (Tula: Izdanie tulgubpolitprosveta, 1924), 9.
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by the Party-state toward a hard-line approach to government policy, including state-
sponsored popular culture. The Stalin leadership threw its support behind ideological
militants in all spheres of activity during this era, while enacting a series of reforms that
placed industry, agriculture, and cultural institutions under increasingly tight control by
the Kremlin.80 This resulted in the decisive settling of the NEP-era debate between the
ideologically militant and the pluralistic approach to state-sponsored popular culture in
favor of the former. Thus, throughout the Cultural Revolution, the Party-state
increasingly centralized organized cultural offerings for the masses, directing them from
above. Cultural institutions now carried a much heavier ideological load, and militant
ideologues strove to even liquidate light entertainment, censored as unacceptable
“kul’turnichestvo,” referring to nonideological, entertaining cultural activities.81 In
particular, a sustained campaign targeted western popular culture, with prominent figures
such as Maxim Gorky identifying jazz with “bourgeois decadence” such as eroticism,
80 For more on the Cultural Revolution, see Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front, 115-48, and for a somewhat
different take, Michael David-Fox, “What is Cultural Revolution?” The Russian Review 58.2 (April 1999):
181-201.
81 For centralization and guidance from above in the amateur theater of the Stalin years, see Mally,
Revolutionary Acts, 215-16. On Stalin-era trade union clubs, and particularly the censure of
kul’turnichestvo in the late 1920s, see Lewis H. Siegelbaum, “The Shaping of Soviet Workers’ Leisure:
Workers’ Clubs and Palaces of Culture in the 1930s," International Labor and Working class History 56
(October 1999): 78-92. The more ideological militant already disparaged kul’turnichestvo in the NEP: V
pomoshch’ klubnomu rabotniku goroda i derevni, 11. For more on the shifts in amateur music, see S. Iu.
Rumiantsev and A. P. Shul’pin, “Samodeiatel’noe tvorchestvo i ‘gosudarstvennaia’ kul’tura,” in K. G.
Bogemskaia ed., Samodeiatel’noe khudozhestvennoe tvorchestvo v SSSR. Ocherki istorii, 1930-1950 gg.
(Moscow: Gosudarstvennyi institut iskusstvoznaniia, 1995), 7-52. On festivals, see Karen Petrone, Life Has
Become More Joyous, Comrades: Celebrations in the Time of Stalin (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 2000); Choi Chatterjee, Celebrating Women: Gender, Festival Culture, and Bolshevik Ideology,
1910-1939 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 2002); Malte Rolfe, Sovetskie massovye prazdniki
(Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2009); Rolfe, “Constructing a Soviet Time: Bolshevik Festivals and Their Rivals
during the First Five-Year Plan. A Study of the Central Black Earth Region,” Kritika 1.3 (Summer 2000):
447-73; Rolfe, “A Hall of Mirrors: Sovietizing Culture under Stalinism,” Slavic Review 68.3 (Fall 2009):
601-30; and Rosalind Sartori, “Stalinism and Carnival: Organization and Aesthetics of Political Holidays,”
in Hans Günther ed., The Culture of the Stalin Period (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990), 41-77. On
movies, see Denise J. Youngblood, Movies for the Masses: Popular Cinema and Soviet Society in the
1920s (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
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drugs, and homosexuality.82 Youth occupied a major role in the discursive tropes
accompanying these policies, depicted as corrupted by the permissive spirit of the NEP
and requiring ideologically purified state-sponsored popular culture to transform them
into model young communist citizens. Moreover, in the context of a shift in
conceptualizing behavior as resulting from individual will rather than external factors
determined by society, official policy moved away from attributing youth misbehavior to
a lack of organized cultural recreation, and adopted a much more punitive method of
dealing with juvenile "delinquency."83 The authorities encouraged youth initiative in
state-sponsored popular culture only in the narrow, specific boundaries of promoting
ideologically militant goals set by the top leadership. This approach is most clearly
symbolized by the agitprop brigades that arose during 1929, peripatetic youth theater
groups that used didactic, propagandistic sketches to promote industrialization and
collectivization, including through the use of humiliating shaming rituals.84 In contrast,
no space remained for Komsomol-managed youth clubs in the sphere of state-sponsored
82 Starr, Red and Hot, 79-106, and Stites, Russian Popular Culture, 72-73. For a broader context of the
struggle over music in these years, see Amy Nelson, Music for the Revolution: Musicians and Power in
Early Soviet Russia (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004); Nelson, “The Struggle
for Proletarian Music: RAPM and the Cultural Revolution,” Slavic Review 59.1 (Spring 2000): 101-32; and
Anna Ferenc, “Music in the Socialist State,” in Catriona Kelly and David Shepherd eds., Russian Cultural
Studies: An Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 109-20.
83 On youth, see Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia, 116-38, 167-81; Gorsuch, “Flappers and
Foxtrotters”; Gorsuch, “‘Smashing Chairs at the Local Club’: Discipline, Disorder, and Soviet Youth,” in
Corinna Kuhr-Korolev ed., Sowjetjugend 1917-1941: Generation Zwischen Revolution und Resignation
(Essen: Klartext, 2001), 247-61; Eric Naiman, Sex in Public: The Incarnation of Early Soviet Ideology
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 250-88; Gabor T. Rittersporn, “Between Revolution and
Daily Routine: Youth and Violence in the Soviet Union in the Interwar Period,” in Kuhr-Korolev ed.,
Sowjetjugend 1917-1941, 63-82; and V. Kirov, Klub i byt: doklad na vsesoiuznom klubnom soveshchanii i
rezoliutsii po dokladu (Moscow, 1930). More broadly on the shift to personal responsibility see, for
example, Dan Healy, Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia: The Regulation of Sexual and Gender
Dissent (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 159-206.
84 Mally, Revolutionary Acts, 146-80.
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popular culture, with these organizations disbanded or absorbed by other cultural
recreation institutions.
By 1933-34, the Party-state increasingly stepped back from some of the more
ideologically militant policies in all fields, declaring that it achieved victory in the
struggle to transform Soviet society and infrastructure, making the intensity of the
Cultural Revolution unnecessary.85 For instance, the Stalinist leadership, in contrast to the
overwhelming emphasis on heavy industry of the early Stalin years, invested a bigger,
though still small, proportion of production resources into making consumer goods and
services. The upwardly mobile social strata of managers and educated professionals
represented the primary beneficiaries of this effort, which had a relatively minor impact
among the mass of the population owing to the extensive social dislocation brought about
by collectivization, industrialization, and urbanization.86 Nonetheless, this top-level
initiative intimates that, despite the decisive victory of the hard-line approach in the end
of the 1920s, the vision and methods advocated by the more soft-line Party cadres in the
NEP remained part of the possibilities of government policy.
For state-sponsored popular culture, the greater emphasis on satisfying
consumption desires meant offering substantially more opportunities for fun cultural
85 For the historiographic debate on whether this period was a retreat from a Marxist-Leninist vision of
communism, see David L. Hoffman, “Was There a ‘Great Retreat’ from Soviet Socialism? Stalinist Culture
Reconsidered,” Kritika 5.4 (Fall 2004): 651-74; Evgeny Dobrenko, “Socialism as Will and Representation,
or What Legacy Are We Rejecting?” Kritika 5.4 (Fall 2004): 675-708; Jeffrey Brooks, “Declassifying a
‘Classic,’” Kritika 5.4 (Fall 2004): 709-19; and Matthew E. Lenoe, “In Defense of Timasheff’s Great
Retreat,” Kritika 5.4 (Fall 2004): 721-30.
86 On consumption in the 1930s, see Jukka Gronow, Caviar with Champagne: Common Luxury and the
Ideals of the Good Life in Stalin’s Russia (Berg: New York, 2003); Julie Hessler, A Social History of Soviet
Trade: Trade Policy, Retail Practices, and Consumption, 1917–1953 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2004); Elena Osokina, Za fasadom “Stalinskogo izobilia”: Raspredelenie i rynok v snabzhenii
naselenia v gody industrializatsii, 1927-1941 (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998); and Sheila Fitzpatrick,
“‘Middle class Values’ and Soviet Life in the 1930s,” in Terry L. Thompson and Richard Sheldon eds.,
Soviet Society and Culture: Essays in Honor of Vera S. Dunham (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 20-38.
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entertainment. Embodying this turn, the number of clubs grew rapidly during the mid-
1930s. For example, between 1927 and 1932, the Soviet Union built 912 of the larger and
more expensive urban clubs, and 13,450 rural clubs. By comparison, from 1932 to 1937,
the number of urban clubs increased by 2,951 to a total of 8,054, and rural clubs by
30,646, to 72,862 altogether.87 Consequently, during the mid-1930s, the population had
many more opportunities to participate in state-sponsored popular culture activities.
Furthermore, while retaining a great deal of the heavily ideologized content
devoted to inculcating loyalty to the Party and Stalin, communist ideology, and
patriotism, the content of club events changed to emphasize more entertaining
performances that better satisfied the desires of the population. Clubs began to include
substantially more fun, light cultural entertainment among their plans, hosting dances,
concerts, and less ideologized plays than previously.88 In addition, significant
opportunities opened up in these cultural institutions for western popular culture such as
jazz and western dances. Soviet jazz musicians performed undiluted versions of the latest
American jazz compositions in the Soviet Union between 1932 and 1936. Millions of
people listened to and danced the foxtrot, tango, charleston, lindy-hop, and rumba to
jazzy music played both by amateur ensembles and professionals such as Alexander
Tsfasman and Leonid Utesov, the latter reputedly a particular favorite of Stalin. During
87 These numbers do not include the one-room “red corners” (krasnye ugolki) run largely by volunteer
labor. Note that these numbers, like all Soviet statistics, were probably artificially manipulated by lower-
level officials eager to inflate their accomplishments, as well as for the propaganda purpose of appearing to
improve the living conditions of the population. Still, as the proportion and nature of such manipulation in
all likelihood did not change over time, the shift in the reported numbers is indicative of actual changes at
the grassroots. See O. K. Makarova, Kul’turnoe stroitel’stvo SSSR: Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow:
Gosudarstvennoe statisticheskoe izdatel’stvo, 1956), 273.
88 Siegelbaum, "The Shaping of Soviet Workers’ Leisure.” On Stalinist cultural norms, see Hoffman,
Stalinist Values.
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the Great Purges, however, censure of western cultural influence in the context of a
foreign spy mania resulted in a clampdown on jazz. As a result, jazz ensembles, called
dzhazy, had to play a watered down, “Sovietized” version of jazz, where saxophones
could be featured only along with Russian folk instruments, with American-style jazz
tunes forbidden.89
Despite these shifts, a central element advocated by the ideological militants in
the NEP intensified during the mid-1930s: reliance on control from above rather than
appeal to initiative from below. Trade unions and the MOC retained control over youth-
oriented cultural activities in clubs and PKOs, with the Komsomol lacking an
institutional foothold in this sphere. At the same time, officials within these organizations
took steps to severely restrict the potential for the autonomy of the amateur participants in
music, theater, and dance circles, and had club managers directly plan club events,
demanding that these occasions hew strictly to accepted models. For instance, with the
end of the Cultural Revolution, professional artist unions received a much bigger role in
overseeing amateurs as part of the broader shift toward the authority of experts over
ideologues in all spheres of Soviet life. These cultural elites demanded that amateurs
strive to emulate professional standards, and closely supervised their performances,
instead of encouraging grassroots initiative and improvisation.90 This meant a
minimization of opportunities even for youth initiative that explicitly targeted
revolutionary goals, embodied by the Party-state’s turn against the agitprop brigades.
89 Starr, Red and Hot, 107-180, and Stites, Russian Popular Culture, 75-76.
90 A tendency best demonstrated by the professionalization of the Paitnitskii Choir. See Susannah
Lockwood Smith, “From Peasants to Professionals: The Socialist-Realist Transformation of a Russian Folk
Choir,” Kritika 3.3 (Summer 2002): 393-425.
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Despite their ideologically orthodox mission, these groups held too much potential for
social disruption and refused to submit to the control of the professional cultural
intelligentsia, resulting in the dispersal of such brigades in the summer of 1932.91
As a result of such policies, by the mid-1930s a cohesive, defined image of how
model young people should participate in state-sponsored popular culture came to the
fore: in a disciplined, obedient, and largely passive manner. On the one hand, with the
escalation of investment into state-sponsored popular culture in the mid-1930s, young
amateurs did receive substantially more opportunities to make music, perform in shows,
and dance on stage, while aid from professionals improved their artistry. On the other
hand, they had to consume what the clubs offered without having any substantial voice in
proposing innovations in club repertoires, though they might help the club management
organize events, with close supervision from above. All of this constituted part of a
broader shift in the image of the model young Soviet citizen in the mid-1930s, in which
official discourse directed young people to adhere fully to directives from above and to
follow in a disciplined manner the orders of the official hierarchy at all levels. They
needed to focus their efforts on studying and work, as the Stalinist leadership declared
that the Soviet Union had reached socialism in its 1936 Constitution and sought to
minimize socially disruptive activities.92 The only officially-approved space for youth
activism lay within closely defined boundaries, such as vigilance in uncovering spies and
traitors or volunteering to build Stalinist construction projects, where the initiating
91 See Mally, Revolutionary Acts, 146-212.
92 On the 1936 Constitution, see Sarah Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia: Terror, Propaganda,
and Dissent, 1934-1941 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 102-12.
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impulse came from above and served the needs of the higher levels of the government.93
Moreover, the government strongly promoted youth compliance by developing the
rhetorical trope that the population owed its “joyous” life to gifts granted by the Party and
particularly Stalin, as opposed to their individual efforts and initiative.94 Notably, in the
mid-1930s the image of the ideal child closely followed that of the youth, from a more
active, autonomous one in the NEP, to a passive, obedient one focusing their time on
studying.95
Along with the growth of centralized control and extension of further restrictions
on initiative from below, another policy associated with the Left Party faction in the NEP
remained in full force and even intensified during the mid-1930s, namely the ascription
of youth crime to individual will rather than social conditions. In the early 1930s, the
notion that juvenile “delinquency” resulted from “objective circumstances,” such as the
lack of organized cultural activities, increasingly lost out to the perception that crime
came from individual motivations, with young people who committed these acts seen by
more and more officials as “social incorrigibles.” Consequently, the regime enacted an
infamous decree to decrease the age of criminal responsibility for certain crimes to
93 Anna Krylova describes both the idealized image and the gaps in constructing such model communists in
her “Identity, Agency, and the First Soviet Generation,” in Stephen Lovell ed., Generations in Twentieth-
Century Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 101-22. Also see Peter Konecny, Builders and
Deserters: Students, State, and Community in Leningrad, 1917–1941 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1999), 229-57.
94 Jeffrey Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 83-105.
95 On children, see Catriona Kelly, Children’s World: Growing Up in Russia, 1890-1991 (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2007), 62-115.
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children as young as twelve in May 1935, embodying the Leftist approach of harsh,
coercive methods of dealing with juvenile misbehavior.96
World War II, the Great Patriotic War in Soviet parlance, brought tremendous
disruption to Soviet life, including state-sponsored popular culture.97 As the state
mobilized for total war, it directed resources away from clubs and other cultural venues.
Evolving to meet wartime needs, the cultural network emphasized wartime mobilization,
propaganda of Soviet patriotism and hatred of Nazis, and preparation of nurses and
technical specialists in courses held in clubs. Moreover, with the population focused on
supporting the military effort and dealing with the harsh living conditions of everyday
life, ordinary citizens had relatively little leisure time or energy for participating in
amateur music groups or attending cultural events.
Despite these obstacles, some opportunities existed for music-making and other
forms of entertainment. Frequently, this occurred on the basis of local initiatives by
committed cultural enthusiasts in the context of a general decentralization of the
previously rigid centralized controls over this sphere. Most prominent, concerts aimed at
military personnel enabled cultural entertainment to explicitly serve wartime needs. In
fact, the government loosened the limitations on jazz imposed during the years of the
Great Purges, as part of a broader wartime relaxation of late 1930s ideological
96 Paul Hagenloh, Stalin’s Police: Public Order and Mass Repression in the USSR, 1926-1941
(Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 328. Also
see Peter H. Solomon Jr., Soviet Criminal Justice under Stalin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), 153-229; and Peter H. Juviler, “Contradictions of Revolution: Juvenile Crime and Rehabilitation,” in
Abbott Gleason, Peter Kenez, and Richard Stites eds., Bolshevik Culture (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1985), 261-278.
97 For the Soviet experience of World War II, see Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World
War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); E.S.
Seniavskaia, Protivniki Rossii v voinakh XX veka: evolutsiia ‘‘obraza vraga’’ v soznanii armii i
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militancy.98 The Party-state now welcomed American-style jazz tunes, performed by
amateurs and professionals in clubs, PKOs, concert halls, radio broadcasts, and even at
the front, as a way of lifting the morale of the troops and populace as a whole, as well as
demonstrating the close relationship with wartime allies. Soviet jazz stars such as
Tsfasman and Utesov reached their former prominence with patriotically-themed
performances such as Utesov’s jazz program “Beat the Enemy.” New stars appeared,
most notably Adolph “Eddie” Rosner, a Polish-Jewish jazz musician who fled to the
USSR at the beginning of the war.99 The prevalence of state-sanctioned jazz
performances during the Great Patriotic War indicates that the Stalinist leadership did not
consider such music as inherently antithetical to Soviet patriotism, despite its patent
western connotations. Along with the loosening of ideological limitations on jazz and
other spheres of activity, official discourse in the wartime years opened up some space
for autonomous activities by young people, praising both youth and children as taking
initiatives at the grassroots to aid the war effort.100
98 For the general relaxation of controls during the war, see see Elena Zubkova, Russia after the War:
Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957, Hugh Ragsdale trans. and ed. (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe,
1998), 11-20.
Specifically for the loosening of reins in the sphere of culture, see Stites, Russian Popular Culture, 98-116.
99 See Starr, Red and Hot, 181-203; Stites, Russian Popular Culture, 98-116; and Karpov and Sintsov,
Klubnoe delo, 20.
100 On both youth and children, see Kelly, Children’s World, 115-19. For a case study of how the young
people in one regional university experienced the war, see S. L. Merzliakov, “Saratovskii gosudarstvennyi
universitet v gody voiny i mira (1941-1964 gg.)” (Kand. diss., Saratov State University, 2008).
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State-Sponsored Youth Popular Culture, 1944-46
During the concluding stages of the war and the immediate postwar period, mid-
1944 to mid-1946, the Soviet Union transitioned from a total war to a peace-time setting.
Despite the widespread expectations of a postwar relaxation, these years were
characterized by a continued mobilization of the citizenry in an extensive, rapid, and
exhausting reconstruction, with the state demanding strict discipline and self-sacrifice.
Although the Soviet people suffered appalling living conditions, including overcrowding
and widescale famine, the new, Fourth Five-Year Plan from 1946 to 1950 focused on
heavy industry and basic infrastructure such as roads and power plants instead of light
industry and housing stock. Additionally, the Stalin leadership made extensive
investments in military might. The Kremlin justified this course not only by stressing the
need to rebuild the country, but also to ensure that the USSR fully prepared itself for any
potential future wars. This occurred during the early stages of a breakdown of the
wartime alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States, which eventually led to
the struggle between the two superpowers for political and ideological dominance that we
now know as the Cold War.101
The Party-state mobilized young people to pursue its goals, enacting its agenda
through channels such as schools, universities, and especially the Komsomol, which had
the direct mission of helping the Party carry out its youth policies. Generally, those with
social ambitions such as becoming a Party member or government official, going to
101 For the postwar expectations for a relaxation, and the dashing of these expectations, see Zubkova,
Russia after the War, 31-39. For more on the harsh exactions of postwar reconstruction, see Jeffrey W.
Jones, Everyday Life and The "Reconstruction" Of Soviet Russia During and After The Great Patriotic
War, 1943-1948 (Bloomington: Slavica Publishers, 2008), and Donald Filtzer, “Standard of Living versus
Quality of Life: Struggling with the Urban Environment in Russia During the Early Years of Post-War
Reconstruction,” in Juliane Fürst ed., Late Stalinist Russia: Society between Reconstruction and
Reinvention (New York: Routledge, 2006), 81-102.
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college, or rising in rank at their workplace joined the Komsomol, as well as those with
an interest in organized collective activities. The Komsomol enrolled only 10 percent of
all Soviet youth in the mid-1930s, serving as a vanguard organization for activist youth.
However, the post-World War II witnessed a major drive for membership growth, as the
Party leadership now wanted the Komsomol to become a mass organization. Thus, by
1949 the Komsomol embraced 20 percent of Soviet youth, and by 1958, about half of all
young people joined. Belonging to the Komsomol meant paying dues, engaging in varied
volunteer work, and attending obligatory Komsomol meetings at primary cells, where
members discussed various organizational activities and policies and passed relevant
resolutions. Additionally, in a process loosely supervised by higher Komsomol officials,
members of each primary Komsomol organization elected their leaders at a special
conference, usually held each year. These election conferences also served as a forum to
report on the activities of the Komsomol cell and to discuss plans for the upcoming year.
Those elected formed the Komsomol committee for each cell, which had responsibility
for the daily management of its affairs. A Komsomol secretary led each cell, with other
committee members responsible for distinct spheres of Komsomol work, such as
propaganda, production, education, cultural events, sports, etc.
The Komsomol resembled the Party in its structure. Institutions where youth
worked or studied had primary cells to which select young people belonged. Larger
establishments, such as factories, colleges, and some collective farms, had several
internal levels of cells. Above the Komsomol cell in each institution were Komsomol
organizations at the raion, city, oblast, and, with the exception of Soviet Russia, republic
levels, with the lower levels all obligated to implement the directions of higher ones. The
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members of Komsomol committees at higher levels frequently belonged to the Party.
Above them all stood the central, all-union Komsomol administration in Moscow, with a
number of departments responsible for helping formulate and enact youth policy. High
Komsomol officials, such as heads of departments and the secretaries of oblast
Komsomol organizations, belonged to the Komsomol Central Committee, TsK, headed
by the top Komsomol leadership in the Komsomol TsK Bureau, in an arrangement
paralleling the Party TsK and its Politburo. N. A. Mikhailov served as the First Secretary
of the Komsomol from 1938 to 1952. The Komsomol held occasional congresses, which
determined the Komsomol’s broad agenda, with only one held between 1938 and 1952,
in 1949. Between the congresses, the most important rulings on Komsomol policy
originated from occasional Komsomol TsK plenums. Next in importance were decrees
issues by the Komsomol TsK Bureau and then the Komsomol TsK Secretariat. Each level
of the regional Komsomol hierarchy had to adopt the decrees enacted above, and also
passed separate resolutions relevant to its own needs. As a result, lower-level Komsomol
committees faced a torrent of decrees, necessitating ignoring or minimizing some in order
to conduct work on others. New top-level initiatives generally pushed previous ones into
the background, unless higher-level Komsomol committees stressed the need to
implement older resolutions through checking up on the work of lower-level cells and
through issuing decrees containing messages similar to the ones passed earlier.102
The war ravaged the Komsomol’s structural and financial cohesion, undermining
its ability to carry out its mission. Thousands of primary cells disappeared, along with
102 Ralph Talcott Fisher Jr., Pattern for Soviet Youth: A Study of the Congresses of the Komsomol, 1918-
1954 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 279-91; Allen Kassof, The Soviet Youth Program:
Regimentation and Rebellion (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 14-64; and A. A. Alekseeva,
Stroka v biografii (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2003), 17-18.
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cash from dues and the ability to enact the Party’s youth policy. Consequently, after the
war, in many regions the Komsomol existed in name only. For example, in 1949, the
Komsomol cells in Riazan oblast regularly failed to collect dues, rarely assembled, and in
many cases did not even elect leaders. It did not provide political education, organize
competitions at the workplace, or offer entertainment. Well aware of these problems, the
Komsomol TsK Bureau took a number of steps to solve them, most notably by launching
a widescale membership drive to reestablish its structure, finances, and ability to
influence Soviet young people.103
Along with efforts to strengthen its organizational capacity, the Komsomol strove
to enact the Party’s broader agenda. The Komsomol’s official discourse called on young
people to devote most of the small amount of free time left over after work or school, and
taking care of basic living needs, to the goals of reconstructing the country and preparing
for a potential war. This included rebuilding the physical infrastructure through volunteer
labor, reconstructing the human capital by voluntary self-education in academic subjects
and Marxism-Leninism, and conditioning the body via extensive participation in civil
defense training and athletics.104
As a result, the small proportion of the Party-state’s resources devoted to state-
organized recreation at that time went mostly into athletics. Even during the Great
Patriotic War, the Komsomol held a number of sport competitions, and helped prepare
dozens of thousands of young people to achieve the Ready for Labor and Defense (Gotov
103 On the Komsomol’s structural weakness, see Juliane Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Youth and
the Emergence of Mature Socialism, 1945-56 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 32-63.
104 For youth obligations to prepare for war under Stalin, see Anna Krylova, Soviet Women in Combat: A
History of Violence on the Eastern Front (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 35-59.
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k Trudu i Oborone, hereafter GTO) badge, which required a series of demanding physical
endurance trials meant to strengthen the body.105 After the war, athletics received even
more attention from the Party-state, now called on not only to train exemplary young
warriors, but also the workforce needed to rebuild the country, as well as to attain success
in international competitions to fit the USSR’s new superpower status. The Komsomol
TsK Bureau passed no less than four decrees on sports and physical culture in 1946, two
in 1947, and three in 1948. A case in point is a 1946 resolution that called for the
Komsomol, in cooperation with athletic organizations, to “organize the involvement of
wide segments of youth in volunteer sport associations and physical culture
collectives.”106 The needs of postwar reconstruction, mobilization for a potential war, and
superpower rivalry put the spotlight on athletics as the appropriate form of organized
recreation most conducive to these goals. Consequently, central Party-state bodies had
very little time and energy left for club activities during the immediate postwar years.
Besides the neglect from the Party-state, state-sponsored popular culture suffered
from extensive damage brought about by the war. If official statistics list 9,997 larger
urban and 108,035 smaller rural clubs in the USSR in 1941, for 1946 they give figures of
6,450 and 87,921 respectively.107 In Soviet Russia, the war closed 8,000 urban and rural
clubs.108 Even clubs in territories not occupied by the Axis powers suffered from a lack of
105 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 7, d. 11, ll. 15-17.
106 See RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 457, ll. 141-42. The other decrees for 1946 are: RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d.
415, ll. 3-5, and RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 431, ll. 2-3. For 1947, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 484, ll. 6-
13, and RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 506, ll. 4-6. For 1948, RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 548, ll. 1-2, 15-18, and
RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 579, ll. 6-8.
107 Makarova, Kul’turnoe stroitel’stvo SSSR, 273.
108 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 378, l. 2.
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basic supplies such as fuel and furniture that severely hampered their function.109 In other
cases, higher-priority sectors within the Soviet system displaced organized leisure
activities, as exemplified by army troops occupying more than a quarter of Moscow’s
clubs in 1943.110 Many military units continued to base themselves in the clubs after the
war, and those in charge of cultural life experienced difficulties in getting the clubs back,
as the army had much greater authority and prestige in the Party-state complex.111 The
government used clubs for other purposes as well. For example, the Chkalovsk oblast
Komsomol committee reported that “special hospitals” (spetsgospitalia) of imprisoned
Germans inhabited three trade union clubs in the fall of 1945.112 In 1948, an agricultural
enterprise utilized the Kirovograd city trade enterprise club as a warehouse, resisting
efforts to return the club to its original function.113
Yet even before the end of the war, the bureaucracies in charge of state-sponsored
popular culture sought to reestablish the cultural network. United under the All-Union
Central Council of Trade Unions (Vsesoiuznyi Tsentral’nyi Sovet Professional’nykh
Soiuzov, VTsSPS), trade unions controlled the large majority of urban clubs. The
Thirteenth VTsSPS plenum in March 1945 enacted a resolution that called on all trade
union organizations to “in the shortest time possible reconstruct, fully renovate, and
expand the network of cultural institutions.” As for the focus of such work, the VTsSPS
109 See a 1945 report on Moscow clubs, which indicates that earlier, the lack of fuel and furniture prevented
many clubs from functioning: RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 321, l. 57.
110 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 176, l. 1.
111 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 321, l. 56.
112 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 403, ll. 27-31.
113 “Skuchno molodezhi v Kirovograde,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, June 19, 1948.
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decree placed political and production concerns over cultural enlightenment, and did not
address worker desires for fun and entertainment. It did acknowledge the importance of
amateur arts for young people. Still, especially in comparison to later VTsSPS plenums,
the resolution largely ignored the young as a particular constituency and did not focus on
the Komsomol as an organization to cooperate with in organizing youth cultural
recreation.114 This lack of emphasis on youth issues or the need to cooperate with the
Komsomol signaled to the trade union club directors that they did not need to specifically
target young people in meeting the cultural needs of the population or elicit the
Komsomol’s participation in planning events.
Similar evidence emerges from the MOC. The 1944 proposed bylaws (proekt
polozheniia) for the MOC houses of culture stated that such institutions “be created in
every district administrative center for political enlightenment and cultural-mass work
among the residents of that center and to host mass cultural events.” The MOC listed the
five goals of its clubs. The first four dealt with distributing information on the war,
propagandizing Party policy, military knowledge, and Soviet patriotism. The last and, in
accordance with the structure of Soviet documents, least important, consisted of
developing culture and organizing cultural events. The bylaws detailed the obligations of
the house of culture manager, but failed to mention the need to work with youth or the
Komsomol.115
Nonetheless, already in the later years of the war, some Komsomol officials
attempted to increase cultural events directed specifically at young people. Thus, in May
114 GARF, f. R-5451, op 24, d. 278, ll. 7-17.
115 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 269, ll. 35-36.
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1943, a Saratov city Komsomol plenum noted the neglect of cultural work among youth,
admitted that Komsomol organizations did not cooperate with clubs and other cultural
institutions, and called for “decisive improvement” in this sphere.116 In the same year, the
Rostov city Komsomol reported on a local amateur music competition (smotr), while
Moscow’s Komsomol committees received criticism for failing to help organize cultural
activities for young people in Moscow clubs.117
The all-union Komsomol organization also attempted to augment cultural
opportunities for youth, in particular through the Propaganda Department, tasked with
managing state-sponsored popular culture directed at young people. O. P. Mishakova
headed this sector of the central Komsomol administration from 1938 to 1947.118 A
subdivision within the Propaganda department, the Cultural-Mass Desk (otdel kul’turno-
massovoi raboty), came up with a comprehensive proposal in 1944 to “decisively
liquidate the neglect of this sphere, and the dismissive attitude of Komsomol
organizations to it.” The document listed the need for specific reforms in the extant
network of cultural recreation: holding more events in clubs on science, literature, and the
Soviet Motherland; having activities specifically targeted for young people; organizing
more amateur arts circles and holding amateur arts competitions; teaching youth new
songs and dances; and taking collective trips to theaters, movies, concerts, art exhibits,
and discussing them afterward. Several points addressed the way to achieve these goals.
For example, the proposal called on training more entertainers (massoviki-zateiniki) and
116 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 117, l. 34.
117 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 117, l. 7, and RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 176, l. 1.
118 Alekseeva, Stroka v biografii, 55-56.
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amateur arts circle directors, printing more instruction booklets for Komsomol officials
responsible for organizing cultural activities, and having Komsomol’skaia pravda publish
articles on this field. The document also encouraged local Komsomol cells to take a more
active role by purchasing string instruments and accordions with money donated by their
members, and participating in factory clubs. The document expressed the need for
changes within the Komsomol structure itself, proposing that every primary-level
Komsomol committee make a member of the committee responsible for organizing state-
sponsored popular culture, and recommending that higher-level Komsomol committees
organize commissions for coordinating cultural work. Finally, it suggested that the
Komsomol should hold such events for youth in its own institutions. This would involve,
according to the document, establishing clubs under the control of the Komsomol in large
cities, and having oblast, city, and district-level Komsomol committees organize agitation
brigades, dance and song ensembles, amateur theater groups, and so on under its
management.119 All this added up to a quite ambitious program, demonstrating the desire
of the Komsomol Propaganda Department to expand the amount of organized cultural
activities for youth. The higher-ups in the Komsomol TsK seem to have fully rejected the
last series of proposals on having Komsomol organizations directly manage state-
sponsored youth popular culture, likely perceiving them as permitting youth too much
autonomy and initiative, and this was unacceptable to the Party leadership at the time.
Some other ideas, however, found top-level backing, as expressed by two front-
page editorials published a day apart in January 1945 in Komsomol’skaia pravda, one on
youth-oriented amateur arts and another on youth involvement in trade union clubs in
119 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 269, ll. 1-9.
59
factories. A close reading of these editorials, appearing in the national organ of the
Komsomol during the closing stage of the war, provides insight on the intentions of the
Komsomol leadership toward state-sponsored youth popular culture in the immediate
postwar years.
The editorial on trade union clubs, published on January 6, provided directions on
the appropriate interactions between clubs and young factory workers. It began with a
series of quotes from what the author claimed represented the answers of young workers
in one factory to a questionnaire on how they want their factory club to function. The
workers apparently stated that “the club should be a place where friends meet, where
people can talk about various topics of concern to them,” adding that the club should
serve as a second home, have a specific youth-oriented setting, and sponsor events
targeting young people. For instance, one young worker wanted more lectures about
“great Russian military leaders,” another requested literary evenings, a group of
Komsomol members desired more lectures on the international situation and on science
and technology, and, lastly, one worker asked for more amateur performances at youth
evenings. The author stressed the need for Komsomol committees to consult with their
members before working with club managers to plan events, since, as the questionnaire
supposedly shows, the Komsomol members themselves provided appropriate guidance
for successful and effective events. The editorial praised the Zuev club of the Moscow
tramway enterprise, which held several lectures allegedly “based on the requests of
youth,” such as “The Dynamo and How to Care for It,” “Electricity and Magnetism,” and
“Energy of the Future,” as an example of best practices. Youth, in the paper’s depiction,
“listened to these useful lectures with great interest.” Finally, the editorial criticized some
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club managers, claiming that they need to direct more of their efforts at youth, for
example, in ensuring that more young people get involved in amateur arts.120
This editorial, representative of many articles published in the press at this time
on youth involvement in the cultural network, presented a narrative of how young New
Soviet Men and Women should relate to clubs.121 The main topics of concern to such
youth consisted of lectures on the domestic and international political situation, on
Russian history, on science and technology, and literature, with amateur arts concerts last
and undoubtedly least on the inventory of model young people’s priorities. In claiming
that lectures on politics and science embodied the priorities of the mass of youth, the
newspaper is less reflective of actual youth desires than what, in the regime’s eyes, model
youth should have desired. The journalist depicted an idealized situation and looked
toward the hoped-for future when all young people behaved as New Soviet Individuals,
rather than depicting the actual situation on the ground in the here-and-now. This article,
then, embodies Socialist Realism, the Stalinist canonical style in rhetoric and cultural
production that presented the officially-prescribed model as the true reality, with the goal
of transforming the imagined ideal into the real by remaking the consciousness of the
population.122 Indeed, after a long day of work, and taking care of basic needs in the
120 “Priblizit’ klub k zavodskoi molodezhi!”Komsomol’skaia pravda, January 6, 1945.
121 For other articles, see “Komsomol’tsy sela Tatishchevo,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, January 6, 1945; “Za
poleznyi i razumnyi otdykh,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, July 4, 1946; and “Skuchno molodezhi v
Kirovograde,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, June 19, 1948.
122 For more on Socialist Realism, see Jeffrey Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture
from Revolution to Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Katerina Clark, The Soviet
Novel: History as Ritual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981); Deming Brown, Soviet Russian
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harsh postwar environment, it seems far-fetched to claim that the typical young worker
really wanted to listen to a lecture on “Electricity and Magnetism.” As this chapter will
later show, such topics, while undoubtedly interesting for a small minority, did not satisfy
the majority of youth. Instead, in depicting youth as fascinated with these topics, this and
similar articles demonstrated how the socially engaged and ambitious young people who
regularly perused the youth press needed to believe and behave in order to advance
within the Soviet system.
Simultaneously, this editorial served as a signal to the leaders of local, city, and
oblast Komsomol committees of what they needed to focus on in organizing events for
young people at clubs, privileging political propaganda and productivist concerns aimed
at fulfilling the Fourth Five-Year Plan over entertainment. A report to the Komsomol
TsK in the fall of 1945 from the Cultural-Mass Desk on the problems in trade union club
work provides further support for this interpretation. The document complains that most
clubs failed to provide laborers with information on domestic and international political
events, discussions of the Soviet Constitution, lectures on the Motherland, science,
technology, and, last on the list, art and literature.123 Although after an extensive
discussion of these issues, the note dealt with other problems with clubs as well, it placed
political propaganda on the pedestal as the primary focus of Komsomol work in state-
sponsored popular culture.
The second editorial in Komsomol’skaia pravda, published the next day,
spotlighted the Komsomol’s role in amateur arts. Stating that youth constitute the
majority of participants in amateur arts circles, the editorial insisted that Komsomol
123 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 403, ll. 17-22.
62
organizations needed to actively involve themselves in amateur arts and promote the
engagement of youth in these circles. The author claimed that the circles create
“extremely favorable conditions for upbringing work,” as “many young men and women
find their way to the Komsomol through these circles.” Amateur arts also helped
“rationally organize the leisure of young men and women.” Censuring the current state of
affairs in many Komsomol cells that demonstrated a lack of concern with amateur arts,
the paper called for more participation by Komsomol organizations in amateur
competitions, and assistance to circle directors in providing training, repertoire, and
equipment.124
What does this editorial reveal about Komsomol policy on amateur arts? First, it
highlights the wartime neglect of amateur arts by the Komsomol, from the top of the
hierarchy to the rank-and-file, and the perceived need by the Komsomol leadership to
revive amateur arts in preparing for the transition to peacetime. In tandem, the Komsomol
TsK provided high-level support for amateur arts, for example, in its July 1945 decree on
holding an all-union technical college amateur arts competition.125 Such competitions
occurred at lower levels as well, for instance in Moscow in July 1947.126 Another
intriguing point in the article, the use of amateur arts as a recruitment mechanism,
reflected the Komsomol effort to rebuild its membership structure, devastated by the
war.127 Stressing the usefulness of amateur arts for getting youth into the Komsomol
124 “Khudozhestvennuiu samodeiatel’nost’ – na sluzhbu vospitaniia molodezhi,”Komsomol’skaia pravda,
January 7, 1945.
125 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 382, l. 125.
126 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 6, d. 32, ll. 1-2.
127 For the Komsomol’s efforts to rebuild its structure, see Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 32-63, and
Kassof, The Soviet Youth Program, 14-18.
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suggests that amateur arts had real popularity among young people, in contrast to the
propaganda lectures on politics and production.
These editorials and decrees embody the Komsomol leadership’s program for the
sphere of state-sponsored popular culture in the early postwar years. Following these
directives, oblast Komsomol committees passed a series of resolutions meant to improve
Komsomol cultural work. In Saratov, the oblast Komsomol committee decreed in July
1945 that city and district Komsomol committees improve club services for youth.128 As
for Moscow, a resolution by the Komsomol TsK in November 1945 called upon the
Moscow city Komsomol to strengthen clubs, and this reportedly resulted in real
improvements in club activities aimed at young people.129 In another instance, the
keynote speech of the August 3, 1946, conference of the secretaries of Moscow
Komsomol cells demanded better work in PKOs, as “99 percent of the visitors are youth,
this is where they relax, but there is no cultural-mass work there,” a deficiency resulting
from Komsomol neglect, according to the speaker.130 This demand reflected a Komsomol
TsK decree earlier that year insisting on better cultural activities for the students of higher
and technical education establishments during the summer vacation of 1946, including
the organization of amateur arts concerts and mass celebrations (massovki) in PKOs.131
The Bureau even enacted a separate resolution in 1946 demanding that Moscow’s
Komsomol organizations improve their work in Moscow PKOs.132
128 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 323, l. 8.
129 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 321, l. 55.
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These intentions ran into serious obstacles. The editorial on amateur arts alluded
to one of them in portraying the situation in Kirov oblast where, despite the fact that the
oblast Komsomol committee passed a resolution promoting the development of amateur
arts, “there was a problem of a resolution existing, but no work was done on enacting
it.”133 The decree on Moscow PKOs also acknowledged this issue, stating that Moscow
Komsomol cells “speak a great deal about the needs and demands of youth, enact many
resolutions, but do little in practice to create the necessary conditions for youth
leisure.”134 Such lack of success on amateur arts, mirroring the apathy of many district,
city, and oblast Komsomol cells toward state-sponsored popular culture, resulted from
the harsh postwar conditions, where youth, including Komsomol members, suffered
hunger and poverty. The Komsomol’s fractured structure due to the war, and its low
standing in comparison to other institutions within the Soviet system, further undermined
the Komsomol’s capacity to help organize cultural events.135 Moreover, despite some
rhetoric to the contrary, cultural recreation remained a low priority for the Komsomol,
resulting in such activities being frequently left by the wayside in Komsomol work.
The problematic situation in the clubs themselves served as a major obstacle to
the Party-state’s youth policy. The management of the Moscow trade union club of the
factory “Krasnyi bogatyr’” reportedly did not prepare for the fall and winter in 1945,
since the club lacked fuel, had broken windows, and poor lighting.136 Such circumstances
133 “Khudozhestvennuiu samodeiatel’nost’ – na sluzhbu vospitaniia molodezhi,”Komsomol’skaia pravda,
January 7, 1945.
134 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 433, ll. 17-19.
135 On the Komsomol’s low standing in the postwar years, see Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 32-63, and
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prevailed in many clubs during that fall, for example in Chkalovsk, where only ten of the
twenty-six clubs had fuel for the winter. The deficit of other basic supplies also haunted
Chkalovsk clubs, as they often had no tables, chairs, or cultural equipment for making
music and putting on plays.137 In the city of Ivanovo, clubs lacked theater curtains,
costumes, and similar materials in late 1945.138 Local Komsomol cells in some places
assisted clubs in dealing with these matters. Komsomol members helped clean and
renovate the club of the “Krasnyi bogatyr’” factory and supplied fuel for it. The club
managed to acquire three couches, three arm chairs, busts of Lenin and Stalin, a life-sized
portrait of Stalin, and other paintings.139 Still, such instances appear to have been rare and
did not represent a systematic policy by the Komsomol, as it generally lacked the
financial wherewithal to procure fuel and supplies, and consequently tended to request
that wealthier organizations such as trade unions acquire these materials.140
An inadequate number of well-prepared club managers and amateur arts leaders
also represented a serious challenge for the cultural network’s supply of services to youth
in the early postwar years. Described as a problem already in the 1944 note from the
Komsomol Propaganda Department, a 1946 report from the same bureaucracy stated that
the lack of qualified club workers with an appropriate level of education and preparation
constitutes “the primary issue” obstructing the improvement of club work. Additionally,
these cadres switched jobs with alarming frequency.141 The Komsomol TsK Bureau
137 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 403, ll. 27-31.
138 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 403, ll. 17-22.
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141 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 378, l. 2.
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sought to deal with these problems, resolving in a 1945 decree that the Komsomol, in
cooperation with several other central bureaucracies, needed to prepare directors of
amateur arts circles in month-long and ten-day seminars. The Komsomol TsK obligated
Komsomol organizations at all levels to select Komsomol members to attend the
seminars, get enterprise directors to let those selected attend the sessions, support the
seminars and their participants materially, and assist those who completed the seminars in
their work in amateur activities.142 In Chkalovsk, the oblast Komsomol committee held
two-week seminars for the amateur arts circle leaders for thirty people, and the Oblast
Executive Committee Artistic Department (otdel isskustv oblispolkom) also provided
artists to work with amateur art circles.143 Nonetheless, two-week seminars for thirty
people in an oblast as large as Chkalovsk likely had only a minimal impact on the quality
of amateur arts.
Hooliganism presented a further obstacle to the Komsomol’s intentions for
cultural activities. The term “hooliganism” served as a broad label used by the Soviet
media to describe the “inappropriate” conduct of, for the most part, working-class males.
It referred to cultural practices which tended to combine fighting, drinking, stealing,
harassing women, smoking, and cursing.144 As the Komsomol Propaganda Department
depicted the situation in the fall of 1945, “in certain cases, clubs are transforming from a
source of culture to a source of hooliganism.” It mentioned a club in Vladimir oblast with
frequent fights, and another in Kemerovo oblast that workers “are very reluctant to visit”
142 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 381, ll. 1-2.
143 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 403, ll. 27-31
144 For youth hooliganism in the postwar Stalin years, see Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 167-99.
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because of hooligans who brawl there.145 In Rostov-on-Don, young hooligans plagued the
city PKO and movie theaters in 1946.146 For many young males, fighting undoubtedly
constituted a fun free-time activity. G. E. Krichevskii, whose postwar adolescence in
Moscow involved a multitude of brawls, recalled that among his friends, such fighting
“was not considered a sin,” and “even brought joy” (kaif). The members of an amateur art
ensemble at a Pioneer Palace near his house represented a favored target for his clique
and him since, in his words, “street kids” like himself “despised the ensemble” and its
participants for their association with the officialdom.147
The Komsomol made some efforts to deal with hooliganism in the clubs. For
example, in 1946 the Komsomol committee of the Krasnopresnenskii neighborhood of
Moscow reported that, in response to the Komsomol city committee’s directions, it sent
500 members to “brigades of police assistance” (brigady pomoshchi militsii), militia
groups of ordinary citizens subordinated to the police.148 According to its claims, the club
of Factory No. 27 and several others witnessed a considerable decrease in hooliganism,
since “Komsomol members themselves monitor” order in the clubs. Based on this and
similar statements, the Moscow city Komsomol committee sent a note to the Moscow
city Party committee stating that it established systematic monitoring in both trade union
clubs and PKOs.149 In reality, such efforts proved meager, as shown by the tough laws
145 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 403, ll. 17-22.
146 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 433, ll. 7-8.
147 G. E. Krichevskii, born 1934, interviewed February 6, 2009. Also see his unpublished memoirs, which
he graciously provided: “Samoanaliz, ili razveiat’ mify.”
148 On such brigades in the prewar period, see Hagenloh, Stalin’s Police, 76-79, 328.
149 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 5, d. 9, ll. 25, 36-42. The Komsomol TsK also received a report from the Moscow
Komsomol on successes in fighting hooliganism in clubs in 1945: RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 321, l. 56.
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passed in 1947. This law made minors as young as twelve liable for harsh penalties in
severe cases. Those under fourteen were liable for nonsevere cases.150 This indicates that
the authorities considered these young adolescents individually responsible for their
actions and thereby deserving of punishments, in a revival of the militant, hard-line
policies from the prewar period.
In many cases, young people could not even secure access to the clubs. The
highest institutional priority for club managers, as in many Soviet enterprises, lay in
fulfilling the financial plan, especially in the immediate postwar years when the Party-
state had little resources to spare and wanted clubs to support themselves financially. In a
fall 1945 note from the Komsomol Propaganda Department on trade union clubs, the
authors drew attention to the fact that “almost everywhere the work of clubs is reduced to
commercial activity, undermining the broader goal of cultural enlightenment.” They
related how, in general, clubs established “unacceptably high” entrance fees, with tickets
for concerts costing 20-30 rubles, for dances 10-25 rubles, while billiards cost 10 rubles
an hour. Certain clubs even demanded payments for participating in some circles, such as
dancing and foreign language study. In many cases, this resulted in only a small, well-off
category of older workers had the means to go to clubs.151 The Chkalovsk oblast
150 Kelly, Children’s World, 237-57; Juliane Fürst, “Between Salvation and Liquidation: Homeless and
Vagrant Children and the Reconstruction of Soviet Society,” Slavonic and East European Review 86.2
(April 2008): 232-48; and Ann Livschiz, “Children’s Lives After Zoia’s Death: Order, Emotions and
Heroism in Children’s Lives and Literature in the Post-War Soviet Union,” in Fürst ed., Late Stalinist
Russia, 192-208.
151 Apparently, although the VTsSPS passed a decree obliging clubs to provide space twice a week to the
students of technical colleges, this “is violated almost everywhere”: RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 403, ll. 17-
22.
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Komsomol related how young workers expressed “much displeasure” over high prices
for tickets to clubs, with dances costing 10 rubles, and concerts 15-30.152
The criticism in internal bureaucratic discourse also surfaced in external
Komsomol rhetoric, with the Komsomol press printing exposes of the costs associated
with state-sponsored popular culture in an effort to use social censure to pressure cultural
institutions. For example, a 1946 article denounced the high prices charged in PKOs in
Khabarovsk, stating that, if a thief robs one person they call it a crime, but “in
Khabarovsk if not one person is robbed but a thousand, they for some reason call it a
cultural enlightenment enterprise.” The journalist additionally censured the trade union
club of the Uralmash factory in the city, writing that when Uralmash Komsomol
members wanted to organize a youth evening in the club, the club director demanded
6,000 rubles from them.153 The Komsomol TsK took some measures to deal with the
costs, asking the Soviet leadership and the VTsSPS to decrease the cost of entrance to
clubs by not taxing the clubs and directing 1 percent from the taxes of other enterprises to
fund clubs.154
These complaints also offer revealing insights into the actual popularity of club
events, since dances, concerts, and certain amateur circles drew people into the clubs,
while lectures notably did not. This indicates the importance of examining the actual, as
opposed to idealized, repertoire of club activities. Here, the prevalence of movies and
dancing deviated significantly from the desired emphasis of the Komsomol TsK, which
152 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 403, ll. 27-31.
153 “Dobro pozhalovat’!”Komsomol’skaia pravda, July 13, 1946.
154 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 403, ll. 17-22.
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ranked political and production propaganda as primary, and amateur arts a distant second,
with movies and dancing not on the list of officially promoted activities.
In fact, however, the Komsomol demonstrated an ambiguous approach toward
movies and dances in clubs. While not officially promoted in policy statements by the
Komsomol TsK, in 1945-46 the Komsomol press and Komsomol committees
occasionally expressed guarded praise and assistance for youth engagement in such
activities. The above-mentioned article on Khabarovsk and the fall 1945 note from the
Komsomol Propaganda Department censured the high prices charged for dancing and
movies, with both pursuing the goal of increasing youth access to such activities. In late
1945, as the example cited in the introduction to this chapter indicates, the Moscow
Komsomol committee praised clubs in Moscow for regularly showing movies and
holding youth dances, for example in the club of the factory “Krasnyi Bogatyr.’”155 A
complaint from Chkalovsk mentioned that clubs generally show movies that are too old,
and this apparently inspired discontent among youth.156 Komsomol’skaia pravda
published an article in July 1946 lambasting the fact that, in the city of Rzhevsk, “people
work hard to heal the wounds caused by the war, rushing to rebuild housing and
enterprises, but no one here is concerned, in effect, over the leisure of youth.” Instead, the
paper presented as a model young workers from the “Serp i Molot” factory who had the
chance to relax and dance, indicating that local Komsomol cells need to make similar
efforts.157
155 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 321, l. 57.
156 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 403, ll. 27-31.
157 “Za poleznyi i razumnyi otdykh,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, July 4, 1946.
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Still, in 1945 the Cultural-Mass Desk of the Komsomol Propaganda Department
expressed concern in an internal report over the fact that “in a considerably number of
clubs, there is no cultural-enlightenment work besides showing movies and organizing
dances.”158 Foreshadowing later attacks, the desk expressed concerns in internal
discourse over western-style dancing even before the conclusion of the war, when the
wartime bonds between the Allies seemed solid. It argued in 1944 for teaching “folk and
ballroom dances to youth” as a means of “agitation against [youth] fascination with
western dances.”159 Similarly, articles from a publication controlled by the Union of
Soviet Writers and the Committee on Art Affairs (Komitet po delam isskustv) censured
jazz in the spring of 1944, although the rash of attacks soon died down.160
Such criticism, nonetheless, proved exceptional and rarely made its way into
public Komsomol discourse in the concluding stages of the war and the immediate
postwar period, when western movies and dances proved all the rage and youth could
engage in these activities largely free of official opprobrium. The movies entered the
Soviet Union largely as the spoils of war, and received the label of “trophy” films. One
example, the 1944 German musical Dream Woman, drew many more spectators than any
of the generally staid, bombastic Soviet movies in the Socialist Realist style made in the
postwar Stalin years. Tarzan’s New York Adventure from 1942, one of the most popular
western films, inspired young Moscow college students to imitate the ape-like howling in
the dorms at night. American gangster and cowboy movies such as The Roaring Twenties
158 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 403, ll. 17-22.
159 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 269, ll. 1-9.
160 Starr, Red and Hot, 187-88, 205.
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(1939) and Stagecoach (1940) also drew large crowds. The very popular 1941 film Sun
Valley Serenade, featuring the Glenn Miller jazz orchestra, helped inspire the popularity
of western music among Soviet youth.161 Many young people greatly enjoyed such
movies, going to see them multiple times.162 Owing to the popularity of the “trophy”
films, movie theaters and clubs ran them over and over.
For club managers, the movies proved a bonanza, enabling them to fill depleted
club coffers. A case in point, the Gor’kii House of Culture, owned by the bread-making
trade union in Moscow, declared in its yearly report for 1946 that the club received
1,164,100 rubles in revenue from movies, a whopping 69 percent of the total 1,681,300 it
collected. For comparison, the club made 268,700 rubles from theater performances,
221,200 from concerts, 22,800 from varied evening events, and a paltry 4,500 from
lectures. Moreover, the club spent only 999,600 on the movies, turning a tidy profit of
164,500 rubles. While concerts also made money, 12,700 rubles, the rest of the events
cost more money to produce than they brought in. Theater performances lost 34,500,
evening events 32,200, and lectures 34,900, with the latter by far the most
disproportionate in terms of cost of event versus revenue taken in.163 Such figures make it
obvious why movies proved beneficial for the resource-strapped clubs, with substantial
financial incentives for club managers to use the club hall for movies as opposed to
lectures.
161 Stites, Russian Popular Culture, 125-26, and Josephine Woll, Real Images: Soviet Cinema and the
Thaw (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2000), 3-4.
162 For the high level of specifically youth interest in these movies, see Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 205-
06.
163 TsAGM, f. 44, op. 1, d. 4, l. 19. Note that it was a common practice to hold dances after concerts and
theater performances, increasing their popularity and consequently the revenue garnered.
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Also important to note, the money obtained from each event reflected the scale of
the ticket-paying audience. The 1946 plan for the club called for lectures to take in
109,800 rubles, instead of the measly 4,500 rubles it actually managed to get, fulfilling
only 4 percent of the planned goal. This sum underlines the abysmally low level of
attendance at lectures. The club’s 1946 plan also reveals another crucial point about
lectures. According to the plan, the club expected movies, concerts, theater performances,
and evening events to take in more money than they lost, although it proved wrong about
the latter two. Lectures, however, were written into the plan as a money-losing activity
from the start, since the plan included anticipated revenue of 109,800 rubles, and cost of
141,600.164 Keeping in mind the pressure for self-sustainability on cultural recreation
institutions, the fact that financially unsustainable lectures figured in the club’s events
indicates the political pressure placed on clubs to have lectures, and support them
materially with profit from money-making events such as movies.
Western films went hand-in-hand with western dancing and music. The end of the
war did not result in any break in the wartime popularity of jazz and, in fact, the peace
treaty resulted in many more opportunities to play, listen, and dance to this music.
Utesov, Tsfasman, Rosner, and other popular jazz musicians brought their bands to
Moscow and Leningrad. Restaurants and bars in these and other cities, especially in the
Baltic states, hosted many jazz bands, which sometimes consisted of recently
demobilized soldiers. Plenty of talented amateur musicians joined professional groups,
164 Ibid.
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for example Iurii Saul’skii, who played in Leonid Geller’s band at the National Hotel
restaurant in Moscow.165
Youth in particular expressed fascination with western music and dancing.
Growing steadily before the conclusion of the war, the number of youth dancing the
foxtrot, tango, rumba, and charleston to music with jazz elements, played by jazz bands
and estrada (variety) ensembles, exploded across the Soviet Union in the immediate
postwar period.166 These dances appealed to all segments of the young urban population.
On the one hand, they filled the repertoire of exclusive establishments devoted to light
entertainment, such as the Cocktail Hall bar on Gor’kii Street, easily accessible only to
those with connections, especially children of elites. On the other hand, jazz and western
dances also crowded out political and production-oriented propaganda, as well as cultural
events seen as more uplifting and enlightening, in the Party-state’s organizations devoted
to mass cultural consumption, clubs and PKOs.167 During this period, the Gor’kii House
of Culture hosted a jazz group.168 A number of jazz ensembles performed in the Gor’kii
PKO in Moscow during 1946, including Rosner’s band. That year, not coincidentally, the
PKO dance hall greatly overfulfilled its plan, with 487 people present on average per
dance instead of the 350 as anticipated, resulting in 759,000 actually coming to the dance
165 Starr, Red and Hot, 205-06.
166 By “music with elements of jazz,” I refer to a wide range of musical maneuvers associated with jazz,
ranging from syncopation to improvisation. Pieces with elements of jazz might have included anything
from a few notes played in a jazz style to full-blown jazz versions of traditional folk or Soviet songs.
167 Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 201-05; Mark Edele, "Strange Young Men in Stalin’s Moscow: The
Birth and Life of the Stiliagi, 1945-1953," Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 50.1 (2002), 37-61; Gleb
Tsipursky, “Living ‘America’ in the Soviet Union: The Cultural Practices of ‘Westernized’ Soviet Youth,
1945-1964,” in Eva-Maria Stolberg ed., "Rivals of the Twentieth Century": USSR and USA. Two
Geopolitical Powers in Competition (forthcoming in 2011); and Starr, Red and Hot, 206.
168 TsAGM, f. 44, op. 1, d. 6, ll. 14-16.
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hall that year instead of the planned 450,000. This compensated for the underperformance
of other PKO attractions.169 Such numbers indicate that the management of the PKO, and
undoubtedly other cultural recreation establishments, may have failed to anticipate the
escalation of interest in dancing by young people, the vast majority of visitors to the park.
Such youth interest in and commitment to dancing served the Gor’kii PKO and other
cultural recreation institutions well, helping cover the losses incurred by the much less
popular lectures. No wonder, then, that the managers of many cultural recreation
institutions proved reluctant to get rid of western music and dancing when these came
under systematic attack in the later Stalin years.
Intriguingly, such hedonist cultural practices by many Soviet youth found their
reflection in other Soviet Bloc countries, and even the United States and western Europe.
For example, in both East and West Germany, the postwar period witnessed a great deal
of young people indulging in American-style jazz and dancing, and watching Hollywood
movies.170 Such youth behavior was widespread throughout the Soviet Bloc.171 The
postwar period saw similar pleasure-seeking behavior, centered on fascination with
American popular culture, across the whole of western Europe.172 Within the United
States itself, the end of the war brought a rapid increase in the number of youth dancing
169 TsAGM, f. 2011, op. 1, d. 37, l. 86.
170 Uta G. Poiger, Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 31-70.
171 Claire Wallace and Sijka Kovatcheva, Youth in Society: The Construction and Deconstruction of Youth
in East and West Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998).
172 Sabrina P. Ramet and Gordana P. Crnkovic eds., KAZAAM! SPLAT! PLOOF! The American Impact on
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to jazz and watching movies at drive-in theaters.173 These parallels among the countries
participating in World War II indicates a postwar trend common to both capitalist and
socialist states, with a large portion of young people reacting to the strains and tensions of
the war by plunging into fun entertainment as the military conflict ended, a development
not welcomed by many adults within these countries.
Still, in the Soviet case, the vast majority of the Komsomol’s documents on
cultural activities from 1944 to mid-1946, whether for public consumption or even
reports for internal use, lacked criticism of hedonistic behavior and western cultural
influence. The major source of hesitancy over youth cultural consumption of western
popular culture emerged from the internal discourse of the Cultural-Mass Desk, which
represents an exception for this period.174 In many other instances, Komsomol officials at
all levels supported expanding youth access to movies and dancing. This suggests that
officials in the Cultural-Mass Desk during these years leaned toward an ideologically
militant position, expressing less tolerance than the general Komsomol line toward
western influence and ascribing little value to the satisfaction of popular youth desires via
light cultural entertainment.
Despite the position of the Cultural-Mass Desk, and its own predilections, the
Komsomol TsK chose to avoid openly condemning movies, dancing, and western
popular culture in its decrees, and did not direct Komsomol’skaia pravda to do so. The
Komsomol higher-ups clearly preferred that young people go to clubs primarily to listen
to propaganda lectures, secondarily to spend time in amateur arts circles and thereby
173 James Gilbert, A Cycle of Outrage: America’s Reaction to the Juvenile Delinquent in the 1950s (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 11-61.
174 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 269, ll. 1-9.
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partake in cultural enlightenment, and rarely to watch movies or to dance, as indicated by
depictions of model communist youth behavior in official discourse. A confluence of
factors, however, explains the failure of the Komsomol TsK Bureau to censure cultural
activities that did not fit its inclinations. First, western-themed culture had genuine
popularity among the young, and provided an easy and cheap means of satisfying desires
for a postwar return to some sort of “normalcy.” Movies and dancing, likewise, relieved
the enormous strains of rebuilding the country. The Komsomol, moreover, would have
been extremely unlikely to adopt a policy of condemning such western popular culture
independently of the Party, since the Soviet leadership would probably have seen it as a
dangerously independent act. Additionally, in the context of a drive to recruit members to
the Komsomol and get them to pay dues and serve as lower-level officials within the
organization, Komsomol higher-ups likely questioned the wisdom of fighting against
such a popular form of entertainment. Conversely, the frailty of the Komsomol and its
focus on assisting reconstruction in this period meant that it had few resources left to
attempt to change youth behavior. Besides, the Komsomol leadership knew it had little
chance of getting the directors of cultural recreation institutions not to show movies or
host dances without pressure from the hierarchy of the VTsSPS and MOC, which
expressed minimal concern for either youth or the Komsomol. As a result, in state-
sponsored youth popular culture the Party-state actually did meet the popular postwar
expectations for relaxation of prewar constraints, at least briefly.175
175 A conclusion in accord with other findings for a brief postwar relaxation: Zubkova, Russia after the
War, 31-39.
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Conclusion
Soviet state-sponsored popular culture had roots in initiatives by social reformists
in imperial Russia, and took its subsequent shape in the dynamic, turbulent NEP years.
During this period, several points of conflict emerged over organized cultural recreation,
which reflected broader NEP-era struggles between a hard-line versus a soft-line vision
of communist construction. In contrast to the militant perspective, the pluralistic, tolerant
one encouraged more space for youth agency and fewer restrictions on initiative from
below; supported entertainment, cultural “enlightenment,” and political propaganda (in
that order); permitted a degree of western cultural influence; and believed in the need to
offer youth fun recreation to prevent juvenile “delinquency.”
In the concluding stages of the war and the early postwar years, 1944 to 1946, the
Party leadership, the VTsSPS, and MOC had little energy or time to devote to state-
sponsored popular culture for young people. Even the Komsomol top-level officials
assigned a low priority to this issue, though their external discourse expressed a
predilection for heavily politicized organized cultural events, with a smaller dose of
cultural “enlightenment,” and largely remained silent on fun entertainment. Yet, while
some Komsomol officials expressed hesitation in internal rhetoric about western popular
culture, the Komsomol’s external discourse generally refrained from censuring western
dances, movies, and music. Some Komsomol newspapers and cells even praised and
made efforts to increase the provision of such activities for youth.
A number of factors explain this ambiguous approach. Despite the preference of
the Komsomol leadership that young people spend their time listening to lectures on
politics and production in clubs, many young people found them boring, refusing to
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attend these events. Some youth took pleasure in making noncontroversial music or
putting on plays in amateur circles, while many others enjoyed western dancing, music,
and movies, similar to young people in other world regions at this time. Thus, official
images of young Soviet citizens as interested primarily in lectures, and to a much smaller
extent amateur arts, constituted a Socialist Realist construct. This depiction of idealized
New Soviet People was intended to instill normative cultural consumption desires and
aesthetic tastes by modeling “appropriate” behavior, rather than mirroring the actual
interests and tastes of young people themselves. In fact, given the weak structure of the
postwar Komsomol, combined with the enormous strain of rebuilding and lack of strong
directives from the Party, the Komsomol leadership tolerated pluralism as a necessary
measure in state-sponsored popular culture. Likewise, such a soft-line approach helped
the Komsomol recruit young members and procure financial resources from dues.
Simultaneously, the financial demands on the managers of clubs and PKOs meant that the
Komsomol hierarchy would have had a very difficult time expunging light entertainment
from the cultural network. Indeed, since clubs and PKOs had to largely sustain
themselves financially, consumers paying for such light entertainment subsidized the
money-losing lectures, which the clubs and PKOs organized mainly due to political
demands from above.
In this period, then, a Soviet youth could successfully reconcile a self-image as a
good Soviet citizen and New Soviet Person with a strong interest in western popular
culture. The socially engaged youth who regularly read newspapers and strove to advance
within the system would have been aware of official Komsomol preferences that model
communist citizens listen to lectures and engage in amateur arts circles in cultural
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recreation institutions. Still, the lack of real censure for dancing and movie-watching in
the Komsomol’s external discourse, combined with the efforts of Komsomol cells and
newspapers to secure access to movies and dancing for youth, served notice of the
acceptability of such activities. In other words, watching Sun Valley Serenade and
dancing the foxtrot may not have served to promote one’s Soviet identity and bring one
closer to the status of an ideal communist citizen, but it did not detract from this either.
Komsomol officials at the lower levels such as the secretaries of primary cells
privy to some of the Komsomol’s internal discourse quite possibly knew of the concern
within the upper reaches of the Komsomol bureaucracy over western cultural influence,
as well as the desired emphasis on political and production-oriented propaganda. Yet,
burdened with a multiplicity of tasks, such local-level administrators made the
organization of lectures and amateur arts circles a low priority, in many ways reflective
of the actual intentions of the Komsomol leadership. As they had to walk a fine line
between serving the interests of policy-makers in the Komsomol hierarchy and ordinary
members who made up their cells, local secretaries had little incentive to openly battle
with the western popular culture admired by many Komsomol members.
While bearing a number of parallels to the policies advocated by those closer to
the pluralistic position in the NEP as well as some similarities to the mid-1930s, mass
organized cultural activities from late 1944 to the summer of 1946 are most suggestive of
the breaks associated with wartime realities and the postwar reconstruction needs. The
period of relative pluralism in cultural policy after World War II, however, lasted for a
little over a year, as the Stalinist leadership turned toward a hard-line approach even more
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extreme than the immediate prewar years, illustrating the powerful continuities in state-
sponsored popular culture policy, as well as the impact of the escalating Cold War.
Chapter 2
The Anticosmopolitan Campaign, 1947-53: Part 1, Ideologizing the Repertoire
The late postwar Stalin years, 1947-1953, witnessed a major shift in the Party’s
approach to state-sponsored youth popular culture as part of a broader ideological
tightening and hard-line policy known as the anticosmopolitan campaign. The repertoire
of organized cultural activities now had to carry a much heavier dose of political
propaganda, communist ideology, and Soviet nationalism than in the 1944 to mid-1946
period, while rejecting any trace of western influence and minimizing entertaining
content more broadly. Leaving the topic of popular cultural activities condemned by late
Stalinist official discourse for the next chapter, here I investigate the transformations in
those forms of organized cultural recreation that authorities considered appropriate for
young people. By exploring top-level prescriptions on normative club activities, I
highlight the Kremlin’s efforts to shape cultural consumption desires and aesthetic tastes
as a way of ensuring that young people fit its idealized image of disciplined and
politicized New Soviet People ready to build communism and fight the Cold War.
By focusing my analysis on mass cultural activities that did not inspire the ire of
ideological organs, this chapter casts light on the cultural life of a subset of young people
who held to a largely conformist perspective, a topic understudied in the historiography
on the USSR and youth culture more broadly. These young people found pleasure and
even excitement in songs about World War II and the Party, in traditional folk and
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ballroom dances, and in plays by Soviet dramatists, thereby investing powerful feelings
and emotions, generally associated with the private sphere, into the state-sponsored
spaces of the Soviet cultural recreation network. My findings in this regard support Lewis
Siegelbaum’s depiction of multiple, layered public and private spheres in the USSR, with
diffuse borders, instead of the traditional view of sharp lines between a clearly defined
Soviet public sphere and private sphere.176 The willing participation of a portion of young
people in officially-prescribed organized cultural recreation underscores the fact that, for
some Soviet youth, individual self-expression and agency did not prove incompatible
with the Party line during the anticosmopolitan campaign.
Be that as it may, the Party-state apparatus failed to deliver a sufficient amount of
noncontroversial, conformist organized cultural recreation to satisfy the demands of
many young people for such orthodox activities. Moreover, some young people
participated in leadership-approved cultural recreation only with reluctance. They
expressed various degrees of discontent with the repertoire of amateur music, theater, and
dances promoted by top-level policy from 1947 to 1953, owing to its intense emphasis on
politics and ideology, and centralized control from above. Nevertheless, having few other
opportunities for organized artistic self-expression in theatrical performances, music-
making, and choreographed dancing, these youth chose to engage in state-sponsored
cultural activities; for them, the advantages of participation outweighed the
disadvantages. Both sets of problems, however, undermined the late Stalinist Party-
176 See Lewis H. Siegelbaum, “Introduction: Mapping Private Spheres in the Soviet Context,” in Lewis H.
Siegelbaum ed., Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2006), 1-21.
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state’s goal of using the cultural recreation network to forge postwar youth into New
Soviet People.
The Context of Organized Cultural Recreation in the Late 1940s and Early 1950s
From the late 1940s, living conditions in the Soviet Union began to markedly
improve. As the widescale postwar famine of 1946-47 drew to a close, leaving millions
dead, especially in Ukraine, the government ended systematic rationing. The initial wave
of Sovietization swept through western Ukraine, Moldavia, and the Baltic states,
suppressing resistance by armed nationalists as the Soviet Party-state imposed its
authority. Currency reform, while disruptive at the time, led to more financial stability.
The high levels of postwar crime also dropped after 1948. Housing stock and social
services grew, if slowly, while price reductions made consumer goods more affordable.
In addition, since it took less effort to meet the basic needs of everyday life, ordinary
citizens had more energy to focus on their leisure.177
The postwar reconstruction led to a slow but steady expansion of youth access to
state-sponsored popular culture. Soviet cities reportedly had 6,450 functioning clubs in
1946, 7,970 in 1948, 9,170 in 1950, and 10,050 in 1953.178 In 1951, trade unions
controlled over 8,000 mostly urban clubs and Palaces of Culture, with 600 built over the
span of 1946 to 1950, and many of the other 7,400 opening their doors anew after
177 See Elena Zubkova, Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957, Hugh
Ragsdale trans. and ed. (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1998): 40-56, 139-48; Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Postwar Soviet
Society: The ‘Return to Normalcy’, 1945-1953,” in Susan J. Linz ed., The Impact of World War II on the
Soviet Union (Totowa: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985), 129-56; and A. Z. Vakser, Leningrad poslevoennyi.
1945-1982 gody (St. Petersburg: Izdatel’stvo Ostrov, 2005).
178 There were 87,921 rural clubs in 1946 and 113,180 in 1953. See O. K. Makarova, Kul’turnoe
stroitel’stvo SSSR: Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe statisticheskoe izdatel’stvo, 1956),
273.
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renovations.179 The bureaucracies that owned club institutions expressed somewhat more
concern than before over the cultural activities of youth. In 1951, the All-Union Central
Council of Trade Unions, VTsSPS, stated that trade union organizations need to improve
cultural activities for young people, cooperating with Komsomol committees in doing
so.180 Nonetheless, in its bylaws for the commission on cultural work of factory trade
union committees passed on February 8, 1951, the VTsSPS explicitly discussed work
with children but failed to bring up the need to serve the interests of Komsomol-aged
youth or cooperation with Komsomol organizations.181 This exemplifies the
inconsistencies in VTsSPS policy, which enabled officials in the lower reaches of the
trade union cultural bureaucracy to choose for themselves what position to adopt on the
issue of orienting cultural activities toward serving the needs of young people.
Regardless, youth participation in organized cultural recreation grew significantly
over these years, as illustrated by amateur art circles, with young people making up the
majority of members.182 In 1945, the circles had just over 2,000,000 performers, but by
the end of 1947, this number rose to 3,500,000, and in 1950 to over 4,000,000. By
February 1953, 4,800,000 people engaged in artistic activities in 324,000 circles; theater
circles garnered the highest popularity, with about 2,000,000 participants.183 The young
179 GARF, f. R-5451, op 24, d. d. 900, l. 11.
180 GARF, f. R-5451, op 24, d. d. 900, l. 17.
181 L. I. Poliakov, Sbornkik rukovodiashchikh materialov po kul’turno-massovoi rabote (Moscow:
Profizdat, 1957), 34-37.
182 I would again like to stress that such numbers, based on reports from the locale, were undoubtedly
inflated, but they can be used meaningfully as a way of measuring change in the provision of amateur art
over time.
183 For 1945 and 1947, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 673, ll. 7-8. For 1950, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32,
d. 630, l. 102. For early 1953, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 741, l. 3. The numbers for early 1953 do not
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performers in these circles also had more access to cultural products. While complaining
of the lack of published repertoires for amateurs in 1950, by February 1953 the
Komsomol expressed satisfaction over the quantity of literature, with 4,077,700 copies of
repertoire collections available.184
This growth occurred in spite of, rather than because of, efforts of the Komsomol
leadership, which, as in 1944 to mid-1946, continued to pay comparatively little attention
to improving the provision of state-sponsored popular culture to young people. In the
1947 to March 1953 period, the Komsomol TsK Bureau passed only two decrees on
state-sponsored popular culture, one in 1947 and another in 1951.185 A 1950 Komsomol
TsK plenum also enacted a resolution calling for improving state-sponsored popular
culture for youth.186 The Komsomol leadership continued to stress organizing sports over
club events, with the Party TsK’s decrees in 1948 calling for more work on athletics
promoting this focus.187 For instance, First Secretary of the Komsomol P. A. Mikhailov,
in his keynote speech at the 1949 Eleventh Komsomol Congress, spent about six times as
long talking about sports than clubs and amateur arts.188 This sent a clear message to
include data from army and school amateur art circles, and the statistics from previous years may or may
not include this data, but this does not impact the overall image of a gradual increase in amateur arts.
184 For 1950, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 630, l. 185, and for 1953, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 741,
ll. 1-6.
185 For 1947, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 523, ll. 3-6. For 1953, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 698, ll. 52-
55.
186 Postanovleniia chetvertogo plenuma TsK VLKSM (23 avgusta – 25 avgusta, 1950 goda) (Moscow:
Molodaia gvardiia, 1950).
187 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 99, ll. 70-71.
188 P. A. Mikhailov, Otchetnyi doklad na XI s’’ezde komsomola o rabote TsK VLKSM (Moscow: Molodaia
gvardiia, 1949), 33-34, 36-39. The early 1950s featured an ongoing commitment to expanding athletics:
Postanovleniia vos’mogo plenuma TsK VLKSM (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1952), 14-21.
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regional Komsomol cells, indicating that they needed to devote substantially more time
and energy to organizing sports rather than to pressuring clubs to host youth evenings or
getting youth involved in amateur arts.
The Anticosmopolitan Campaign and Youth Cultural Policy
Suffering from the strain of wartime reconstruction after the devastation of the
war, the population looked forward to a “normal” life. People proved more and more
willing to speak and act against state demands for discipline and self-sacrifice.189 The
Stalin leadership, however, strove to maintain its wartime insistence on absolute
obedience and on keeping the populace mobilized, as best embodied in Stalin’s famous
1945 praise of Soviet citizens as “small cogs” holding together the “state machine.”190
The authorities ramped up the cult of personality, stridently demanding that the
population show extreme gratefulness to the leader for victory over the Nazis and for any
improvement in living conditions, as opposed to their own individual initiatives.191 A
series targeted purges aimed at powerful cliques perceived as too autonomous.192 Worried
over the loosening of ideological controls during the war, the triumvirate of top officials
who achieved predominance in 1948, led by L. P. Beria, G. M. Malenkov, and M. A.
189 Zubkova, Russia after the War, 101-08, and Fitzpatrick, “Postwar Soviet Society.”
190 On this phrase, see Zubkova, Russia after the War, 27-30.
191 Nina Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia (New
York: Basic Books, 1994), and Jeffrey Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from
Revolution to Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 195-232.
192 Anne Applebaum, Gulag: A History (New York: Doubleday, 2003), 445-75.
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Suslov, launched a campaign to intensify ideological and political education in all
spheres of life.193
Likewise, Soviet authorities had a clear target to mobilize its citizenry against, as
the Cold War escalated in the late 1940s. This served to justify maintaining a wartime
footing, which demanded from Soviet citizens continued discipline, self-sacrifice, and
preparation for a potential war. To achieve its goals, the Kremlin launched the campaign
against “cosmopolitanism,” a label used by official discourse to condemn anything seen
as alien and foreign to the Soviet way of life. Beginning in late 1946, reaching its apogee
in 1948, and continuing largely unabated throughout the rest of the postwar Stalin years,
this campaign had two interlinked goals. First, it promoted Soviet and particularly
Russian nationalism and militant, hard-line interpretations of Marxism-Leninism, as well
as full loyalty to the Party and Stalin as leader. Second, the anticosmopolitan campaign
aimed to purge “anti-Soviet” elements, overtly targeting western influence of all sorts.194
Less openly, this initiative also targeted Jews.195
193 Robert Edelman, Spartak Moscow: A History of the People’s Team in the Workers’ State (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2009), 165-66.
194 On the anticosmopolitan campaign, see David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass
Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian Identity,, 1931-1956 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2002), 183-96; Serhy Yekelchyk, Stalin’s Empire of Memory: Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet
Historical Imagination (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 62-71; Sheila Fitzpatrick, The
Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 238-
57; N. I. Nikolaeva, “Nekotorye itogi antiamerikanskoi kampanii v SSSR v kontse 40kh-nachale 50kh
godov,” in A. V. Gladyshev and V. S. Mirzekhanov eds., Novaia i noveishaia istoriia (Saratov: Izdatel’stvo
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In the arts, the first waves of this campaign began in the late summer and early
fall of 1946. Instigated by Politburo member A. A. Zhdanov, a series of high-level Party
TsK decrees appeared in August and September 1946 on literature, theaters, and movies,
and a rash of newspaper articles publicized these pronouncements.196 For instance, the
August 1946 decree by the Organizational Bureau of the Party TsK on theaters censured
drama theaters for putting on too few plays dealing with Soviet reality and those that
were performed for presenting a “perverted image of Soviet life.” The decree cited as the
“worst political mistake” the introduction of plays by “foreign bourgeois playwrights,”
which “poison the consciousness of Soviet people with a worldview hostile to Soviet
society.”197
Although sporadic censure of western influence in music began in late 1946, such
criticism took off only in late 1947, when a revived series of attacks on jazz appeared in
the press. These presaged the full-blown expansion of the anticosmopolitan campaign
into the sphere of music the next year.198 The key event in this new wave of
anticosmopolitan stridency came in the infamous February 10, 1948, Party TsK
resolution condemning V. I. Muradeli’s opera “Great Friendship” and other Soviet
composers. In this resolution, the TsK stated that Muradeli and others had wrongly taken
a “formalist path,” with a style that that “transformed music into cacophony,” which
196 See Richard Stites, Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment and Society since 1900 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 116, and S. Frederick Starr, Red and Hot: The Fate of Jazz in the
Soviet Union, 1917-1980 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 213.
197 The full text of the 1946 decree against theaters is published in: A. N. Iakovlev ed., Vlast’ i
khudozhestvennaia intelligentsiia. Dokumenty TsK RKP(b) – VKP(b) – OGPU – NKVD o kul’turnoi
politike. 1917-1953 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond “Demokratiia”, 1999), 591-96.
198 Kiril Tomoff suggests that, in regard to music, the first wave of the anticosmopolitan campaign in late
1946 was ameliorated by the Composers’ Union. See his Creative Union: The Professional Organization of
Soviet Composers, 1939-1953 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 97-121.
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“strongly recalls modern bourgeois culture.”199 With this initiative, the Party TsK forbid
clubs, dance halls, and restaurants from playing jazz, directing these institutions and
former jazz musicians to perform bland variety music, folk songs, classical pieces, and
ideologized tunes. The authorities removed jazz stars from high positions in the cultural
industry, while some jazz players, including Eddie Rosner, ended up in the Gulag. The
word “jazz” acquired a negative connotation in official discourse, and the state even
banned saxophones.200 By underscoring the need for “ideologically sound” works, and
censuring the western music popular among youth, the Party TsK signaled the
importance of stressing politics over fun entertainment, intolerance toward western
influence, leadership by a narrow ideological vanguard, and the use of heavy-handed
censorship. This turn toward ideological militancy in music marked the triumph of those
who advocated positions in many ways similar to the NEP-era Left.
The Komsomol leadership devoted minimal energy to mass cultural activities in
these years, and much of it went to ensuring that the club repertoire matched the tenets of
the anticosmopolitan campaign as opposed to increasing the opportunities for youth to
participate in state-sponsored popular culture. The emphasis on enacting the
anticosmopolitan campaign meant undertaking a range of efforts aimed at promoting
ideological militancy and strict discipline. In this regard, Komsomol cultural policy fit the
pattern identified by Juliane Fürst, who argued that, after the war, ideological purity came
to the forefront of the regime’s goals for youth as Stalin wanted to secure his legacy by
199 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1069, ll. 42-48.
200 Starr, Red and Hot, 204-233, and Tomoff, Creative Union, 122-151. Besides jazz, another target of the
Party TsK decree was western art music. See Peter J. Schmelz, Such Freedom, if Only Musical: Unofficial
Soviet Music during the Thaw (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 26-27.
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ensuring that youth develop absolute loyalty to his vision of the future.201 At the same
time, such efforts formed part of the broader Stalinist endeavor to create a unified,
homogeneous cultural field that concealed the existence of cultural tastes that did not
conform to the newly-promulgated official norms.202
The evidence demonstrates that the early stage of the anticosmopolitan campaign
in the arts, from late 1946 to 1947, already had some impact on organized youth cultural
activities. One example comes from the Komsomol TsK Bureau’s 1947 decree on
preparing for an all-union amateur art competition of technical college students, which
demanded that the competition function as “a new, bright sign of the benefits of our
socialist art, in the face of the pernicious capitalist art that causes youth degeneracy.”203
In contrast, the two Komsomol TsK Bureau resolutions on state-sponsored popular
culture in 1946 did not include such ideologized wording, focusing on the pragmatic
issues involved in increasing youth participation in club activities.204
Nonetheless, the Party TsK decree on the opera “Great Friendship” represented
the most crucial event for extending the anticosmopolitan initiative into state-sponsored
popular culture. The Komsomol Propaganda Department, headed during this period by A.
G. Klimov in 1947-48 and V. I. Kochemasov from 1949 to 1955, sought to implement
the Party TsK’s directives.205 Less than a month after the censure of “Great Friendship,”
201 Juliane Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism, 1945-56
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 23.
202 For how this functioned in regard to reading, see Stephen Lovell, The Russian Reading Revolution:
Print Culture in the Soviet and Post-Soviet Eras (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 43-44.
203 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 523, l. 3.
204 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 429, ll. 2-4, and RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 433, ll. 17-19.
205 A. A. Alekseeva, Stroka v biografii (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2003), 62-63.
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an internal policy document from the Komsomol Propaganda Department stated that all
Komsomol cells have to fully implement the Party TsK resolution.206 Oblast Komsomol
organizations heard these signals. For instance, the Rostov-on-Don Komsomol city
committee reported in 1948 that, after the Party TsK decree, it significantly improved
work on promoting classical music and music writted by Soviet composers among youth
in the city.207 The Komsomol leadership’s external discourse reinforced this message: At
the 1949 Eleventh Komsomol Congress, Mikhailov highlighted the need to “vigilantly
defend youth from pernicious foreign influences.”208 Similar tropes persisted in the
Komsomol’s discourse during the rest of Stalin’s rule. A case in point, a 1950
Propaganda Department report on state-sponsored popular culture expressed the essence
of the Komsomol leadership’s emphasis in the years of the anticosmopolitan campaign. It
stated that the Party and the population demand “Bolshevik idealism” (bol’shevitskaia
ideinost’) from arts, which, according to the department, meant propagandizing the
Party’s political line and helping the Party bring up youth in the spirit of absolute loyalty
to the Soviet system.209
The rhetoric of other institutions involved in the organization of cultural
recreation for young people contained parallel messages in the 1948 to 1953 period.
Thus, at its 1951 plenum, the VTsSPS condemned the performance of what it termed
“ideologically lacking and antisocial” pieces in some trade union amateur circles.210 This
206 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 630, l. 120.
207 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 475, l. 140.
208 Mikhailov, Otchetnyi doklad, 33-35.
209 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 630, ll. 149-50.
210 GARF, f. R-5451, op 24, d. 900, l. 12.
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differed from the 1945 VTsSPS plenum’s resolution on cultural recreation, which lacked
such anticosmopolitan language.211
Officially-Recommended Amateur Arts and Youth Evenings
The anticosmopolitan campaign impacted all spheres of amateur arts, with music
one prominent example. Repertoire booklets and Komsomol conferences stressed
performing pieces eulogizing the Party and Stalin, praising high production
achievements, Soviet patriotism and “the friendship of the peoples,” the “struggle for
peace in the whole world,” and so on.212 Club managers, amateur art directors, and local
Komsomol cadres clearly grasped what the hierarchy expected of them, as indicated by
the actual repertoires of state-sponsored popular cultural events. Young amateur
musicians performed many songs devoted to the Motherland, the Party, the Komsomol,
Stalin, and heroic labor.213 For instance, the first piece in an amateur concert at the
Pervomaiskii House of Culture in Odessa was the “Song about Stalin.”214 An automobile
factory’s palace of culture indicated that its amateur chorus learned the songs of Soviet
composers and those from other socialist countries.215 In contrast, even classical western
pieces did not find much welcome during the anticosmopolitan campaign.216
211 GARF, f. R-5451, op 24, d. 278, ll. 7-17.
212 For example, see the following instruction booklet: V pomoshch’ krasnym ugolkam (Moscow, 1951), 33.
Also, see a speech at a 1952 Komsomol conference in Saratov’s Kirov neighborhood: GANISO, f. 3234,
op. 11, d. 85, l. 15.
213 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 710, ll. 17-18.
214 Vechera molodezhi (Odessa, 1952), 6.
215 “Vo dvortse kul’tury avtozavoda,” Moskovskii komsomolets, October 2, 1951.
216 Although official rhetoric did not directly censure such pieces, they only rarely received
acknowledgment as appropriate: for one example, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 630, l. 120.
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The authorities in the postwar Stalin years heavily promoted choruses above all
other forms of amateur music collectives. The 1950 Komsomol TsK Plenum’s resolution
on organized cultural recreation called for the organization of amateur choruses in
enterprises, collective farms, schools, and colleges.217 In Leningrad, the Komsomol city
committee underscored its work in helping create choruses, for example a 120-member
city youth chorus at the Leningrad Conservatory.218 V. E. Semichastnyi, a prominent
Komsomol official, even proposed creating an All-Union Chorus Society.219 V. K.
Stepanchuk, who rose to the rank of secretary of a neighborhood Komsomol cell, also
underlined the significance attributed to choruses at this time.220
The stress of choruses resulted from their embodiment of the late Stalinist ideal.
They constituted a mass, collective, disciplined endeavor, whose success depended on its
members functioning together as “small cogs” holding together the “machine” of the
chorus, evocative of Stalin’s famous toast. Another benefit of choruses was their link to
traditional Russian heritage, a perfect fit with the stress on nationalism in the
anticosmopolitan years.221 Also, Party officials easily understood songs, in contrast to
more abstract musical pieces.222 Lastly, with minimal need for equipment, amateur
chorus circles required little financial outlays.
217 Postanovleniia chetvertogo plenuma TsK VLKSM, 7, 12-13.
218 RGASPI, op. 32, d. 630, l. 90.
219 RGASPI, op. 32, d. 630, l. 110.
220 V. P. Stepanchuk, born 1929, interviewed May 19, 2009.
221 On promoting nationalism in the anticosmopolitan campaign, see Brandenberger, National Bolshevism,
214-26.
222 For the problems Party officials experienced in managing music due to its inherently abstract nature in
the 1920s and 1930s, see Amy Nelson, Music for the Revolution: Musicians and Power in Early Soviet
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The repertoire of drama collectives, which put on plays and read poems,
paralleled that of music circles. Frequently, they began their performance with a eulogy
of Stalin. A case in point, one performance by students of technical colleges began with a
reading of “A Word to the Great Stalin,” and another with “Stalin–equals peace.”223
While official rhetoric did not ban classical Russian plays, the emphasis lay on Soviet
productions, as exemplified by a 1951 list of recommended plays that included only
Soviet ones.224 Thus, at Saratov State University, SGU, an amateur collective produced a
play entitled “First Joys” in 1952, based on a novel about Saratov in World War I written
by the Saratovite Konstantin Fedin, who had received a Stalin Prize.225
Drama circles received explicit censure if they did not put on ideologized Soviet
plays. For instance, the Moscow city Komsomol committee criticized certain amateur
theater groups for performing “vulgar” plays, such as “Old Wives’ Tales,” and censured
lower-level Komsomol organizations that did not appropriately monitor the ideological
content of club activities.226 In another example, the author of an instruction booklet
described how the amateur collective of the Labinsk House of Culture had great success
among the audience with its first few performances. However, the group drew a rebuke
from the district Party committee for putting on light, entertaining plays, which
supposedly did not satisfy the demands of the local citizenry. The committee informed
223 For the first, see “Na stsene – remeslenniki,” Moskovskii komsomolets, June 13, 1951, and for the
second, see Vechera molodezhi, 6.
224 V pomoshch’ krasnym ugolkam, 35-37. Still, classical plays were occasionally performed. See “V
svobodnye chasy,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, June 29, 1948, and “Samodeiatel’nost’ kluba imeni Zueva,”
Moskovskii komsomolets, December 13, 1951.
225 Untitled article, Stalinets, May 6, 1952.
226 In its February 1953 annual conference: TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 133, l. 49.
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the house of culture management that such plays “might lead to rolling down a slippery
path to apolitical cultural entertainment” (apolitichnogo kul’turnichestva), and
recommended that the theater circle put on a play critical of foreign warmongers and
another praising collective farm production, which the group did.227
In claiming that the population wanted plays condemning foreign warmongers
and praising collective farms instead of the entertaining plays, the booklet presented an
idealized, Socialist Realist vision of what the bulk of the spectators actually desired.
After all, it was the light plays that made the Labinsk House of Culture drama collective
popular in the first place. This example illustrates the tension between what the Party
committee perceived as the problem of cultural recreation devolving to “apolitical
entertainment,” and the potential to use amateur arts to promote the agenda of the Party-
state, fighting the Cold War and increasing production. As such, this instruction booklet
shines bright light on the everyday, grassroots efforts of the authorities to mold the
cultural consumption desires and aesthetic tastes of the population to fit the
anticosmopolitan ideal of a New Soviet Woman and Man.
Amateur dance circles also carried an ideological load, though in a less direct
fashion than song and theater collectives. Dance groups typically performed various
forms of “mass dances,” often staged for official events, such as shows for election voters
or celebrations of the anniversary of the October Revolution.228 Folk dances represented
the most common form of recommended dances, especially Russian ones, embodying the
anticosmopolitan emphasis on Russian nationalism. An instruction booklet even
227 E. Semenov, Dom kul’tury na Kubani (Moscow, 1950), 9-10.
228  “Kontserty dlia izbiratelei,” Moskovskii komsomolets, January 28, 1951, and “Vo dvortse kul’tury
avtozavoda,” Moskovskii komsomolets, October 2, 1951.
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criticized satirical depictions of Russians in Russian folk dances, such as the traditional
personage of the “merry fool.” The author claimed that World War II revealed the
“amazing qualities” of Russian people, making their negative depictions in Russian folk
dances inappropriate.229 Likewise, cultural officials promoted novel “modern” and
“socialist” ballroom dances.  The Party-state intended such ballroom dances both to
convey ideological messages and to replace western dances, a goal pursued by some
officials already in the late stages of the war, as the last chapter made clear. These
endeavors took on new life in the anticosmopolitan campaign, as authorities promoted
novel ballroom dances, with names such as “Meeting of Friends.”230 The Komsomol
Propaganda Department placed high value on ballroom dances, old and new, insisting in
1952 that they had “almost completely” forced out western dances.231
Likewise, during the anticosmopolitan period, the vast majority of youth-oriented
evening events, which the Komsomol often helped to organize in clubs and PKOs,
centered on heavily ideologized themes. For instance, in 1949-50, the main themes of
Leningrad’s youth evenings spanned the struggle for peace and democracy, the great
communist construction projects, and the image of Lenin and Stalin in the arts.232 A
typical example of one such event comes from the Gor’kii House of Culture. Targeting
young voters, this event had games, songs, and dances in the foyer before the event
kicked off with a lecture entitled “The Stalin Constitution and Soviet Youth.” A theatrical
229 Khudozhestvennaia samodeiatel’nost’, 59-81
230 “Molodye talanty,” Moskovskii komsomolets, June 6, 1950.
231 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 710, l. 6.
232 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 630, l. 90.
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performance followed the lecture.233 Another event, devoted to friendship between
Moscow and Kiev college students, began with a speech praising the “great teacher and
leader” Comrade Stalin, followed by an amateur concert, and, finally, dancing the
waltz.234
Nonetheless, in contrast to the 1944 to 1946 period, from the late 1940s the
Komsomol’s official discourse powerfully censured club evening events that devoted
“excessive” effort to entertainment and lacked “sufficient” ideological content. In 1948,
Komsomol’skaia pravda strongly condemned a Kirovograd club that provided only
dancing.235 Such themes persisted into the early 1950s. For instance, in 1951 the
Krasnopresnenskii neighborhood Komsomol committee chastized a club that held daily
dances instead of organizing mass political work with youth.236 Similarly, the SGU
newspaper critiqued youth evenings lacking in ideological content.237 A 1951 editorial in
Komsomol’skaia pravda complained that evenings at clubs that feature dances and old
movies “cannot attract youth.”238
Since clubs often sought to offer the kinds of events that appealed most to youth
in order to fulfill financial plans by having visitors pay entry fees, such discursive claims
reveal the gaps between official rhetoric and actual youth desires at this time. Most youth
continued to find political propaganda unappealing, and lectures, as previously, drew
233 TsAGM, f. 44, op. 1, d. 19, ll. 3-4.
234 “Vecher druzhby,” Moskovskii komsomolets, February 7, 1953.
235 “Skuchno molodezhi v Kirovograde,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, June 19, 1948.
236 TsAOPIM, f. 667, op. 2, d. 41, l. 10.
237 “Bol’she vnimaniia studencheskim obshchezhitiiam,” Stalinets, March 25, 1952.
238 “Udovletvoriat’ kul’turnye zaprosy molodezhi,”Komsomol’skaia pravda, December 12, 1951.
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only a small audience, failing to fill halls and satisfy the financial needs of clubs. The
most revealing evidence comes from a keynote speech at a conference of
Krasnopresnenskii neighborhood Komsomol cadres, a semi-closed forum that permitted
more honesty. The secretary of the Krasnopresnenskii neighborhood Komsomol
disparaged the club of the Silicate factory for holding too few lectures on youth themes,
and also the secretary of the factory Komsomol cell, Comrade Olenin, for not doing
anything about this since, in Olenin’s words, “youth will not go to them anyway.”
Additionally, the speaker criticized the club of the Stromynka dormitory at Moscow State
University, MGU, for its lectures that had poor attendance. The club’s plan, according to
the speech, failed to respond to the demands of the students, for example by not
propagandizing Soviet patriotism sufficiently.239 Yet, as shown by the lack of popularity
for lectures, such Socialist Realist claims did not correspond to reality. Here, as
elsewhere, such discursive tropes functioned as a signal to convey top-level pressure for a
heavier ideological load.
In addition to acting against “inappropriate” club events, the Komsomol hierarchy
made occasional calls for Komsomol organizations to get more involved in organizing
youth evenings, for example in the 1950 Komsomol TsK Plenum resolution.240 Regional
Komsomol committees responded to these instructions. The Saratov oblast Komsomol
organization, in reporting on its implementation of the 1950 plenum’s decree, spotlighted
musical evenings held for youth.241 The 1951 Krasnopresnenskii Komsomol annual
239 TsAOPIM, f. 667, op. 2, d. 39, l. 14.
240 Postanovleniia chetvertogo plenuma TsK VLKSM, 15-17.
241 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 676, l. 13.
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conference censured some Komsomol cells that apparently did not pay sufficient
attention to organizing evenings of youth leisure.242
The Komsomol leadership’s encouragement of local Komsomol committees to
organize evenings for young people did not mean that the Komsomol’s top officials
wanted youth to exhibit autonomy in managing their own cultural activities. A 1952
instructional booklet, based on a trade union club at a Minsk factory, illustrates this well.
Printed by the Komsomol press, it represents an authoritative model of prescribed
cultural organization for Komsomol committees. According to the text, the club’s council
formulates the monthly plan in agreement with the factory Party and Komsomol
committee. The Party committee “pays a great deal of attention to the upbringing of
youth, and gives the club leadership much valuable advice and directives.” Komsomol
members helped organize youth evenings, consulting with the Party committee on the
topic of the lecture, finding a lecturer, and, together with the club management,
organizing a concert. These evenings, always tied to the production goals of the factory,
also endeavored to instill Soviet patriotism and artistic tastes in young workers, and
expand their cultural horizons.243 Another 1952 booklet, while stating that Komsomol
cells “should be the initiators” of activities in cultural institutions, highlighted the need
for all cultural work to serve the goal of bringing up youth in the spirit of Bolshevik
ideology, friendship of the peoples, and Soviet patriotism.244
242 TsAOPIM, f. 667, op. 2, d. 41, l. 10.
243 Kogda konchaetsia smena, 13-14.
244 Vechera molodezhi, 3, 5.
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Such sources shine light on the nature of officially-prescribed youth activism in
state-sponsored popular culture in the late Stalin years. The Party-state’s rhetoric on
organized cultural recreation demanded that local Komsomol cells show discipline and
subordinate themselves to the directives of Party committees. Recollections by a former
Moscow Komsomol neighborhood committee secretary, V. S. Miakhovka, support this
point. She stressed the important role of local Party committees and also trade union
committees and Ministry of Culture organizations in controlling the content of the
repertoire of club activities for youth during the anticosmopolitan period, noting that
Komsomol cells had only a minor voice.245 In fact, the trope of discipline pervaded
rhetoric on cultural recreation in these years. Thus the railroad trade union instructed its
red corners to help “raise the discipline of each worker.”246 Komsomol rhetoric not
dealing with state-sponsored popular culture likewise emphasized discipline.247
Allusions to youth autonomy and initiative figured only rarely in postwar Stalinist
discourse on young people. When they did, such references frequently appeared in the
context of discipline and management from above. For instance, the Komsomol’s
national organ published an article in December 1951 about the city of Melikess, entitled
“Develop Youth Initiative.” It praised a local Party committee for activating a Komsomol
cell. Before the Party’s intervention, the Komsomol cell “barely showed life,” but with
the Party’s deep, pervasive attention, the cell held conferences regularly and “discipline
has improved,” and now the Party would need to intervene only if the Komsomol gets off
245 V. S. Miakhkovka, born 1923, interviewed April 29, 2009.
246 V pomoshch’ krasnym ugolkam, 12.
247 For instance, on higher education: O rabote komsomol’skikh organizatsii vysshikh uchebnykh zavedenii,
5-6.
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track.248 In the same spirit, the 1952 Saratov city Komsomol conference censured the city
Komsomol committee for not providing enough direction to local Komsomol cells.249
Other Komsomol conferences and press stories in this period confirm that the vast
majority of criticism on the question of leadership ensued from insufficient instructions
and guidance from above, not from higher-up officials failing to provide room for
grassroots initiative.250 This mirrored the dynamic of the campaign for criticism and self-
criticism of the late postwar Stalin years, whose very narrow boundaries permitted only a
minimal scope for autonomous activism from below.251
The stress on youth discipline and passiveness dovetailed with the eulogizing of
Stalin. Artistic pieces about the “Great Leader” constituted part of the Stalin cult of
personality that reached new heights with the celebration of Stalin’s seventieth birthday
in 1949.252 The rhetoric’s demands that the populace show loyalty and gratitude to the
leader ascribed to Stalin the role of the initiator of any productive activity. The tropes in
the official discourse depicted young people as passive and responding only to top-level
initiatives, especially those originating directly from Stalin, which inevitably functioned
to deprive youth of legitimate space for individual agency.253
248 “Razvivat’ initsiativu molodezhi,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, December 9, 1951.
249 GANISO, f. 4529, op. 9, d. 3, l. 289.
250 TsAOPIM, f. 667, op. 2, d. 41, ll. 84-87, 130-35, and “Rabotat’ tvorcheski, initsiativno,”
Komsomol’skaia pravda, December 8, 1951.
251 On this campaign and its limits, see Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 103-12.
252 On the cult, see Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin!, 195-232.
253 On Stalin as source of authority, see Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, until It Was No More:
The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 36-76.
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Instruments of Oversight and Officially-Prescribed Motivations
Responding to pressure from above to improve controls over state-sponsored
popular culture, Komsomol and club officials undertook various institutionalized efforts
to monitor amateur arts. For instance, they joined or established art councils, which
brought together Komsomol, Party, trade union, MOC, and enterprise officials, as well as
professional and amateur artists. In the prewar period, such institutions sought to improve
the artistic quality of club events and to control their content. Largely inactive during the
war, art councils experienced a revival in the years of the anticosmopolitan campaign,
with their censorship function acquiring priority. For example, the Gor’kii House of
Culture organized an art council, which reportedly gave directions to each amateur
collective on implementing a “high-quality” program.254 The Stalin auto factory Palace of
Culture indicated that it created an art council to better manage its amateur arts.255
In certain large cities, cultural institutions known as a House of Folk Creativity
(Dom narodnogo tvorchestva, DNT, also called House of Amateur Arts, Dom
khudozhestvennoi samodeiatel’nosti), played a central role in oversight functions. Top
Komsomol officials, such as Semichastnyi, underlined the importance of DNTs in
managing the work in amateur arts at that time.256 The most prominent Soviet DNT, in
Moscow, had oversight over the capital and attendant influence over the rest of the
USSR.257 Its functions included examining and approving all amateur circle repertoires
and giving the collectives guidance, training, and support, with the goal of managing their
254 TsAGM, f. 44, op. 1, d. 12, ll. 29-31.
255 “Bol’shaia druzhba,” Moskovskii komsomolets, May 27, 1950.
256 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 630, ll. 108-09.
257 TsAGM, f. 2987, op. 1, d. 1, l. 1.
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artistic content.258 For instance, DNT representatives watched all shows before their open
debut at Moscow’s Gor’kii House of Culture.259
Amateur cultural competitions served as another instrument of managing
organized cultural recreation. These began with local-level contests, for example between
amateur circles within a local establishment, such as the ten amateur circles at the
different workshops of the Cheboksarsk electric appliance factory.260 SGU had even more
amateur collectives, holding annual internal competitions between the different
departments (fakul’tety).261 Collectives that won local competitions met in neighborhood
and then city-level competitions.262 The collectives awarded top honors in these contests
sometimes went on to oblast and then national competitions, with financial support for
travel often coming from Party-state institutions.263
These contests offered an opportunity for the hierarchy to assess the current state
of amateur arts, which provided a corrective to the overly rosy picture in reports from
below.264 Clubs and Komsomol organizations, fully realizing this evaluative aspect of the
contests, devoted much more energy to amateur arts shortly before and during these
events, a practice that inspired much criticism from above. In 1947, for example, the
258 TsAGM, f. 2987, op. 1, d. 13, ll. 1-2.
259 TsAGM, f. 44, op. 1, d. 19, ll. 7-10.
260 “V svobodnye chasy,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, June 29, 1948.
261 “Nachalsia smotr khudozhestvennoi samodeiatel’nosti,” Stalinets, December 12, 1952.
262 “150 sel’skikh khorov,” Moskovskii komsomolets, October 3, 1950, and “Molodye talanty,” Moskovskii
komsomolets, June 6, 1950.
263 For the oblast level, see “Smotr sel’skoi khudozhestvennoi samodeiatel’nost’,” Moskovskii komsomolets,
December 7, 1950. For the all-union level, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 523, ll. 3-6.
264 On the problem of inflation of numbers in reports from below in regard to industry, see Joseph S.
Berliner, Factory and Manager in the USSR (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).
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Krasnopresnenskii neighborhood Komsomol lambasted the fact that amateur circles
functioned primarily during competitions.265 Three years later, the Komsomol
Propaganda Department similarly lambasted such behavior, testifying to the scale of this
problem.266 Still, these events enabled the bureaucracy to gather more data about the state
of amateur participants than reports from below would have provided by themselves, and
limited the potential for extreme falsification. Furthermore, the contests served to
intensify work in the amateur arts. In doing so, they mirrored elements of the
competitions in industry, which also praised model laborers and collectives in order to
improve production.267
In contrast to industrial production, however, amateur art contests served as a way
to monitor and send signals about the appropriate repertoire and the ideological goals of
amateur art. For instance, the Komsomol Propaganda Department’s report on the 1947
competition of Moscow’s technical college students stressed that “in the repertoire of
circles, there now appear works reflecting the might and steadfastness of the Soviet
system, instilling love in the Motherland.”268 Such statements are strongly indicative of
the differences between officially-recommended amateur art competitions in the
anticosmopolitan years and those held earlier, which featured more entertainment-
oriented and less ideologized pieces. Amateur competitions, likewise, served to reveal
problems in the repertoire. A case in point, Semichastnyi criticized amateur cultural
265 TsAOPIM, f. 667, op. 2, d. 14, l. 159.
266 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 630, l. 151.
267 On such industrial competitions, see Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 72-105, and Berliner, Factory and Manager.
268 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 6, d. 32, ll. 1-2.
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competitions in 1950 for “apolitical, low-quality works lacking in ideological content.”
Not coincidentally, he also called for holding regular competitions at all levels.269 Press
rhetoric and the awarding of prizes highlighted officially-prescribed repertoires, setting
them as a model for the all to follow.270
While the brunt of the demands on Komsomol work regarding state-sponsored
popular culture emphasized ideological concerns, cultural enlightenment received some
attention as well, if scant. Though decidedly emphasizing the ideological load of
organized cultural activities, the 1950 Komsomol TsK Plenum’s resolution did mention
the need to bring up cultured youth.271 The keynote speaker of the 1951
Krasnopresnenskii neighborhood Komsomol conference directed Komsomol
organizations to improve their work on raising the cultural level of youth.272 Lists of
approved lectures, overwhelmingly dealing with politics and production, generally
included a few on cultural topics at the bottom.273
Less frequently, official rhetoric presented amateur arts and youth evenings as
helping to draw young people into greater involvement in Party-state institutions,
especially in conjunction with the eventual goal of joining the Komsomol, a continuation
of the postwar drive for higher membership. Official publications sometimes linked the
Komsomol’s organization of cultural events with growth in the Komsomol ranks, for
instance inspiring the increase of a sewing factory’s cell from twenty-six members in
269 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 630, l. 110.
270 “Smotr sel’skoi khudozhestvennoi samodeiatel’nosti,” Moskovskii komsomolets, December 7, 1950.
271 Postanovleniia chetvertogo plenuma TsK VLKSM, 9.
272 TsAOPIM, f. 667, op. 2, d. 41, l. 9.
273 TsAGM, f. 44, op. 1, d. 16, ll. 11-13, and V pomoshch’ krasnym ugolkam, 14-18.
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1947 to over a hundred in 1952.274 The Rostov-on-Don Komsomol reported in 1948 that
the improvement of political and cultural work resulted in the city cell increasing its rate
of growth.275 Such claims likely had some basis in reality. The appeal of getting free
tickets to a Komsomol-organized evening may well have swayed some to join. Likewise,
if a primary Komsomol cell involved itself actively in bringing about amateur art and
youth evenings, it might well have convinced youth interested in state-sponsored popular
culture to join the Komsomol. Furthermore, membership offered young people a chance
to play a bigger role in organizing club activities, which some youth enjoyed.
Another benefit, as portrayed in the discourse, consisted of improving labor
productivity. Some press stories depicted fun and pleasurable cultural recreation as a
requisite that leads to better labor at the workplace.276 However, such direct connections
between relaxation and higher labor productivity appeared with rarity during the late
Stalin years, owing to the Stalinist state’s emphasis on nonstop production efforts.277
More in line with the latter trope, official sources depicted club activities that
propagandized production as inspiring workers to commit to higher outputs. For instance,
improved cultural work supposedly resulted in young Rostov-on-Don workers fulfilling
and over fulfilling production plans.278 A youth evening in Minsk centering on lowering
costs and saving metal apparently inspired groups of Komsomol members to take on the
274 Vechera molodezhi, 8.
275 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 475, l. 142.
276 “Park – dlia molodezhi,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, June 2, 1949.
277 See Stephen E. Hanson, Time and Revolution: Marxism and the Design of Soviet Institutions (Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 131-33.
278 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 475, l. 142.
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obligation to save many tons of metal.279 Undoubtedly, some young workers motivated
by socialist competition found the combination of propaganda and fun inspirational and,
following the tropes of official discourse, readily took on new obligations after such
events.280 For others more skeptical of the assertions in official rhetoric, such evenings
may have served as a signal of current priorities and consequent potential rewards for
following the demands of the system in taking on new obligations.
Tellingly, the use of state-sponsored youth popular cultural activities to battle
against juvenile “delinquency” received almost no attention in high-level policy
statements or the youth press during the years of the anticosmopolitan campaign. In rare
instances, it appeared in internal reports from the oblasts.281 Instead, the Komsomol
generally ascribed even the most violent crimes to insufficient political lectures and
upbringing work.282 The postwar Stalin Komsomol press, in the rare instances when it
acknowledged hooliganism by young people, generally connected it to incompetent
socializing by the local Komsomol or educational organizations, or blamed parents.283
Other Party-state agencies similarly prescribed a mixture of political propaganda and
coercion as the appropriate solutions to juvenile “delinquency,” with the use of force
279 Kogda konchaetsia smena, 16-17.
280 On the belief of many postwar Soviet youth in official claims, see Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 134-
36.
281 For instance, a Komsomol Propaganda Department summary of the reports of a host of oblasti on
organized cultural recreation referenced only one, the Karelo-Finskaia SSR, which connected the poor
organization of state-sponsored youth popular culture to the existence of youth hooliganism. See RGASPI,
f. M-1, op. 32, d. 630, l. 83.
282 A case in point, when Leonid Gorenkov, born in 1936, a school Komsomol secretary, killed the fourth-
grader Aleksandr Kishkin in December 1952, the oblast Komsomol organization reported that “this fact
resulted from unsatisfactory political enlightenment and teaching in the school”: RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32,
d. 742, ll. 25-26.
283 “‘Trudnye’ mal’chiki,” Moskovskii komsomolets, December 25, 1952, and “Za otsovskoi spinoi,”
Komsomol’skaia pravda, June 22, 1950.
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receiving preference at the top levels of policy-making.284 In this approach to youth
misconduct, the postwar Stalinist state in the late 1940s reproduced the prewar pattern,
continuing to hold to the hard-line posture advocated in the NEP by the Left faction.
Young People and Officially-Recommended Organized Cultural Recreation
Young people generally participated in amateur art circles based on personal
enthusiasm for cultural activities. Komsomol members did fulfill social obligations by
doing so, while Komsomol officials received credit for their work on these activities.285
Nonetheless, amateur arts stood on the bottom rung in the hierarchy of praiseworthy
social work, with considerably more importance given to political propaganda or
volunteer construction work and, in the postwar Stalin years, sports. D. V. Gal’tsov, an
amateur art circle participant, made this clear: “the administration considered
participation in amateur arts as social work, and every [student] had to have some sort of
social work,” which “was included in one’s official file.” Otherwise, the student might be
criticized as an “antisocial element” and encounter potential obstacles in one’s life path,
such as in attempting to enter graduate school, since “all formal moments were tied with”
the official file. Yet amateur cultural activities, in his words, lay “in the bottom drawer”
of the hierarchy of prescribed social work. He underscored that he would have
“undoubtedly” participated in amateur arts without getting official credit for it, since
284 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 122, d. 102, ll. 215-22; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 122, d. 289, ll. 2-12; and GARF, f. 9401,
op. 2, d. 199, l. 184-89. Reprinted in: E. Iu. Zubkova, L. P. Koshelova, G. A. Kuznetsova, A. I. Miniuk, and
L. A. Rogovaia eds., Sovetskaia zhizn’, 1945-1953 (Moscow, Rosspen, 2003), 194-210. For more on the
postwar Stalinist approach to youth crime, see Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 167-99.
285 Such praise of lower-level Komsomol officials was described by N. A. Troitskii, born 1931, interviewed
May 22, 2009.
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“people engaged in amateur arts out of their own personal desire.”286 V. A. Miliaev,
another amateur art activist, confirmed that amateur arts figured in the official file of
Komsomol members, but also insisted that he did not participate in them just for “a
checkmark” in his file.287 According to O. V. Chernyaev, amateur arts “was that which
you were not forced to do, but did by choice out of your own personal desire, yet when
the official file is written, it includes active participation in social work, in amateur
arts.”288 Such personal memories help illustrate the real desire of many young Soviet
people to partake in club events, with 4,800,000 participants on the eve of Stalin’s death.
Furthermore, these personal sources open the curtain on the willingness of young
people to invest their emotions and feelings, traditionally ascribed to the private realm,
into conformist forms of cultural recreation organized by the Party-state, generally
equated with the public sphere. A case in point, during her reading of a selection from a
Stalin Prize-winning novel, A. A. Fadeev’s Young Guard, at an oblast-level amateur art
competition in Ukraine, N. K. Petrova experienced such intense emotion that she burst
into tears, and audience members cried as well. She remembers this event and the
emotion it evoked with clarity to this day.289 As a schoolgirl, S. N. Shchegol’kova
enjoyed the opportunity to dance officially-recommended ballroom dances in amateur
dance circles.290 The Saratovite F. A. Kurilova sang and read poetry, and recalled her
286 D. V. Gal’tsоv, born 1942, interviewed February 20, 2009.
287 V. A. Miliaev, born 1937, interviewed February 28, 2009.
288 O. V. Chernyaev, born 1946, interviewed February 22, 2009. For more confirmation that amateur arts
counted as social work for the Komsomol, see S. V. Semenov, born 1948, interviewed March 18, 2009.
289 N. K. Petrova, born in the late 1930s, interviewed May 5, 2009.
290 S. N. Shchegol’kova, born 1937, interviewed February 19, 2009.
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excitement over going through all levels of an amateur art competition, up to the final
performance at the oblast level.291 In another case, V. N. Iarskaia enthusiastically
performed in amateur plays, and even over fifty years later clearly recollected the details
of a scene where she played the role of a spy interrogated by the Soviet political police.292
Although youth had minimal input on the shape and content of organized cultural
recreation, many young people who sincerely accepted the claims of official discourse
and were not bothered by the heavy ideological load found in state-sponsored popular
culture a means of expressing themselves, their values, and their agency. Furthermore, if
writing personal diaries could serve the goal of making a model communist on an
individual level, singing paeans to the Party, World War II, and production achievements
in a chorus of fellow amateur singers likely contributed to a collective process of
instilling and confirming officially-prescribed ideals among these youth.293 The fact that
young people invested personal emotions and feelings and devoted much time and energy
to such activities may well have contributed to them being forged into New Soviet People
through organized cultural recreation.
However, the slow rate of expansion of such “appropriate” state-sponsored
popular cultural offerings for youth served as an obstacle to the Party-state’s intentions. A
major reason for the failure of the mass cultural recreation network to orient itself toward
291 F. A. Kurilova, born 1936, interviewed May 15, 2009.
292 V. N. Iarskaia, born in the mid-1930s, interviewed May 30, 2009.
293 On diary writing, see Jochen Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). Also, see the contributions to Jochen Hellbeck and Klaus
Heller eds., Autobiographical Practices in Russia/Autobiographische Praktiken in Russland  (Goettingen:
Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2004). Especially relevant is Katerina Clark, “‘The History of the Factories’ as a
Factory of History: a Case Study on the Role of Soviet Literature in Subject Formation,” in Hellbeck and
Heller eds., Autobiographical Practices in Russia., 251-78. Also see Anna Krylova, "In Their Own Words?
Autobiographies of Women Writers, 1930-1946," in Adele Barker and Jehanne M. Gheith eds., A History
of Women’s Writing in Russia (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2002), 243-63.
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youth was the reluctance of many local-level Komsomol cadres to invest much effort into
club activities. For instance, the director of a PKO in the city of Gor’kii complained in
1949 that neighborhood Komsomol committees expressed no interest in the PKO’s
work.294 In 1950, Moscow’s Komsomol paper decried Komsomol committees in Moscow
oblast’s Kommunisticheskii district for not taking any measures to correct problems in
local clubs that provided insufficient cultural events for youth.295 The Komsomol of the
“Avtostal’” factory in Stalin oblast came under criticism from the Komsomol Propaganda
Department in 1952 for its failure to organize adequate cultural activities for young
people, as out of 6,000 young workers, only 88 participated in amateur art circles.296
Considering the fact that the Komsomol leadership paid minimal attention to
state-sponsored youth popular culture, such statistics should not have surprised the
department. The Komsomol’s top officials placed much more pressing demands on local
Komsomol cadres, with political propaganda, production needs, and even sport
organization having higher priority than cultural recreation. The overloaded local
Komsomol cadres, consequently, had little incentives to put more than token efforts into
helping organize club events in the postwar Stalin years. According to L. K. Baliasnaia, a
former Komsomol TsK Secretary, those few who engaged in substantive cultural work
largely acted out of their own, personal enthusiasm and commitment, as opposed to
responding to directives and incentives from above.297
294 “Parki i sady – dlia molodezhi,”Komsomol’skaia pravda, June 3, 1949.
295 “V storone ot zaprosov molodezhi,” Moskovskii komsomolets, May 20, 1950.
296 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 710, ll. 19-25.
297 L. K. Baliasnaia, born 1927, interviewed April 5, 2009. In the early and mid-1950s, Baliasnaia served in
Ukraine, rising to the position of managing all young people in Ukrainian educational institutions. In the
late 1950s and early 1960s, she became a Komsomol TsK Secretary in charge of all Komsomol activities
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In addition to the lack of attention from the top, the demographic profile of
Komsomol cadres played a major role in the low level of concern local-level officials
expressed over supplying young people with state-sponsored popular culture. At this
time, a high percentage of Komsomol officials were war veterans. As a result, a
significant age gap existed between them and their cell members.298 The former soldiers
who served as Komsomol cadres focused their energy on education, job training, and
political activism in an effort to catch up on what they missed during the war and to
establish a career. They had little time left for Komsomol work, such as club activities,
that they, quite accurately, perceived as not advancing their careers. Furthermore, as
recalled by A. I. Avrus, who matriculated into SGU in 1948, former soldiers personally
preferred to spend their free time on paramilitary training and sports, and considered
cultural recreation intrinsically less important.299
This led to some tensions with nonveteran Komsomol members at SGU. Avrus
related that SGU students who went to college straight from high school sought not only
to acquire an education for a career, but also to find a path into adult society and an
identity, and even to “spend five years having fun.” As a result, nonveteran SGU students
tended to spend much more time on state-sponsored popular cultural activities, especially
since they developed some artistic abilities due to the opportunities to participate in
amateur circles in schools and after-school programs. Overall, Avrus recalls that “during
aimed at youth in schools. From the mid-1960s, she served as the Deputy Minister of Enlightenment. For
more on Baliasnaia, see A. A. Alekseeva, Stroka v biografii (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2003), 72.
298 For more on veterans, including their role as Komsomol officials and interactions with nonveteran
members, see Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 32-63, and Mark Edele, Soviet Veterans of the Second World
War: A Popular Movement in an Authoritarian Society, 1941-1991 (New York: Oxford University Press,
2008), 39-101.
299 A. I. Avrus, born 1930, interviewed May 28, 2009.
114
this time there was a comparatively strong desire among students to engage in amateur
arts,” owing to the end of the war and the accompanying “desire for a peaceful life, with
participation in amateur arts and sports helping show that peace had arrived.” Further,
according to Avrus, students lacked other forms of entertainment in those years, with the
exception of movies, making “amateur arts or participation in sports the only way of
relaxing.”300 Others, such as N. A. Troitskii, also at SGU in those years, similarly recalled
student enthusiasm for amateur arts.301 This evidence confirms the tensions resulting
from the gap found in the literature in age and veteran status between lower-level
Komsomol officials and Komsomol members.302 Moreover, it illustrates the Party-state’s
failure to deliver a sufficient amount of conformist cultural consumption options to
satisfy the desires of at least some young people who wanted such cultural recreation.
If a deficiency in the amount of normative mass cultural recreation functioned as
one obstacle to using club activities to build model young communists, the content of
conformist cultural events offered another challenge. A subset of young people who liked
the noncontroversial, officially-approved forms of state-sponsored popular culture
rejected some of the tropes resulting from the heavy ideologization of repertoires during
the anticosmopolitan campaign. Troitskii, for example, enjoyed performances in an
amateur vocal circle and also served as a Komsomol primary cell official in charge of
cultural activities. According to him, “it was obligatory to open a concert with a song
about Stalin,” yet this “was perceived as a formality” that did not reflect the actual
300 Ibid.
301 N. A. Troitskii, born 1931, interviewed May 22, 2009.
302 On these conflicts, see Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 32-63, and Ludmilla Alekseeva and Paul
Goldberg, The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin Era (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), 29-
56.
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sentiment and values of young people, at least in his clique. In contrast, although patriotic
songs also formed a compulsory part of a concert, he insisted that youth sang such songs
with true feeling, despite their obligatory nature, as they, and he, “believed, with
pleasure” (ia sam veril, s udovol’stviem), in the content of songs about the Civil War, the
Great Patriotic War, and the Soviet Motherland.303 For young people such as Troitskii
and his friends, the contradiction between some of the tropes in the obligatory amateur art
repertoire, and their personal sentiments and feelings, undoubtedly bred cynicism and
undermined the Party-state’s attempt to forge New Soviet People through mass cultural
events.
Likewise, the politicization of professional cultural activities in the
anticosmopolitan campaign inspired the hostility of some young amateurs. Iarskaia, the
amateur drama circle performer, remembered how she, together with her class in school,
went to see a contemporary opera written by a Soviet composer, Mal’tsev, entitled “From
the Whole Heart.” Sitting in the nosebleed section in the gallery, she and other members
of the class “listened with horror,” as the tenor began to sing: “and so, we begin the Party
committ-ee mee-ting.” The whole gallery, according to her, began to laugh. The class did
not even stay until the end of the performance.304
Moreover, not all club events ostensibly devoted to ideologically approved
themes fit the confines of officially-recommended practices, as exemplified by an
unusual SGU amateur concert held on May 9, 1950, to mark the fifth anniversary of the
end of the war. While Stalin revoked the celebration of Victory Day soon after the war,
303 N. A. Troitskii, born 1931, interviewed May 22, 2009.
304 V. N. Iarskaia, born in the mid-1930s, interviewed May 30, 2009.
116
many veterans celebrated it on a more informal basis.305 SGU student veterans decided to
mark the occasion with a concert, finding support from the SGU Komsomol as many of
its officials fought in the war. This performance featured an SGU student veteran who
sang what Avrus labeled “folklore from the front.” During the concert, the 200 audience
members “did not make one sound” because of “how interesting the songs were.”306 Such
events, which conveyed the individual soldier’s perspective as opposed to the prescribed
vision of the authorities, did function to promote patriotism, yet undermined some aspects
of the official narrative of the war, and thus the molding of New Soviet Women and Men.
Conclusion
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Stalinist leadership pursued the goal of
forging an anticosmopolitan version of model young Soviet people, ones highly
ideologized and politicized, disciplined as opposed to initiative-oriented, and mobilized
for the Cold War. To achieve this aim, the Party-state wanted to manage the cultural
consumption desires, aesthetic tastes, and social values of young people through state-
sponsored popular culture, powerfully impacting this sphere of activities. Indeed, much
of the relatively limited efforts the Komsomol devoted to organizing cultural events for
youth in these years revolved around enacting the tenets of the anticosmopolitan
campaign, in contrast to expanding youth access to fun cultural recreation as in the
immediate postwar period. The anticosmopolitan campaign insisted on a widescale
escalation in the ideological elements of club activities, along with an extensive
305 For more on local-level celebrations of Victory Day by veterans, see Edele, Soviet Veterans of the
Second World War, and Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead.
306 A. I. Avrus, born 1930, interviewed May 28, 2009.
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centralization of repertoire management. These initiatives achieved significant successes
in imposing top-down controls over noncontroversial, leadership-recommended forms of
club activities in the late postwar Stalin years. The Party-state created and distributed a
series of recommended plays, songs, and dances, as well as instructions for normative
youth evenings. Instruments of oversight such as artistic councils and DNTs, and amateur
cultural contests, helped the Kremlin monitor repertoires at the grassroots. Official
rhetoric demanded that any youth activism in this and other spheres fully subordinate
itself to the ideologically conscious vanguard, meaning all levels of the Party hierarchy.
This chapter, by tracing how the Soviet cultural bureaucracy implemented the
anticosmopolitan campaign on the ground, helps illustrate how official ideological
initiatives were enacted in Soviet everyday life.
In spite of the high ideological load of state-sponsored popular culture during the
anticosmopolitan campaign, on the eve of Stalin’s death 4,800,000 youth took part in
amateur arts. Unlike some other officially-approved forms of social work such as
volunteer construction projects or sports, amateur arts carried a heavy ideological load
during the anticosmopolitan campaign. Many of the young amateur performers did not
express any hesitation about their participation, as they sincerely believed in the ideals
and values promoted by the anticosmopolitan campaign. These true believers willingly
and enthusiastically performed pieces eulogizing official tropes, spotlighting the fact that,
for some conformist youth, individual agency was compatible with full participation in
heavily ideologized state-sponsored cultural activities. Additionally, young people
placing their emotions and feelings into their artistic self-expression at highly politicized
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club events illustrates the lack of clear, distinct boundaries between sharply marked
private and public realms.
For such youth, participating in amateur arts likely proved effective in
strengthening their acceptance of the rhetoric’s messages, and also taking in new official
tropes, such as the disparagement of the US during the anticosmopolitan campaign.307 In
this regard, state-sponsored popular culture contributed to the Stalinist leadership’s goal
of molding youth into an anticosmopolitan version of New Soviet Individuals, especially
since inspiring strong emotions serves as a powerful way of instilling values and
norms.308 Building on the recent literature on Soviet subjectivity that illustrates how
official discourse encouraged the writing of autobiographical narratives to attempt to
forge people into model communists, my findings enrich this historiography by
highlighting another mechanism of doing so, one deployed on a mass scale and in a
collective setting.309
The Party-state, however, faced a series of obstacles in using ideologically-
approved forms of cultural recreation to forge young New Soviet People. The Soviet
leadership placed little emphasis on increasing the provision of organized cultural
activities for youth. Because of this, the Komsomol leadership and much of the
307 See Rósa Magnúsdóttir, “Keeping Up Appearances: How the Soviet State Failed to Control Popular
Attitudes toward the United States of America, 1945–1959” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill, 2006).
308 For how the prewar Soviet state sought to use positive emotions resulting from festivals to instill norms
and values, and the challenges in doing so, see Malte Rolfe, Sovetskie massovye prazdniki (Moscow:
ROSSPEN, 2009), and Karen Petrone, Life Has Become More Joyous, Comrades: Celebrations in the Time
of Stalin (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000).
309 On using narratives to forge model communists, see Igal Halfin, From Darkness to Light: Class,
Consciousness, and Salvation in Revolutionary Russia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000);
Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind; Clark, “‘The History of the Factories’ as a Factory of History”; Anna
Krylova, Soviet Women in Combat: A History of Violence on the Eastern Front (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 20-26; and Krylova, “In Their Own Words?”
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Komsomol hierarchy focused on political propaganda and production concerns, and to a
lesser extent on improving youth access to sports. Cultural activities occupied a miniscule
portion of Komsomol organizational work, with only cultural enthusiasts among lower-
level cadres investing much effort into this sphere. The cultural consumption demands of
many rank-and-file Komsomol youth, even for fully normative forms of organized
cultural recreation, remained unmet, especially due to the gap between age and veteran
status of Komsomol cadres and ordinary members. This inspired tensions between
conformist youth and the Komsomol hierarchy, and, as a result, the Party-state. The
leadership’s own policy, therefore, contributed to undermining its intentions in this
sphere.
Another challenge to the Party-state’s goals emerged from the fact that a number
of young people participated in the heavily-ideologized forms of amateur arts and youth
evenings that fit within the tenets of the anticosmopolitan campaign only due to the lack
of other options. These young people enjoyed officially-approved forms of amateur
artistic activities, such as choruses and plays, while rejecting some or most aspects of the
heavily politicized repertoires, especially eulogies of Stalin, though patriotic-themed
events found much grassroots support. For such young people, participating in organized
cultural recreation meant distancing their personal sentiments and feelings from what
they performed. Such “singing Bolshevik” bred cynicism and disillusionment, subverting
the aims of the Stalinist leadership to forge New Soviet Men and Women.310
Simultaneously, these young people developed a strategic approach to interactions with
310 Here, I tweak Stephen Kotkin’s use of the term “speaking Bolshevik,” which he defines in the context of
the Stalin era as “the obligatory language for self-identification and as such, the barometer of one’s political
allegiance to the cause.” See Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1995), 220.
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the Party-state, maneuvering within the clubs to acquire access to the artistic activities
they desired, a skill that would serve them well in their adult lives.
Chapter 3
The Anticosmopolitan Campaign, 1947-53: Part 2, Purging the Repertoire
The previous chapter investigated the impact of the anticosmopolitan campaign
on top-level guidelines for appropriate state-sponsored cultural offerings for the masses
of youth, and the resulting intensification in the politicization of club activities. This
chapter reveals that a number of clubs, as well as parks of culture and leisure–PKOs,
hosted jazz and western dancing, activities that went directly against the tenets of the
anticosmopolitan campaign, undermining its spirit and purpose. I first examine official
efforts to expunge western dancing and jazz from club activities, especially by the
Komsomol leadership and ideological control organs such as the Houses of Folk
Creativity, DNTs. The significant challenges they met in enacting the anticosmopolitan
campaign’s prohibition on western popular culture at the grassroots level offer insights on
the nature of the Soviet system as a whole. I demonstrate that official socialist culture in
the height of the postwar Stalin period, far from being monolithic, was riven by tensions
between economic incentives oriented toward consumption and ideological directives
from the top, a conflict ultimately attributable to the policies of the Kremlin itself.
In the chapter, I also draw on interviews with former Komsomol officials as well
as with a variety of ordinary youth who grew up in the postwar Stalin era to illuminate
the perspective of young people who partook in western popular culture during the
anticosmopolitan campaign. First, this chapter scrutinizes the understudied alternative
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youth culture of jazz enthusiasts, a community of fans who used legal and illegal means
to listen to the newest American and western European jazz music, despite official
prohibitions. Second, it investigates the much larger mass of youth who danced what
official discourse at this time labeled as western dances, including the foxtrot, tango, and
rumba. Though such behavior presented a challenge to the Stalinist leadership’s goals of
forging disciplined, militant young New Soviet People mobilized for the Cold War, the
preponderance of youth who consumed western popular culture did not perceive their
actions as resistant or anti-Soviet. Instead, their conduct exhibits a high degree of
awareness of the Soviet system and thus integration into it, as they successfully
maneuvered to achieve their desires within its confines, showing the room available for
individual agency in official cultural institutions. Likewise, I illustrate the ideological
organs’ difficulty in transforming the cultural consumption desires and aesthetic tastes of
young people. Finally, my findings permit insights on the nature of the public and private
spheres in the Soviet context, as well as on the young generation growing up in the
postwar Stalinist era
The Party-State’s Struggle with Western Popular Culture in Club Institutions
The anticosmopolitan campaign pronounced a strict proscription on western
cultural influence in club activities. For popular music, this included not only a
prohibition on all American-style jazz, but even the Sovietized jazz that mixed balalaikas
with saxophones. In regard to dancing, the ban spanned not only the more recently-
imported jazz dances, such as the lindy-hop and charleston, but also the older foxtrot,
tango, and rumba. While these dances had less explicit associations with jazz as such, in
123
the Soviet context they were traditionally danced to music with elements of jazz played
by jazz bands.
Following the tenets of the anticosmopolitan campaign, and particularly the Party
TsK’s 1948 decree on music, the Komsomol leadership took a series of steps to purge
western popular culture from mass recreation, since youth constituted the largest
demographic group consuming such cultural offerings. Komsomol-owned newspapers
played a central role in this top-down initiative. A case in point, Komsomol’skaia pravda
published a letter to the editor that condemned a club in a workers’ settlement where
“mournful (zaunyvnye) tangos and vulgar foxtrots are boring youth, but there are no other
dances there.”311 Expressing similar antiwestern rhetoric, Moskovskii komsomolets
critiqued the administration of the club of the Bauman factory for thinking that “the only
entertainment for youth should be dancing the foxtrot to the sound of jazz,” with the
journalist lambasting the “cacophony produced by one dingy ensemble” with “as a rule,
only a western repertoire.”312 A 1952 story in this paper attributed the interest of young
people at a Moscow factory in “vulgar romances and foxtrots” to incompetent work in
socializing youth, criticizing the Komsomol organization there.313 While the paper’s
disparagement of foxtrot dancing explicitly relates to the broader criticism of western
popular culture, the mention of “vulgar romances” refers to a blend of gypsy, criminal,
and folk music that served as popular entertainment. The latter, becoming popular in the
cities of late imperial Russia and surviving throughout the Soviet period despite official
311 "V klube tol’ko tantsuiut...," Komsomol’skaia pravda, December 8, 1951.
312 “Klub ili… tansploshchadka?” Moskovskii komsomolets, January 19, 1950.
313 “Kak zhe nam provodit’ svobodnoe vremia?” Moskovskii komsomolets, August 14, 1952.
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disapprobation, suffered a degree of suppression in the general clampdown of the
anticosmopolitan campaign, although not nearly as much as jazz or western dancing.314
In publishing such articles, which appeared with some regularity in the youth press
throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, newspapers fulfilled their function as
investigators and overseers of the implementation of the Komsomol leadership’s policy.
The papers censured club and PKO managers for putting on western dances and
Komsomol officials for looking the other way, instead of taking appropriate educational
and disciplining measures.
The press depicted ordinary youth, however, as going to these dances only
because of a lack of other interesting activities, or due to young people’s confusion about
what constituted “appropriate” popular cultural activities. Although clearly hostile to
such dances, Komsomol rhetoric rarely presented overt criticism of their young
participants and, despite the occasional article broadly condemning “bowing down to the
West,” the papers usually did not draw explicit connections between “bowing down” and
dancing the foxtrot, tango, and rumba. The young dancers themselves, consequently,
occupied an ambiguous location in the contours of official public discourse,
demonstrating the difficulties in finding the appropriate approach to an officially
condemned activity enjoyed by so many young people. Besides such press rhetoric, the
Komsomol also sent brigades that included music students to visit cultural institutions
and restaurants and ensure that western music did not appear there. They compared the
314 On the origin of such songs, see Richard Stites, Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment and Society
since 1900 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 12-16, and Louise McReynolds, Russia at
Play: Leisure Activities at the End of the Tsarist Era (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 223-52.
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repertoires of house bands with lists of forbidden melodies and styles, and vetoed
forbidden jazz-style tunes.315
The Komsomol hierarchy placed direct pressure on central Soviet agencies to
comply with the drive against western popular culture. In 1950, the First Secretary of the
Komsomol P. A. Mikhailov sent a note to Deputy Prime Minister G. M. Malenkov
criticizing the content of gramophone records produced by government-owned factories.
Their repertoire apparently included “dance music in jazz style,” such as rumbas and
foxtrots by Alexander Tsfasman, as well as gypsy songs performed by Tamara Tsereteli,
a prominent female singer, and also songs influenced by a criminal lifestyle. Mikhailov
requested more Russian folk and Soviet songs.316 In another letter to Malenkov,
Mikhailov complained of repertoire booklets with “songs in a westernized jazz style.”317
In 1952, the Komsomol Propaganda Department asked for a decrease in the radio
broadcasts of what it called “American and western European dance music.”318
While such censure of non-Komsomol institutions served as a relatively painless
and easy way of underlining the Komsomol’s commitment to the anticosmopolitan
campaign, the department likewise undertook investigations into how regional
Komsomol cells followed central Komsomol policy. One investigation into Orlov oblast
315 S. Frederick Starr, Red and Hot: The Fate of Jazz in the Soviet Union, 1917-1980 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1983), 216-17.
316 RGASPI, op. 32, d. 630, l. 79.
317 RGASPI, op. 32, d. 630, ll. 182-83.
318 RGASPI, op. 32, d. 710, l. 16.
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disparaged the fact that youth evening events “have nothing but western dances,” with
frequent drinking of alcohol and fighting.319
Such scrutiny proved necessary for the center to implement its policy, as
messages condemning youth’s interest in western culture appeared only rarely at local
Komsomol conferences during these years. For example, the keynote speech of the 1950
annual Moscow city Komsomol conference condemned “bowing down before foreign
influences,” but the keynote speeches of the subsequent two postwar Stalin conferences,
in 1951 and early 1953, failed to mention this issue.320 The Krasnopresnenskii
neighborhood Komsomol conferences from 1947 to 1952 did not bring up this matter at
all, neither in the keynote speech nor the recorded comments of delegates.321 The Saratov
city Komsomol conference keynote speech and conference resolutions in 1952 also
lacked references to western influence in popular culture.322 Despite the clear presence of
Komsomol members who enjoyed western music and dancing both in Moscow and in
Saratov, the Komsomol secretaries who spoke at these conferences proved reluctant to
deal with these issues. After all, in contrast to Komsomol newspapers or the Propaganda
Department, local Komsomol secretaries bore responsiblility for the behavior of the
members of their cells, making them reluctant to publicize problematic conduct.
319 RGASPI, op. 32, d. 742, l. 95.
320 On 1950, see TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 11, d. 31, l. 24. For 1951, see TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 12, d. 1. For
1953, see op. 13, d. 133.
321 For 1947, see TsAOPIM, f. 667, op. 2, d. 14; for 1948, see TsAOPIM, f. 667, op. 2, d. 20; for 1950, see
TsAOPIM, f. 667, op. 2, d. 33; for 1951, see TsAOPIM, f. 667, op. 2, d. 41; and for 1952, see TsAOPIM, f.
667, op. 2, d. 49.
322 GANISO, f. 4529, op. 9, d. 3.
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Besides the Komsomol, control organs within the network of cultural institutions
themselves attempted to enact the Party’s policy shift in the late 1940s. The most
revealing case study on how the broader impact of the anticosmopolitan campaign played
out at the local level in clubs and PKOs comes from the Moscow DNT. This institution
stood on the front lines of the battle against western elements in the mass cultural
network in Moscow, but also indirectly impacted the rest of the USSR, since it served as
an example to all other Soviet DNTs. In 1949, the Moscow DNT censured certain
Moscow amateur orchestras that played “formalist, western European and American
music,” and avoided having their repertoire approved in the DNT.323 By 1951, the DNT
found that the activity of amateur variety orchestras–the ones that played a range of
popular music, including jazz, in the immediate postwar era–to have “noticeably
decreased over the last years,” with only two performing at an all-union amateur contest.
The DNT did not complain about the music of such orchestras or their failure to approve
the repertoire. Instead, it emphasized the fact that the DNT did a lot of work to ensure the
appropriate content of amateur arts and to improve the qualifications of circle leaders.324
From this, it can be inferred that the anticosmopolitan campaign generally succeeded in
expunging jazz and even music with elements of jazz from the amateur art circles in
Moscow. The fall in the number of amateur collectives devoted to variety music likely
resulted from the ban on western music in their repertoire, and resultant lack of youth
interest in such music. One example comes from the Gor’kii House of Culture, which
reported that, after the Party’s shift on the ideological front, the club got rid of its own in-
323 TsAGM, f. 2987, op. 1, d. 13, ll. 16, 20.
324 TsAGM, f. 2987, op. 1, d. 20, ll. 2-3, 24-25.
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club jazz ensemble. In addition, it sought to improve educational work in its amateur
collectives by holding lessons on “appropriate” dancing, likely meant to purge western
dancing.325
This helps explain the substantial decrease in the growth in amateur art circle
membership in the late postwar Stalin years. From 1945 to late 1947, the number of
participants grew by 1,500,000. From that date to early 1953, however, membership
increased by only 1,300,000, as the previous chapter has shown. The 1945-47 period
undoubtedly witnessed a postwar upswing, with Soviet citizens embracing amateur arts in
the peacetime transition. Still, this does not fully explain the rapid decrease in the rate of
growth of amateur arts in the late 1940s to early 1950s, especially since the opportunities
for amateur art increased with the provision of space, equipment, and repertoires for
amateur art circles. However, the ban on western music in early 1948 led to the
dissolution of many amateur art circles devoted to western popular culture and the
transformations in the repertoire of many others to focus on ideologically-prescribed
themes. This, along with the escalation in the ideological load carried by amateur arts,
likely discouraged many Soviet youth from engaging in amateur arts. Further support for
this point comes from the more rapid growth of amateur artistic circle membership after
the anticosmopolitan campaign ended with Stalin’s death, as detailed in the next chapter.
Examining the Moscow DNT also provides insights into the Party-state’s struggle
against western dancing and efforts to promote officially-prescribed dances. In 1949, the
DNT criticised dance directors at clubs such as the Metrostroi House of Culture, whose
325 TsAGM, f. 44, op. 1, d. 6, ll. 14-16.
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amateur dance collective apparently did not teach ballroom dancing.326 Focusing much
energy on managing dancing in 1951 in response to the continued popularity of what it
termed “foreign influences” in dancing, the DNT sent representatives on 236 inspections
of mass dances in Moscow’s cultural institutions. The DNT likewise promoted new
ballroom dances with the goal of “helping in the struggle against western dances foreign
to us.” It tried a new tack in dealing with recalcitrant directors of dance collectives by
creating an Attestation Commission, intended by the DNT to confirm all dance circle
leaders before they would be hired, with thirty-six confirmed in sixteen commission
meetings in 1951.327 Yet, as revealed by the 1953 yearly report from the MDNT, this
tactic did not prove fully effective as the managers of some clubs refused to submit those
they wanted to hire to the DNT Attestation Commission. As a result, the DNT
complained that “incompetent people” continued to work in the clubs.328
Overall, the DNT undertook vigorous efforts against western music and dancing.
This may indicate that its officials held an ideologically militant vision of communism.
At the same time, working to expunge jazz, tango, foxtrot, and rumba from clubs enabled
the DNT to claim a larger slice of administrative turf, reflecting the institutional drive of
any bureaucratic entity. In addition, such efforts fit the interests of the dance teachers
working in the DNT choreographic division, who sought to use the Attestation
Commission as a means of professionalizing the teaching of dance under their own
control, imposing their traditional views on what constituted normative dancing.
326 TsAGM, f. 2987, op. 1, d. 13, l. 20.
327 TsAGM, f. 2987, op. 1, d. 20, ll. 3, 24-25.
328 TsAGM, f. 2987, op. 1, d. 34, ll. 48, 58.
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A 1952 internal policy report on dancing in Moscow prepared by the Komsomol
Propaganda Department provides in-depth evidence of western influence in dancing, and
of Komsomol efforts to combat it. The very fact that the department thought it necessary
to produce such a document demonstrates its concern with this issue. The report closely
mirrors the sentiments expressed by the DNT and points to ideological concordance and
likely cooperation between the DNT and certain officials in the Komsomol Propaganda
Department, who already in late 1944 expressed hesitancy over western dances. Thus,
like the DNT’s reports cited above, the Komsomol Propaganda Department criticized
club officials that it termed “dance poachers, who distort the tastes of Soviet youth” by
“propagandizing degenerate western foxtrots, languid tangos, and vulgar rumbas.” With
the pressure of the campaign for officially-prescribed dancing, these “dance speculators”
(tantseval’nye del’tsy), according to the report, “quickly painted themselves over” as
teachers of ballroom dances, yet they “teach ballroom dances in a vulgar foxtrot style.”
The department also complained that the managers of dance halls failed to hire “dance
controllers, who need to correct those dancing and call to order those who distort Russian
ballroom dances.” The report, essentially repeating the DNT position, blamed these
problems on the lack of a centralized system of management over dancing directors, as
club managers hired whomever they want. As for evening dances, the Propaganda
Department found that dance halls, such as the ones in the Central PKO and in the
Krasnopresnenskii PKO, “still propagandize western dances, while ballroom dances are
often performed in a distorted manner” (iskazhenno). It claimed that youth complained
about western dances, for example quoting a letter to Komsomol’skaia pravda by three
young people who blew the whistle on a PKO dance floor where “a jazz ensemble”
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performed “cosmopolitan ‘foxtrots’ and ‘crying’ tangos.” The department also
condemned the broadcasting of western dances on the radio and sale of records with
western dance music.329
The evidence indicates that the anticosmopolitan campaign’s targeting of western
popular culture in clubs had some partial successes on the eve of Stalin’s death. It
managed to expunge the more recently imported dances associated most clearly with
jazz, such as the lindy-hop and charleston, from the network of clubs and PKOs, since,
despite their popularity in the Soviet Union during the 1930s-mid 1940s, they were not
mentioned as a problem either by the Moscow DNT or the Komsomol Propaganda
Department. In addition by 1951-52, these institutions raised no concerns over amateur
art groups performing American-style or even Sovietized jazz in Moscow. The struggles
in these years moved to dances generally perceived as less western and thus less
subversive, namely foxtrot, tango, and rumba, which still had great popularity among
youth. Ideologically militant officials from the Komsomol and control organs in the
cultural recreation network itself lamented the presence of such dances and music in
clubs and PKOs. By 1952, these efforts pushed such dances to the margins of legitimacy
in state-sponsored popular culture, with teachers of the foxtrot and tango having to
present themselves as experts in ballroom dancing while avoiding the officials of the
DNT Attestation Commission.
329 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 710, ll. 6-8.
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Young Enthusiasts of Western Popular Culture
Nonetheless, certain club and PKO directors continued to provide young people
with limited opportunities to dance foxtrot, tango, and rumba in state-owned cultural
institutions. This primarily resulted from, as the Komsomol Propaganda Department
admitted in the internal discourse of its 1952 report, the existence of a substantial “group
of fans of western dances” among young people. As a result, “certain club and park
directors, seeking to attract more visitors to the dance halls to fulfill the financial plan,
allow western dances.” Some dance teachers, those the department labeled “dance
speculators,” apparently made a good living by making financial deals directly with the
club managers to take charge of teaching dancing and organizing evening dances.330 In
the context of the resource-scarce postwar Stalin years, the willingness of many young
people to part with the rubles necessary to gain admittance to a dance floor indicates their
enthusiasm for these dances and the substantial role played by western popular culture in
their everyday lives.
The Komsomol had trouble explaining the popularity of western cultural activities
among youth. In external rhetoric, it often claimed that young people went to such dances
only because of a lack of “appropriate,” officially-approved options such as lectures or
amateur art circles. In its internal bureaucratic discourse, however, other explanations
appeared. The ongoing provision of western-style music and dancing by Party-state
institutions, such as clubs, PKOs, radio stations, and record stores received a major
portion of the blame. Another factor in explaining the widespread appeal of ‘‘western’’
dancing among youth, at least according to the Komsomol Propaganda Department, was
330 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 710, ll. 7-9.
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that young people simply did not know how to dance ballroom dances, while lessons for
ballrooms dances cost too much, at forty rubles each. Yet, distressingly for the
department, “a significant portion of youth” tried to “make themselves look like
‘foreigners’ and recreate the most repulsive western European and American foxtrots.” It
stated: “among these emulators of foreigners, new dances appeared, such as ‘Get Your
Hands Off Korea’ and ‘The Wall-Street Smile,’ as well as expressions such as the
‘Truman style.’”331
This evidence intimates at the rise of stiliagi, a youth counterculture that appeared
in the USSR at the end of World War II. Popularized by an infamous 1949 article in the
satirical journal Krokodil, the term stiliagi, loosely translatable as the “style-obsessed,”
was used by official discourse to homogenize and stigmatize young people who were
enamored with and adopted western European and American cultural practices.332 These
young people, largely male, emerged from among the children of Soviet elites in the mid-
1940s, and most stiliagi in the postwar Stalin years continued to come from this social
group, particularly since participation required considerable financial resources. By the
early 1950s, though, some middle- and even working-class youth began to join the ranks
of the stiliagi as living conditions and the purchasing power of Soviet citizens improved.
Stiliagi made adopting a style they considered western central to their lives and self-
definition. Indeed, the Krokodil article tellingly condemns the protagonist, a young male,
for “complex and absurd dance moves” in the dance hall, a reference to American-style
331 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 710, ll. 7-8.
332 “Stiliaga,” Krokodil, March 10, 1949. Some of these youth disliked the term at first, preferring to call
themselves chuvaki for young men and chuvikhi for women, although eventually adopting the term stiliagi
as their own. See Artemy Troitskii, Back in the USSR: The True Story of Rock in Russia (Winchester: Faber
and Faber, 1988), 13.
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dancing, and for wearing a jacket with an orange back and green sleeves, yellowish-green
pants, and socks in colors suggestive of the American flag. More generally, it censured
stiliagi for “developing their own style in clothing, conversations, and manners,” where
“the main thing is to not be like normal people.” Notably, the article lambasted the fact
that stiliagi “studied all foxtrots, tangos, rumbas, lindy-hops in-detail.”333 This official
condemnation makes references to important signifiers in stiliagi cultural practices,
including music and dancing, fashion, an argot, and manners, in which these youth
affected a western style.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly in light of the anticosmopolitan campaign, the
postwar Stalin leadership expressed little concern with such youth, with minimal public
denunciations and no substantial actions by the central Komsomol bureaucracy, although
some of the more militant local Komsomol secretaries made efforts to censure stiliagi.
Recent archival-based scholarship has substantially advanced our understanding of the
history of this alternative youth culture in the postwar Stalin years.334 However, other
Soviet youth who did not belong to the stiliagi alternative youth culture also expressed a
333 Krokodil, March 10, 1949, “Stiliaga.”
334 See Juliane Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism, 1945-
56 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 217-35. Here, she develops the ideas she expressed earlier in:
Fürst, "The Importance of Being Stylish: Youth, Culture and Identity in Late Stalinism" in Juliane Fürst
ed., Late Stalinist Russia: Society between Reconstruction and Reinvention (New York: Routledge, 2006),
209-30. Also see Mark Edele, "Strange Young Men in Stalin’s Moscow: The Birth and Life of the Stiliagi,
1945-1953," Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 50.1 (2002): 37-61, and Gleb Tsipursky, “Living
‘America’ in the Soviet Union: The Cultural Practices of ‘Westernized’ Soviet Youth, 1945-1964,” in Eva-
Maria Stolberg ed., "Rivals of the Twentieth Century": USSR and USA. Two Geopolitical Powers in
Competition (forthcoming in 2011).
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genuine interest and even fascination with certain aspects of western popular culture, a
topic poorly illuminated in the historiography.335
As a result, focusing on young jazz enthusiasts who eventually became jazz
musicians and promoters serves to expand the boundaries of current research. With rare
exceptions, jazz musicians did not self-identify as stiliagi, as they considered the
aesthetics of jazz music, its sound and feel, much more significant than its origins in the
United States.336 For example, A. A. Kuznetsov, a prominent Moscow jazz musician,
stated that “I was not among the stiliagi.” He underlined that the marginal position of jazz
and its association with US culture did not serve as a draw for him, that he was interested
in jazz because of the aesthetic qualities of the music itself.337 A Saratov jazz musician, F.
M. Arons, also indicated that he did not consider himself a stiliaga.338 V. N. Iarskaia, a
Saratov jazz singer during the mid-late 1950s, considered stiliagi fashion amusing, and
expressed apathy toward stiliagi in general.339 One of the most famous jazz musicians in
the Soviet Union, the late G. A. Garanian, suggested a clear difference between “jazz
enthusiasts” (dzhazovye liudi) and stiliagi. The latter, in his words, had their own way of
dressing, slang, everything, “all with an air of superiority.” Garanian stated that he did
not really have any contacts with stiliagi cliques. He related how he and his jazz
335 Thus, both Fürst and Edele mentioned the existence of youth interested in western popular culture who
did not belong to stiliagi ranks, but focused the lens of their analysis on stiliagi. See Fürst, Stalin’s Last
Generation, 218, and Edele, "Strange Young Men.”
336 A. S. Kozlov is one such exception, a prominent jazz musician who did consider himself a stiliaga. See
his memoir, "Kozel na sakse’’: I tak vsiu zhizn’ (Moscow: Vagrius, 1998).
337 A. A. Kuznetsov, born 1941, interviewed February 21, 2009.
338 F. M. Arons, born 1940, interviewed May 18, 2009.
339 V. N. Iarskaia, born around 1936, interviewed May 30, 2009.
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enthusiast friends “were so into jazz that we had no other interests, it was jazz and
nothing else.”340 These jazz enthusiasts, for whom a major component of individual self-
understanding and social life revolved around a form of popular culture associated with
the US, constituted an alternative youth culture with similarities to, but distinct from the
stiliagi one. In furthering our understanding of the experience of jazz enthusiasts in the
anticosmopolitan campaign, we gain insights on how this initiative shaped youth lives.
Interviews with and memoirs by jazz enthusiasts reveal the powerful impact of the
anticosmopolitan campaign on their everyday existence. Garanian described the Party
TsK’s 1948 resolution as a crucial break point after which the authorities did not allow
jazz.341 I. P. Zhimskii, who became a prominent jazz musician in Saratov during the post-
Stalin years, recalled that the resolution resulted in the “harassment” (pritesnenie) of jazz
ensembles. He confirmed that the campaign targeted the instrument most symbolic of
jazz: “saxophones were replaced by clarinets.” Even accordions were either moved to the
back rows or replaced by baiany, a Russian version of an accordion.342 Another such jazz
musician in Saratov, L. A. Figlin, stated that even “the word jazz was banned,” and
“playing jazz, with saxophones, was called cacophony” in official discourse, with a broad
consensus in place within the field of music experts and commentators that “jazz is not
our music.”343 Avrus, not a jazz enthusiast but deeply involved in and informed about the
Komsomol’s activities in the late 1940s-50s, related that in Saratov in the postwar Stalin
340 G. A. Garanian, born 1934, interviewed February 4, 2009.
341 G. A. Garanian, born 1934, interviewed February 4, 2009.
342 I. P. Zhimskii, born 1936, interviewed May 27, 2009.
343 L. A. Figlin, born 1938. interviewed May 25, 2009.
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era, “there was a struggle against jazz.”344 Multiple sources depict an absence of jazz at
youth evenings in schools or colleges.345
Even so, young people fascinated with jazz had a number of options in their
efforts to access this music in the postwar Stalin years, some of these within the
boundaries of the law. For example, Iarskaia recalled how, in the late 1940s-early 1950s,
she repeatedly watched “Happy-Go-Lucky Guys” (Veselye rebiata), a Soviet jazz
comedy from the time when the authorities permitted jazz in the 1930s.346 Both she and a
future jazz promoter, V. E. Kleinot, also described the high esteem of jazz enthusiasts for
trophy films, as these often featured jazz music, most notably Sun Valley Serenade,
described in chapter 1.347 According to Zhimskii, plenty of old records survived the ban
on jazz music, as the Party-state did not confiscate them. Middle-class young people
whose parents had gramophones could dance to these tunes at home. Crucial to this was
the fact that many well educated adults ignored the ban on jazz music, the music they
grew up with in the 1930s, and even danced the foxtrot and tango themselves, in
Zhimskii’s words.348 Not only future jazz musicians, but ordinary youth such as S. N.
Shchegol’kova, who did not express a fascination with jazz, danced to tunes with jazz
344 A. I. Avrus, born 1930, interviewed May 28, 2009.
345 See the following: N. A. Troitskii, born 1931, interviewed May 22, 2009; F. A. Kurilova, born 1936,
interviewed May 15, 2009; A. S. Derzhavets, born 1935, interviewed April 28, 2009; and L. I. Derzhavets,
born 1939, interviewed April 28, 2009.
346 V. N. Iarskaia, born around 1936, interviewed May 30, 2009.
347 V. E. Kleinot, born 1941, interviewed February 14, 2009.
348 I. P. Zhimskii, born 1936, interviewed May 27, 2009.
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elements by the famous musician Leonid Utesov, despite knowing full well about the
anticosmopolitan campaign’s ban on jazz and western dancing.349
Those really enthusiastic about jazz also adopted illicit methods to access the
newest foreign jazz pieces and information on jazz, requisite for those who considered
themselves part of a jazz fan community.350 They used the black market to acquire illegal
records, such as those made by Soviet underground music production studios. Such
studios, which sprouted up with the conclusion of the war, demonstrate how
entrepreneurially-minded citizens found ways to satisfy popular cultural consumption
demands in ways that went around the Party-state’s system of cultural provision.
Moreover, this underground production testifies to the deficiencies in the late Stalinist
government’s efforts to control cultural life in the USSR.
The “Golden Dog” (Zolotaia Sobaka) represents a case in point of one such
underground enterprise. In late 1946, several young people, including Stanislav Filon and
Boris Taigin, opened the “Sound Recording” (Zvukozapis’) music recording studio as
part of an officially sanctioned cooperative. They relied on “trophy” German musical
recording equipment that had the capacity not only to copy extant gramophone records
but also to create new records. Overtly, this studio’s business model consisted of making
“sound letters” (zvukovye pis’ma): people came in to record themselves giving short
speeches or singing songs. As Taigin notes, though, “this served as an official cover,
349 S. N. Shchegol’kova, born 1937, interviewed February 19, 2009.
350 For more on the formation of fan communities, see Simon Frith, “The Cultural Study of Popular Music,”
in Lawrence Grossburg, Cary Nelson, and Paula A. Treichler eds., Cultural Studies (New York: Routledge,
1992), 174-86; John Storey, Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: An Introduction (Essex, Pearson
Education Ltd., 2009), 223-25; and Eckhardt Derschmidt, “The Disappearance of the Jazu-Kissa: Some
Considerations about Japanese ‘Jazz-Cafés’ and Jazz-Listeners,” in Sepp Linhart and Savine Frühstück
eds., The Culture of Japan as Seen through Its Leisure (New York: State University of New York Press,
1998), 285-302.
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since the primary purpose of this studio lay in illegally produce ‘profitable goods’
(khodovoi tovar) in order to sell them.” The actual work of this studio began after the end
of the business day, when it recorded popular music, including foreign pieces, as well as
gypsy and criminal-style songs, on used X-ray films, which received the name of “music
on bones,” also known as “music on ribs.” This studio, one among many underground
production studios in Leningrad, distributed their black market recordings through a
network of dealers for several years. However, in November 1950, the police made mass
arrests of approximately sixty people involved in making and distributing “music on
bones” in Leningrad, with Taigin receiving a five-year sentence.351 Such arrests of black
marketers constituted the main coercive actions by the police agencies of the Stalinist
state against youth fascinated with western popular culture. These black market practices
also occurred in the Soviet regions, as illustrated by Figlin’s recollection that youth in
Saratov got access to jazz via “black marketers making records on X-rays.”352 Besides
underground distribution methods, the official network of state-owned retailers also made
efforts to cash in on the passion of youth western music.353 In an illustrative example, the
Komsomol Propaganda Department complained that in music stores, “there are cases
when records with American foxtrots have the labels of Russian ballroom dances.”354
351 See the following published interview with Boris Taigin, “Rastsvet i krakh ‘Zolotoi sobaki’,” Pchela 20
(May-June 1998) http://www.pchela.ru/podshiv/20/goldendog.htm [accessed 03/02/2009].
352 L. A. Figlin, born 1938, interviewed May 25, 2009.
353 For more on the Soviet retail network in these years, see Julie Hessler, A Social History of Soviet Trade:
Trade Policy, Retail Practices, and Consumption, 1917–1953 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2004), 296-328.
354 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 710, ll. 7-8.
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This evidence demonstrates the existence of illicit record production and
distribution networks of some sophistication within the USSR. These networks spanned
enterprises directly owned by the Party-state such as music stores, or those more distantly
affiliated with it, such as the “Golden Dog” studio, whose distribution occurred through
underground dealers. Therefore, jazz enthusiasts who wanted to access jazz, as well as
club directors who sought to play dance music with elements of jazz at their clubs, had
the option of shopping on the black market and even in those official music stores where
salespeople were willing to run the risk of stocking illegally-produced records,
undoubtedly making a tidy profit on them.
The illegal purchase of western-style goods even received its own term, “fartsa.”
While jazz enthusiasts focused on purchasing music records, stiliagi bought western-like
clothing, cigarettes, and alcoholic products, along with records. Some of these were made
illegally in the USSR itself, while others were smuggled in by Soviet sailors, diplomats,
performers, and other visitors abroad. These goods had a clear hierarchy of values, with
those produced in the US most prestigious and expensive, followed by western Europe,
then the nonaligned countries, with socialist allied states next and, last and least, those
made in the Soviet Union.355 The trade in western products made up part of the broader
grey economy that permeated the USSR.356
355 For more on fartsa, see E. R. Iarskaia-Smirnova, and P. V. Romanov, “Fartsa: Podpol’e sovetskogo
obshchestva potrebleniia,” Neprikosnovennyi zapas: Debaty o politike i kul’ture 5.43 (2005),
http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/ (Accessed December 31, 2009).
356 Alena V. Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking, and Informal Exchange (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), and Daniel Bertaux, Paul Thompson, and Anna Rotkirch,
“Introduction,” in Daniel Bertaux, Paul Thompson, and Anna Rotkirch eds., On Living Through Soviet
Russia (New York: Routledge, 2004), 1-24.
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Another option for young Soviet jazz enthusiasts, especially those whose families
had no gramophones, involved listening to jazz illegally on foreign radio stations. Soon
after World War II, radio stations financed and managed by the US and British
governments started making radio broadcasts into the USSR, including not only news but
popular culture as well. Despite Soviet state efforts to jam foreign radio stations in this
period, some signals got through.357 The most prominent radio station for jazz, the US
State Department’s Voice of America (VOA) with Leonard Feather’s Jazz Club USA
program in the postwar Stalin years and from 1955 Willis Connover’s Jazz Hour, enabled
many future jazz musicians and promoters to listen to their favored music.358 Iarskaia
describes how, in the early 1950s, she listened to what she called “American music” on
VOA; her parents allowed her to do this as “they were democratic.”359 In turn, K. A.
Marvin, who later became a prominent Saratov jazz musician during the post-Stalin
years, recalls trying to listen to Benny Goodman and Louis Armstrong.360 Arons relates
how, while still quite young, he managed to catch jazz on VOA, and “understood already
back then that this is a very interesting music, literally jumping up in the air” with
excitement.361 Jazz Club USA and Jazz Hour allowed many young people who had a
passion for jazz to both listen to and acquire information on this musical genre, such as
357 For more on these radio stations and efforts to jam them, see Michael Nelson, War of the Black
Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1997).
358 On jazz broadcast into the Soviet Union, see Starr, Red and Hot, 210, 228.
359 V. N. Iarskaia, born around 1936, interviewed May 30, 2009.
360 K. A. Marvin, born 1934, interviewed May 13.
361 F. M. Arons, born 1940, interviewed May 18, 2009. For memoir accounts of jazz enthusiasts listening to
foreign radio stations, see Mikhail Kull’, Stupeni Voskhozhdeniia
http://www.jazz.ru/books/kull/default.htm [Accessed March 24, 2011], and Kozlov, "Kozel na sakse," 9-16,
90.
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the names of prominent musicians, the varied jazz styles, the playing techniques, and so
on, all necessary to the formation of a fan community.362 In the Soviet context, however,
this fan community of jazz enthusiasts formed into a youth counterculture due to the
politicization of jazz and the criminalization of the means of getting access to this music
during the anticosmopolitan campaign.
Listening to this music on foreign radio stations had a more overtly politicized
element in the Soviet Union than listening to jazz on 1930s Soviet records and movies,
and even purchasing illegally-made records in stores and the black market. The US
government sponsoring western popular culture on VOA constituted a direct challenge to
the Soviet Union on the cultural front of the Cold War. It proved quite effective in
reaching its goals.
In finding out information about this music, many young jazz enthusiasts received
exposure to and developed an interest in the western way of life and culture. For instance,
Garanian, Kuznetsov, and Kleinot remembered that they grew to admire American
culture. Kleinot in particular stressed the importance of his realization about the
inextricable connections between jazz and the United States, especially black culture.
Seeking to emulate western jazz musicians, they often wore what they considered
American-style clothing to concerts and youth evenings.363 However, this interest in
American culture more broadly stemmed from and was decisively secondary to their
passion for jazz. Unlike many stiliagi, they did not explicitly self-identify with the United
362 Jazz fan communities worked similarly in other contexts: Derschmidt, “The Disappearance of the Jazu-
Kissa.”
363 V. E. Kleinot, born 1941, interviewed February 14, 2009; A. A. Kuznetsov, born 1941, interviewed
February 21, 2009; and G. A. Garanian, born 1934, interviewed February 4, 2009.
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States or western Europe and did not adopt a specifically western style in their everyday
life and behavior.364 Since they broadcast other information besides jazz, the radio
programs served as a source of knowledge external to and at odds with official discourse.
As such, they provided an outside frame of reference in the postwar years for those who
risked tuning to these programs, in contrast with the much more limited options in the
prewar years.365
Besides listening to jazz, legally and illegally, jazz enthusiasts frequently tried
joining amateur music circles as a means of trying to play this music, unlike the vast
majority of stiliagi. Garanian recalled that his participation in amateur arts at his Moscow
institute enabled him to access the piano after hours, which he used to figure out the notes
of the jazz pieces he memorized from the radio. This involved some risk since, according
to him, if the college administration found out that a student musician played jazz, then
“the student might have been kicked out.”366 Such punishment, likely in association with
expulsion from the Komsomol, though relatively mild in comparison to the harsh
treatment of Ukrainian nationalist partisans or exiled ethnic minorities, posed a serious
threat to young people who wanted to achieve a white-collar career and middle-class
364 On stiliagi self-identification with the United States in particular, and to a lesser extent with western
European countries, see the following memoir accounts: V. P. Aksenov, V poiskakh grustnogo bebi: Kniga
ob Amerike (New York: Liberty Publishing House, 1987), 14-22; V. I. Slavkin, Pamiatnik neizvestnomu
stiliage (Moscow: ‘‘Artist. Rezhiser. Teatr,’’ 1996), 5; and Kozlov, "Kozel na sakse," 82-98.
365 On the 1930s, see Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1995), 1-26, and Jochen Hellbeck, “Speaking Out: Languages of
Affirmation and Dissent in Stalinist Russia,” Kritika 1.1 (Winter 2000): 71-96. In the post-Stalin years,
another frame of reference external to official discourse became widespread in the USSR, the one that
developed within the Gulag. See Miriam Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime,
and the Fate of Reform after Stalin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 119.
366 G. A. Garanian, born 1934, interviewed February 4, 2009.
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lifestyle in the USSR.367 Notably, neither Garanian nor the vast majority of other jazz
enthusiasts received a formal education in music. They generally taught themselves how
to play jazz by ear, and many did not even know how to read musical notation.368
Despite the risk of punishment, some amateur student collectives proved willing
to introduce jazz elements into their repertoire. In the geology department of Saratov
State University, SGU, Marvin joined a collective in 1952 that played songs in a jazz
style, “although this was frowned upon.”369 Figlin got his start in a twenty-member
variety ensemble at the Saratov Medical Institute in the early 1950s, which had, in his
words, “elements of jazz.” The ensemble managed to play jazz compositions by
deceptively listing a different name and author to avoid censorship.370 Zhimskii similarly
recalled the formation of collectives in 1951-52 that played jazz-influenced tunes in
movie theaters. He himself belonged to one amateur group in high school that played
pieces such as the “Chattanooga Choo-Choo,” yet calling them by a different name for
the official records.371 In another interesting case, Oleg Lundstrom, a prominent jazz
musician already before the war, managed to survive the anticosmopolitan campaign
relatively unscathed through a voluntary exile to Kazan’, where his group played
367 On Ukrainian nationalists, see Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate
of the Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). On exiled minorities, see
Alexander Statiev, “The Nature of Anti-Soviet Armed Resistance, 1942-44: The North Caucasus, the
Kalmyk Autonomous Republic, and Crimea,” Kritika 6.2 (Spring 2005): 285-318.
368 G. A. Garanian, born 1934, interviewed February 4, 2009; K. A. Marvin, born 1934, interviewed May
13, 2009; and Kozlov, "Kozel na sakse," 134-35.
369 K. A. Marvin, born 1934, interviewed May 13, 2009.
370 L. A. Figlin, born 1938, interviewed May 25, 2009.
371 I. P. Zhimskii, born 1936, interviewed May 27, 2009.
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jazzified Tatar folk music.372 The recently-annexed Baltics, as the most western-oriented
region in the Soviet Union, proved an especially safe haven for jazz in the late postwar
Stalin years.373
Thus, in some Soviet regions, jazz-inspired music survived the anticosmopolitan
campaign’s ban on western influence in state-sponsored popular culture, particularly by
the early 1950s, when the vigor in implementing the decree seems to have abated
somewhat in certain locales outside of Moscow. The capital likely proved fraught with
danger for jazz musicians as a result of potential discovery due to the presence of so
many ideological workers in the central bureaucracy, and the diligent efforts by the
militants in the Moscow DNT to suppress this music, which did not let up by the early
1950s. Such evidence suggests the potential pitfall of mistaken interpretations in relying
on sources only from Moscow. Still, even in the periphery, slipping a modicum of jazz
into club activities depended on either more tolerant local cultural officials, or
alternatively incompetent ones incapable of identifying such music, while state policy
continued to tilt heavily against this music on the eve of Stalin’s death.
The anticosmopolitan campaign, which identified the model New Soviet Person
as someone inherently opposed to anything deemed “western,” labeled the activities both
of jazz enthusiasts and of the stiliagi as “deviant,” despite the distinctions between these
alternative youth cultures.374 The Stalinist leadership, in enacting the 1948 Party TsK
372 Michael May, “Swingin’ under Stalin: Russian Jazz during the Cold War and Beyond,” in Reinhold
Wagnleitner and Elaine Tyler May, eds., “Here, There and Everywhere: The Foreign Politics of American
Popular Culture (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2000), 179-91.
373 Starr, Red and Hot, 228-32.
374 As Fürst noted, in the tense early Cold War environment, “any form of individualism was soon
condemned as selling out to the West.” See her Fürst, “The Importance,” 225. For the powerful effect of
labeling a group as deviant, see the historiography on the “labeling theory,” which posits that “deviants”
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decree condemning western-style music, chose to politicize and denigrate the jazz
enthusiasts’ tastes, regardless of whether the young people feeling the brunt of this
censure saw themselves as good Soviet citizens, opponents of the regime, or something
in-between. This state policy marginalized jazz enthusiasts within the Soviet system
during the late Stalin era, not because of something they actively did, but because of a
change in state policy, part of a broader pattern of an increasingly exclusionary approach
to governing by the Party-state at this time.375
The Party TsK’s 1948 decree functioned to create “deviance” where none existed
beforehand by relabeling behavior considered quite acceptable previously as subversive
and intolerable.376 Indeed, in contrast to stiliagi, for whom, in Juliane Fürst’s words,
“differentiation, not pure entertainment, was their driving force,” the jazz enthusiast
counterculture was not driven by deliberate attempts by young people to juxtapose
themselves to the extant cultural mainstream.377 In this regard, jazz enthusiasts also
become “deviant” when those with power successfully attach this label to them: Emile Durkheim, The
Rules of the Sociological Method, George E. G. Catlin ed., Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller tr. (New
York: The Free Press, 1965), 47-75; Howard S. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance
(New York: The Free Press, 1973), 177-208; Stephen Pfohl, Images of Deviance and Social Control: A
Sociological History (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994); 345-98, Stuart H. Traub and Craig B. Little eds.,
Theories of Deviance (Itasca: F. E. Peacock, 1985), 277-332; and Emile Durkheim, The Rules of the
Sociological Method, George E. G. Catlin ed., Sarah A. Solovay and John H. Mueller tr. (New York: The
Free Press, 1965), 47-75. For a work that utilizes labeling theory in the Soviet context, see Brian LaPierre,
Defining, Policing, and Punishing Hooliganism in Khrushchev’s Russia (Ph. D. diss., University of
Chicago, 2006).
375 For more on increasing exclusionary tendencies, see Golfo Alexopoulos, “Amnesty 1945: The
Revolving Door of Stalin’s Gulag,” Slavic Review 64.2 (Summer 2005): 274-306, and Sheila Fitzpatrick,
“Postwar Soviet Society: The ‘Return to Normalcy’, 1945-1953,” in Susan J. Linz ed., The Impact of World
War II on the Soviet Union (Totowa: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985), 129-56.
376 Such making of “deviance”  was not only the oblast of the Stalinist leadership: for example, as Brian
LaPierre recounts, the post-Stalin Kremlin by relabeling cursing and minor altercations as unacceptable
behavior, actually created “deviant” groups. See his "Making Hooliganism on a Mass Scale: The Campaign
against Petty Hooliganism in the Soviet Union, 1956-1964," Cahiers du monde russe, 47, 1-2 (January-
February 2006): 349-75.
377 Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 220-22.
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differed from western alternative youth cultures such as British Teddy Boys, American
beatniks, and German Halbstarken, as these countercultures self-consciously departed
from the cultural norms.378 By its actions, the Party hierarchy inevitably alienated these
youth due to its repression of their favored leisure activity. Such alienation, though, did
not rise to the level of resistance in the sense of political dissent, in contrast to some other
youth who formed underground groups dedicated to political reform.379 Moreover, the
Kremlin’s censure of jazz transformed this cultural form into a forbidden fruit that likely
drew some of those inclined toward youth rebellion into the jazz enthusiast youth culture,
although those who did not develop a passion for jazz did not remain within it.
Generally well educated, jazz enthusiasts tended to come from middle-class social
backgrounds. The cultural and financial resources provided by growing up in the families
of Soviet white-collar professionals, and/or through being a college student, was
conducive to acquiring the taste for and the access to jazz music and information on jazz,
marking membership in the jazz enthusiast culture as a middle-class attribute. Unlike the
stiliagi counterculture, the children of the Soviet elites rarely joined the ranks of jazz
enthusiasts, as the cultural practices of the latter did not revolve around western-style
fashion and other conspicuous consumption products, leaving less space for creating
378 On western youth countercultures, see Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson eds., Resistance through Rituals:
Youth Subcultures in Post-war Britain (New York: Routledge, 2006 [1975]); James Gilbert, A Cycle of
Outrage: America’s Reaction to the Juvenile Delinquent in the 1950s (New York: Oxford University Press,
1986), 3-10; Deena Weinstein, “Youth,” in Bruce Horner and Thomas Swiss eds., Key Terms in Popular
Music and Culture (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 101-10;  Michael Brake, Comparative Youth
Culture: The Sociology of Youth Cultures and Youth Subcultures in America, Britain, and Canada (New
York: Routledge, 1985); Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils & Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and
Rockers (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987); and John Springhall, Youth Popular Culture and Moral
Panics: Penny Gaffs to Gangsta-Rap, 1830-1996 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998).
379 For political dissent by underground circles of youth in the postwar years, see Elena Zubkova, Russia
after the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957, Hugh Ragsdale trans. and ed. (Armonk:
M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 109-16, and Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 327-35.
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spectacular taste-based social status hierarchies. 380 With rare exceptions such as Iarskaia,
jazz enthusiasts were male, similar to the jazz musicians in non-Soviet contexts.381 The
Soviet jazz fans’ interactions with each other, whether at jam sessions, public
performances, black market exchanges, or social events, created a homosocial male space
that provided an alternative vision of Soviet youth masculinity.382 Overall, though, the
Stalinist Party-state’s constraints on jazz resulted in jazz enthusiasts constituting a
relatively small minority among young people.
By comparison to the strong censure of jazz music, dancing the tango, foxtrot, and
rumba, pastimes enjoyed by a great many youth, received less intense denunciations in
the official discourse, and occupied a more ambiguous position in organized cultural
recreation during the anticosmopolitan campaign.383 Avrus described how the authorities
focused their efforts on battling jazz as opposed to the foxtrot and tango. As a result,
students at SGU danced the foxtrot and tango more often than ballroom dances.384
Troitskii confirmed that evening dances at SGU in those years featured the foxtrot and
380 For the role of taste-based social hierarchies created by conspicuous consumption in youth
countercultures, see Sarah Thornton, Club Cultures: Music, Media and Subcultural Capital (Hanover:
Wesleyan University Press, 1996).
381 For the United States, see Becker, Outsiders, 79-119.
382 For other sources of alternative masculinities in the postwar Stalin years, see Ethan Pollock, “‘Real Men
Go to the Bania’: Postwar Soviet Masculinities and the Bathhouse,” Kritika 11.1 (Winter 2010): 47-76, and
Edele, “Strange Young Men.”
383 For more on how youth enjoyed tango and foxtrot en masse during these years, see Fürst, Stalin’s Last
Generation, 201-08.
384 Specifically in regard to foxtrot and tango under Stalin, he stated: “Yes, there was a struggle against
jazz. But I do not recall such a battle against tango and foxtrot” (da, protiv dzhaza borolis’. A protiv tango i
fokstrota, ia uzhe ne pomniu, chtoby takaia bor’ba shla). A. I. Avrus, born 1930, interviewed May 28,
2009.
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tango.385 N. K. Petrova remembered the foxtrot and tango as widely performed in dance
halls in Briansk, Ukraine, although waltz had more prominence.386 The future Komsomol
TsK secretary Baliasnaia also depicted the foxtrot and tango as widespread in dance halls
in Ukraine, where she resided in the postwar Stalin years.387 L. I. Derzhavets, however,
recalled that in postwar Stalinist Moscow, “tango was forbidden.”388 A. S. Derzhavets,
her husband, stated that in the Ukrainian town where he grew up, waltz had the most
popularity, with “the foxtrot considered a bourgeois dance”; he did not dance it, but
others did.389
Not all of those who danced the foxtrot, rumba, or tango had a passionate cultural
taste for western dances. Youth attended the dances on a regular basis, frequently paying
sizable entrance fees, because the foxtrot, tango, and rumba lay at the core of youth
sociability for significant segments of the young population at this time, especially in
regard to developing romantic relationships. For young men, as Zhimskii described, these
dances provided an opportunity for “meeting girls, this is what we dreamed of. These
[dances] offered us our first romantic adventures, our first loves.”390 N. A. Popkova, who
attended SGU, underlined the importance of dancing for entertainment, hanging out, and
“of course” for meeting young men, as these dances enabled “more intimate
385 N. A. Troitskii, born 1931, interviewed May 22, 2009.
386 N. K. Petrova, born in the late 1930s, interviewed May 5, 2009.
387 L. K. Baliasnaia, born 1927, interviewed April 5, 2009.
388 L. I. Derzhavets, born 1939, interviewed April 28, 2009.
389 A. S. Derzhavets, born 1935, interviewed April 28, 2009.
390 I. P. Zhimskii, born 1936, interviewed May 27, 2009.
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socializing.”391 The official censure of the foxtrot, tango, and rumba, which imbued these
dances with a rebellious character, likely contributed to their romantic appeal for some
youth.
In many cases, those to whom the Party-state assigned the task of ideological
control over youth did not carry out this mission to the full extent demanded by the
anticosmopolitan campaign. F. A. Kurilova, a former Komsomol secretary in her all-
female school in Saratov during the early 1950s, recalled that officials promoted
ballroom dances such as the mazurka, and if “people started dancing the foxtrot or tango,
they were told ‘this is not recommended’ in those years.” The school’s principle, for
example, informed Kurilova before school-sponsored youth functions that “according to
official guidelines, the foxtrot and tango should not be danced” and told her that “I am
relying on you” to make sure that everything goes well. Kurilova, in turn, using her
prerogative as the Komsomol secretary, allowed one or two tangos or foxtrots danced in a
calm and unprovocative manner each evening, but she “immediately chased away the
boys” visiting her all-female school if “foxtrot dancing began to get out of control”
(nachinalos’ buistvo v foxtrote). Once some boys even tried to take revenge on Kurilova
for kicking them out by jumping her after school during the winter; she managed to get
away, but her friends were not so lucky, and the boys rubbed them down with snow. Still,
Kurilova danced the tango and foxtrot at private parties without any guilt.392 If the
Komsomol enforced controls at Kurilova’s school, teachers took on this role at
Zhimskii’s school. There, despite knowing about the ban on the foxtrot and tango, the
391 N. A. Popkova, born 1936, interviewed May 20, 2009.
392 F. A. Kurilova, born 1936, interviewed May 15, 2009. For another recollection of ballroom dancees
promoted in schools, see S. N. Shchegol’kova, born 1937, interviewed February 19, 2009.
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students, who apparently “had control over the gramophone,” put on the foxtrot and
tango, resulting in conflicts with teachers who “disapproved of this” and told them “stop
it, stop it.”393 Figlin suggested that one way that the foxtrot and tango, which “were
partially forbidden” (kak-by zapreshcheny), avoided censorship involved deceptive re-
naming: “the foxtrot and tango became slow and fast dance,” respectively.394
This creative labeling, similar to the techniques used by jazz enthusiasts when
performing in official clubs, indicates the need to revise the image of the transformations
in official discourse in the post-Stalin years as identified by Alexei Yurchak. He argued
that Stalin’s death and the consequent collapse of legitimating authority resulted in
official discourse becoming increasingly oriented toward seeking validation from past
cannons and thus divorced from everyday life. At the grassroots, this resulted in what
Yurchak called a performative shift, with local-level cadres fully emulating the tenets of
official discourse in their conversations with and reports to higher-ups, while actually
doing quite another thing on the ground level. He specifically used the example of
Komsomol officials condemning rock’n’roll publicly and then organizing rock music
events.395 The evidence adduced here demonstrates that such practices, in regard to jazz
and western dancing, occurred already in the 1940s and were not related to Stalin’s death
per se. Likely, they occurred earlier as well. This not only illustrates that Stalin’s
discursive authority was hardly absolute, but also indicates the need for a new look at
post-Stalin official discourse.
393 I. P. Zhimskii, born 1936, interviewed May 27, 2009
394 L. A. Figlin, born 1938, interviewed May 25, 2009.
395 Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2006), 36-125.
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My findings confirm that foxtrot, tango, and rumba acquired a semimarginalized
status, tainted by association with western cultural influence but not to the same extent as
jazz music or dances more directly associated with jazz, such as the charleston or lindy-
hop. As a result, youth experiences varied based on the positions taken by local figures of
authority, whether club managers, Komsomol cadres, or university and school
administrators. Realizing the relatively soft nature of the ban on the tango, foxtrot, and
rumba, officials sympathetic to a pluralist viewpoint and/or motivated by financial and
other incentives could risk permitting some “slow dances” and “fast dances.” When those
with authority did tolerate such western dances, they often put limitations on these
activities, making efforts to distance themselves from prospective repercussions. At the
school evening events Zhimskii depicted, the decision to allow students control over the
gramophone functioned both to allow a modicum of western popular culture, yet remove
teachers from suffering the consequences, as they could claim to have attempted to stop
these dances. The principal at Kurliova’s school probably knew that she would allow a
couple of banned dances that evening, but made a pro-forma nod to the official
prohibition, thereby covering himself in the event of any negative consequences.
Kurilova, in turn, limited foxtrots and tangos to one or two per evening, a common
practice at this time, and made sure they were danced in a nonprovocative manner. Such
behavior, which those involved in organizing official cultural activities for young people
considered within the acceptable range, provide a glimpse into the gaps between official
rhetoric and everyday practice by local cadres.
Such examples illustrate the implicit negotiations taking place between young
people who loved western music and dancing, and local officials with authority in the
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sphere of state-sponsored popular culture, who had systemic incentives to permit such
popular cultural forms. In the case of club institutions, the popularity of the foxtrot,
tango, and rumba among youth led to fulfilling the plan and profits gained by club
managers and dance entrepreneurs willing to organize the foxtrot, tango, and rumba. For
the club managers, strongly pressured to run self-supporting institutions throughout the
postwar Stalin years, western dances, along with trophy films, could help achieve their
institutional goals, while subsidizing the obligatory, but financially draining lectures.396
These dances likely grew even more profitable than earlier, since only certain club and
PKO directors decided to continue hosting the foxtrot, tango, and rumba despite the
prohibition from above, resulting in more young people congregating on the dance floor
of each individual institution. Permitting amateur groups to perform music with jazz
elements occurred more rarely, as this was a less profitable and more perilous
undertaking. Still, allowing jazz rhythms in an amateur variety music circle certainly
drew more young people to participate in it, permitting club managers to claim greater
successes on their annual reports.397
The leaders of local Komsomol cells also had many reasons for allowing their
constituents to engage in the consumption of western popular culture. On the one hand,
unlike club managers, local Komsomol officials denouncing western popular culture
among their cell members fulfilled the ideological component of their positions. On the
other hand, admitting that such activities took place in their cell reflected badly on the
396 For example, in 1950 the Gor’kii PKO was given the goal of not incurring economic losses: TsAGM, f.
2011, op. 1, d. 164, ll. 17-18.
397 For how financial incentives led to the tolerance of western popular culture in Soviet clubs during the
1960s-70s, see Sergei Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet
Dniepropetrovsk (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 65-212.
154
cell’s secretary. Moreover, tolerating jazz music and ‘‘western’’ dancing led to better
statistics for youth participation in organized social activities in reports to higher-ups. A
permissive stance by local Komsomol cadres also contributed to increasing membership
in the Komsomol and the fees paid, a central priority of the Komsomol leadership at the
time, since a hard-line approach would have discouraged some from joining.
Additionally, the success of lower-level Komsomol officials in collecting dues,
organizing cell members to accomplish projects, and even achieving production goals
rested on the attendant goodwill of their constituents, with a militant position on western
popular culture having the potential to undermine these crucial social bonds. This proved
especially so since the leaders of local cells not only managed their members, but also
socialized and often even lived with them. The failure of official criticism of the foxtrot,
tango, and rumba to gain much traction in this youth milieu, as the continuing popularity
of the dances indicates, made the suppression of such dances that much more difficult.
For those lower-level Komsomol officials disinclined to pursue the political career track,
the likelihood of harming their relationships with their friends and coworkers made them
even less interested in vigorously implementing the anticosmopolitan campaign. All this
indicates that the Komsomol collective functioned less as a social control mechanism
than envisioned by the authorities.398
These findings further our understanding of the tensions and diversity within the
postwar Party-state structure. The Stalinist leadership would undoubtedly have liked to
purge every trace of western popular culture from the Soviet Union during the late 1940s
398 For how student collectives in postwar Stalinist universities in some cases undermined the intentions of
the Party-state, see Benjamin K. Tromly, “Re-Imagining the Soviet Intelligentsia: Student Politics and
University Life, 1948-1964” (Ph. D. dissertation: Harvard  University, 2007), 94-150.
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and early 1950s. Top-level officials, however, continued to make other demands that
subverted the full-scale implementation of the anticosmopolitan campaign. They stressed
the importance of clubs and PKOs meeting financial plans and of increasing membership
and dues payment in the Komsomol. This highlights the tensions between ideological
priorities and market forces in the function of the Soviet system. The fact that different
institutions within the Soviet polity had varying missions, with some financially oriented
and others centered on ideology, exacerbated these fractures. Thus the club managers
reported directly to the directors of their enterprise and higher-ups in the trade union
hierarchy, for whom financial matters and plan fulfillment often held sway. The DNTs
focused on the question of ideology and could safely disregard the need to achieve
financial self-sufficiency and planned targets for the number of amateur performers. In
the case of the Komsomol, the ideologically-oriented figures in the Propaganda
Department did not have to contend with the need to raise membership and dues, in
contrast to the leaders of lower-level Komsomol cells. A more extensive implementation
of the anticosmopolitan campaign’s censure of western popular culture would have
required a significant investment of financial resources, which the Stalinist leadership
proved unwilling to do. The Stalinist leadership’s contradictory policy, thereby, placed
club managers and local Komsomol officials in the position of negotiating the vast gap
between top-level ideological directives, and systemic demands for fulfilling financial
plans and achieving membership growth.
Faced with these competing priorities, club managers and lower-level Komsomol
officials made a wide variety of choices, with some banning western popular culture
outright, and others tolerating some degree of such music and dances. To an extent, the
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decision-making of individual administrators resulted from diverse local factors. For
example, the vigilance of the Moscow DNT and central ideological organs in the capital
increased the difficulty of sponsoring western popular culture in Moscow. A large
number of young people in a given Komsomol cell interested in the foxtrot, tango,
rumba, and jazz offered more incentives for hosting evenings with western dancing and
even jazz elements in amateur circles.
The personal ideological predilections of local officials likely constituted another
factor that played a role in the amount of western popular culture present in state-
sponsored popular cultural activities for youth. Indeed, this may best explain the diversity
in offerings by clubs in the same neighborhood, and thus facing somewhat similar
political conditions and serving largely overlapping populations of young people. The
cadres in charge of organized cultural recreation for youth, conversant at least somewhat
with earlier developments in this sphere, could hardly have been unaware of the
ideological implications of their activities during the anticosmopolitan campaign. This
suggests that the managers who allowed elements of western popular culture in their
institutions, and the Komsomol officials who did not censure their Komsomol members
or even assisted in organizing such activities, tended to hold a more tolerant, pluralistic
vision of the appropriate popular culture in a communist society than that advocated by,
for example, the Moscow DNT. The fact that many grew up in the 1920s and 1930s
listening to jazz and dancing the foxtrot, tango, even the charleston and lindy-hop, likely
contributed to their tolerant perspective on western popular culture. This finding
highlights the central role played by the agency of these officials in the postwar Stalinist
Party-state.
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Conclusion
The rhetoric of the anticosmopolitan initiative denied any legitimate space for
western music and dancing in the Party-state complex, including in the Party-state-
managed cultural recreation institutions. Nonetheless, some club and PKO directors
organized these forbidden activities, motivated by material consumption desires ranging
from gaining bonuses to keeping their jobs, all resulting from the need to fulfill financial
plans. Plenty of local Komsomol cadres adopted a tolerant stance, also as a consequence
of the incentive structure within the Komsomol organization. At the same time, a more
pluralistic ideological stance may have played a role in the decision-making process of
both club and Komsomol officials.
The actions of these club and Komsomol officials illuminate the multiple and
layered private and public spheres in the USSR, with unclear, shifting, and porous
boundaries, as opposed to traditional depictions of clearly delineated, singular, and
cohesive public and private realms. Informed by this perspective, I posit that the
individual clubs and PKOs each represent a distinct layer of the Soviet public sphere that,
while certainly part of the broad public sphere of the Party-state, occasionally acted
against the ideological directives of the top officials who led the USSR. In doing so,
local-level officials responded to the private, individual consumption desires of a
multitude of Soviet youth for western popular culture. At the same time, young Soviet
citizens satisfied their desires for western dancing and music in government-funded
clubs, spaces unmistakably denoted as part of the public sphere both in official discourse
and popular conceptions. This evidence spotlights the interpenetration between the public
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and private, and the diffuse boundaries between them. More than this, Soviet youth had
varied perspectives on what constituted private and public. While plenty considered
dancing western dances as appropriate both at home and in cultural institutions, others
drew a difference between these spaces. For instance, Kurilova danced the foxtrot freely
at home and at friends’ parties, while restricting it in her public capacity as Komsomol
secretary at school. Overall, however, the presence of the jazz enthusiast counterculture
and the mass dancing of foxtrots, tangos, and rumbas in clubs indicates a distancing by
large segments of young people from what we may call the top layer of the public sphere,
the leadership and press discourse, during the anticosmopolitan campaign.
In evincing the contradictions between ideological and consumption-oriented
factors within the postwar Party-state’s system of organized cultural offerings, this
chapter expands upon recent work by Kiril Tomoff that underlines the need to examine
the actions and motivations of different entities in the government in order to acquire a
nuanced understanding of the USSR.399 Moreover, the chapter shows that the postwar
Stalinist leadership placed varied degrees of emphasis on its campaigns, and even on
different aspects of the same initiative. In the anticosmopolitan campaign, for instance,
the prohibition on contact with foreigners was much more stringently enforced than the
ban on western music and dancing, although anticosmopolitan discourse denounced
both.400 The postwar Stalin years, then, often regarded as the ones most closely
approaching the “totalitarian” model of a monolithic authoritarian state fully dominating
399 Kiril Tomoff, Creative Union: The Professional Organization of Soviet Composers, 1939-1953 (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2006), 1-10.
400 On enforcing the ban on contacts with foreigners, see V. D. Esakov and E. S. Levina, Stalinskie "sudy
chesti": Delo "KR" (Moscow: Nauka, 2005).
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a passive citizenry, actually prove much less than totalitarian on close examination,
offering both local officials and youth significant room to maneuver on certain questions.
Still, the anticosmopolitan campaign’s rhetoric and the enactment of policies
associated with it undoubtedly influenced everyday youth experience. The previous
chapter underscored how the heavy politicization of officially-recommended amateur
cultural activities had a powerful impact on the millions of amateur performers,
particularly those skeptical of pieces eulogizing official values. Through its radical
transformation of the Soviet cultural field, the Kremlin forced true jazz enthusiasts into a
nonconformist, alternative youth culture, who had to indulge their taste for jazz largely in
spaces labeled private and often using illicit methods. The foxtrot, tango, and rumba
occupied a more ambiguous position, as despite the criticism in official discourse and the
actions of ideological organs, some clubs continued to provide these western dances,
although to a substantially lesser extent than previously. The presence of the foxtrot,
tango, and rumba in the public sphere of the cultural recreation network reflects the
diversity within socialist official culture in the years of the anticosmopolitan campaign,
which likely contributed to a degree of skepticism about top-level pronouncements
among young people.401 Yet the latter could hardly remain unaware of the Stalinist
leadership’s disapproval of these cultural forms. Willingly engaging in such violations
planted the seeds of future evasion of Party-state guidelines among young people, a
finding in line with Fürst’s writing on this subject. Still, the anticosmopolitan campaign’s
401 This situation differed to a degree from the context of the 1930s, when youth had room to express their
agency due to a lack of unity in official discourse on appropriate youth identities. In the case of western
dancing, the official discourse was characterized by a significant degree of cohesion in its censure: the
space for youth agency lay in the gaps between top-level policy and its grassroots implementation. On the
1930s, see Anna Krylova, "Identity, Agency, and the First Soviet Generation," in Lovell ed., Generations in
Twentieth-Century Europe, 101-22.
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powerful impact on everyday youth cultural life suggests the need to revise another of
Fürst’s conclusions, namely that, with the exception of the small minority of direct
victims of the anticosmopolitan campaign, this initiative had little meaning for and
influence on the large majority of young people.402
Official club activities offer insights into the cohort of young people growing up
in the postwar Stalin years, what Fürst labeled “Stalin’s last generation.”403 Fürst
correctly notes that these young people, despite sharing a generational location, which
Karl Mannheim defines as growing up in similar circumstances, did not develop a
common worldview or a generational consciousness, meaning self-awareness as a
generation or unity of action around this consciousness. They thus constituted what
Mannheim would call a silent generation.404 The recent work of Jane Edmunds and Brian
Turner provides further nuance on the analytical category of generations in this regard.
They differentiate between “active” generations who develop a strong generational
consciousness, which contributes to their ability to bring about social change based on a
self-conscious unified front with other members of their generation, and “passive”
generations that lack a clear self-identification and consequently fail to act in tandem
with their age cohort to bring about social change.405 From this perspective, Stalin’s last
402 Specifically, she argues that “the anticosmopolitan campaign targeted primarily the creative and
academic intelligentsia, leaving less educated youth puzzled over what it was really all about.” Also, “the
campaigns did leave a lasting and negative impact on a small, but significant segment of youth. Young
people who found themselves to be victims in the anticosmopolitan and anti-Western drives lost their
beliefs in the righteousness of a system, in which they had hitherto fervently believed.” See Fürst, Stalin’s
Last Generation, 92-93.
403 Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 17-21.
404 Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, Paul Kecskemeti trans. and ed. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1952), 276-80.
405 Jane Edmunds and Bryan S. Turner, “Introduction,” in Jane Edmunds and Bryan S. Turner eds.,
Generational Consciousness, Narrative, and Politics (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002),
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generation would belong to the latter category, as it did not have a cohesive generational
identity and did not attempt to undertake substantial social transformation as part of a
united effort with other members of their age group.
Fürst argues that Stalin’s last generation, despite lacking a unified generational
consciousness, had shared experiences and developed some common values and beliefs.
Most notably, “consumption, not ideology, became the dominant identifier for young
people, who defined themselves by the dresses they wore or the music they liked rather
than considering themselves bound together by a shared communist outlook,” side-
stepping official norms while largely not expressing active resistance to the system.406
My findings support Fürst’s argument of a growing gap between the Party-state’s
leadership and major segments of Stalin’s last generation. A substantial portion of the
latter, by participating in western popular culture within clubs, shirked official calls for
them to emulate the late Stalinist vision of disciplined and politicized New Soviet People.
However, I suggest that consumption may be read as indicative of conformity to
the Party-state, as well as side-stepping the system. After all, while many youth engaged
in western dancing in clubs and PKOs, plenty of others willingly performed in amateur
art circles and other club activities with a heavy ideological load, and even demanded
much more of these activities than the Stalinist Party-state provided. Since aesthetic
1-12, and Edmunds and Turner, Generations, Culture and Society (Philadelphia: Open University Press,
2002), 16-23. For more on generational theory, see, for example, Norman B. Ryder, “The Cohort as a
Concept in the Study of Social Change,” American Sociological Review 30.6 (December 1965): 843-61.
For other writings on generations in Russia, see Stephen Lovell, “Introduction,” in Stephen Lovell ed.,
Generations in Twentieth-Century Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1-18; Lovell, “From
Genealogy to Generation: The Birth of Cohort Thinking in Russia,” Kritika 9.3 (Summer 2008): 567-94;
and Rex A. Wade, “Generations in Russian and Soviet History,” The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 32.1
(2005): 125-41.
406 Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 3-4.
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tastes and cultural consumption desires constitute a crucial component of youth identities,
their participation in such diverse club activities sheds light on the vast differences
among the values and beliefs of the postwar generation. This suggests a lesser
commonality of beliefs and ideals among the Stalin’s last generation than claimed by
Fürst.
The behavior of Soviet youth who adroitly maneuvered within the mass cultural
network in order to access western popular culture illuminates their awareness of the
borders of the tolerable within the Soviet system, and their willingness to stretch these
limits. These youth, especially the educated urbanites coming from middle-class
backgrounds, thought of themselves as being integrated into society and conscious of its
various dimensions. They negotiated the boundaries of the permissible and tested the
restrictions of the multiple and layered Soviet public spheres in ways familiar to any
teenagers around the globe. Their socialization into the Soviet system, thereby, expressed
itself in ways diametrically opposed to the diarists examined by Jochen Hellbeck in the
1930s, who sought to write themselves into the social and political order of the USSR.407
This may speak to the much greater sense of self-confidence and even entitlement among
young people who grew up within the Soviet system. Aware that the censure of jazz and
western dancing began only recently, that the punishments tended to be less than severe,
and that some of their parents and local officials disregarded this prohibition, such youth
generally did not perceive their conduct as anti-Soviet, but as lying within the broad
Soviet public sphere while departing from the leadership’s current cultural policy. This
mass of youth, then, hardly had to “speak Bolshevik” in their interactions with the more
407 Jochen Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2006), 4-5.
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tolerant club and Komsomol cadres who permitted western cultural activities in local
public spheres.
The independent-minded amateur artists, the small minority of jazz enthusiasts,
and the mass of youth who found pleasure in western dancing highlights the failures of
the postwar Stalinist leadership to forge all youth in Stalin’s last generation, even
Komsomol members, into disciplined model communists, and mobilize them for the
cultural front of the Cold War. While far from rejecting Soviet reality or resisting the
state, such youth articulated a personal vision of “Sovietness” that did not fit the narrow
strictures of the anticosmopolitan vision of the New Soviet Women and Men. The
contradictions inherent in state-sponsored popular culture between official rhetoric and
grassroots cultural activities left much space for youth to engage in conduct that both
expressed and further shaped their cultural tastes, and thus personal identity, on their own
terms, and at some variance with the Stalinist Party leadership’s wishes. In choosing to
side-step the Kremlin’s demands, youth who engaged in western popular culture
experienced an intertwining of pleasure with risk, of joy with guilt, whose powerful
emotional impact became a component of their identities.408
The conduct of these young people illustrates how some members of Stalin’s last
generation shaped their environment in ways that fit their personal interests in consuming
western popular culture, expressing their agency while influencing broader historical
processes. Similarly, the citizens in western Europe and America expressed their agency
408 On the power of dancing to shape youth identities, see Peter Wicke, “Music, Dissidence, Revolution,
and Commerce: Youth Culture between Mainstream and Subculture,” in Axel Schildt and Detlef Siegfried
eds., Between Marx and Coca-Cola: Youth Cultures in Changing European Societies, 1960-1980 (New
York: Berghan Books, 2006), 109-26, and Barry Doyle, “‘More than a dance hall, more a way of life’:
Northern Soul, Masculinity, and Working class Culture in 1970s Britain,” in Schildt and Siegfried eds.,
Between Marx and Coca-Cola, 313-30. On how emotions associated with cultural consumption shaped
Soviet identities, see Crowley and Reid, “Introduction: Pleasures in Socialism.”
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to shape their own environment as well. In those settings, the capitalist marketplace
played the central role, and many ordinary people used the opportunities and products
supplied by the market to form an individual identity that departed from the
mainstream.409 In juxtaposing this pattern to the case of the USSR, it becomes clear that,
instead of a capitalist marketplace, the Soviet government and Party-managed social
organization structured the cultural and material consumption options available to youth.
The Party-state, however, did not constitute a cohesive, monolithic entity, as lower-level
cadres, particularly in the regions, did not fully implement the attack on western popular
culture during the anticosmopolitan campaign. This resulted from the pressure exerted by
youth consumption desires on club and Komsomol officials, underlining the powerful
role of market forces in the Soviet system of organized cultural recreation, a finding that
challenges Stephen Lovell’s thesis on the nature of Soviet cultural production.410 My
evidence thus points to parallels between the Soviet system and the capitalist marketplace
in western Europe and America in regard to the power exerted by popular demand and
mass cultural tastes.411
409 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, Steven F. Rendall trans. (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1984), 29-42; Daniel Miller, Material Culture and Mass Consumption (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1987), 147-217; Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 5-11; and Lawrence Grossberg, We Gotta Get Out of
This Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture (New York: Routledge, 1992), 113-27.
410 He argues, based on a study of Soviet print culture, that market forces had little impact on official Soviet
cultural production, at least until the late 1980s: Stephen Lovell, The Russian Reading Revolution: Print
Culture in the Soviet and Post-Soviet Eras (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 18.
411 For more on how youth dancing in the western context placed pressure on the dominant capitalist
system and opened up new spaces of youth activities, see Jeremy Gilbert and Ewan Pearson,
Discographies: Dance Music, Culture, and the Politics of Sound (New York: Routledge, 1999), 158-86.
Chapter 4
State-Sponsored Popular Culture for Youth in the Early Thaw, 1953-56
“Carnival Night” (Karnaval’naia noch’), the most popular Soviet movie of 1956,
tells the story of a New Year celebration at a house of culture. On the eve of the holiday,
a new director arrived at the club, Comrade Ogurtsov. He wanted the celebration to be
“typical” and “the main thing, serious!” Expressing discontent with the program for the
festivities, Ogurtsov banned the performance of the house of culture’s amateur ensemble,
whose large complement of saxophones suggested a jazz overtone. Instead, he directed
the house of culture workers to invite a staid, traditional ensemble from the pensioners’
association to perform at the New Year event. Moreover, he suggested starting the
celebration with a forty-minute speech on the achievements of the house of culture,
followed by a propaganda lecture. The young club workers refused to accept Ogurtsov’s
plan for such a boring, politicized event. Taking matters into their own hands, they used
subterfuge to achieve their goals, for example, getting the propaganda lecturer drunk.
Furthermore, the house of culture ensemble members dressed up as pensioners, and
began their performance with classical music. The camera’s close-up of Ogurtsov showed
his surprise when the “pensioners” launched into a jazz-style number heavy on
saxophones and brass, and his anger when they began to do somersaults. By the end of
the movie, the house of culture employees managed to ensure a festive celebration for
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everyone except Ogurtsov.412 “Carnival Night” evokes of the transformations in Party-
state policy on, and discourse about, club activities during the early Thaw, 1953-56, the
topic of this chapter.
These shifts constituted part of a broader array of changes that occurred following
Stalin’s death in March 1953. The new leadership, especially after N. S. Khrushchev
consolidated power, launched a reenergized drive to achieve the “bright socialist future,”
characterized by optimistic renewal of the mission to reach communism. As a part of this
initiative, Kremlin officials endeavored to transform everyday life or byt in a fashion that
they perceived as fitting the idealized communist future.413 Furthermore, the abrupt
ending of the anticosmopolitan campaign and amnesties of Gulag prisoners soon after
Stalin’s death contributed to the hesitant questioning and calls for limited reform that
emerged at all levels of Soviet society. Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin in the Secret
Speech at the 1956 Twentieth Party Congress accelerated these processes.414 Previously
accepted versions of truth began to lose their sanctified status, for example, in the sphere
of elite culture, where the dominant model of Socialist Realism faced intensifying
412 On this film, see Josephine Woll, Real Images: Soviet Cinema and the Thaw (New York: I. B. Tauris,
200), 51-56.
413 Deborah A. Field, Private Life and Communist Morality in Khrushchev’s Russia (New York: Peter
Lang Publishing, 2007), and Polly Jones, “The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization,” in Polly Jones ed., The
Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era (New York:
Routledge, 2006), 1-18.
414 On the ending of the anticosmopolitan campaign, see Jonathan Brent and Vladimir P. Naumov, Stalin’s
Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953 (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 312-29.
On the amnesties of Gulag prisoners, see Miriam Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees,
Crime, and the Fate of Reform after Stalin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 21-49. For the calls for
changes in the Thaw and the popular reactions to the government’s reforms, see Iu. V. Aksiutin,
Khrushchevskaia “Ottepel’”  i obshchestvennye nastroeniia v SSSR v 1953-1964 gg. (Moscow: ROSSPEN,
2004).
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challenges.415 At the same time, a massive expansion in the provision of consumer goods
improved the living conditions of the population, providing better housing, furniture,
vacation homes, modern appliances, clothing, and social services.416
Much of the scholarship emphasizes the crucial role played by Stalin’s death and
the coming to power of the post-Stalin leadership in shaping the course of Soviet history.
Some new publications by Juliane Fürst and others have questioned this postulate,
positing that Thaw-era innovations resulted more from postwar reconstruction, than from
policy shifts resulting from the ascendance of a new leadership.417 My investigation of
organized cultural recreation for young people, though acknowledging some areas of
continuity, offers more evidence for casting 1953 as a substantial break. The post-Stalin
Kremlin instigated a rapid escalation in organized cultural recreation accompanied by a
415 For literature, see Stephen Lovell and Rosalind Marsh, "Culture and Crisis:  The Intelligentsia and
Literature after 1953,” in Catriona Kelly and David Shepherd eds., Russian Cultural Studies: An
Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 56-85. For other spheres of elite culture, see M.
R. Zezina, Sovetskaia khudozhestvennaia intelligentsiia i vlast’ v 1950-e – 60-e gody (Moscow: Dialog-
MGU, 1999).
416 On housing, see Steven E. Harris, “‘I Know all the Secrets of My Neighbors’: The Quest for Privacy in
the Era of the Separate Apartment,” in Lewis H. Siegelbaum ed., Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of
Soviet Russia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 171-190. On furniture, see Susan E. Reid, "Cold
War in the Kitchen: Gender and the De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the Soviet Union," Slavic
Review 61.2 (Summer 2002): 211-52. On vacation homes, see Stephen Lovell, Summerfolk: A History of
the Dacha, 1710-2000 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 163-208. On appliances, see N. B. Lebina
and A. N. Chistikov, Obyvatel’  i reformy: Kartiny povsednevnoi zhizni gorozhan v gody nepa i
khrushchevskogo desiatiletiia (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2003). On fashion, see L. V. Zakharova,
“‘Naibolee raspostranennoi iavliaetsia forma priamogo pal’to s odnoborotnoi zastezhkoi’: o sovetstkoi
mode epokhi ‘ottepeli,’” Neprikosnovennyi Zapas: Debaty o Politike i Kul’ture 45.1 (2006),
http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/ (Accessed December 31, 2009). On social services, see E. R. Iarskaia-
Smirnova, P. V. Romanov, N. B. Lebina, “Sovetskaia sotsial’naia politika i povsednevnost’, 1940-85,” in
E. R. Iarskaia-Smirnova and P. V. Romanov eds., Sovetskaia sotsial’naia politika: Stseny i deistvuiushchie
litsa, 1940-1985 (Moscow: Variant, 2008), 7-33.
417 See, in particular, Juliane Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Youth and the Emergence of Mature
Socialism, 1945-56 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 20-29. Also see Julie Hessler, A Social
History of Soviet Trade: Trade Policy, Retail Practices, and Consumption, 1917–1953 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2004), 296-336, and Juliane Fürst, Polly Jones and Susan Morrissey, “The
Relaunch of the Soviet Project, 1945–64: Introduction,” The Slavonic and East European Review 86.2
(April 2008): 201-07.
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decrease in its political load, tolerance of some western dancing and jazz, and the use of
club activities to combat juvenile “delinquency.” While informed by ideas present
already during the postwar Stalin years, and enabled by the postwar reconstruction of the
infrastructure of mass cultural recreation, such a shift would not have been enacted
without the change in leadership.
These findings add support to scholars such as Susan E. Reid and Christine
Varga-Harris, who argue that the post-Stalin Kremlin offered a new consumerist social
contract to the population.418 While the literature has shed much light on the growth in
material consumption, I focus on the poorly-studied field of cultural consumption, which
provides important insights on the Thaw-era social contract. Garnering social legitimacy
for the new leadership after the demise of Stalin constituted one motivation for this
policy. Nonetheless, rather than serving only as a social palliative or “safety valve,” the
consumerist social contract was intended to attract the mass of Soviet citizens to
communist construction by convincing them–in a marked departure from postwar
Stalinist tropes–that communism would satisfy their individual desires and personal
interests. Importantly, I find that the sphere of cultural consumption experienced a
sharper break with postwar Stalin precedents than material consumption, due to the
418 As opposed to Julie Hessler, who sees Thaw-era consumption as evolving organically from postwar
Stalinist trends. See Hessler, A Social History of Soviet Trade, 296-336. For the contrasting view, see
Christine Varga-Harris, "Constructing the Soviet Hearth: Home, Citizenship, and Socialism in Russia,
1956-1964" (Ph. D. diss.: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2005), 1-24; David Crowley and
Susan E. Reid, “Introduction: Pleasures in Socialism,” in Crowley and Reid eds., Pleasures in Socialism:
Leisure and Luxury in the Eastern Bloc (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010), 3-52; Catriona
Kelly, “The Retreat from Dogmatism: Populism under Khrushchev and Brezhnev,” in Catriona Kelly and
David Shepherd eds., Russian Cultural Studies: An Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press,
1998), 249-73; Lebina and Chistikov, Obyvatel’  i reformy; and Iarskaia-Smirnova, Romanov, and Lebina,
“Sovetskaia sotsial’naia politika.” This debate began already in the 1960s. See Alec Nove, “Social Welfare
in the USSR,” in Abraham Brumberg ed., Russia under Khrushchev: An Anthology from Problems of
Communism (New York: Praeger, 1962), 571-90.
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deemphasis on politics, spotlighting of entertainment, and some tolerance of western
influence in state-sponsored popular culture.
The Thaw-era leadership endeavored to satisfy popular consumption desires in a
manner it considered ideologically appropriate and conducive to communist construction.
For instance, supplying more club activities for youth and making them more entertaining
aimed to increase the amount of time young people spent in clubs. The intention was to
enlarge the sphere of “communist time,” the period when one supposedly behaves most
like a model New Soviet Person by having youth not only work and study, but also relax
in state-monitored, public, collective settings. This expanded the role of official
collectives in Soviet life during the Thaw, but did not necessarily result in a more
repressive everyday experience for the population.
These diverse aspects of the Thaw-era social contract suggest that the new top-
level officials sought to build a Soviet version of modernity, in the sense of modernity as
defined by a combination of mass consumption and an emphasis on individualization.419
In doing so, the Thaw-era Party-state strove to enact a socialist version of what Eliezer
Ben-Rafael and Yitzak Sternberg termed a “multiple modernity,” a vision of the future
informed by yet explicitly alternative to, the traditional modernity of western Europe and
419 On this view of modernity, especially as related to consumption, see Mike Featherston, Consumer
Culture and Postmodernism (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2007 [1991]), and Daniel Miller,
“Consumption as the Vanguard of History: A Polemic by Way of an Introduction” in Daniel Miller ed.,
Acknowledging Consumption: A Review of New Studies (New York, Routledge, 1995), 1-57. On its relation
to leisure, including cultural activities, see Rudy Koshar, “Seeing, Traveling, and Consuming: An
Introduction” in Rudy Koshar, ed., Histories of Leisure (New York: Berg, 2002), 1-25. Others term similar
developments as postmodernism instead of modernity, for example Claire Wallace and Sijka Kovatcheva,
Youth in Society: The Construction and Deconstruction of Youth in East and West Europe (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1998), 209-12.
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the US.420 The post-Stalin shift in foreign policy made this especially crucial, as the
Thaw-era Kremlin moved away from postwar Stalinist militarism to an emphasis on the
Cold War’s “peaceful competition,” with the USSR seeking to present itself, at home and
abroad, as a model of modernity for the world’s future.
Kremlin Policy on Youth Cultural Recreation
During the Thaw, an essential component of the revived drive to forge New
Soviet Men and Women as a means of building communism centered on youth as the
individuals who would construct and live in this idealized future. Furthermore, after the
losses of World War II, those younger than twenty-six years of age constituted just under
half of the population in 1959, making their integration into society central not only for
the idealized future, but also for the pragmatic needs of the present.421At the same time,
the spirit of optimism and rejuvenation in the Thaw was frequently associated with
youthhood. All of this helps explain the prominence given to young people during these
years. In fact, one scholar described the Thaw as characterized by a spirit of
youthfulness.422
The Soviet orientation toward youth intersected with another novel departure in
the public discourse, namely the stress on the need for official institutions and collectives,
such as clubs and Komsomol cells, to provide fun entertainment and deemphasize heavily
420 See Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yitzak Sternberg, “Analyzing Our Time: A Sociological Problématique,” in
Eliezer Ben-Rafael with Yitzak Sternberg eds., Identity, Culture, and Globalization (Boston: Brill, 2001),
3-17.
421 Out of 117,534,315 people in the RSFSR, 54,796,718 were under 25 in 1959. See Tsentral’noe
Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda, RSFSR (Moscow, 1963).
422 L. B. Brusilovskaia, Kul’tura povsednevnosti v epokhu “ottepeli”: Metamorfozy stilia (Moscow:
Izdatel’stvo URAO, 2001), 169-74.
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politicized activities. This switch found reflection in the crucial September 1953 Plenum
of the Party Central Committee, TsK, held only half a year after Stalin’s death. Along
with electing Khrushchev as the Party leader, the plenum participants announced a new
policy course of acceleration the provision of both material and cultural consumption.423
Consequently, central Soviet institutions, including the Komsomol, erupted in a flurry of
activity aimed at increasing cultural consumption opportunities. By November 1953, two
months after the Party TsK plenum, the Komsomol Propaganda Department made a
number of recommendations for improving state-sponsored popular culture for young
people. For example, it wanted to ensure that each district with more than 5,000 residents
had a house of culture with a concert hall accommodating 400 to 500 people.424
Moreover, the department noted that, “after work, young people want to sing, dance, have
fun, read a good book or simply get together at a club.”425 It must be emphasized that this
phrasing fails to mention youth wanting to listen to propaganda lectures or study
Marxism-Leninism, a substantial shift away from the kinds of themes emphasized in the
postwar Stalin years. In October 1953, a report from this department that explicitly
referenced the previous month’s Party TsK plenum strongly criticized the poor material
conditions in clubs. It also underlined the need to change the primary focus of club
managers. The department noted that, since local institutions such as Party and
Komsomol committees engage in extensive political agitation, while schools teach
literacy and the intelligentsia provide propaganda of science, the club managers should
423 For example, see a decree that followed the plenum on increasing the production of light consumer
goods relevant to both material and cultural consumption: RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 30, ll. 122-28.
424 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 741, l. 100.
425 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 741, ll. 23-25.
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focus “only on organizing cultural recreation work: amateur art, youth evenings, etc.”426
This deemphasis of political, scientific, and literacy education in the clubs’ agenda, and
highlighting of entertaining and fun events hints at a rethinking of the goals of state-
sponsored popular culture institutions. Indeed by May 1954, an internal Komsomol
Propaganda Department document on the goals of cultural recreation did not mention
inculcating loyalty to the Party and patriotism to the USSR, which would have been
unthinkable only fifteen months prior to this date.427
Such transformations in internal bureaucratic discourse and policy soon found
their expression in external rhetoric at the February 1954 Twelfth Komsomol Congress.
The keynote speaker at the 1949 Eleventh Komsomol Congress had devoted less than
half a page to club activities and only praised accomplishments, indicating to local-level
Komsomol cells that they did not need to focus on state-sponsored popular culture.428 In
1954, the Komsomol First Secretary A. N. Shelepin’s keynote speech devoted about five
times as much space to discussing clubs, amateur music, and amateur theater, and
expressed criticism of the work done by clubs and Komsomol cells.429 The final
resolution of the congress called on Komsomol organizations to “pay particular attention
to the management of youth recreation,” and to organize concerts of amateur art, various
excursions, games, sport events, and tourist trips for youth during vacation days, a list
that did not include propaganda lectures on ideologically-laden topics or improving
426 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 741, ll. 8-10.
427 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 700, l. 20.
428 P. A. Mikhailov, Otchetnyi doklad na XI s’’ezde komsomola o rabote TsK VLKSM (Moscow: Molodaia
gvardiia, 1949), 33-34.
429 A. N. Shelepin, Otchetnyi doklad TsK VLKSM XII s’’ezdu komsomola (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia,
1954), 44-45.
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productivity. Importantly, the resolution also proposed a change in the introductory
section of the Komsomol Ustav, its bylaws, that called on the Komsomol to assist in
“continually raising the material and cultural level of society,” moving such activities
closer to the center of the Komsomol’s work.430
Rather than constituting an ephemeral, short-term campaign, the Komsomol
leadership kept up the pressure on lower-level organizations to act. For instance, in its
final resolution, the 1956 Fifth Komsomol TsK Plenum criticized the inadequate use of
“the widescale capacities for undertaking cultural recreation.” Expanding on its message,
this resolution underlined the need for Komsomol cells to “fight for (dobivat’sia) the use
of halls and clubs for work with youth,” much stronger language than postwar Stalin-era
documents.431 This trend continued in later years. Khrushchev himself gave a major
speech at the Thirteenth Komsomol Congress in April 1958, a substantial break with
precedent as Stalin did not address the only postwar Komsomol Congress in 1949,
providing further evidence of the Thaw serving as a major shift, and highlighting the
escalating importance of the young in the post-Stalin years. The Soviet leader paid a great
deal of attention to state-sponsored popular culture, noting that although the country has
“hundreds of thousands of clubs and houses of culture,” the “spiritual demands of the
people are growing all the time, and thus there are not enough cultural institutions. In
addition, some of these cultural institutions function poorly, failing to satisfy the demands
of youth.”432 Overall, he devoted approximately one-fifth of the speech to what youth do
430 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 38, ll. 119, 126.
431 Dokumenty piatogo plenuma TsK VLKSM (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1956), 4.
432 N. S. Khrushchev, Vospityvat’ aktivnykh i soznatel’nykh stroitelei kommunisticheskogo obshchestva
(rech’ na XIII s’’ezde VLKSM 18 aprelia 1958 goda) (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1961), 35-36.
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in their leisure time and how to satisfy their cultural demands, reflecting the attention this
issue garnered at the top levels of the Soviet power structure in the Thaw.
Likewise, when compared to the postwar Stalin years, youth newspapers
expanded the amount of column inches devoted to cultural consumption, and reduced the
space offered to more directly ideologically-laden stories on construction, industry, and
agricultural triumphs. For instance, occasional listings of upcoming cultural events in the
back of the newspaper grew from approximately one-tenth of the last page of Moskovskii
komsomolets in the early 1950s, listing mostly movies, to about one-third or more by the
late 1950s, including movies, shows, concerts, plays, and so on.433 The general tone of
newspaper discourse shifted as well. Komsomol’skaia pravda, for example, placed a
greater emphasis on improving state-sponsored youth popular culture in the post-Stalin
years.434 Regional and local youth papers did so as well.435
These shifts indicate a swing toward moving the satisfaction of youth cultural
consumption desires closer to the center of official concerns. Former Komsomol
administrators confirm this shift. For instance, L. K. Baliasnaia, a former Komsomol TsK
secretary, stated that, earlier, “our country either fought or carried out reconstruction after
the war. Thus, there was no time to organize leisure, and this was not seen as a serious
433 For example, compare the number of listings on the last page of Moskovskii komsomolets, October 19,
1952, to the substantially larger number of listings on the last page Moskovskii komsomolets, July 4, 1953.
These listings grew even more copious by the mid-late 1950s.
434 See “Otkroite eti zaly dlia molodezhi,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, May 25, 1956, and “Komsomol’tsev
zdes’ ne vidno,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, June 3, 1955.
435 “Khudozhestvennoi samodeiatel’nosti – postoiannoe vnimanie,” Stalinets, October 22, 1955, and
“Uchis’ otdykhat’!” Zaria molodezhi, December 14, 1956.
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issue.” Now, in the mid-1950s, “we already had time for leisure” since “the time to
tighten the screws was over.”436
The post-Stalin administration also expanded the time young people had to
participate in state-sponsored popular culture events. In a break with Stalinist practices,
the authorities in the early Thaw provided substantially more leisure to the population.437
Young people in particular received more hours per week free from work and study. A
1955 resolution by the Komsomol TsK delimited the workday of young people between
fourteen and sixteen years of age to four hours, and those aged seventeen and eighteen to
seven hours.438 At the same time, the number of youth enrolled in higher education grew
substantially, with such students having large swaths of free time.439 The Komsomol
publicly depicted such measures as indicative of the state’s concern for the population. A
case in point, the keynote speaker at the April 1956 Twelfth Moscow city committee
Komsomol conference said that “in 1957, there will begin a transition to a seven-hour
work day,” and “each young person gratefully and joyfully greets these Party
decisions.”440
436 L. K. Baliasnaia, born 1927, interviewed April 5, 2009. As a Komsomol TsK secretary, Baliasnaia
occupied a high position within the Komsomol, in charge of all of its activities aimed at school-age youth.
She also oversaw the Pioneers, a separate organization for children between about ten and fourteen, but one
managed by the Komsomol. For more on Baliasnaia, see the biography of Komsomol TsK secretaries: A.
A. Alekseeva, Stroka v biografii (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2003), 72.
437 For more free time available in general in the post-Stalin years, see John Bushnell, "Urban Leisure
Culture in Post-Stalin Russia: Stability as a Social Problem?" in Terry L. Thompson and Richard Sheldon
eds., Soviet Society and Culture: Essays in Honor of Vera S. Dunham (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 58-
86, and Jiri Zuzanek, Work and Leisure in the Soviet Union: A Time-Budget Analysis (New York: Praeger,
1980), 39-49.
438 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 877, ll. 3-4.
439 For example, see a report on how students at technical colleges had plenty of free time, see RGASPI, f.
M-1, op. 32, d. 802, l. 125.
440 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 484, l. 30.
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The last phrase embodies a central motivation as described in the official
discourse of the early Thaw for changes in state-sponsored youth popular culture policy:
satisfying youth desires. During the postwar Stalin years, public rhetoric suggested that
lectures on politics, ideology, science, and production best satisfied the desires of young
people. This Socialist Realist claim bore little resemblance to reality, and instead served
to signal how idealized young New Soviet People should behave. In contrast, the
resolutions of the 1954 Twelfth Komsomol Congress proclaimed the need for mass
cultural work “that responds to the interests and demands of youth,” calling on
Komsomol organizations to initiate mass celebrations, carnivals, amateur music concerts,
and so on–privileging fun entertainment in state-managed cultural events.441 At the 1954
Moscow city Komsomol committee conference, its first secretary stressed: “the spiritual
world of our youth is rich and diverse, their demands high and varied, they grow every
day. Our youth likes having fun, singing songs, reading interesting books, enjoying
themselves.”442 Shelepin’s speech at the 1956 Twentieth Congress of the Communist
Party had criticized the Komsomol for “inadequate organization of [youth] free time.”
Claimed Shelepin, “we are timid and slow to add new and interesting content to work
with Komsomol members,” which “naturally, cannot satisfy young people.”443
The official discourse’s emphasis on fulfilling youth desires rings true. The post-
Stalin leadership had a vested interest in acquiring political legitimacy after the death of
the central authority figure of the last quarter-century, and satisfying the desires of the
441 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 38, l. 119.
442 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 12, d. 267, l. 42.
443 XX s’’ezd KPSS. Stenograficheskii otchet. Ch. 1 (Moscow, 1956), 606-07.
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population constituted an effective way of doing so: in other words, offering youth in the
early Thaw a consumerist social contract. Doing so extended the offer given by the
Kremlin during the late Stalin period to managers and higher-up officials–what Vera
Dunhma termed the Big Deal–to include youth, at least in regard to state-sponsored youth
popular culture.444 Furthermore, the post-Stalin leadership likely intended the provision
of fun cultural consumption to help close the gap between the Party-state and young
people that grew wide during the anticosmopolitan campaign.
At the same time, the leadership intended the extension of a social contract to
serve as a draw for Soviet youth to participate actively in the process of making
communism by illustrating the promise of the communist utopia on an everyday,
practical level. In the postwar Stalin years, the official discourse stressed the need for the
masses of young people to sublimate personal consumption desires for the sake of the
leadership’s demands, and presented any improvement in consumption as a gift from
Stalin, for which Soviet citizens had to express abject gratitude. During the Thaw,
however, the Komsomol’s rhetoric, as seen from the quotes above, stressed the need for
official institutions to satisfy individual wants and personal interests of youth. Similar to
the Big Deal for elites, the Thaw-era discursive tropes functioned to mark the desires of
young people as legitimate and deserving of attention from the Party-state. This sent the
message to young people that, by actively contributing to the building of communism,
they not only deserved to but would actually achieve satisfaction of their personal desires
444 Vera Dunham argues that the major beneficiaries of consumption-oriented measures in the postwar
Stalin era constituted professional middle class managers and Party cadres, in a “Big Deal”. See her In
Stalin’s Time: Middleclass Values in Soviet Fiction (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976). In
contrast, others suggest that the “Big Deal” described by Durham originated in the late 1930s. See Sheila
Fitzpatrick, “‘Middle-Class Values’ and Soviet Life in the 1930s,” in Thompson and Sheldon eds., Soviet
Society and Culture, 20-38, and Jukka Gronow, Caviar with Champagne: Common Luxury and the Ideals
of the Good Life in Stalin’s Russia (Berg: New York, 2003), 145-52.
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with the assistance of the Party-state, a key element of the vision of socialist modernity
promoted by post-Stalin leaders.
Undoubtedly, state-sponsored cultural policy for youth in the mid-1950s built
upon the gradual gains made in the reconstruction of the network of cultural recreation
institutions in the postwar Stalin years. Nonetheless, the turn in public policy toward
improving club activities for young people constituted a conscious shift away from
Stalinist priorities, and fit the broader development of expanding consumption options for
the population. Still, some differences existed between material and cultural
consumption. The emphasis of the early Thaw authorities on material consumption
represented a deliberate and powerful intensification of already extant postwar trends
toward improving the living conditions of the population. In contrast, the sphere of
cultural consumption witnessed a sharper, more revolutionary break associated with
Stalin’s death, since the shift away from politics and toward entertainment in state-
sponsored popular culture had no clear parallels to material consumption. Instead, it
constituted a decisive transformation connected to the ascendancy of new leaders in the
Kremlin. This challenges the view of Fürst, Hessler, and other scholars that Thaw-era
innovations resulted from structurally-determined policies that evolved organically from
broader processes associated with postwar reconstruction as opposed to being attributable
primarily to the actions of the new top officials in the Kremlin. My analysis also calls
into question Anne White’s suggestion that the softening of cultural policy in cultural
recreation institutions was an “unintended” consequence of broader top-level
initiatives.445 In addition, the Party-state’s endeavors to increase youth free time and
445 Anne White, De-Stalinization and the House of Culture: Declining State Control over Leisure in the
USSR, Poland and Hungary, 1953-89 (New York: Routledge, 1990), 37.
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provide pleasurable organized cultural activities indicate the need to revise Stephen
Hanson’s thesis that the post-Stalin Kremlin, like the Stalinist leadership, focused
exclusively on demanding time-transcending heroic labor.446
Indeed, the Komsomol TsK explicitly linked the new initiatives in the Thaw to
de-Stalinization. An overview report on the state of the Komsomol sent by its TsK to the
Party TsK in early 1956, for instance, criticized the fact that, “in many enterprises, the
most basic conditions for youth leisure are lacking: there are no clubs” or other facilities.
The blame for this failure “was due to the cult of personality, as essentially all of the
propaganda work in the Komsomol was aimed at the rote memorization of what Stalin
said or wrote.”447 Furthermore, at the 1957 Seventh Komsomol TsK Plenum, Shelepin
drew attention to “the correctness of the Komsomol’s turn” following the 1954 Twelfth
Komsomol Congress and especially after the Twentieth Party Congress to more actively
organizing youth popular culture–underlining the shift after 1953.448
Moreover, if the postwar Stalinist government managed society via constant
mobilization for a potential war, embodied by the militant, discipline-oriented
anticosmopolitan campaign, an important part of the Thaw-era reforms in organized
youth recreation centered on a transition toward peacetime activities.449 This
demobilization of society played a considerable role for moving youth free time, and
446 Stephen E. Hanson, Time and Revolution: Marxism and the Design of Soviet Institutions (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 171-75.
447 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 179, ll. 45-46.
448 A. N. Shelepin, Ob uluchshenii ideino-vospitatel’noi raboty komsomol’skikh organizatsii sredi
molodezhi (Doklad na VII plenum TsK VLKSM 1957 g.) (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1957), 6.
449 For more on preparing for war as the primary goal of the Stalinist leadership’s youth policy, see Anna
Krylova, Soviet Women in Combat: A History of Violence on the Eastern Front (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 35-87.
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particularly cultural activities, closer to the center of public attention and policy-making.
If the late Stalinist authorities devoted the large brunt of their efforts in organizing youth
leisure activities to sports, the much intensified attention of officialdom to cultural
recreation in the mid-1950s gave state-sponsored popular culture similar attention. For
instance, A. N. Shelepin’s keynote speech at the 1954 Komsomol Congress spent
approximately the same amount of time on club activities and amateur art as it did on
sports, illuminating the rapid rise of priority ascribed to cultural recreation in the sphere
of youth leisure organization.450 Indicative of the shift to peace, in the second half of
1956 the Komsomol TsK even changed the name of its sport subdivision from “The
Military and Physical Culture Department (Voenno-fizkul’turnyi otdel)” to the “The
Department of Physical Culture and Sports (Otdel fizkul’tury i sporta).”451 These policies
formed part of a general revision in outlook, promoted particularly by Khrushchev, which
took a less confrontational stance toward western Europe and America.452 Such reforms
in state-sponsored youth popular culture embodied, and brought into the everyday life of
the population, the turn from the presumption of an inevitable war between communism
and capitalism toward peaceful competition; they encouraged young people to see
themselves less as soldiers of communism who need to prepare for future conflicts during
450 A. N. Shelepin, Otchetnyi doklad, 44-45, 49-51.
451 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 912, l. 103.
452 On a more peaceful stance in foreign policy soon after Stalin’s death, especially as promoted by
Khrushchev, see Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Insider Story of
an American Adversary (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), 5-32; Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The
Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2007), 62-94; Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of
the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 49-116; and Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Cold
War: What Do ‘We Now Know’?” The American Historical Review 104.2 (April 1999): 501-24.
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their free time, and more as peaceful, if vigilant, citizens who can afford to spend more of
their leisure engaged in fun, playful activities.
Club Activities and Youth “Deviance”
Besides satisfying cultural consumption wants, the other crucial motive for the
new initiatives in mass cultural recreation as presented in official discourse involved the
desire to fill up youth free time and ensure normative behavior concordant with the
standards of New Soviet Men and Women. Specifically, the early years of the Thaw
witnessed an emphasis on using club activities as a means of combating youth “deviants,”
namely hooligans and, to a lesser extent, stiliagi.453 In the postwar Stalin years, the
authorities generally utilized a mixture of political propaganda and, more often, harsh
police repression to deal with youth misbehavior. In 1947, they even made minors as
young as twelve liable for harsh penalties. The Thaw-era Kremlin, which launched an
initiative to liquidate juvenile “delinquency” as part of its broader efforts to reform Soviet
daily life, relied less on policing measures, and more on satirical press articles lambasting
“deviants”; especially novel was an emphasis on community policing, which involved the
453 Stiliagi are discussed in the previous chapter, and hooliganism in the Soviet Union before the Thaw is
covered in Chapter 1. On hooliganism in the Thaw itself, see Brian LaPierre, Defining, Policing, and
Punishing Hooliganism in Khrushchev’s Russia (Ph. D. diss., University of Chicago, 2006); Sheila
Fitzpatrick, “Social Parasites: How Tramps, Idle Youth, and Busy Entrepreneurs Impeded the Soviet March
to Communism,” Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique 47, 1-2 (2006): 377-408; Miriam Dobson, “‘Show
the Bandit-Enemies No Mercy!’: Amnesty, Criminality, and Public Response in 1953,” in Jones ed., The
Dilemmas, 21-40; Ann Livschiz, “De-Stalinizing Soviet Childhood: The Quest for Moral Rebirth, 1953-
1958,” in Jones ed., The Dilemmas, 117-34; Juliane Fürst, “The Arrival of Spring? Changes and
Continuities in Soviet Youth Culture and Policy between Stalin and Khrushchev” in Jones ed., The
Dilemmas, 135-53; and V. A. Kozlov, Mass Uprisings in the USSR: Protest and Rebellion in the Post-
Stalin Years, trans. Elaine M. MacKinnon (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2002).
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population in fighting crime via new institutions such as Komsomol patrols, volunteer
groups of young Komsomol members who patrolled the streets to maintain order.454
So far, however, the scholarship has overlooked the role that the authorities
ascribed to state-sponsored popular culture in combating juvenile “delinquency,”
particularly hooliganism, in the early Thaw. For instance, the Komsomol launched the
campaign against youth “deviance” with a resolution at the 1954 Twelfth Komsomol
Congress. It called for Komsomol cells to struggle with drunkenness, hooliganism, theft,
and licentiousness, demanding that Komsomol organizations ensure the widespread
development of cultural recreation activities among youth, “which encourages worthy
leisure.”455 A 1954 Komsomol TsK decree spotlighted the need for Komsomol cells to
improve state-sponsored youth popular culture: “the provision of cultured leisure and
rational entertainment is a decisive method of propaganda for a healthy everyday life and
struggle against drunkenness among youth.”456 Shelepin’s speech in 1957 at a Moscow
city Komsomol conference highlighted the change from earlier methods of dealing with
youth “deviance,” stating that “administrative measures alone are insufficient”: to solve
this problem, the Komsomol needed to “undertake the organization of youth leisure with
454 On how post-Stalin authorities strove to expunge delinquency in a new campaign, particularly for
Komsomol patrols, see Juliane Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Youth and the Emergence of Mature
Socialism, 1945-56 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 167-49, and N. A. Mitrokhin, Russkaia
partiia: Dvizhenie russkikh natsionalistov v SSSR, 1953-1985 gody (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe
obozrenie, 2003). On newspapers in this initiative, see Gleb Tsipursky, “Citizenship, Deviance, and
Identity: Soviet Youth Newspapers as Agents of Social Control in the Thaw-Era Leisure Campaign,”
Cahiers du monde russe 49.4 (September-October 2008): 1-22. For the broader campaign against
hooliganism, see Brian LaPierre, "Making Hooliganism on a Mass Scale: The Campaign against Petty
Hooliganism in the Soviet Union, 1956-1964," Cahiers du monde russe, 47, 1-2 (2006): 349-75.
455 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 80, l. 18.
456 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 841, l. 81.
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real Komsomol energy.”457 Newspapers also published articles underlining the
importance of organizing appropriate state-sponsored youth popular culture to fight
crime.458 Making sure that youth spent their free time “appropriately” acquired particular
significance due to the increase of free time available to young people in the Thaw. As an
example, a Komsomol conference in Saratov’s Kirov neighborhood emphasized that
“with the transition to a seven-hour workday, the organization of youth cultural leisure is
acquiring particular significance.”459
Interviews with former Komsomol cadres support these findings from official
sources. For example, the former Komsomol TsK secretary Baliasnaia confirms that,
before the mid-1950s, there was no systematic national policy to use organized recreation
against hooliganism, although some individual Komsomol officials made efforts to do so.
From the mid-1950s, however, the organization of youth free time activities as a means
of dealing with hooliganism and drunkenness “became part of the program of Komsomol
activities, and thus obligatory.” Baliasnaia specifically explained the motivations of
official policy on cultural activities in this period, which she helped create and enact: “if
schools and families do not inculcate in children an interest in something beautiful and a
way of satisfying their interests, then what will happen? They may smoke and drink.”460
This perspective reflects that of many Komsomol bureaucrats in high positions
during the Thaw. A case in point, N. I. Butov, who served as the assistant director of the
457 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 14, d. 546, l. 47.
458 For example, see “Gde molodezhi otdykhat’?”Komsomol’skaia pravda, June 22, 1955; Moskovskii
komsomolets, March 9, 1957; Moskovskii komsomolets, March 12, 1958; and Komsomol’skaia pravda,
January 9, 1957.
459 GANISO, f. 3234, op. 14, d. 8, l. 56.
460 L. K. Baliasnaia, born 1927, interviewed April 5, 2009.
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Komsomol Propaganda Department and thus was directly involved in formulating and
implementing cultural recreation policy in the Thaw, maintained that “it was necessary to
organize youth leisure, otherwise there would have been drinking parties.”461 Komsomol
officials at the local level, for example Avrus at Saratov State University, also stressed
the perceived need to use organized leisure as a means of preventing hooliganism at that
time.462 Those more directly involved in cultural recreation at the grassroots during the
Thaw held similar viewpoints. S. A. Krylov, a Soviet bard and later a music promoter
who cooperated closely with various Komsomol committees, thought that amateur art
“undoubtedly” protected young people from becoming hooligans.463 L. V. Guseva, who
organized cultural events in the SGU library, claimed that they helped ensure that “youth
would not become criminals.”464 This helps explain part of the motivation for the shift in
top-level policy to promoting fun and pleasurable youth-oriented club activities, and for
the active support of many mid- and lower-level officials for this change in course.
Such efforts to get rid of hooliganism have class overtones. Hooliganism served
as a broad concept used by official discourse to label supposedly “immoral” free time
activities generally associated with male workers and peasants, such as drunkenness,
brawling, cursing, rude manners, mistreating women, smoking, stealing, and so on. By
attempting to replace such conduct with normative cultural recreation, Thaw-era officials
emulated on a mass scale, whether knowingly or not, the small-scale endeavors of the
461 N. I. Butov, born 1944, interviewed February 16, 2009. He rose from membership in his university
Komsomol committee in the 1960s, through the ranks of the Komsomol during the 1960s-70s, and up to the
assistant director of the Komsomol Propaganda Department in the 1970s-80s.
462 A. I. Avrus, born 1930, interviewed May 28, 2009.
463 S. A. Krylov, born 1941, interviewed March 2, 2009.
464 L. V. Guseva, born 1935, interviewed June 1, 2009.
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progressive intelligentsia reformers of the late imperial period, who inspired the early
Soviet state-sponsored popular cultural practices. As in late imperial Russia, well-
educated individuals in the Thaw sought to have working-class “hooligans” take on
leisure values associated with the middle class.
The post-Stalin Kremlin’s stress on the use of club activities as one of the major
tools against juvenile “delinquency” formed part of a wider transformation. Moving away
from a method of rule characterized by centralized state coercion, the Party-state shifted
toward more populist and decentralized strategies of ensuring normative conduct.465 In
doing so, it relied to a much greater extent than previously on grassroots surveillance and
persuasion, whether by the newly-empowered community policing groups or existing
institutions such as official Komsomol collectives, which were now directed to focus on
managing youth misbehavior. Part of the same development was the Soviet policy in the
early Thaw that aimed to expand “communist time” from the well-surveilled work and
study of the Stalin years to encompass leisure, in cultural recreation institutions and other
spheres of life.466 Through getting young people to spend much more of their free time in
state-monitored settings, the new leadership wanted to make youth leisure to more
465 On the weakening of state police powers and reliance on community policing after Stalin’s death, see
Louise I. Shelley, Policing Soviet Society: The Evolution of State Control (New York: Routledge, 1996),
44-45.
466 The Stalinist leadership, demanding exemplary free time conduct of the new managerial and communist
elite in the 1930s, enforced by Party control commissions, paid much less attention to the leisure of the rest
of the populace: David Hoffman, Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917-1941
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 57-88. For the expansion of surveillance into other spheres of life
in the Thaw, particularly the home, that previously were considered a nonstate matter, see Field, Private
Life and Communist Morality, and Edward D. Cohn, “Sex and the Married Communist: Family Troubles,
Marital Infidelity, and Party Discipline in the Postwar USSR, 1945–64,” The Russian Review 68.3 (July
2009): 429–50.
186
visible, organized, and productive, more “rational” in the words of official rhetoric.467 By
doing so, the Party-state sought to intensify social controls and forge youth into model
New Soviet People.468 This constituted part of the process of shaping values and desires
that, along with the offering of the consumerist social contract, were vital in the Thaw-era
endeavor to move toward a socialist version of modernity.469
However, this analysis does not indicate my agreement with scholars who read
evidence of the government’s intentions as indicative of its actual success. Most notably,
Kharkhordin, relying largely on government manuals providing instructions on forming
collectives, argued that official Soviet collectives grew more influential and repressive in
the Thaw, while the internal life of these official collectives was characterized by cynical
strife. The increased power and coercive orientation of such collectives resulted in the
massive intervention of the public sphere into the private life of the population.470 As the
last chapter illustrated, however, collective bodies such as Komsomol cells did not prove
467 Thus, an internal 1954 report by the Komsomol Propaganda Department on mass cultural activities, in
describing the aims of the cultural recreation network, gave pride of place to the goal of “helping Soviet
youth spend its leisure rationally” (razumno): RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 770, l. 20. Another example
specifically advocating “rational and beneficial” (razumnyi, poleznyi) leisure is in an instruction manual on
clubs. See Z. A. Petrova and M. P. Rymkevich eds., Novoe v rabote klubov (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia,
1962), 85.
468 For the classical analysis of how surveillance is meant to manage behavior, see Michel Foucault,
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 178-79. For criticism of
the applicability of Foucault to the USSR, see Laura Engelstein, "Combined Underdevelopment: Discipline
and the Law in Imperial and Soviet Russia," The American Historical Review 98.2 (April 1993): 338-53. I
would instead agree with Jan Plamper, who defends the use of certain ideas from Foucault to shed light on
the USSR. See his "Foucault’s Gulag," Kritika 3.2 (Spring 2002): 255-80.
469 For how this admixture of consumption and social mobilization were part of the new method of rule in
the Thaw and how this applied to youth, see Gleb Tsipursky “Coercion and Consumption: The Khrushchev
Leadership’s Ruling Style in the Campaign against ‘Westernized’ Youth, 1954-64,” in William J. Risch
and Kate Transchel eds., The Socialist Beat in the Soviet Bloc (Lanham: Lexington Books, forthcoming in
2011). On how this applied to consumption in particular, see Crowley and Reid, “Introduction: Pleasures in
Socialism.”
470 Oleg Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1999), 279-302.
187
all that effective at imposing social controls, in contrast to the assumptions of the authors
of manuals. In turn, the multilayered and diffuse nature of the Soviet public sphere meant
that the individual environment within each club may well have departed from the
overarching intentions of the leadership. Consequently, the emphasis on community
policing and collective surveillance in the Thaw, accompanied by the decreased reliance
on harsh police tactics, might well have improved youth lives, suggesting a less negative
outcome for the populace than allowed by Kharkhordin.
Arguably, then, the use of club activities to combat juvenile “delinquency”
denoted a more peaceful, humane means of dealing with youth misbehavior in the Thaw,
in which the authorities extended the rights associated with children under Stalin to
young people. If the late Stalinist authorities deployed harsh penalties against criminals in
their early teens, the government blamed the misconduct of children under twelve on the
lack of appropriate state-sponsored popular culture opportunities.471 The Thaw-era
Kremlin, in proposing that youth criminality was due in large part to a deficit of mass
cultural recreation for young people, shifted some of the guilt for the crimes of individual
youth to failures in the club network. Paralleling this new approach, the post-Stalin Party-
state and especially the Komsomol TsK pushed to increase the age of criminal
responsibility and to grant amnesties for youth.472 In doing so, as well as in ascribing part
471 For example, the Komsomol TsK’s 1952 decree on liquidating childhood vagrancy paid substantial
attention to providing more cultural recreation: RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 744, ll. 46-50.
472 For discussions on raising the age of responsibility for the most severe crimes from twelve to fourteen,
and less severe ones from fourteen to sixteen, as well as discussions of amnesties for youth, see GARF, f.
R-8131, op. 28, d. 4218, ll. 2-25, and GARF, f. R-8131, op. 28, d. 2526, l. 58. The age of criminal
responsibility was finally raised in 1958: Catriona Kelly, Children’s World: Growing Up in Russia, 1890-
1991 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 125-26, 271. Yet, already in late March 1953, the new
Soviet leadership passed an amnesty that included youth under eighteen: Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold
Summer, 21-49.
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of the blame for youth “deviance” to the lack of fun cultural consumption opportunities,
the actions of the Thaw-era leadership extended the period of social protection from adult
responsibilities from childhood to youthhood. Similarly, the post-Stalin focus on
improving the provision of cultural consumption opportunities for youth aimed to ensure
that they had a “happy youthhood,” mirroring the “happy childhood” promoted by the
Stalin regime for Soviet children.473 Expanding the privileges of childhood status to
youth after 1953 has intriguing parallels to what scholars of youth in western Europe and
the United States find occurred in these countries around the turn of the twentieth
century, a development explicitly associated with becoming modern.474 This Soviet top-
level government policy, then, arguably constituted another building block in the Thaw-
era efforts to build a socialist modernity.
Ironically, though, the government bodies of the United States and Britain in the
postwar years tended to emphasize varying combinations of increasing police coercion,
judicial penalties, and censorship to deal with their own young “deviants.” Stanley
Cohen, for instance, revealed how supposed “experts” assailed the British youth
counterculture of Mods and Rockers, while the press published exaggerated accounts of
youth “immorality” and crime, creating deep anxieties among the population, a “moral
panic.” Harsh extralegal coercion was deployed by the police and the courts to repress
473 On the trope of “happy childhood,” see Kelly, Children’s World, 99-154.
474 For the transformations of the meanings associated with youth as western states approached modernity,
including the extension of protections earlier granted only to children, see John R. Gillis, Youth and
History: Tradition and Change in European Age Relations, 1770-Present (New York: Academic Press Inc.,
1981), 37-131; John Springhall, Coming of Age: Adolescence in Britain, 1860-1960 (Dublin: Gill and
Macmillian Ltd., 1986); Wallace and Kovatcheva, Youth in Society; Harry Hendrick, Images of Youth: Age,
Class, and the Male Youth Problem, 1880-1920 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 250-59; and Anthony M.
Platt, The Child Savers/The Invention of “delinquency” (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969).
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these youth, labeled as socially “deviant.”475 Similarly, the US press printed greatly
embellished accounts of the misbehavior associated with the postwar youth culture that
revolved around jazz and rock’n’roll, less inhibited sexuality, souped-up cars, milk bars,
and so on. Top government and law enforcement figures, such as J. Edgar Hoover,
presented inflated statistics of youth crimes and even equated juvenile “delinquency”
with infection by communist totalitarianism. This led to mass anxiety and consequent
efforts to censor movies and comic books, as well as to police action targeting young
people, with arrests climbing rapidly, especially due to the newly-implemented
puritanical behavior codes passed at the local levels.476 The central governing bodies of
these countries made little efforts to offer normative recreation as a solution for youth
misconduct in these years.477 Hence, the post-Stalin Party-state had the opportunity to use
its new approach toward youth crime as a way of presenting itself as comparatively more
humane, modern, and democratic.478
475 Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils & Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers (New York: Basil
Blackwell, 1987), 71-91.
476 See James Gilbert, A Cycle of Outrage: America’s Reaction to the Juvenile Delinquent in the 1950s
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 11-78, 142-77; Steven Mintz, Huck’s Raft: A History of
American Childhood (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 275-309; and Michael Brake,
Comparative Youth Culture: The Sociology of Youth Cultures and Youth Subcultures in America, Britain,
and Canada (New York: Routledge, 1985), 99.
477 While youth “experts,” the press, and central governments in western Europe and North America
generally advocated a mixture of coercion and censorship in targeting youth “deviance,” some local
government bodies and government-funded nonprofits and churches, made efforts to offer organized leisure
activities, though these programs were few and far between and, as a result, never had much reach for
youth. For children, though, after-school programs and the Boy and Girl Scouts did provide many
opportunities for fun organized recreation options. See Margaret Peacock, “Contested Innocence: Images of
the Child in the Cold War” (Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texast at Austin, 2008).
478 On the use of youth policy as Cold War propaganda, see Uta G. Poiger, Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold
War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000),
168-205.
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Although the change in leadership in 1953 was decisive for this and other policy
shifts in the sphere of state-sponsored popular culture, such transformations did have
some roots in the Stalin years. After all, for the swift changes in the years after 1953 to
occur, a number of those who held administrative positions already in the late 1940s and
early 1950s had to disagree with the extant policies and believe in the necessity of a
different course.479 Indeed, even during the ideological militancy of the anticosmopolitan
campaign, some officials risked hosting western popular cultural activities, or suggested
that youth “deviance” originated from the lack of fun club activities.480 Others expressed
some hesitant criticism of the one-dimensional, unrealistically politicized and ideologized
depictions of daily life in the repertoire for youth amateur art. For example, an internal
1952 Komsomol Propaganda Department report censured I. Kasumov’s play “Happy
Day” for having the protagonists discuss about production matters while confessing their
love to each other.481 Only with the arrival of the new administration, however, could
they openly advocate for a soft-line, tolerant course in mass cultural recreation, an
479 Here, we can see intriguing parallels to the liberal bureaucrats that W. Bruce Lincoln describes as
developing ideas and proposals for reform under Nicholas I, which they then implemented under Alexander
II. See his The Great Reforms: Autocracy, Bureaucracy, and the Politics of Change in Imperial Russia
(Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1990). Although not directly related to state-sponsored youth
popular culture, recent research indicates that some of the reforms implemented under Khrushchev were
already discussed in high Party circles in 1945-47, only to be buried as a result of the hard-line turn by the
Stalinist leadership from 1948 onward. See Alexander Titov, “The 1961 Party Program and the Fate of
Khrushchev’s Reforms,” in Melanie Ilic and Jeremy Smith eds., Soviet State and Society under Nikita
Khrushchev (New York: Routledge, 2009), 8-25, and A. V. Pyzhikov, Khrushchevskaia “ottepel’”
(Moscow: OLMA-PRESS, 2002), 15-40.
480 For some rare examples of links drawn between the lack of organized cultural recreation and juvenile
“delinquency” in the late Stalin years, made by lower-level officials and generally ignored by those higher
up in the power hierarchy, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 630, l. 83, and RGASPI, f. 17, op. 122, d. 102, ll.
215-22.
481 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 741, ll. 4-6. For more on criticism of such stultified portrayals in theater
during 1952, see Manon van de Water, Moscow Theaters for Young People: A Cultural History of
Ideological Coercion and Artistic Innovation, 1917-2000 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 67.
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approach that fit the optimistic sensibilities and goals of the post-Stalin Kremlin.482
Additionally, the postwar reconstruction under Stalin helped ensure that there would be
resources available to enact the shift in policy toward club activities that took place in the
mid-1950s. In this sense, the transformations in the early Thaw owe a debt to
developments in the postwar Stalin years.
Going back even further reveals insightful parallels between the policy initiatives
of the mid-1950s and state-sponsored popular culture during earlier periods of Soviet
history, most notably the 1920s. As chapter 1 described, in the wide-ranging debates
during NEP, officials favoring the more pluralistic and soft-line Right faction promoted
more entertaining cultural recreation, with some elements of western culture, and
believed in using club activities as a tool against juvenile “delinquency.” The contrasting
position of the Left faction prevailed by the late 1920s and largely predominated under
Stalin, especially in the late Stalin era. Still, the policy options associated with the Right
faction provided a potential precedent for those who wanted to pursue an alternative
course. Considering that the post-Stalin leadership sought to revive what it termed the
“Leninist principles” of the 1920s as a means of finding a path to communism untainted
by Stalin’s “cult of personality,” it is not surprising that its approach to state-sponsored
popular culture resembled that of the Right faction in the NEP.483
482 For insights on early Thaw-era optimism, see Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 156-85. We should
be wary of giving Shelepin much individual credit for these soft-line changes, as less than a month after
Stalin’s death, Shelepin sent a letter to the Secretary of the Communist Party, Khrushchev, asking him to
consider renaming the Komsomol into the “Vsesoiuznyi Leninsko-Stalinskii Kommunisticheskii Soiuz
Molodezhi,” and the newspaper Komsomol’skaia pravda into Stalinskaia smena (Stalin’s shift). See
RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 38, l. 33.
483 For how the 1920s served as an inspiration for many of those in the Thaw, see Melanie Ilic,
“Introduction,” in Ilic and Smith eds., Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev, 1-8; Stephen V.
Bittner, The Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw: Experience and Memory in Moscow’s Arbat (Ithaca,
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Enacting the Early Thaw Initiatives in State-Sponsored Popular Culture
The gaps between official Soviet rhetoric and grassroots reality require an
examination of how the authorities implemented their intentions to transform cultural
recreation for youth. Before turning to this, we need to consider developments in the
network of clubs in the mid-1950s. Data on clubs owned by trade unions, which
controlled the large majority of clubs in cities, indicate that the trade unions in 1951 had
over 8,000 clubs and larger cultural recreation institutions, with 600 built in the last five
years, and 80,000 red corners.484 By 1956, the trade unions had over 10,500 clubs, and
112,000 red corners, suggesting that most of the construction took place after Stalin’s
death.485 Data from specific urban areas illuminate similar trends. In the Soviet capital,
the number of clubs expanded minutely from 204 in 1950 to 207 in 1953, but grew to 226
in 1955. In Saratov, clubs showed a more sustained growth, accelerating after Stalin,
from 20 in 1950, to 25 in 1953, and 32 in 1955. Tellingly, the number of club workers in
the urban clubs belonging to the Ministry of Culture, MOC, more than doubled over this
period, from 846 in 1951 to 2,200 in 1956, while those in trade unions increased by
nearly half, from 19,400 in 1951 to 28,854 in 1956.486 In 1952, the Moscow
Krasnopresnenskii neighborhood had 31 clubs, with no larger houses of culture, and also
Cornell University Press, 2008), 75-104, 211-19; and William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His
Era (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 236-99.
484 GARF, f. R-5451, op 24, d. d. 900, ll. 11.
485 GARF, f. R-5451, op 24, d. d. 1543, ll. 19.
486 O. K. Makarova, Kul’turnoe stroitel’stvo SSSR: statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe
statisticheskoe izdatel’stvo, 1956), 46-49, 276.
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had 13 red corners in large housing complexes. By 1962, there were 35 clubs, of them 5
large houses of culture, and 57 red corners.487
Club growth after 1953 relates to financial investment in clubs. For example, the
Komsomol’s 1954 budget for financing social and cultural events (sotsial’no-kul’turnye
meropriatiia) amounted to 141,400,000,000 rubles, or 9.8 percent more than in 1953.488
Moreover, soon after 1953 regional officials began writing to the Party TsK to ask for
various forms of assistance, mostly financial, in constructing clubs, probably inspired by
the shift in discourse emphasizing the importance of state-sponsored popular culture.489
Official publications also gave greater attention to the club network. For instance,
youth newspapers printed substantially more articles on clubs.490 In addition, the USSR
began to systematically publish guidebooks on how to conduct appropriate work in clubs,
while very few such publications appeared in the late Stalin era.491 The content of these
manuals also reveals a shift associated with Stalin’s death. A case in point, a 1955
booklet stated that “cultural recreation work now acquired deep significance,”
487 TsAGM, f. 1988, op. 1, d. 15, ll. 19-21, and TsAGM, f. 1988, op. 1, d. 114, l. 1.
488 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 770, l. 16.
489 These letters met with some limited success. See RGANI, f. 5, op. 34, d. 11, ll. 27, 34-35
490 As an example, in comparing three randomly selected two-week periods of Komsomol’skaia pravda, I
found only two relevant articles on clubs in 1950 and the same number in 1951, but six stories in 1955 and
eight in 1956.
491 For examples of these guidebooks, see T. Kutasova, Samodeiatel’nyi tantseval’nyi kollektiv (Moscow:
Profizdat, 1954); T. Amosova and E. Ivanova, Tematicheskie molodezhnye vechera k 40-letiu leninskogo
komsomola (Alma-Ata, 1958); B. Kozudlin, Kul’turno-prosvetitel’naia rabota sredi molodezhi
(Sverdlovsk: Sverdlovskoe knizhnoe izdanie, 1954); I. N. Nikolaeva, Rabota kluba s molodezh’iu
(Moscow: “Sovetskaia Rossiia”, 1957); M. E. Nepomniashchii ed., Entuziasty: Sbornik o peredovikakh
kul’turno-prosvititel’noi raboty (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1959); and Z. A. Petrova and Rymkevich,
M. P. eds., Novoe v rabote klubov (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1962).
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differentiating the mid-1950s from the recent past when organized cultural entertainment
had much less prominence.492
The Komsomol’s efforts to use its own resources to increase both the number of
clubs and of club workers served as another important reason for improving the club
network. While lacking the financial capacity of the trade unions, the Komsomol had
access to a resource of equal magnitude, namely having Komsomol members engage in
semi-obligatory labor as part of their Komsomol duties, including construction. In the
postwar Stalin years, the Komsomol’s construction efforts in regard to building
recreational institutions focused on sport complexes.493 Soon after 1953, however, the
Komsomol TsK directed its cells to build clubs as well as sports complexes, for example,
in the 1956 Fifth Plenum of the Komsomol TsK.494 Similarly, youth newspapers
promoted club construction. In December 1954 Komsomol’skaia pravda, for instance,
published a letter critical of the lack of a club in the village of Kuznetsovo, attributing
“immoral” pastimes to the lack of organized recreation. As a result, a club was built in
Kuznetsovo by January 1955, with the main labor coming from local Komsomol
members.495
Regional Komsomol committees responded to the signals from the Komsomol
leadership and youth press, and invested time and energy into constructing clubs. Thus
492 A. Bratenkov, Klubom rukovodit sovet: Iz opyta raboty kluba Krasnoiarskogo lespromkhoza (Tomsk,
1955), 6-7.
493 As made clear by the keynote speech in the 1949 Eleventh Komsomol Congress: Mikhailov, Otchetnyi
doklad na XI s’’ezde komsomola o rabote TsK VLKSM, 38.
494 Dokumenty piatogo plenuma TsK VLKSM, 23.
495 “Klub otkrylsia v derevne Kuznetsovo,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, January 16, 1955. Also see Leninskii
put’, October 26, 1957, and Komsomol’skaia pravda, August 4, 1955.
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the Novgorod oblast Komsomol helped repair many clubs and establish red corners.496 A
Komsomol conference at a wood production enterprise in the town of Pugachevsk,
Saratov oblast, resulted in the organization of a youth brigade to fix the factory club.
With the factory providing 10,000 rubles of financial support, the brigade reportedly
completed a capital overhaul of the club building, with the enterprise’s Komsomol
committee receiving the right to manage the club’s activities.497 This document, like
many others, demonstrates how local Komsomol cells cooperated with the management
of their enterprises to construct spaces for recreation. Additionally, it illustrates how, as a
result of its activities, Komsomol organizations frequently acquired more input into and
influence on the work of the clubs. A speaker at a Kransnopresnenskii neighborhood
Komsomol conference specifically emphasized that Komsomol committee needs to take a
major role in shaping club activities in the district in order to improve youth popular
culture, since otherwise the clubs “present plans that do not satisfy us.”498
The Komsomol also used its labor resources in directing members to both work
and volunteer in clubs. At the 1954 Twelfth Komsomol Congress, Shelepin called on the
Komsomol to improve the quantity of amateur circle directors.499 By the 1958 Thirteenth
Komsomol Congress, Shelepin praised the Komsomol for helping prepare qualified
workers of cultural recreation institutions and directors of amateur art collectives, as in
the preceding two years Komsomol cells sent over 30,000 members to work in clubs and
496 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 802, l. 75.
497 GANISO, f. 4158, op. 20, d. 472, l, 10.
498 TsAOPIM, f. 667, op. 3, d. 26, l. 58.
499 He called on Komsomol cells to assist in preparing courses and seminars for training directors of such
amateur collectives from among amateur artists. See Shelepin, Otchetnyi doklad, 46.
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libraries.500 Likewise, Komsomol members served on club councils and volunteered in
these institutions, roles that frequently overlapped. An instruction booklet describing the
volunteer council of a club belonging to a wood production enterprise in Krasnoiarsk
reported that seven youth actively volunteered in a club, with each taking on a sector that
fit his or her interests: for example, N. I. Devianin, who liked photography, ran the photo
collective.501 Club councils helped chart and carry out the club’s activities, making them
an important component in determining the function of mass cultural recreation
institutions. In sum, the Komsomol played a vital role in enacting the Thaw-era
leadership’s efforts to expand cultural consumption provided to youth. In so doing, the
Komsomol acquired a greater presence in the club network than before 1953, and
increased its abilities to lobby on behalf of its young constituents.
The trade unions, though, controlled the large majority of clubs in the cities, and
thus their policy on youth cultural entertainment was vital to the everyday life experience
of urban youth leisure. It is instructive to compare two resolutions on club activities
issued by the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, VTsSPS, one at a plenum in
1951 and the other at a plenum in 1956. In 1951, the plenum resolution did not mention
using cultural recreation as a tool against “deviants,” while the 1956 decree explicitly
linked shortcomings in the organization of state-sponsored popular culture to
drunkenness and hooliganism. The 1951 resolution noted the need to improve cultural
recreation for young people; however, the more strongly worded 1956 decree stated that
500 A. N. Shelepin, Otchetnyi doklad Tsentral’nogo Komiteta Vsesoiuznogo leninskogo
kommunisticheskogo soiuza molodezhi XIII s’’ezdu komsomola (15 aprelia 1958 g.) (Moscow: Molodaia
gvardiia, 1958), 43-44.
501 Bratenkov, Klubom rukovodit sovet, 4-5.
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trade union organizations are “obliged (obiazany) to improve their work” in regard to
youth cultural recreation.502
The rhetorical shift did not remain confined to the plenums, as the VTsSPS
enacted new guidelines reflecting the emphasis on working with youth in its mass
cultural network. Thus, in its bylaws for the commission on cultural recreation work of
factory committees passed in February 1951, the VTsSPS discussed work with children
but failed to bring up the need to serve the interests of young people or work with the
Komsomol. Five years later, in its 1956 bylaws for trade union clubs, the VTsSPS gave a
prominent place to youth and even listed the Komsomol first among the social
organizations with which the club’s management should cooperate.503
This formed part of a broader focus on youth within clubs, both those owned by
trade unions and other organizations. For instance, an oversight institution, the Moscow
Krasnopresnenskii neighborhood’s cultural-enlightenment department, already in
October 1953 criticized the “lack of thematic evenings for youth, which does not satisfy
youth desires” in the club of the city bus transport system, not something for which the
department censured clubs in previous years.504 In 1956, the archival holdings for this
department for the first time included a separate report on how the clubs in this
neighborhood worked with youth.505 This document clearly indicated interest in the issue
of youth cultural entertainment higher-up in the hierarchy. Those demanding such reports
502 For the 1951 plenum, see GARF, f. R-5451, op 24, d. d. 900, ll. 12-17. For the 1956 plenum, see GARF,
f. R-5451, op 24, d. d. 1543, ll. 20-25
503 L. I. Poliakov, Sbornkik rukovodiashchikh materialov po kul’turno-massovoi rabote (Moscow:
Profizdat, 1957), 34-37, 49-53.
504 TsAGM, f. 1988, op. 1, d. 21, ll. 13-15.
505 TsAGM, f. 1988, op. 1, d. 49, ll. 2-3.
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intended not only to get information on youth cultural activities, but also to reorient the
club network toward serving youth more directly by encouraging club managers to
organize events for young people in order to report successful club activities to those
above.
To an extent, this emphasis on youth interests in the clubs resulted from the
Komsomol TsK’s intervention with the Party TsK to ensure that youth had a social space
for fun entertainment. For instance, in 1956 the Komsomol TsK asked the Party TsK to
build more trade union clubs, impose fewer limitations on existing club financing for
state-sponsored popular culture, free up club spaces occupied by other organizations, and
increase the production of musical instruments and other equipment for cultural
recreations.506 In April 1956, the Party TsK suggested the need to consider allowing
college and secondary school students the right to use sport and cultural recreation
institutions in the daytime without paying fees.507 In addition, the Party TsK devoted
more club time to events dedicated only to youth and organized with the participation of
the Komsomol, such as youth evenings by limiting the amount of movies shown in clubs,
despite the loss in income from a very profitable enterprise. The Komsomol TsK declared
in 1956 that the Party TsK had accepted its suggestion to decrease the number of movie-
days in trade union clubs from eighteen to fifteen after January 1957, and directed
Komsomol cells to use this as a means of improving cultural recreation work among
youth in clubs.508
506 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 811, ll. 27-28.
507 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 179, ll. 54-55.
508 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 912, l. 5.
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As a result of such across-the-board efforts by the Komsomol, the Party, and trade
unions, the number of state-sponsored popular cultural activities for young people shot
up. Shortly after March 1953, youth evenings received significantly more attention from
clubs and from institutions overseeing clubs. For example, the Moscow Gor’kii House of
Culture had ten youth evenings in 1950, one-third of the total evenings that year, with the
rest largely dedicated to revolutionary dates and elections.509 Yet between October 1955
and October 1956, the house of culture held forty-nine evenings of youth leisure and
fourteen evenings of college student amateur concerts, which, together, made up 69
percent of the total ninety-one evenings, over six times the number of youth-oriented
evenings in 1950.510
The rise in club activities for youth comes through even clearer in amateur art, a
sphere in which the Party-state gathered more thorough statistics. In 1950, the USSR had
over 200,000 amateur art collectives with 4,000,000 participants, mostly youth.511 By
1954, around 5,000,000 performed in 350,000 circles.512 However, the number of those
involved in amateur art reached 9,000,000 participants in 600,000 collectives by 1962,
with a much faster rate of growth from 1954 to 1962 than previously.513
Other evidence demonstrates a shift in priorities from political lectures to amateur
art concerts. In 1955, the clubs belonging to the Ministry of Culture held 2,571,000
509 TsAGM, f. 44, op. 1, d. 19, ll. 1-4.
510 TsAGM, f. 44, op. 1, d. 50, ll. 5-6.
511 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 630, l. 102.
512 Shelepin, Otchetnyi doklad, 46.
513 S. P. Pavlov, Otchet Tsentral’nogo Komiteta VLKSM i zadachi komsomola, vytekaiushchie iz reshenii
XXII s’’ezda KPSS (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1962), 51.
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lectures and political speeches with 197,000 in attendance, and 2,786,000 lectures and
political speeches in 1959 with 226,000,000 in the audience, an increase of less than 5
percent in the number of events and just over 13 percent in the audience members.
Comparing this to amateur art performances, with 757,000 shows in 1955 and
105,000,000 in attendance, and 1959 with 951,000 performances and 143,000,000 in the
audience, reveals increases of more than 25 percent in the number of events, and over 36
percent in the people attending amateur art shows.514 Consequently, although lectures
certainly remained important, Thaw-era MOC clubs placed comparatively more stress on
increasing the provision of amateur art.
The growth in the number of amateur art participants reflected the stepped-up
measures of Komsomol cells in the mid-1950s to promote youth involvement in amateur
art. A case in point, the keynote speaker at the 1956 Moscow city Komsomol conference
stated that “we need to, in the most active manner, get youth involved in amateur art
collectives,” with the goal of “ensuring that each club will be the favorite place for youth
leisure.”515 In contrast, the keynote speaker at the 1951 Moscow city Komsomol
conference expressed far less concern over involving young people in amateur art
activities, and instead underscored the need for sport stadiums to become “the favorite
place for youth leisure.”516
The pressure for sustained youth participation in amateur art occurred in primary
Komsomol cells as well, as evinced by the Komsomol organization of the Third State
514 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1055, l. 5.
515 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 484, l. 51
516 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 12, d. 1, l. 31.
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Ball-Bearing Factory of Stalinsk neighborhood in Saratov. In late December 1953, the
Komsomol committee disparaged the fact that the factory’s amateur arts had so few
Komsomol participants. The Komsomol committee censured the Komsomol secretaries
of factory workshops who considered amateur art “a secondary activity,” and called for
participation in amateur circles “to be considered one of the primary obligations
(pervoocherednykh obiazannostei) of Komsomol members.”517 This statement on behalf
of amateur art activities by the factory Komsomol committee used much stronger rhetoric
than the committee used previously, for example, at its 1952 Komsomol conference,
helping illuminate the weight and speed of the shift after March 5, 1953.518 Avrus
similarly describes amateur art at SGU during the mid-1950s as being “much more
developed than previously.”519
This evidence demonstrates the impact of the early Thaw campaign in the sphere
of state-sponsored youth popular culture. It illustrates that youth in the mid-1950s did, in
fact, have substantially more opportunities to participate in officially-managed cultural
recreation institutions, which organized events oriented more toward young people. Thus,
the post-Stalin Party-state did not only offer young people a new social contract in its
official discourse, but also invested significant energy and resources into attempting to
satisfy youth desires at the grassroots level of the cultural recreation network.
Additionally, by having young people participate in many more club activities, the
authorities arguably succeeded in substantially expanding the period of “communist
517 GANISO, f. 654, op. 1., d. 16, l. 166.
518 GANISO, f. 654, op. 1., d. 12, l. 37.
519 A. I. Avrus, born 1930, interviewed May 28, 2009.
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time” that youth spent in officially-monitored settings, though whether doing so actually
increased social controls is another matter.
The Content of Club Events in the Early Thaw
In addition to the greater amount of club activities targeting young people in the
early Thaw, these events grew more popular among young people, as revealed by a close
examination of the fate of jazz and western dancing. Previously denounced by official
discourse and marginalized within clubs, western popular culture slowly emerged from
the margins of the Soviet musical scene after 1953. Music with jazz elements began to
play on Soviet radio, estrada or variety ensembles in restaurants started to include more
syncopated rhythms in their repertoire, and formerly prominent jazz musicians returned
to Moscow and Leningrad from either voluntary exile or prison.520 Party-state
organizations that organized youth popular culture dropped anticosmopolitan language
from their policy statements. The 1956 VTsSPS Plenum decree on cultural recreation
work, in contrast to the 1951 plenum decree, did not censure “antisocial” amateur art
pieces.521 At the 1954 Twelfth Komsomol Congress, the TsK sent an important signal in
Shelepin’s keynote speech, which conspicuously failed to mention western music as a
problem.522 All of this marked a sharp departure from the militant Stalin-era approach.
520 Richard Stites, Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment and Society since 1900 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), 123-35; S. Frederick Starr, Red and Hot: The Fate of Jazz in the Soviet Union,
1917-1980 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 261-88; and David Caute, The Dancer Defects:
The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy During the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003),
441-67.
521 GARF, f. R-5451, op 24, d. 1543, ll. 13-25.
522 Shelepin, Otchetnyi doklad, 44.
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Nonetheless, those holding militant ideological perspectives fought stridently
against these reforms. The Moscow House of Folk Creativity, DNT, provides a clear
example of this. A letter sent by the director of this institution, N. A. Astriev, to the MOC
on December 27, 1953, acknowledged that “certain western dances are broadcast over the
radio with the knowledge and permission of the MOC.” Despite this, the Moscow DNT,
“lacking specific directions to the contrary,” would not change its policies, since “who
would be interested in corrupting the ideology of our youth?” The Moscow DNT thus
will continue to “stop any attempt to dance foxtrots and tangos in the clubs and parks of
the capital.”523 Another missive sent soon afterward by a commission in this DNT
underlined the need for “dance directors” at dance floors, meant to “discipline stiliagi,
hooligans, and defend the rest of youth from their harmful influence” and instill the
appropriate “culture of behavior and beauty in dancing.”524
Despite such opposition, the permissive policy from above continued. In 1954, the
Moscow DNT complained that dance floors witnessed “the introduction of the foxtrot
and tango.”525 The next year, its report failed the mention the foxtrot or tango at all.526
This does not indicate that the foxtrot disappeared or that the Moscow DNT stopped
caring about the issue; likely, it saw no point in continuing to make such complaints.
Indeed, despite the argument of the Moscow DNT that its dance teacher attestation
commission functioned to ensure that dance “teaching was concentrated in the hands of
523 Emphasis in original: RGALI, f. 2329, d. 16, l. 4.
524 RGALI, f. 2329, op. 10, d. 16, l. 11.
525 TsAGM, f. 2987, op. 1, d. 39, l. 39.
526 TsAGM, f. 2987, op. 1, d. 45, l. 37.
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professionals instead of random people,” the Moscow city executive committee officially
closed the commission in 1956.527
This closing reflected the growing acceptance of western-style dancing in state-
sponsored popular culture institutions. It also responded to specific criticism of the
Moscow DNT, which shows that another approach to youth socialization via dance took
hold, visible in a letter sent by A. K. Azarov, a Moscow dance teacher, to the MOC in
1956. He criticized the period of what he called the “veto” on foxtrots, meaning the late
postwar Stalin years, as having resulted in youth learning to dance these dances
“improperly, without pedagogues, without good examples, having lost the criteria of what
is good and what is bad in dancing.” Azarov proclaimed that “we must help them!” and
went on to censure the Moscow DNT for continuing to forbid the teaching of foxtrots and
similar dances, which result in youth learning them from the “back door” (chernogo
khoda), giving birth to stiliagi-style dancing, “with jaunty (razviaznymi) bodily
movements and indiscreet poses.” He concluded: “this is exactly what we cannot
allow.”528 Such statements illustrate that the Moscow DNT vigorously fought against
tangos, rumbas, and foxtrots less out of its institutional position than out of the
ideological orthodoxy of its administration, which failed to adapt to the more pluralistic
context of the early Thaw and lost some of its bureaucratic turf.
Other sources confirm the increasing acceptability of the foxtrot and tango,
despite continued criticism by more militant officials. Thus, an instruction booklet issued
in 1957, a publication that typically does not press the boundaries of acceptability,
527 TsAGM, f. 2987, op. 1, d. 58, l. 37.
528 RGALI, f. 2329, d. 324, ll. 4-6.
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approvingly portrayed the dancing of a tango at a youth ball in a club, quoting the ball
director as stating: “Let us continue the ballroom program! Tango! The best dancers will
get a prize.”529 F. A. Kurilova, the Komsomol secretary of her school who tried to limit
youth from dancing the foxtrot or tango at school dances during the postwar Stalin years,
remembered that at SGU in the mid-1950s, students freely danced the foxtrot and tango
at university-sponsored evenings. In 1957, she even danced the boogie-woogie herself,
taught to her by Czech visitors to a Soviet summer camp.530 Another student at SGU, N.
A. Popkova, stated that the foxtrot and tango were the only dances in her student
dormitory, since lack of space in the dorm did not permit ballroom dances.531 Marvin, the
Saratov jazz musician, remembered young people dancing the foxtrot and tango in the
1950s, and the boogie-woogie in the 1960s.532 A Saratov jazz musician, Arons, suggested
that the young students at SGU danced the foxtrot, tango, and boogie-woogie in the late
1950s.533 However, the former Komsomol secretary of SGU Avrus remembered that, at
the university-sponsored evening events of the mid-1950s, youth danced the foxtrot and
tango, but boogie-woogie remained “officially forbidden,” and the Komsomol and trade
union organizers of the evening events prevented youth from dancing this dance, even
though youth danced the boogie-woogie at home.534 These discrepancies show that, while
529 E. Makhlin, Opyt raboty kul’turno-prosvititel’nykh uchrezhdenii na zheleznodorozhnom transporte
(Moscow: Gudok, 1957), 102.
530 F. A. Kurilova, born 1936, interviewed May 15, 2009.
531 N. A. Popkova, born 1936, interviewed May 20, 2009.
532 K. A. Marvin, born 1934, interviewed May 13, 2009.
533 F. M. Arons, born 1940, interviewed May 18, 2009.
534 A. I. Avrus, born 1930, interviewed May 28, 2009.
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the boogie-woogie did not become widespread in the mid-1950s among Saratov youth
and faced opposition from the SGU Komsomol committee, the foxtrot and tango grew
commonplace. This occurred in spite of disapproval from the more militant Saratov
Komsomol city committee, as embodied in a 1955 newspaper article that criticized a
young dancing couple who supposedly “inspired nausea” with their dancing of the
rumba, boogie-woogie, and foxtrot (Figure 1).535
535 “Na ostrie pera…,”Molodoi stalinets, August 21, 1955.
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Figure 1.  A 1955 editorial cartoon from Molodoi stalinets that illustrates
“improper” dancing.
Other hard-line officials also expressed opposition to the more tolerant policy of
the post-Stalin leadership. Baliasnaia related a story from the time when she served as a
secretary in the Ukrainian Komsomol TsK in charge of students and Pioneers from
October 1953 to 1958. Her remembrances embody the new focus on and conflicts over
youth cultural recreation and tolerance of western cultural influence in the early Thaw.
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She described how, when she visited a school in Khar’kov, she found that the principal
refused to hold an evening dance as students preferred the boogie-woogie and “did not
like waltzes,” while the principal, like many other principals at the time, “did not
understand such music.” The principal told Baliasnaia that “the school roof will fall on
my head or I will quit my job before the boogie-woogie will be danced here.” Baliasnaia,
in turn, answered that “you can write a letter of resignation right now, because I will not
leave Khar’kov until your school hosts a dance with the boogie-woogie.” According to
Baliasnaia, this argument reflected a broader tension between the Komsomol and “a type
of authoritarianism of principals,” as the Komsomol at that time “forcefully promoted
(nasazhdali)” such youth evenings. She, thereby, forced the dancing of western dances in
order to ensure well-attended state-sponsored events, despite her personal feeling that,
compared to the foxtrot or tango, “boogie-woogie was a truly alien (chuzhdyi) dance for
us,” as “the music itself was alien, and the dance was alien.”536
All of this indicates that the changes in policy toward youth dances in Moscow’s
clubs and PKOs had strong parallels throughout the Soviet Union. In the mid-1950s, the
narrow range of acceptable dances expanded from ballroom dances in the postwar Stalin
years to include the foxtrot, tango, and rumba. The struggle moved on to dances more
closely associated with western Europe and the United States, such as the boogie-woogie.
However, from the late 1950s, especially after the 1957 Sixth International Youth
Festival in Moscow,537 other dances appeared, most notably those inspired by rock’n’roll,
which troubled even soft-line officials.538
536 L. K. Baliasnaia, born 1927, interviewed April 5, 2009.
537 This remarkable event marked a key turning point in opening the USSR to western influence. See
Kristin Roth-Ey, “‘Loose Girls’ on the Loose: Sex, Propaganda and the 1957 Youth Festival” in Melanie
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The attitude toward jazz music in state-sponsored cultural events also changed in
the early Thaw. The Moscow DNT again offers a revealing case study. In its annual
report for 1954, the Moscow DNT stated that:
Variety ensembles are becoming more and more widespread, especially in
Moscow colleges. Yet it has to be acknowledged that both in their repertoire and
manner and style of performance, many of them seek to emulate western jazz
ensembles. They are too caught up in rhythmic complexity, do not pay attention
to the clearness of the sound, sometimes deliberately play off key, and abuse
saxophone and tuba glissandos. Thus, they lose the feel of light, elegant music,
and transform into bad dance ensembles. There is an intensive struggle taking
place to rid these ensembles of everything superficial and alien to the Soviet
listener. In places where ensembles are managed by experienced and cultured
musicians, and not volunteer directors, it is possible to ensure an appropriate
manner of playing, with a repertoire of light music by Soviet composers.539
This passage provides information on what it meant for variety ensembles to include jazz
elements, which are similar to those parts of the “pensioner’s ensemble” that so upset
Ogurtsov in “Carnival Night.” In addition, it demonstrates that the Moscow DNT fought
against the growing number of jazz-style variety ensembles, just as it struggled against
the foxtrot, rumba, and tango. The passage also hints at similarities in how the Moscow
DNT approached this conflict, as in both cases it wanted to control who directed the
amateur art collective, whether dance or variety ensemble by having a professional lead
the group, presumably one approved by the Moscow DNT. The Moscow DNT did not
fare well in this battle, reporting in 1955 that “the number of variety ensembles continues
to increase,” with many “in the hands of unqualified directors.” These ensembles
Ilič, Susan E. Reid and Lynne Attwood eds., Women in the Khrushchev Era (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004), 75-96, and Pia Koivunen, “Overcoming Cold War Boundaries at the World Youth
Festivals,” in Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalyn Miklossy eds., Reassessing Cold War Europe (New York:
Routledge, forthcoming in 2011).
538 For rock’n’roll after the festival, see V. E. Kleinot, born 1941, interviewed February 14, 2009.
539 TsAGM, f. 2987, op. 1, d. 39, ll. 29-30.
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“emulate bad jazz ensembles,” as a result of which “the situation of most variety
ensembles,” especially in universities, “remains unsatisfactory.”540 Thus, the militants in
the Moscow DNT music section, just like those in the dance section, lost some battles in
the struggle to keep jazz elements out of amateur ensembles and to place people loyal to
their views in charge of these groups.
The archival data suggest a palpable improvement in the official environment of
clubs for jazz enthusiasts, which is borne out by interviews. In Moscow, Garanian
described how, in the mid-1950s, his underground jazz group, the “Golden Eight,” joined
one of the most prestigious youth orchestras at the time in the Central House of Artists
(Tsentral’nyi Dom Rabotnikov Iskusstva), under B. S. Figotin and later Iu. V. Saul’skii.541
Another prominent jazz musician of the Thaw, A. S. Kozlov, recalled that the Komsomol
committee at Moscow State University helped him purchase a saxophone for
participating in university amateur art activities, despite the fact that many continued to
view this instrument as an alien object.542 In Saratov, Marvin commented that, after
Stalin’s death, the atmosphere “became somewhat freer” in regard to jazz.543 Arons stated
that the Saratov jazz scene truly took off toward the end of the 1950s.544 Yet Zhimskii
recalled new jazz-oriented collectives forming already in the mid-1950s and performing
540 TsAGM, f. 2987, op. 1, d. 45, ll. 25-26.
541 G. A. Garanian, born 1934, interviewed February 4, 2009. For more on Iu. V. Saul’skii, see chapter 1.
For more on the “Golden Eight,” see Starr, Red and Hot, 245-47.
542 The date for this purchase is unclear, likely sometime in the late 1950s: A. S. Kozlov, "Kozel na sakse":
i tak vsiu zhizn’ (Moscow: Vagrius, 1998), 134-35.
543 K. A. Marvin, born 1934, interviewed May 13, 2009.
544 F. M. Arons, born 1940, interviewed May 18, 2009.
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on university stages.545 He supplied a photograph of his jazz group performing at the
Saratov Pedagogical Institute, visually illustrating the growing acceptability of jazz
(Figure 2).
Figure 2. This is a photograph of a performance at the Saratov Pedagogical
Institute. Courtesy of the private archive of I. P. Zhimskii.
The SGU newspaper even featured Zhimskii in an overall friendly cartoon in 1958, which
did not hesitate to use the term jazz with a positive connotation (Figure 3).
545 I. P. Zhimskii, born 1936, interviewed May 27, 2009.
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Figure 3. This editorial cartoon from Leninskii put’ demonstrates the friendlier tone
toward jazz in the mid-1950s. The article is “Druzheskie sharzhi,” Leninskii put’,
April 5, 1958.
Local Komsomol officials echo these comments. According to Avrus, after
Stalin’s death and especially the Secret Speech in 1956, space opened up for jazz and
jazz-oriented amateur art collectives began to appear.546 A Komsomol official who
546 A. I. Avrus, born 1930, interviewed May 28, 2009.
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entered SGU in 1955 and reached the rank of Komsomol Secretary of the university
Komsomol in the early 1960s, L. E. Gerasimova, remembered that jazz-style pieces
began to appear in amateur competitions from the late 1950s.547
A particularly fascinating example in regard to amateur art competitions, and one
illustrative of the contestation between those holding hard-line and soft-line viewpoints,
comes from a debate by the jury of an amateur art competition over variety ensemble
performances in preparation for the 1957 Moscow International Youth Festival. The
discussion centered on Saul’skii’s Central House of Artists ensemble, where Garanian
played at the time. One jury member censured the ensemble’s piece as “played in the
modern style, the style of an American jazz ensemble.” He concluded that “giving an
award to this ensemble would mean that other jazz ensembles would see this as” meaning
that jazz “is now permitted!” Leonid Utesov, the professional jazz musician popular since
the 1930s who sat on the jury, took a more tolerant view: “we should not think of this
collective as flawed” owing to the “several sharp techniques used from the arsenal of
American jazz ensembles.” Fearing such a style of play, in his view, would result in “the
creation of ensembles lacking any spirit.” Utesov insisted, in regard to Saul’skii’s group,
that “we need such music, it needs to be joyful and full of life.”548 The ensemble ended
up getting a bronze medal, and this undoubtedly demonstrated the acceptability of jazz to
many other young musicians, as the more orthodox jury member feared.
Nevertheless, since those controlling the repertoire in the early Thaw tended to
have a more militant perspective than jazz enthusiasts who joined amateur ensembles, the
547 L. E. Gerasimova, born in the late 1930s, interviewed May 27, 2009.
548 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 873, l. 105-26.
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latter had to use a variety of strategies in order to overcome censorship, which,
unsurprisingly, resembled some of the methods used under Stalin. One strategy,
according to Garanian, involved playing jazz music in satirical skits making fun of the
United States. For example, in a dance scene about a conflict between the USSR and US,
when the performer representing the latter danced on the stage, he stated that “we played
jazz.” This “was one of the naïve strategies to play a couple of jazz notes” while “what
was happening on the stage was irrelevant to us,” and “the audience gladly listened to
jazz.”549 I. V. Gaponov, who enrolled at MGU in 1952 and rose to Komsomol secretary
of the physics department as a graduate student in the early 1960s, participated in a series
of amateur art activities during these years, such as the opera “Dubinushka.” Written in
1954-55 by several students in the physics department, this piece had a scene with a
stiliaga dancing rock’n’roll. In Gaponov’s words, although the opera depicts the stiliaga
as “a negative character,” his presence “gave us the opportunity to present real rock’n’roll
on the official stage of MGU,” and “in this way, legitimate this [music].” He added that
every subsequent opera authored by students of the physics department–several were
written after “Dubinushka”–had a similar scene of “moral degeneration,” giving students
a way to perform western dances on the university stage. According to him, “this was a
form of freedom, under the guise of making fun of western models,” a strategy that he
specifically describes as appearing “in the post-Stalin years, before Khrushchev’s Secret
Speech, but not right away after Stalin’s death.”550 While he speaks authoritatively about
549 G. A. Garanian, born 1934, interviewed February 4, 2009.
550 Likely, the dances that Gaponov refers to as rock’n’roll were not the same as rock’n’roll in the US at
this time, and should be understood to mean as the most radically western-themed dances, those considered
unquestionably beyond the boundaries of legitimacy by the censors. I. V. Gaponov, born 1934, interviewed
April 28, 2009.
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MGU, elsewhere, especially outside Moscow, jazz enthusiasts in the anticosmopolitan
campaign may have used similar tactics where more pluralistic local officials tolerated
them.551
People in the regions certainly deployed such methods in the Thaw. In Saratov,
M. I. Ryskin remembered how, in an SGU amateur art collective in the late 1950s, the
student who was supposed to represent a cheater on an exam danced to foxtrot music.
Overtly, this depicted foxtrot in a negative light, which allowed the amateur art collective
to get such dancing through the censorship process and show it on the stage. In reality,
however, the situation proved more complex. The role of the cheater was given to the
most popular, good-looking male in the group, implicitly associating high status and
prestige with western-style music.552 Gerasimova presented another strategy. She
described how an artistic council approved repertoires for amateur art competitions and
festivals at SGU, and “could put the brake on more radical, fashionable music (krainye
veshchi, modnye), on ‘cacophony’,” meaning jazz-style music. In her words, while the
amateur art collectives stuck to the program, they “could perform a more daring piece
(ostruiu veshch’) after the end of the program if the audience called for an encore (na
bis).”553
The shift in the content of state-sponsored youth popular culture in the early Thaw
toward acceptance of some western cultural influence had a flip side: a decrease in the
ideological load of amateur art. Avrus, much involved in Komsomol work at SGU from
551 Starr presents one example from a professional theater, but does not discuss amateurs: Starr, Red and
Hot, 224.
552 M. I. Ryskin, born 1938, interviewed June 1, 2009.
553 L. E. Gerasimova, born in the late 1930s, interviewed May 27, 2009.
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the late 1940s to the late 1950s, related that the ubiquitous songs devoted to Stalin
disappeared, and “there were no songs about Khrushchev,” though the USSR and the
Party continued to receive praise. Moreover, cultural recreation “took on a more
entertaining character” and “less attention was paid, much less than in the [postwar Stalin
years], to ideological orthodoxy (chtoby eto vse bylo ideologicheski vyderzhanno).”554 A
perusal of instructional booklets on state-sponsored popular culture confirms his
statements. After 1956, Stalin did not appear in their pages and Khrushchev received
little attention in amateur songs.555 Likewise, choruses declined from their previous
position because Thaw-era authorities did not express nearly as much support for them as
in the postwar Stalin years, and both club workers and young cultural activists poured
more energy into variety ensembles and other cultural forms. Propaganda lectures,
although still frequent, increasingly altered their themes from a more ideological focus to
dealing with issues of greater interest to youth, such as lectures entitled “About Love,
Comradeship, and Friendship.”556 Moskovskii Komsomolets even proposed replacing the
existing forms of political education with dancing, watching movies, listening to records,
and studying new songs.557
Overall, the data illuminate the reality of the everyday impact of the early Thaw
initiatives in the sphere of state-sponsored youth popular culture. This should not come as
a surprise, since this new course fit in well with the existing incentives for club and
554 A. I. Avrus, born 1930, interviewed May 28, 2009.
555 There are instances where Stalin’s name is mentioned in the period between 1953 and 1956. For
example, see N. Sizov, V klubakh i dvortsakh kul’tury (Moscow: Profizdat, 1954), 47.
556 TsAGM, f. 1988, op. 1, d. 49, l. 2-3.
557 This information comes from a 1957 report on youth newspapers: RGANI, f. 5, op. 34, d. 43, l. 43.
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Komsomol officials. For clubs and PKOs, ideologically-oriented events such as political
lectures continued to cause financial losses.558 Hosting western dances and to a lesser
extent jazz ensembles enabled them to fulfill financial plans, and the soft-line policy of
the leadership decreased the barriers to doing so. For local Komsomol officials,
permitting their charges to engage in western popular culture, or even helping organize
such events, served to satisfy the cultural consumption desires of young people and
helped ensure the growth of their cells, payment of dues on time, and the willingness of
members to undertake obligatory social activities.
Nevertheless, those within the Party-state hierarchy holding a more militant
outlook opposed the pluralistic notes in the reforms of the early Thaw. Both cultural and
Komsomol officials, for instance those in the Moscow DNT, Ogurtsov, and the Saratov
city Komsomol committee, struggled to limit the foxtrot, rumba, tango, and jazz, despite
the nod from above for such forms of western popular culture. They disparaged the turn
toward entertainment and pleasure. For example, at the 1956 Komsomol conference at
MGU, an institution with a well-established reputation for pluralism, a representative
noted that “comrades have said that our Komsomol cells are losing their political face and
are becoming sport and cultural clubs.”559 Hard-line officials also criticized the policy of
greater lenience toward youth “deviance.” Thus, a March 1955 letter from the Head
Procurator P. Baranov to the Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet criticized
558 As the Krasnopresnenskii cultural-enlightenment department admitted in 1954, there were some
problems with lectures, and “first of all, the inability to assemble an audience, as a result of which there are
cases when lectures are cancelled and when lectures have a small audience.” See TsAGM, f. 1988, op. 1, d.
29, ll. 9-11.
559 TsAOPIM, f. 6803, op. 1, d. 1, l. 138.
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the proposed shortening of sentences for crimes committed by youth under eighteen.560
Some ordinary citizens also expressed hesitancy over lenient treatments of criminal
youth.561
Such evidence, along with the struggles over western popular culture in clubs,
highlights the prominence of conflicts during the early Thaw between cadres holding
hard-line and soft-line views on “appropriate” organized cultural activities. These
findings from the sphere of state-sponsored popular culture lead me to argue that tensions
between those holding opposing views of the post-Stalin reforms had a larger impact on
daily life than suggested by some recent scholarship that deemphasized the importance of
these struggles.562 I am not arguing for the existence of a fixed, unchanging camp in the
Thaw opposed to de-Stalinization, whose battles with a reformist-oriented faction fully
explain the developments during this period. Few supported or opposed the Thaw-era
shifts wholesale, and the outlooks of officials and citizens on these changes evolved over
time and in reaction to concrete developments. Nonetheless, as evinced by the sphere of
organized cultural recreation, conflicts between those holding hard-line and soft-line
positions took place both within the bureaucracy and at the everyday level of planning
and implementing cultural activities. Because the late Stalinist leadership pursued a
radically militant position on state-sponsored popular culture for young people,
supporting a hard-line approach even after the transformations in the early Thaw marked
people as opponents of de-Stalinization. In turn, strong supporters of reforms generally
560 GARF, f. R-8131, op. 28, d. 2526, l. 58.
561 Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 21-49, 79-108.
562 See in particular Bittner, The Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw, 1-13, and Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold
Summer, 156-85.
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held a more pluralistic and tolerant position toward state-sponsored popular culture than
the post-Stalin Kremlin’s moderate soft line in the mid-1950s. Moreover, throughout the
Thaw, the leadership’s official policy on cultural activities for young people wavered
between more or less pluralism. Although many officials simply followed the Party line,
some actively and openly promoted a softer approach, while others advocated a harder
one, which generally corresponded to their view of de-Stalinization as a whole. This
pattern recalled the developments in organized cultural recreation policy in NEP, though
without the open, formal factions of the 1920s.
If some officials and citizens expressed opposition to the new course from a
militant position, certain youth refused to conform to even the more pluralistic policy of
the post-Stalin leadership in state-sponsored popular culture. A former stiliaga, for
example, described what seems like a standard maneuver for a school evening: “one of us
would get into the playing booth, lock the door, and put on American music. In the dance
hall, several pairs would begin to dance, while the rest, the ‘proper’ students, looked on
with wonder and jealousy.”563 In a letter-to-the-editor published in Komsomol’skaia
pravda, a group of young factory women condemned their co-worker, Valia. According
to the letter, Valia was forced to leave an evening event for youth because she danced
“differently” than everyone else, while also apparently revealing too much of her body
and wearing too much make-up, all associated with female stiliagi.564 The growth in the
number of stiliagi during this period, and the further expansion of this counterculture to
middle-class and even working-class youth such as Valia, made such confrontations
563 This story depicted the late 1950s, and American music here referred to jazz: Kozlov, “Kozel na sakse,”
72.
564 “Nam stydno za nashu podrugu,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, June 21, 1955.
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increasingly common. Likewise, hooliganism in clubs continued from the postwar Stalin
years into the Thaw. A case in point, a group of nearly a hundred youth aged fourteen to
eighteen, armed with sticks and metal bars, invaded the dance hall of the “Pavshikh
Bortsov” club and beat up those inside.565
Both stiliagi and hooligans felt the brunt of persecution from the Party-state due
to the new initiative against juvenile “delinquency” in the early Thaw. This proved
especially true for stiliagi, since the Stalin authorities, though clearly placing them
beyond the boundaries of legitimacy, expressed little active concern over this
counterculture. The Thaw-era leadership, however, launched a campaign against stiliagi
in the mid-1950s, relying in particular on Komsomol patrols and youth newspapers.
This marked a sharp break between the official treatment and the resulting
everyday experience of stiliagi and jazz enthusiasts. The latter increasingly entered the
Soviet mainstream as the music that stood at the center of their social and cultural life
acquired patronage from above. Jazz enthusiasts, then, represented one of the major
beneficiaries of the new consumerist social contract offered to youth. The willingness and
even eagerness that jazz enthusiasts expressed during the early Thaw over participating in
club activities monitored and managed by the Party-state further illuminates the
difference between stiliagi and jazz enthusiasts. Jazz enthusiasts did not perceive or use
jazz as a subversive mechanism of oppositional cultural politics. They focused on the
aesthetics of jazz, not on showcasing their defiance of the mainstream through adopting
spectacular western styles, like stiliagi did.
565 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 186, l. 82.
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The developments described above signify how the top-level shift toward a more
tolerant approach in regard to western popular culture contributed to a
reconceptualization of New Soviet Men and Women. During the anticosmopolitan
campaign, the Party prohibited model communists from bearing any trace of western
influence, contributing to the escalating gap between the authorities and the many youth
who refused to abandon western popular culture. After 1953, the Party-state’s policy
opened up room for young New Soviet People to adopt a limited degree of western
culture style. Indulging in Sovietized, although not American-style, jazz, and in the
foxtrot, rumba, and tango, although not the boogie-woogie, became increasingly
acceptable.
Likewise, debates ranged in the press on what constituted appropriate fashion.566
For instance, Moskovskii komsomolets attempted to begin a discussion by publishing a
letter in 1955 from one young woman, entitled “And What Do You Think?” The author
wrote that many young women have begun to wear pants, but “this clothing surprises
some passersby, and occasionally one hears ‘stiliaga’ addressed to those women” from
people with a “stagnant mindset” (kosnost’).567 Other articles similarly expressed an
ambiguous position on and threw open to debate the exact parameters of
stiliazhnichestvo.568 Such debates provide further evidence of the conflicts between
“stagnant” and soft-line approaches in the mid-1950s.
566 Tsipursky, “Citizenship, Deviance, and Identity.”
567 “A kak dumaete vy?” Moskovskii komsomolets, March 10, 1957.
568 See Moskovskii komsomolets, March 13, 1957; Komsomol’skaia pravda, July 9, 1958; and
Komsomol’skaia pravda, August 6, 1958.
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Furthermore, the post-Stalin leadership’s new course left much room for
individual youth to formulate their own viewpoint on the crucial question of the
appropriate relationship to western culture. This resulted in the substantial expansion of
the space for youth agency, as young people had the opportunity to choose from a
diversity of competing claims by official figures, including those that validated
occasional indulgence in certain forms of jazz, western dancing, and western fashion.569
The Thaw-era leadership, in effect, extended a compromise to the mass of Soviet youth
tempted by some aspects of western influence in an effort to avoid alienating them by
allowing them to maintain a degree of western style, while still perceiving themselves as
loyal Soviet citizens. Moreover, the Party-state’s public campaign against the small
minority of full-fledged stiliagi enabled young people who adopted only a limited degree
of western culture to avoid seeing themselves as beyond the bounds of Soviet
legitimacy.570 This, in part, helps explain why jazz enthusiasts, such as Garanian,
Kuznetsov, Iarskaia, and Kleinot, chose to not identify as stiliagi, despite the parallels
between jazz enthusiasts and stiliagi, and the fact that those more militant might have
labeled jazz enthusiasts as stiliagi.571
569 For how official discourse left room for young people to shape their own perspective in the 1930s, see
Anna Krylova, "Identity, Agency, and the First Soviet Generation," in Stephen Lovell ed., Generations in
Twentieth-Century Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 101-22.
570 This point is informed by Alexei Yurchak’s analysis of the mid-1960s to 1980s: apparently, similar
mechanisms were at work already in the mid-1950s. See Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, until It
Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 164-65.
571 V. E. Kleinot, born 1941, interviewed February 14, 2009; A. A. Kuznetsov, born 1941, interviewed
February 21, 2009; G. A. Garanian, born 1934, interviewed February 4, 2009; and V. N. Iarskaia, born
around 1936, interviewed May 30, 2009.
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Conclusion
An analysis of state-sponsored popular culture for youth testifies to the post-Stalin
leadership’s offer of a new social contract to young people. The top-level officials
invested substantially more resources into the club network, directed its activities toward
young people, and increased the entertaining aspects of club events while decreasing their
political load. Moreover, they validated a degree of western popular culture in the club
network. The changes in state-sponsored youth popular culture, rather than evolving
naturally from postwar Stalinist processes, resulted from the Thaw-era Kremlin’s
decision to undertake a series of conscious policy shifts, with cultural consumption
undergoing an even more radical break than material consumption. Jazz enthusiasts made
particular gains. As their favored cultural form acquired legitimacy, they eagerly
performed under the Party-state’s supervision, underscoring their focus on the aesthetics
of jazz and lack of subversive or oppositional intentions.
All of these efforts likely did garner legitimacy for the leadership by appeasing
youth desires. Besides serving as a social palliative, these cultural consumption offerings
arguably helped persuade young people that building communism would help satisfy
their personal desires and interests, decreasing the gap between the officialdom and youth
that remained from the postwar Stalin years. Furthermore, the more tolerant approach by
the leadership toward New Soviet Women and Men expressing a degree of interest in
western influence, along with the debates over this issue in official discourse, permitted
young people room to express and develop their agency by determining their personal
viewpoints and preferences.
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While offering young people many more consumption options, the post-Stalin
leadership wanted to shape youth values and conduct. Its desire to impose social controls
on youth leisure by extending “communist time” constituted another fundamental
motivation for the Party-state leadership’s new course on state-sponsored youth popular
culture. The post-Stalin leadership considered the lack of organized cultural recreation as
a primary reason for youth “deviance,” and hoped to prevent such behavior by offering
appealing club activities, in a collective, officially-monitored context. The increase in the
number of entertaining youth-oriented events in clubs and PKOs meant that young people
did spend substantially more time in cultural recreation institutions, although this hardly
implies a deep penetration of the public into the private sphere, or a rise in repressive
social controls. As stiliagi and hooligans in youth-oriented club activities illustrate, young
people, in fact, did not always behave “appropriately” in clubs. Some research, however,
indicates that softer and subtler versions of cultural propaganda may have more impact in
instilling desired beliefs than more overt propaganda. This, along with the growth of time
youth spent in clubs, might have functioned to improve the propaganda effectiveness of
clubs.572
Taken together, the new policies on youth-oriented club activities illuminate the
intentions of the early Thaw top officials to construct a socialist version of a “multiple
modernity,” one informed by but explicitly alternative to the traditional western model of
modernity, while also at some variance with postwar Stalinism. The post-Stalin
leadership wanted to achieve a uniquely socialist form of a mass consumer society,
572 On how this functioned regarding American cultural propaganda, see Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-
Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second
World War, trans. Diana M. Wolf (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 1-7.
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characterized by a welfare state that satisfied individual desires and interests in a fashion
conducive to building communism and forging a Thaw-era version of young New Soviet
Individuals.573 In contrast to the Stalinist ideal of disciplined and politicized citizens
constantly preparing for war with the western enemy, the official discourse in the Thaw
directed model communist citizens to hold a more peace-oriented and pluralistic
perspective. Instead of sacrificing their consumption desires for the sake of the state’s
goals, the post-Stalin Party-state encouraged New Soviet People to partake in more fun
and entertaining cultural consumption, even a degree of western popular culture, while
still remaining fully committed to communism.
Unlike the late Stalinist approach of presenting any improvements in consumption
as gifts from on-high, the post-Stalin leadership acknowledged that young people’s actual
desires have legitimacy and deserve satisfaction from Party-state organs. Such official
recognition of and attempts to appease popular opinions and wants speaks to the
movement away from the widescale reliance on the harshest aspects of what Michael
Mann termed “coercive power” and the incorporation of “infrastructural power”
elements. According to Mann, the latter constitutes the state’s capacity to bring about
changes in everyday life by its interpenetration, integration, and negotiation with society,
while despotic power refers to authoritarian, coercive state actions.574 Through its actions
in state-sponsored popular cultural policy, the post-Stalin Kremlin tried both to gain
573 According to Paul Glennie’s overview of the historiography on consumption, most historians agree on
certain attributes of a “consumer society,” including growth of: per capita consumption, production of
consumer goods, individualism in social life, and consumer acquisitiveness. See his “Consumption within
Historical Studies,” in Miller, ed., Acknowledging Consumption, 164-203. Another good overview is Grant
McCracken, “The History of Consumption: A Literature Review and Consumer Guide,” Journal of
Consumer Policy 10 (June 1987): 139-66.
574 Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results,” in John H.
Hall ed., States in History (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 109-36.
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social support among young people and to get them to spend their leisure in state-
monitored settings in official collectives, augmenting “communist time.”
Nonetheless, in conceding that young people have valid desires for cultural
consumption that the Komsomol needs to assuage, the Party-state opened room for
potential criticism from below. The discourse and policy shifts of the Thaw-era Kremlin
initiated a transformation in the perception of state-sponsored popular culture for young
people. From being seen as a luxury, it came to be considered a need and even a right.
This left the government open for criticism based on how well it met the desires of
youth.575 Thus, in its policy on cultural recreation, post-Stalin leaders sought to walk a
fine line between satisfying young people and attracting them to the process of
constructing communism, while not diluting the meaning of what it defined as
“communism,” all while contesting the Cold War’s cultural front.
As illustrated by the opposition of militant officials to the Thaw-era Kremlin’s
soft-line approach to state-sponsored popular culture, conflict between those opposing
de-Stalinizing reforms and those supportive of the new course had a considerable role in
shaping young people’s everyday experience. These fractures bear some parallels to the
tensions in the popular cultures of capitalist states. Still, in the latter, struggles for
hegemony revolve primarily around issues associated with social class.576 Some of the
575 On the transformations of luxuries into needs in postwar socialist contexts, see the contributors to
Crowley and Reid eds., Pleasures in Socialism. On luxury in the prewar Soviet Union, see Gronow, Caviar
with Champagne.
576 See Tony Bennett, “Introduction: Popular Culture and the ‘Turn to Gramsci,’” in Tony Bennett, Colin
Mercer, and Janet Woollcott eds., Popular Culture and Social Relations (Philadelphia: Open University
Press, 1986), xi-xix, and Stuart Hall, “Popular Culture and the State,” in Bennett, Mercer, and Woollcott
eds., Popular Culture and Social Relations., 22-49. Also see Richard B. Gruneau, “Introduction: Notes on
Popular Culture and Political Practice,” in Richard B. Gruneau ed., Popular Cultures and Political
Practices (Toronto: Garamong Press, 1988), 11-32. For hegemony, see Antonio Gramsci, Selections From
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central conflicts over Soviet state-sponsored popular culture, such as over tolerance of
western influence or over the balance of ideology and entertainment, reveal that
ideological and political factors related to broader debates over the correct path to
communism had a crucial part in the open battles within officialdom over popular culture
in socialist contexts. Such disagreements over organized cultural recreation policy date
back to earlier periods in Soviet history, and while expressed most openly in the NEP,
they influenced the Stalin years as well. This sheds light on the larger tensions between
hard-line and soft-line visions of building communism that lay at the heart of the Soviet
experiment. Class also played a vital role in organized cultural recreation, yet a less overt
one, as the efforts to expunge traditional working-class leisure practices via club
activities imply. Neither hard-line nor soft-line officials expressed sympathy for behavior
labeled as “hooligan,” though they disagreed on the appropriate means of getting rid of it.
As a result, rather than taking place within Thaw-era official discourse, struggles related
to class largely played out at the everyday level of the clubs, over whether working-class
youth would successfully indulge in supposedly immoral behavior.
the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith trans. and ed. (New
York: International Publishers, 1971), 57-58, 263, 275-76, 417.
Chapter 5
Youth Initiative and Youth Initiative Clubs in the Thaw, 1953-64
Besides advancing the cause of jazz, the 1956 film “Carnival Night” also sent
another signal by depicting how young club workers refused to enact the new manager’s
politicized and boring program for the New Year and took initiative into their own hands
to put on a fun event. This reflects another major break with the late Stalinist approach, as
the Thaw-era leadership now sought to inspire grassroots activism among youth. First
Secretary of the Komsomol A. N. Shelepin underscored the importance of youth social
activism in his speech at the 1956 Twentieth Communist Party Congress. Shelepin
repeatedly stressed the “serious” problem of Komsomol cells relying on “bureaucratic
methods,” without bringing anything “new and interesting” to their work, which “cannot
satisfy youth.” To deal with this dilemma, Shelepin proclaimed that the Komsomol
Central Committee, TsK, wanted to “broadly develop initiative and grassroots
activism.”577 This chapter first offers an overview of the Komsomol TsK’s attempts to
promote social engagement among young people in the post-Stalin period. Then, it
empirically grounds these efforts within the sphere of state-sponsored popular culture by
offering a close look at one concrete institutional measure taken by the Komsomol to
advance this goal: the creation of youth initiative clubs (molodezhnye initsiativnye kluby,
also known as molodezhnye samodeiatel’nye kluby).
577 XX s’’ezd KPSS. Stenograficheskii otchet. Ch. 1 (Moscow, 1956), 603, 606-08.
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As we have seen, the post-Stalin Kremlin assigned a vital role to satisfying
cultural consumption desires in its drive to bring about an alternative, socialist version of
a modern consumer society. However, the new top officials, led by Khrushchev, also
considered grassroots activism and social engagement in governance through official
collectives essential to enacting a socialist modernity. Despite this, scholars have not
undertaken any in-depth analyses of the intersections between consumption and initiative
during the Thaw.578 Kremlin leaders saw initiative from below as integral to forging a
Thaw-era version of activist New Soviet Men and Women, ready to participate fully in
the self-governing of society once the state withered away in the eschaton of
communism.579 The post-Stalin top officials also supported new social institutions, such
as youth initiative clubs, which they saw as necessary for eliciting community-based
governance. Their campaign marked out a vision of a socialist modernity which, in some
ways, clearly differed from the western model of consumerist modernity. An analysis of
grassroots activism is thus crucial for understanding the unique aspects of the alternative,
socialist version of a modern consumer society, especially in the context of the Cold
War’s “peaceful competition” between two modes of modernity.
578 In one exception, a recent work does comment on the important role of these intersections. See David
Crowley and Susan E. Reid, “Introduction: Pleasures in Socialism,” in David Crowley and Susan E. Reid
eds., Pleasures in Socialism: Leisure and Luxury in the Eastern Bloc (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 2010), 3-52.
579 On the post-Stalin efforts to solicit grassroots initiative, see Melanie Ilic, “Introduction,” in Melanie Ilic
and Jeremy Smith eds., Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev (New York: Routledge, 2009), 1-
8; Polly Jones, “The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization,” in Polly Jones ed., The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization:
Negotiating Cultural and Social Change in the Khrushchev Era (New York: Routledge, 2006), 1-18; and
Soo-Hoon Park, “Party Reform and ‘Volunteer Principle’ under Khrushchev in Historical Perspective”
(Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1993). The classical work on this subject is George Breslauer,
“Khrushchev Reconsidered,” in Stephen F. Cohen, Alexander Rabinowitch and Robert Sharlet eds., The
Soviet Union since Stalin (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), 50-70.
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While contributing to the further intermingling of public and private and a shift to
a different mode of governance, the emphasis on grassroots activism resulted in greater
room available in official settings for youth agency and the formation of a civic spirit.
Youth initiative clubs offered young people room to achieve their desires and thereby
express and develop their agency. In turn, the post-Stalin Party-state’s creation of youth
initiative clubs and other venues for community engagement in governance paved the
way for the growth of a civic spirit that in some ways served as an alternative civil
society, as these official collectives encouraged reflection on, and debates over, issues
that had a bearing on political life.580 These youth initiative clubs helped bring such
discussions out of kitchens and other private spaces into the public spaces of clubs.
The youth clubs also demonstrate that the early Thaw witnessed a movement
away from the Stalinist emphasis on despotic power. The Kremlin reached out to and
negotiated with young people, encouraging them to have substantial input in shaping
their own cultural leisure activities. This, of course, was far from full-scale infrastructural
power, as the Khrushchev leadership only allowed a limited range of autonomy. By
setting boundaries on “appropriate” youth interests through these clubs, Soviet authorities
sought to channel youth cultural consumption desires into directions that fit the Party’s
goals, while also getting youth to spend their leisure in officially-monitored spaces.581
580 For how civic spirit formed in Soviet cultural activities, see Susan Costanzo, “Amateur Theatres and
Amateur Publics in the Russian Republic, 1958-71,” The Slavonic and East European Review 86.2 (April
2008): 372-94. For how civic spirit and civil society arose in response to state encouragement in Russia, see
George E. Hudson, “Civil Society in Russia: Models and Prospects for Development,” The Russian Review
62.2 (April 2003): 212-22, and Alexander N. Domrin, “Ten Years Later: Society, ‘Civil Society,’ and the
Russian State,” The Russian Review 62.2 (April 2003): 193-211.
581 For another example of how the Soviet state sought to channel consumption desires, see Susan E. Reid,
"Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and the De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the Soviet Union," Slavic
Review 61.2 (Summer 2002): 211-52.
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Doing so served to increase the role of official collectives in the lives of young people.
Still, by showing how youth enjoyed themselves in Party-state institutions such as youth
initiative clubs, I challenge Oleg Kharkhordin’s conclusion that this growth of
“communist time” led to a more repressive, coercive everyday life experience for the
Soviet population.582
Youth Initiative in Top-Level Discourse and Policy
The post-Stalin Kremlin’s turn toward social engagement dates back to
controversies within the prerevolutionary Marxist movement over whether to trust
spontaneity and initiative from below, or to impose centralized control over grassroots
activism, expressed in the historiography as the spontaneity-consciousness paradigm
discussed in chapter 1. Once the Bolsheviks seized power, the question of how much
room to allow for youth initiative, including within organized cultural activities, became
a topic of debate between Right and Left Party factions. The latter perspective, which
minimized the space for any youth autonomy and instead demanded that young people
exhibit full obedience to Party officials at all levels, won out under Stalin. The period of
the anticosmopolitan campaign witnessed a particularly strong emphasis on youth
discipline, leaving little legitimate space for young people to exhibit activism that did not
directly advance the narrowly-defined needs of the Soviet state.
The Party-state’s rhetoric on youth initiative showed changes already by the 1954
Twelfth Komsomol Congress, held a year after Stalin’s death. Its resolution underlined
the importance of “developing criticism and self-criticism, especially from below, the
582 Oleg Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1999), 279-302.
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strengthening of Komsomol members’ control over Komsomol organs, and the escalation
of Komsomol member activism.”583 A January 1956 major internal report on the state of
the organization from the Komsomol TsK presents an even harsher indictment of
Komsomol methods than Shelepin’s Twentieth Party Congress speech. This document
lambasted what it identified as the main problems of Komsomol work: an insufficient
number of interesting activities for youth due to excessive bureaucracy, authoritarian
methods, and a lack of concern with the actual interests of young people, which led to
boredom among youth. Consequently, the Komsomol TsK lamented that “a significant
number of Komsomol members grow estranged from the Komsomol and find an outlet
for their initiative, occasionally, in unseemly activities.” The report drew attention to
violations of the principle of democratic centralism in the use of administrative methods,
such as higher Komsomol organs demanding that local Komsomol cells implement their
decisions without any room for discussion, instead of using persuasion. To deal with such
issues, the Komsomol TsK proposed a “perestroika,” or restructuring, meant to achieve
the “decisive development of initiative and grassroots activism by the Komsomol
masses.” Among other measures, the Komsomol TsK called for substantial changes in the
Komsomol’s by-laws: giving more power to lower-level Komsomol cells, emphasizing
the grassroots activism of individual Komsomol members, and relying more on
volunteerism and enthusiasm than on paid officials.584
The Komsomol TsK passed a series of decrees in the mid-1950s that reinforced
this discursive shift with concrete policies. In September 1955, a resolution helped
583 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 38, l. 127.
584 This report was prepared by the Komsomol TsK and sent to the Party TsK, indicating its importance:
RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 811, ll. 1-13.
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decentralize the Komsomol by limiting the Komsomol TsK’s control through lowering
the number of top-level (nomenklatura) appointments that required its approval.585 The
Komsomol TsK changed the Komsomol’s by-laws in early 1958, adding that “one of the
most important principles of Komsomol work is initiative and grassroots activism by all
its members and organizations.”586 Oblast Komsomol cells followed the policy discourse
of the Komsomol TsK in highlighting youth community leadership.587 Komsomol advice
literature unambiguously stated that to move upward within the Komsomol organization
necessitated exhibiting initiative.588 Komsomol press discourse expressed strong support
for grassroots activism, and criticized officials who did not support young people’s
community engagement.589 In an interview, L. K. Baliasnaia, a former Komsomol TsK
secretary and at that time a high-ranking Komsomol official in Ukraine, also confirmed
the new emphasis on youth initiative from below during the early Thaw. She drew a
particular difference between those officials who supported the idea of grassroots
initiative and those “not very wise” functionaries who could not shed their habit of
discipline and command acquired earlier, a type of governing style that, in her words,
repelled youth.590
585 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 880, l. 36.
586 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 971, ll. 62-63.
587 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 14, d. 484, l. 20.
588  A. Disudenko and A. Skrypnik, Zakon komsomol’skoi zhizni (Moscow: “Molodaiia gvardiia,” 1966),
96.
589 “Videt’ i podderzhivat’ komsomol’skuiu initsiativu,” Leninets, June 1, 1957.
590 L. K. Baliasnaia, interviewed April 5, 2009.
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Furthermore, the Komsomol TsK linked the focus on youth grassroots activism
to the renewed drive of the post-Stalin leadership to achieve communism. Shelepin’s
keynote speech at the 1958 Fourteenth Komsomol Congress devoted one out of its five
sections to developing grassroots activism in the Komsomol. Said Shelepn: “The Party
teaches us that, as we move toward communism, the functions of the government will
gradually shift, and the role of the Party and social organizations such as the Komsomol
in life will grow.” He praised the Komsomol’s work in dealing with the problems caused
by Stalin’s “cult of personality,” and spotlighted the effectiveness of the measures aimed
at decentralizing and lowering the number of paid officials, claiming that the Komsomol
bureaucracy shrunk by over 15 percent.591 Khrushchev also gave a major speech at the
congress, where he underlined similar themes: “The Komsomol is increasingly becoming
an organization that is instilling in youth an ability to live in a communist society and
manage its activities. What is needed for this? A wider development of grassroots
activism.”592 Although forging enthusiastic and activist young model communists
constituted the major motivation for the focus on youth initiative in official discourse,
decreasing administrative expenses constituted a secondary motivation. For instance, a
Komsomol TsK resolution criticized the growth in paid cadres, because this did not fit
the spirit of the Komsomol as a grassroots, initiative-based organization and also
contradicted the Party’s directives on reducing the size and cost of the apparatus.593
591 A. N. Shelepin, Otchetnyi doklad Tsentral’nogo Komiteta Vsesoiuznogo leninskogo
kommunisticheskogo soiuza molodezhi XIII s’’ezdu komsomola (15 aprelia 1958 g.) (Moscow: Molodaia
gvardiia, 1958), 63-65.
592 N. S. Khrushchev, Vospityvat’ aktivnykh i soznatel’nykh stroitelei kommunisticheskogo obshchestva
(rech’ na XIII s’’ezde VLKSM 18 aprelia 1958 goda) (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1961), 40.
593 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 946, ll. 12-13.
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Such evidence indicates a desite to transform the image of the New Soviet Young
Person, from a disciplined, militarized, and obedient postwar Stalinist youth, to an
empowered young Thaw-era citizen, taking charge of managing local-level community
affairs. In effect, the Thaw witnessed a transition in the semiotics associated with the
term “initiative,” from its postwar Stalinist meaning of heavily circumscribed activism
directly responding to orders from the hierarchy, to encouragement of grassroots activism
and a search for more innovative and autonomous forms of Komsomol work from below.
This drive, combined with the effort both to appeal to and manage youth interests and
desires, became the hallmark of the Thaw-era vision of a socialist consumer-oriented
modernity.
Club Activities and Youth Initiative
The Komsomol’s fresh rhetorical tropes and policies powerfully impacted state-
sponsored popular cultural offerings for young people. National and local youth
newspapers promoted Komsomol members taking a leadership role in creating spaces for
organized cultural recreation. For example, a series of articles in youth newspapers called
on Komsomol members to express their initiative by building clubs with their own hands.
According to one such story, Komsomol youth in one primary cell succeeded in turning
an empty room into a club space, acquiring a place to have interesting meetings and
lectures, socialize, read, and sing fun songs.594 Oblast Komsomol committees highlighted
594 “Po initsiative komsomol’tsev: Svoimi rukami,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, January 15, 1955. For similar
stories, see “Vse mozhno sdelat’ svoimi rukami,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, August 4, 1955, and “Postroim
klub svoimi rukami!” Leninets, October 26, 1957.
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their success in having members contribute to building clubs “using initiative-based
means” (initsiativnym sposobom), meaning volunteering their labor.595
Furthermore, club officials were explicitly directed to promote youth activism.
Instructions to club workers now stressed the need for “youth-oriented events to occur in
an atmosphere that encourages the fullest expression of personal initiative,” according to
one 1957 guidebook.596 In the words of another, club officials had to “create an
atmosphere in which young people felt themselves to be true owners of the club,
initiators and organizers.” The author of the 1959 publication gave many examples of
how to activate youth initiative. For instance, one club director gave a young man who
liked photography a newspaper story about amateur movie-making groups. After reading
the story, the latter apparently pressed the director to organize a similar group at the club.
The director, however, replied that he had no time to do so and that the club lacked the
money for the equipment. Hearing that, and encouraged by the club director, the youth
decided to take on the requisite fundraising and organizing duties.597
Nevertheless, the Komsomol TsK drew attention to ongoing problems with
organizing youth cultural activities in trade union clubs. It complained that Komsomol
organizations “are deprived of being able to use trade union clubs for youth work, since
they have been transformed into commercial organizations, showing movies days and
nights.”598 The Komsomol TsK requested that the Party TsK decrease the obligatory
595 For example, in Kemerovo: RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 838, l. 120.
596 E. Makhlin, Opyt raboty kul’turno-prosvititel’nykh uchrezhdenii na zheleznodorozhnom transporte
(Moscow: Gudok, 1957), 3.
597 M. E. Nepomniashchii ed., Entuziasty: Sbornik o peredovikakh kul’turno-prosvititel’noi raboty
(Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1959), 38-39.
598 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 811, l. 8.
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movie days in the club plans, and the Party TsK did so. Yet, since the Party TsK left the
total financial demands in the club plans unchanged, the clubs apparently still spent much
of their time showing movies in order to meet these high economic goals.599 After all, as
the Komsomol TsK complained, “trade union committees often evaluate the work of
clubs based on their fulfillment of financial plans, and thus Komsomol organizations lack
the opportunity to use club spaces for their own purposes.”600 With this in mind, the
Komsomol TsK, both in its internal and external discourse, stressed the importance of
creating a variety of innovative cultural collectives for young people managed by the
Komsomol itself, with their own independent official status, material base, and budget.601
These Komsomol-managed collectives represented a clear departure from Stalin-era
practices, when the leadership refused to let the Komsomol have control over
autonomous institutions dedicated to organizing cultural activities for youth.
One type of new cultural form, interest-based clubs (kluby po interesu), catered to
diverse youth interests and social groups.602 Exemplifying the variety of such clubs, a
proposal for a plan to construct a Youth Palace in Moscow included rooms for youth
clubs aimed at differing demographics, such as college students, young women, and older
school students (starsheklassniki), those in seventh through tenth grades aged
599 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 912, l. 5, and RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 811, l. 8. Apparently, movies
permitted club directors to receive bonuses by over-fulfilling the plan for profits: RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32,
d. 838, l. 119.
600 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, l. 8.
601 For internal discourse, see the 1956 internal report on the state of the Komsomol: RGASPI, f. M-1, op.
32, d. 811, l. 14. For external discourse, see Shelepin’s speech at the Twentieth Party Congress: XX s’’ezd
KPSS, 607-08.
602 For an in-depth look at one of these new types of clubs devoted to nature protection, see Douglas R.
Weiner, A Little Corner of Freedom: Russian Nature Protection from Stalin to Gorbachev (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2001), 312-39.
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approximately fourteen to seventeen. It also included youth clubs dedicated to specific
interests: photography, movies, radio, music, tourism, fishing and hunting, keeping
pigeons, collecting stamps, cars, technology, aeronautics, gardening, and an international
club.603
Many sources report the successful establishment of such clubs throughout the
Soviet Union in the late 1950s. The Rostov oblast Komsomol noted the creation of a club
for young writers.604 In Kemerovo, chess, tourist, and photography clubs expanded the
range of cultural activities for youth. These club forms also contributed to the varied
duties of the Komsomol, with the photography enthusiast clubs, for instance, creating
photo displays, producing satirical newspapers, and preparing albums with views of the
city and the countryside, all done using youth initiative, and this decreased financial
outlays.605 The Komsomol TsK passed a resolution in 1956 on improving the function of
Komsomol cells in schools, underscoring the need to create clubs for older students, in
which the students themselves took responsibility for club work, with oversight from the
Komsomol, parents, and educators.606 The next year, the Rostov Komsomol documented
the creation of several clubs for older school students.607 The Saratov Pioneer Palace and
many schools in the city created clubs for older school students that, according to the
Saratov Komsomol paper, held many interesting activities. The students themselves
played a major role in the organizational work of such clubs. For instance, a tenth-grader
603 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, l. 133.
604 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 839, l. 22.
605 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 838, l. 120.
606 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 901, l. 168.
607 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 839, l. 22.
239
headed the organizational committee of the club in the palace. The Komsomol paper
wrote favorable articles praising this collective activity (Figure 4).
Figure 4. This photograph from a Zaria molodezhi article illustrates the collective
nature of clubs for older school students. The article is “Klub starsheklassnikov,”
Zaria molodezhi, September 13, 1957.
This stress on youth activism points to a crucial difference between interest-based
clubs and the previously existing club circles. Circles had an adult leader who organized
activities that necessarily had a patent didactic and socializing purpose. In contrast, the
young club members themselves took charge of an interest-based club’s organizational
work, though within the limits defined by the club’s mission and various oversight
institutions. An interview with a club official in Moscow’s Pioneer Palace, who worked
with both circles and interest-based clubs dedicated to aeronautics and astronomy during
the Thaw, further illuminates these differences. When asked to compare circles and clubs,
he stated that clubs had an element of self-management, more autonomy, and less
bureaucratism.608 Another difference stemmed from interest-based clubs serving a much
broader range of interests, as no Stalin-era circles involved activities such as collecting
608 B. G. Pshenichner, born 1933, interviewed April 29, 2009.
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stamps or watching movies that lacked a clear educational function. Likewise, Stalin-era
circles did not target specific demographic groups, as that would implicitly admit the
need to offer differentiated cultural activities for young people. These interest-based
clubs functioned to legitimate young people actively pursuing their own individual
interests, departing from the postwar Stalinist pattern of condemning any expression of
individualism.609 While current scholarship, most notably by Anne White, considers such
clubs a phenomenon of the 1960s, my research shows that they actually originated in the
previous decade.610 Interest-based clubs contributed to the growing differentiation of
organized cultural recreation activities to serve varying wants and interests. They also
opened up room for the expression and development of youth agency and a civic spirit,
something that youth initiative clubs advanced even further.
Youth Initiative Clubs: Origins and Structure
If interest-based clubs catered to specific interests and demographic groups, youth
initiative clubs offered young people belonging to all social elements the opportunity to
come together to pursue a diversity of interests as a single collective. Based on volunteer
labor and lacking much direct financing, youth initiative clubs did not have to file annual
reports. Consequently, most of the case studies in this section come from newspaper
articles or archival reports by local officials to higher-ups on these clubs, which tend to
highlight the best clubs in each oblast. Nonetheless, these model clubs illuminate the
609 For the postwar Stalinist approach, see Juliane Fürst, "The Importance of Being Stylish: Youth, Culture
and Identity in Late Stalinism" in Juliane Fürst ed., Late Stalinist Russia: Society between Reconstruction
and Reinvention (New York Routledge, 2006), 209-30.
610 Anne White, De-Stalinization and the House of Culture: Declining State Control over Leisure in the
USSR, Poland and Hungary, 1953-89 (New York: Routledge, 1990), 2.
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lived experience of the many young members of such clubs and served as models for
other initiative clubs founded across the USSR.
Thaw-era youth initiative clubs bore a great deal of similarities to the Komsomol-
managed clubs of the 1920s. Both provided young Komsomol members at the local level
with a chance to run official collectives devoted to cultural recreation. This makes the
youth initiative club movement part of a broader Thaw-era search for a path to
communism on “Leninist principles” untainted by Stalin’s “cult of personality.”611
Another potential contribution to the creation of youth initiative clubs came from abroad.
During a trip to Norway in 1955–the visit itself a result of de-Stalinization–Baliasnaia
recalled being impressed with a college club based on independent student management.
She successfully promoted the establishment of analogous institutions once she returned
to Ukraine.612 Similar clubs in other Soviet Bloc countries, and even Yugoslavia, may
have served as another source of inspiration.613
The first Soviet youth initiative clubs emerged at the local level in 1954-55,
originating from the individual efforts of Komsomol officials such as Baliasnaia willing
to experiment with new forms of organizing youth cultural leisure activities in the more
open environment of the Thaw. However, they received widespread promotion only after
the Komsomol TsK deemed them worthy of emulation and promoted their formation
611 For this turn, see Stephen V. Bittner, The Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw: Experience and Memory
in Moscow’s Arbat (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 75-104, 211-19, and William Taubman,
Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 236-99.
612 L. K. Baliasnaia, interviewed April 5, 2009.
613 For more on such clubs in Bulgaria, see Karin Taylor, Let’s Twist Again: Youth and Leisure in Socialist
Bulgaria (Wien: Lit, 2006), 95. On initiative from below in Yugoslavia, see Sabina Mihelj, “Negotiating
Cold War Culture at the Crossroads of East and West: Uplifting the Working People, Entertaining the
Masses, Cultivating the Nation,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 53.2 (forthcoming in 2011).
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throughout the USSR in early 1956. Regional Komsomol committees quickly responded
to this directive. A representative from the Moscow Dzerzhinskii neighborhood called for
the establishment of a Komsomol-managed club at the 1956 city Komsomol
conference.614 A number of lower-level Komsomol conferences also supported providing
youth with more autonomous leisure institutions. At the 1957 Saratov State University
Komsomol conference, the main speaker, A. I. Avrus, articulated the need for innovative
state-sponsored popular culture forms, commenting that they already existed at other
universities.615 Iu. V. Gaponov spoke at the 1956 Moscow State University Komsomol
conference in favor of transferring a poorly-managed university-owned club to students
as a way of both improving its work, and promoting youth initiative.616 Youth
newspapers also encouraged the youth initiative club movement, publishing articles
praising the establishment of these institutions and providing instructions on how to do
so.617
All this translated into youth activism at the grassroots level in establishing youth
initiative clubs. A story in Komsomol’skaia pravda opens a window into “Petrogradskaia
storona” (Petrograd Side), a club in Leningrad. Before its founding, youth were
“obviously reluctant” to attend organized cultural events. Eventually, Komsomol activists
realized that the problem lay with the fact that youth “felt themselves to be not owners,
but guests,” and decided to establish a youth initiative club in cooperation with a local
614 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 484, l. 94
615 GANISO, f. 652, op. 1, d. 3, ll. 51-52,
616 TsAOPIM, f. 6083, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 164-65.
617 “Molodezhnyii klub v TsPKiO,” Moskovskii komsomolets, May 23, 1957; “Fakel,” Zaria molodezhi,
October 3, 1956; and “Klub kul’tury,” Leninskii put’, March 21, 1959.
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house of culture, where “the tone is set by the creative energy and imagination of the
youth,” who themselves organize evenings, balls, lectures, debates, and exhibitions.618 A
Moscow club in the Kuibyshev district, “Fakel” (Torch), which reported 200 members in
1957, was described as “friendly collective that came together during youth evenings,
meetings, debates, tourist trips.”619
Youth initiative clubs, while promoted from above, found a great deal of
enthusiastic response from young people. I. V. Sokolov, who grew up in the city of
Kaluga in the 1950s, recalled the identically-named Kaluga club “Torch” being a “child
of the Thaw.” He explained that, in contrast to previous practices where “everything
originated from above,” this youth initiative club “sprang from below, because of the
Thaw.” Sokolov described how a group of local Kaluga young people came together to
promote the idea of creating a youth initiative club. Soon, they received sponsorship from
the Kaluga city Komsomol organization, and especially the Kaluga Komsomol
newspaper Molodoi leninets (Leninist Youth).620 According to the Molodoi leninets
editors, the Kaluga city Komsomol called the creation of the Kaluga “Torch” youth
initiative club “a useful, healthy, and very important activity.” This club had 172
members by November 1957, with 112 of them workers, and was thus a largely working-
class club.621 While the club itself got started at the grassroots level, the inspiration for
this club came from elsewhere, specifically a newspaper article about the Moscow
618 “Boi serosti i skuki,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, September 6, 1956. This club was likely opened in 1955,
and may have served as one of the examples to the Komsomol leadership in its promotion of youth
initiative clubs. For an extensive depiction of this club, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, ll. 213-18.
619 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, l. 112.
620 I. V. Sokolov, interviewed April 16, 2009.
621 RGANI, f. 5, op. 34, d. 11, ll. 64-67.
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“Torch” club. The Kaluga “Torch” even borrowed many of its organizational forms, such
as its by-laws, from Moscow’s “Torch” club, with representatives from Kaluga’s “Torch”
visiting Moscow’s “Torch” for advice and directions.622 Many local Komsomol papers
reprinted the same article about Moscow’s “Torch,” perhaps as a result of a directive to
do so as a means of jump-starting the creation of such clubs.623
In some cases, higher-ranking Komsomol officials instigated such clubs in the
areas they oversaw, creating the structures necessary to bring young cultural enthusiasts
together. Baliasnaia succeeded in getting the first student club established in
Dnepropetrovsk, followed by many others. The Dnepropetrovsk club’s leadership
committee comprised students from several major colleges in this city. Pupils
representing different institutions took turns organizing planned events. This led, in
Baliasnaia’s words, to each group “trying to outdo the last.”624 Thus, Baliasnaia utilized
college loyalty and competitiveness as a mobilizing tool for youth clubs.
The Komsomol TsK helped develop the work of youth initiative clubs by asking
the Party TsK to transfer control of one trade union club in each major urban area to the
city Komsomol, and also for district houses of culture to be available to youth at least
four times a month. Noting that the Komsomol lacked money approved for use on state-
sponsored popular culture, the Komsomol TsK asked the Party TsK to allow the
Komsomol to use some of its budget for such needs. It also acquired the right to raise
money for youth cultural recreation from volunteer Komsomol-organized events such as
622 RGANI, f. 5, op. 34, d. 11, l. 65.
623 For an example from Saratov, see “‘Fakel,’” Zaria molodezhi, October 3, 1956.
624 L. K. Baliasnaia, interviewed April 5, 2009.
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selling tickets to youth amateur concerts and collecting scrap metal and paper, without
having to pay taxes.625 Furthermore, youth initiative clubs received assistance from
various institutions within their towns, ranging from enterprises to artistic and hobby
associations and educational establishments, and this defrayed much or all expenses.626
Consequently, the creation and financing of youth initiative clubs, and therefore their
effective functioning, depended heavily on advocacy by the Komsomol TsK, on the
organizational impetus of activist local Komsomol committees and youth papers, on the
support of local enterprises, and especially on the enthusiasm of Komsomol members
themselves.
The youth initiative club campaign took off quickly, and by 1957 acquired a high
enough priority among Komsomol activities that the Komsomol Propaganda Department
prepared a summary report on these clubs. Noting that over twenty existed in Odessa
alone, a sizable number given that Shelepin called for such clubs only in the previous
year, the department stated that they “have to be created in every town and village
cultural establishment.” It praised youth initiative clubs for allowing youth to do
everything by themselves, giving freedom to grassroots enthusiasm and voluntarism, and
creating a core of activists around Komsomol committees. The department claimed that
participating in such clubs helped develop a collective spirit among youth and confidence
in their own power and capacity. The clubs encouraged friendship and unity among
young people from diverse social groups and between the mass of youth, Komsomol
committees, and youth newspapers. Finally, the clubs “got youth accustomed to rational
625 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 811, l. 26, and RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 912, l. 6.
626 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, l. 111.
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leisure.”627 The last phrase illustrates the department’s goal of using such clubs not only
to provide room for and strengthen grassroots activism, but also to channel youth
interests and desires into “appropriate” forms. These appeals to and implicit negotiation
with youth highlights the Kremlin’s optimistic turn in the mid-1950s to moving away
from despotic power and incorporating certain infrastructural power elements through
negotiating with young people and appealing to their desires.628
The Activities and Impact of Youth Initiative Clubs
The nature of the events sponsored by youth initiative clubs supports the claim
that they both reflected and sought to inspire grassroots activism, initiative, and
enthusiasm. The theme and structure of the formal part of evening events at these clubs
aimed to engage youth, appealing to their interests and desires, with generally much less
ideological content than activities at trade union clubs. For example, one event in the
Odessa “Klub interesnykh vstrech” (Club of Interesting Meetings), billed as an evening
for newlyweds, invited young people to discuss love, friendship, loyalty, and jealousy.
According to the club’s report, placards, drawings, and signs with folk sayings helped
create a warm, informal atmosphere. Beforehand, the organizers collected questions from
young people. Among the more revealing ones are: “How can one learn how to love for
real?”; “Can one love a second and third time?”; and “Is it good to be jealous?” A young
philosophy teacher addressed these issues in a presentation, followed by a question and
627 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, ll. 107-12.  Hilary Pilkington touches on the drive of Soviet state in the
post-Stalin years to get youth used to supposedly rational leisure in “‘The Future is Ours’. Youth Culture in
Russia, 1953 to the Present,” in Catriona Kelly and David Shepherd eds., Russian Cultural Studies: An
Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 368-86.
628 On the mid-1950s as a period of optimism, see Miriam Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag
Returnees, Crime, and the Fate of Reform after Stalin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 133-55.
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answer session with the audience. Youth could also pose questions they wanted answered
to long-wed couples. The club held a competition for the best-dressed couple, and
provided flowers, a beauty salon, and fashion consultation.629 Another youth evening
event, “Girls! Let’s Talk about Taste,” featured models of and advice on “proper”
haircuts and clothing.630 Evening organizers purportedly paid careful attention to filling
events with “interesting content, and original forms, which helped express the main
theme.”631 The evenings aimed to engage issues that mattered to young people, and in the
process to promote youth initiative, while ensuring “rational” youth leisure in the context
of an official setting.
While lectures, the overwhelming means of conveying political information in the
Stalin years, were dull and ponderous, the post-Stalin era witnessed an explosion in a
comparatively open, dynamic mode of ideologically-oriented events–youth debates.632
The Komsomol TsK’s 1956 internal report to the Party TsK emphasized the need for
629 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, ll. 110-11. Questions for long-wed couples may have had particular
relevance due to the low level of knowledge about sex among the population in the Khrushchev era. See
Anna Rotkirch, “‘What Kind of Sex Can You Talk about?’ Acquiring Sexual Knowledge in Three Soviet
Generations,” in Daniel Bertaux, Paul Thompson and Anna Rotkirch eds., On Living through Soviet Russia
(New York: Routledge, 2003), 193-219. For scholarship on Soviet fashion in the Thaw, see Olga Gurova,
“The Art of Dressing: Body, Gender and Discourse on Fashion in Soviet Russia in the 1950s and 60s,” in
Paulicelli Eugenia and Hazel Clark eds., The Fabric of Cultures: Fashion, Identity, Globalization (New
York: Berg, 2008), 73-91; Ol’ga Vainshtein, “Female Fashion, Soviet Style: Bodies of Ideology,” in
Helena Goscilo and Beth Holmgren eds., Russia – Women – Culture (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1996), 64-93; and L. V. Zakharova, “‘Naibolee raspostranennoi iavliaetsia forma priamogo pal’to s
odnoborotnoi zastezhkoi’: O sovetskoi mode epokhi ‘ottepeli,’” Neprikosnovennyi Zapas: Debaty o
Politike i Kul’ture 45.1 (2006), http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/ [Accessed December 31, 2009].
630 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, l. 109.
631 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, l. 110.
632 The archive of the Krasnopresnenskii neighborhood branch of the Ministry of Culture lacks
documentation of debates in the postwar Stalin years in contrast to the Khrushchev era. See TsAGM, f.
1988, op. 1. While the Stalinist state allowed disputes on literary works, the clubs held them rarely, if ever,
likely due to the potential of significant punitive actions if something went wrong: TsAOPIM, f. 635, op.
11, d. 31, ll. 15-16.
248
more of these, since “youth like to argue and discuss issues of deep concern to them,” for
example “on the most important questions of modernity, on moral themes, books,
movies, plays, friendship, love, comradeship.”633 According to the Komsomol
Propaganda Department, “it is necessary that heated debates take place in youth initiative
clubs, that youth find here the answers to all the questions that concern them.”634 The
activists of the Leningrad youth initiative club “Petrograd Side” believed that “the rules
and norms of communist morals can become convincing only when you defend them
successfully in passionate debate, when you are yourself completely convinced of their
correctness.” These disputes strove to engage youth in discussing issues that the club
activists described as having fundamental relevance to youth lives, with titles including
“About love and loyalty,” “The question of happiness is on the agenda,” and an
especially serious dispute on “What does it mean to live a communist life?” In contrast to
the sparsely-attended political lectures, the debates apparently drew many youth, with the
hall not large enough to fit all those who wished to participate.635
The Komsomol TsK promoted the debates as an effective instrument of instilling
normative values, and even sent an instructional letter to local Komsomol cells on
conducting them. According to these instructions, the debates were both popular and
didactic. They helped to expunge negative phenomena from youth collectives, enabled
youth to express and defend their views, and confirmed the best and newest in their lives,
the latter a reference to the Party’s guidance. The letter stated that the topic had to interest
633 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 811, ll. 25-28.
634 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, l. 114.
635 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, ll. 216-18.
249
youth, and presented a model debate on “What should a real friend and comrade be like?”
Reportedly, this debate’s organizers announced the debate widely. They prepared the
ground by publishing satirical newspapers making fun of “improper” views on friendship
and love, which inspired heated discussion among youth even before the event itself. The
debate began with a presentation. A speaker familiarized himself with local events, using
these to address general questions, such as: “What is the essence of principled behavior
among friends?”; “Does love presume friendship?”; and “What is friendship, and what
are corrupt relations?” The letter explained that the presenter aimed not to impose his
own opinion, but to inspire debate on each of these issues. After this initial speech, many
audience members took the floor, debating these issues with the presenter and each
other.636
Such events encouraged youth to interrogate the tenets of official ideology,
morals, and ethics within the contexts of Komsomol-managed events, with the intention
of shaping the outcomes of debates and strengthening young people’s faith in the system.
Komsomol TsK communications reveal a further purpose, noting that “currently, debates
among youth, as a rule, take place outside of Komsomol organizations.”637 A number of
underground youth groups devoted to discussing issues of concern to young people
sprang up in the postwar Stalin years.638 The Thaw-era state-sanctioned debates meant to
bring these cliques back into spaces with government oversight.
636 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 814, ll. 17-18. Also see an instruction booklet on youth debates: M. P.
Kapustin, Kak provesti molodezhno-komsomol’skie disputy v klube (Tashkent, 1959).
637 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 811, l. 28.
638 On unofficial youth debate groups in the late Stalin era, often repressed by the state, see Elena Zubkova,
Russia after the War: Hopes, Illusions, and Disappointments, 1945-1957, Hugh Ragsdale trans. and ed.
(Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 109-38, and Juliane Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Youth and the
Emergence of Mature Socialism, 1945-56 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 95-136.
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Still, the extended room for discussion and argument caused the Komsomol
leadership some discomfort. In a 1957 meeting of the Moscow city Komsomol committee
devoted to explaining the Seventh Komsomol TsK Plenum, Shelepin disparaged those
who, instead of true Marxist criticism, engaged in “demagoguery and lies about the
Party,” which need “to be fought decisively.”639 One example of a problematic debate,
described at the MGU university-wide Komsomol conference of 1963, occurred over
abstract art, with certain students accused of “showing political immaturity, failing to
understand the Party’s positions on art.”640 This episode constituted part of a broader
crackdown on abstract art by the Khrushchev administration from late 1962, precipitated
the the Soviet leader’s derision of such art forms in December 1962 at the Manege
exhibit.641 Such instances demonstrate the limitations of the top-level promotion of youth
grassroots initiative, as the Khrushchev leadership reigned in youth autonomy when it
threatened to go beyond the boundaries of the permissible. The dates cited above have
particular resonance, since both 1957-58 and 1962-63 represent two periods when those
at the top of the Party hierarchy moved away from pursuing a more pluralistic, tolerant
policy course, due to anxiety inspired by both sharpening Cold War hostilities and
domestic developments.642 In these periods, official rhetoric censured what it labeled as
639 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 546, ll. 56-57. This is likely related to criticism of the Party associated with
the fallout from the Secret Speech and the Hungary invasion. For more, see Polly Jones, “From the Secret
Speech to the Burial of Stalin: Real and Ideal Responses to De-Stalinization,” in Jones ed., The Dilemmas,
41-63.
640 TsAOPIM, f. 6083, op. 1, d. 52, ll. 166-67.
641 Susan E. Reid, “In the Name of the People: The Manege Affair Revisited,” Kritika 6.4 (Fall 2005): 673-
716.
642 On these anxieties, see Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 156-88.
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“excessive” youth initiative in debates, although, even then, the debates received official
support.
Debates in youth initiative clubs served as incubators of a civic spirit. Such
discussions in state-sanctioned, official settings enabled youth to reflect on pressing
issues of importance to their lives, and, consequently, on the political life of the Party-
state as a whole, given the major place of young people in Soviet policy and discourse in
the Thaw.643 Youth initiative clubs likewise functioned as a venue for youth to take
concrete actions to deal with perceived problems, such as organizing club events that
satisfied desires and wants not met by other components of the Soviet system.
Youth initiative clubs hosted a range of other activities as well, as exemplified by
the Kaluga “Torch” club, which organized a skiing trip that the Molodoi leninets editors
cited as illustrative of the didactic function of the club. They spotlighted Valentin
Kriukhin, a youth who “radically changed” his behavior during the trip. At first, he tried
“to set himself off from others, as always,” but when he met with difficulties, “everyone
helped him, and soon his arrogance was gone. The young man felt the strength of the
collective.”644 This case demonstrates how the clubs simultaneously promoted the official
Soviet value of collectivism, in contrast to “arrogant” individualism, and imposed the
social control of the collective on individuals whose behavior deviated from accepted
social norms. Undoubtedly, similar reprimands of misbehaving club members took place
at youth evenings and other events. The plan for the “Torch” club included a series of
643 In fact, during the perestroika years, clubs offered a space for meetings by dissenting political groups: A.
G. Borzenkov, Molodezh’ i politika: Vozmozhnosti i predely studencheskoi samodeiatel’nosti na vostoke
Rossii (1961-1991 gg.), Chast’ 2 (Novosibirsk: Novosibsirskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet, 2002), 166-67.
644 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, ll. 67-68, and I. V. Sokolov, interviewed April 16, 2009.
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other activities, for instance a jazz orchestra, a theater studio, and a “Museum of
Bureaucracy,” likely meant to criticize officious bureaucrats.645
The role of youth initiative clubs as both social control institutions and spaces for
the development of civic spirit is particularly evident when the Komsomol hierarchy
interacted with kompanii–bohemian cliques of marginal, semi-dissident writers, poets,
musicians, and artists.646 Perhaps the most evocative example comes from the attempt to
create a club for the unofficial poets of Moscow’s Maiakovksii Square. In what its
participants referred to as a Soviet Speaker’s Corner, Maiakovskii Square served since
1958 as a gathering place for young amateur poets who read their poetry to the populace,
drawing huge crowds and establishing an informal public space for poetry. While at first
the poetry tended to stay within the limits of what the leadership tolerated, by 1960 its
tone changed to an increasingly harsh critique of the Soviet government. Hard-pressed to
deal with mounting criticism in such an open, public environment, local authority figures
began to harass these poets. At one point, however, a group composed of lower-level
Komsomol officials and activists, and some poets and enthusiasts from Maiakovskii
Square, decided on a different solution. Lower-level cadres managed to convince mid-
level officials in the neighborhood Komsomol committee and a local club manager to
offer the young poets an autonomous club.647 For Komsomol officials, providing such a
645 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 830, l. 14a.
646 On kompanii, see Juliane Fürst, “Friends in Private, Friends in Public: The Phenomena of Kompaniia
Among Soviet Youth in the 1950s and 1960s,” in Lewis H. Siegelbaum ed., Borders of Socialism: Private
Spheres of Soviet Russia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 229-50; Benjamin K. Tromly, “Re-
Imagining the Soviet Intelligentsia: Student Politics and University Life, 1948-1964” (Ph. D. diss., Harvard
University, 2007), 155-56; and Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg, The Thaw Generation: Coming of
Age in the Post-Stalin Era (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993).
647 This case study is based mainly on a collection of primary sources composed of published interviews
with participants, including the poets and also Komsomol cadres, as well as on extensive quotes from
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club aimed to solve the immediate problem of such open criticism by redirecting it into a
less open, although still public context, embodying the Khrushchevite state’s decreased
reliance on despotic power and incorporation of infrastructural power elements. Thus,
kompanii not only tried to privatize public spaces, as Fürst insightfully notes. 648 In some
cases, authorities actively negotiated with kompanii over the boundaries between public
and private, enriching our understanding of the phenomenon of Thaw-era kompanii and
their relationship to the Party-state.
Shelepin’s 1956 call for new forms laid the groundwork for the appearance of
other novel initiative-based institutions, including the MGU “Arkhimed” (Archimedes)
studio, which combined elements of a youth initiative club and an amateur art
collective.649 This group coalesced around the staging of the 1960 opera “Archimedes” in
the MGU physics department, part of a trend of creating operas by this department that
began in the mid-1950s, as exemplified by the “Dubinushka” opera described in the
previous chapter. “Archimedes” originated from a resolution of the October 1959 annual
conference of the MGU physics department Komsomol cell to prepare a fun celebration
for the next spring. In fact, the committee decided on the creation of a holiday, Physicists
Day, celebrated on the supposed birthday of Archimedes, which the committee decreed to
be May 7. The fact that young people had the confidence and took the initiative to
establish this new holiday speaks volumes about youth social activism. During the
newspaper articles and archival documents: L. V. Polikovskaia, My predchustviie... predtecha...
ploshchad’ Maiakovskogo, 1958-1965 (Moscow: Zvenia, 1997), 143-52. For official criticism of the
Maiakovskii Square events, see: “Kubarem s parnasa,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, January 14, 1962.
648 Fürst, “Friends in Private.”
649 This narrative is based on the group memoir of the “Archimedes” collective: S. K. Kovaleva, Ty
pomnish’, fizfak? Neformal’nye traditsii fizfaka MGU (Moscow: Pomatur, 2003), 81-86, 362. For the
broader context of MGU in the 1950s, see Tromly, “Re-Imagining the Soviet Intelligentsia,” 310-69.
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following months, a select group of Komsomol cultural officials and activists among the
MGU physics students invested a great deal of energy into preparing the celebration.
The 1960 celebration, attended by a huge crowd, began on the steps of the
building housing the physics department, with performances of amateur arts by each
class. Next followed an unruly, carnival-like parade, led by floats with students dressed
up as famous scientists: Archimedes, Newton, Popov, etc. The world-famous physicist N.
D. Landau, the faculty patron of the celebration, joined the fun on one of the floats
(Figure 5).
Figure 5.  A photograph of the first Physicists Day parade. Landau is in the black
suit. Courtesy of the private archive of M. A. Lebedeva.
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After circling the university, the procession ended up at the MGU club, where, in the
extremely overcrowded hall, the students put on the opera “Archimedes” for the first
time. The plot of this opera juxtaposed the heroic Archimedes, a university dean at the
University of Syracuse, Sicily, fighting for the future of physics against the might of the
Greek gods, who are wary of being left behind by the progress of science (Figure 6).
Figure 6.  A photograph of the “Archimedes” scene where Archimedes challenges
the Greek gods. Courtesy of the private archive of M. A. Lebedeva.
The gods, among other measures, encouraged corrupt behavior by university staff. They
also tempted students to drink and dance the twist, forbidden at the time due to the
officialdom associating it with rock’n’roll music, sexual licentiousness, and an excessive
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western orientation. A key moment in the show came when, as the opera’s libretto states,
“the students, tempted by the gods, for a minute lose their humanity, and a general
dancing of the twist (tvistopliaska) begins.” The opera’s first performance apparently
“had incredible success” with the audience (Figure 7).
Figure 7.  A photograph of the audience for the first performance of “Archimedes.”
Note that many audience members had to stand in order to fit into the overcrowded
hall during the show, and some sat on the banisters. Courtesy of the private archive
of M. A. Lebedeva.
The play combined three basic tropes that came to the fore in Thaw-era official
discourse and policy: propagation of science and technology, criticism of bureaucratism,
and disparagement of “negative” student behavior such as stiliagi-style dancing.650 Such
censure of “deviance” occurred elsewhere as well, for instance at an exhibit in the youth
650 For how these came to the fore in the Thaw, see P. L. Vail and A. A. Genis, 60-e. Mir sovetskogo
cheloveka (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1988).
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initiative club “Petrograd Side.” Called an electric patrol, this exhibit featured dolls
dancing, and “suddenly–a wailing siren. The lights of two projectors pick out a dancing
pair that performs an ugly [referring to American-style] dance move.”651 The day the club
opened witnessed several short skits making fun of “bureaucracy, boredom, drunkenness,
and ‘style’ [referring to stiliagi].”652The targeting of stiliagi, in particular, illuminates the
at least outward concordances between youth initiative in state-sponsored popular culture
and the broader Thaw-era campaign against youth “deviance” as described in the
previous chapter.
“Archimedes” participants recall enthusiastically engaging in this Komsomol-
organized cultural leisure activity. T. M. Tkacheva enjoyed an “enormous emotional lift”
from her performances in the opera, and for D. V. Gal’tsоv, it “was just fun.”653 In
addition to singing and acting itself, the opera experience involved the customary post-
performance banquet for its members, remembered with pleasure by S. V. Semenov
(Figure 8).654
651 “Vot chto takoe klub molodezhi!”Komsomol’skaia pravda, July 9, 1957.
652 “Boi serosti i skuke,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, September 6, 1956.
653 T. M. Tkacheva, born 1945, interviewed January 20, 2009, and D. V. Gal’tsоv, born 1942, interviewed
February 20, 2009.
654 S. V. Semenov, born 1948, interviewed March 18, 2009.
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Figure 8.  A photograph of a banquet held after an “Archimedes” performance.
Courtesy of the private archive of M. A. Lebedeva.
In the words of the poet-bard S. A. Krylov, the extracurricular life of the physics
department, such as “Archimedes,” played “an extremely significant role in the lives of
students,” constituting “a bright memory of wonderful times.”655
“Archimedes” played a deep social role as well. According to O. M. Lebedikhina,
the chorus master, “Archimedes” represented “real life” for its members, the center of
their social world.656 S. N. Shchegol’kova confirmed the key role of the clique that
formed around the opera, describing them as “friends, with whom we are close and hang
out (obshchaemsia) with pleasure” to this day.657 Gaponov, the opera’s director, stated
that for him, “creating a collective” from among the opera participants constituted the key
655 Kovaleva, Ty pomnish, fizfak?, 4.
656 O. M. Lebedikhina, born 1947, interviewed December 25, 2008.
657 S. N. Shchegol’kova, born 1937, interviewed February 19, 2009.
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goal of the “Archimedes” project.658 S. K. Kovaleva similarly stressed the importance of
“our group of friends that lasts to this day.” She also illuminated how the opera gave a
“sportive, combative spark (strunku) for the rest of one’s life,” inspiring her to consider
that “we can achieve whatever we want.”659 The co-author of the opera V. A. Miliaev
likewise underscored its crucial role in personal growth, since having to work with so
many people developed his social skills. For Semenov, the opera also proved helpful in
gaining confidence in public speaking. Both also highlighted the crucial role of friends
made via “Archimedes.”660
Evidence indicates that other youth initiative-based institutions also powerfully
influenced young people. Perhaps in some cases too much so, as revealed by an alarming
letter from the leadership council of the “Kuibyshev city youth club” (Kuibyshevskii
gorodskoi molodezhnyi klub), in Novosibirsk oblast, to the First Secretary of the
Komsomol S. P. Pavlov in 1964. The missive describes the founding of the club in 1962,
and its rapid rise in popularity among youth, with 400 “fanatics-enthusiasts” who “devote
all of [their] free time after work to the club,” and events drawing 35,000 people in 1963.
However, the club lacked a space of its own, despite promises from the oblast Komsomol
and Party organizations. This posed the danger of the club collapsing and youth who
actively participated “walking away embittered,” if Pavlov did not intervene. A separate
note by the president of the club explicitly stated that “if the club fails, the Komsomol
members and youth of the city will lose faith in the Komsomol organization of the oblast
658 Iu. V. Gaponov, interviewed April 29, 2009.
659 S. K. Kovaleva, interviewed March 3, 2009.
660 V. A. Miliaev, interviewed February 28, 2009, and S. V. Semenov, born 1948, interviewed March 18,
2009.
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and in all guarantees and promises of Party organs.”661 Confirming the genuine
importance to young people of the new clubs, the documents hint that, in some cases,
these institutions acquired greater meaning in the lives of young people than the
Komsomol itself. The letter also points to the potential problem of grassroots
disillusionment when initiative from below did not receive support from above.
Such findings apply to other institutions as well, since youth initiative clubs
proved far from the only Komsomol activity where the Komsomol TsK encouraged
autonomous youth grassroots activism. Community-based policing through patrols of
Komsomol members, discussed in chapter 4, represents one such example. Another case,
Komsomol construction brigades, originated in Moscow universities in the late 1950s and
traveled to the Virgin Lands and other “heroic” construction sites.662 The Komsomol took
a much broader role in managing tourism and sport activities as well, drawing on
grassroots activism to do so. Youth-themed television shows, such as KVN, presented
role models of initiative-oriented youth, relying on teams of young enthusiasts to
voluntarily devote time and energy to competing.663 In the early 1960s, neighborhood and
city-level Komsomol cells opened up youth cafes, staffed by volunteers and featuring
engaging cultural events. These examples show that the encouragement of youth
initiative was not limited to clubs, but represented a broad trend in the Kremlin’s youth
661 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1170, ll. 97-100.
662 While the Virgin Lands campaign began during the immediate post-Stalin years, the Komsomol
construction brigades in particular sprang up as grassroots groups in the late 1950s. See Tromly, “Re-
Imagining the Soviet Intelligentsia,” 370-424, and Kovaleva, Ty pomnish’, fizfak?, 32-75.
663 Kristin Roth-Ey, “Playing for Cultural Authority: Soviet TV Professionals and the Game Show in the
1950s and 1960s,” in Crowley and Reid eds., Pleasures in Socialism, 147-76.
261
policy during the Thaw.664 Besides such specifically youth-oriented activities, the Party-
state also encouraged the general population to express active social engagement in other
venues.665
Points of Tension in Youth Initiative Clubs
Nonetheless, discontinuities existed between the vision of “appropriate” popular
culture activities held by many youth initiative club members and some authority figures.
Evidence for this comes from a conference devoted to youth initiative clubs in May 1962,
sponsored by the Komsomol TsK. The very first speaker noted that many of the
conference participants likely recalled meetings with officials at the dawn of the youth
initiative club movement, meaning the mid-1950s, when “many expressed mistrust and
lack of faith” in youth initiative clubs.666 In a prominent example, the Moscow
Kuibyshev neighborhood club “Torch,” which served as a model for many other youth
clubs, at one point almost failed. According to the Komsomol Propaganda Department,
this resulted from club activists proving unable to overcome the “conservatism and
mistrust” toward the club from the local house of culture, which denied them space for
events. The department censured the Kuibyshev district Komsomol committee, which
“did not exhibit appropriate behavior” over this problem. The Moscow city Komsomol
committee also received a reprimand for its “skepticism toward youth initiative.”667 This
664 Of course, far from all youth wanted to belong to such official collectives, as exemplified by unofficial
kompanii: Fürst, “Friends in Private.”
665 Park, “Party Reform.”
666 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1096, l. 3.
667 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, l. 113.
262
incident offers a glimpse at the tensions between younger, lower-level Komsomol
officials and activists, enthusiastic over new Thaw-era initiative-based forms, and older,
more orthodox officials and club managers reluctant to permit innovations and support
grassroots social engagement, preferring the postwar Stalinist model of discipline instead.
Another case is even more illustrative of such conflicts. The editors of Kaluga’s
Molodoi leninets complained to the Party TsK about the Kaluga city Party committee’s
conduct toward the Kaluga youth initiative club “Torch.” The complaint stated that “the
spirit of the cult of personality has become so rooted in the consciousness of certain Party
cadres that they are ready to limit and regulate everything, including the enthusiastic
creativity of the masses, which even makes them afraid.” On November 20, 1956, the
committee called in the club’s activists and “voiced baseless, irrational charges,”
condemning the “intolerable autonomy” in the establishment of “Torch,” and labeling
those in charge of the club “apolitical.” Furthermore, the local Party officials accused the
club members of providing “a wide breach for the enemy,” implying that the club served
the interests of western Europe and the United States. As a result, the committee
members decreed the closing of the club, imposing punishments for “Torch” activists,
including the editors of Molodoi leninets and the city Komsomol committee second
secretary. The denunciation letter commented that such misguided “vigilance” can come
only from “people poisoned by bureaucracy, who are thus capable of destroying
initiative.”668
668 RGANI, f. 5, op. 34, d. 11, ll. 69-70. For more on complaint letters in the Thaw, see Gleb Tsipursky,
“‘As a Citizen, I Cannot Ignore These Facts’: Whistleblowing in the Khrushchev Era,” Jahrbücher für
Geschichte Osteuropas 58.1 (March 2010): 52-69.
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The “Torch” supporters’ appeal to a series of agencies in Moscow received a
quick response. By December 9, Komsomol’skaia pravda published a story condemning
the situation surrounding the Kaluga “Torch.”669 Sokolov still remembers this article,
indicative of the significance of the club in the lives of some Kaluga youth.670 In addition,
the letter sent by the Molodoi leninets editors resulted in an investigation by the Party
TsK Propaganda Department, which confirmed all of the facts in the complaint, and
ensured the continued existence of the club, as well as the revocation of Party reprimands
on club activists.671 Such actions by the Khrushchev leadership, which undermined the
authority of regional Party leaders and expressed strong support for youth grassroots
enthusiasm and initiative, made clear the seriousness of and dedication to the new course
in the Party TsK, and served as guidelines for all Party officials elsewhere who showed
reluctance over youth initiative clubs. This example draws an especially stark divide
between those supportive of Thaw-era reforms in regard to youth initiative in state-
sponsored popular culture, and those who expressed a hard-line, conservative desire to
maintain militant methods characteristic of the anticosmopolitan period.
The promotion of youth initiative clubs caused some tensions with well-
established cultural recreation institutions, as revealed by a December 14, 1956, note sent
by a high official in the Ministry of Culture, MOC, to the minister, who then forwarded it
to the Komsomol TsK. The official suggested that, as a consequence of youth initiative
clubs, the best organizers and amateur arts performers may quit trade union clubs and
669 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, l. 208, and “Kak tushili ‘Fakel,’” Komsomol’skaia pravda, December 9,
1956.
670 I. V. Sokolov, interviewed April 16, 2009.
671 RGANI, f. 5, op. 34, d. 11, l. 71.
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“form some sort of elite caste of chosen youth.” Problematically, according to the
official, youth initiative clubs “focus on the newness, unusual nature, originality of this
enterprise, and not its practical purpose and necessity.” Moreover, he implied that, in
some cases, the youth initiative clubs had too much autonomy, creating a “special
organization of youth,” a “Komsomol within the Komsomol,” with its own program. He
specifically cited the Kaluga “Torch” as exemplary of such problems, and censured
Komsomol’skaia pravda for defending it. Concluding that organizing youth initiative
clubs “is a mistake,” the note proposes instead that the Komsomol form commissions to
participate in the work of trade union clubs.672 In unpacking the motivations behind this
note, we see on the one hand the same sort of conflict as described in the example above,
as the official expresses wariness of the autonomy found within youth initiative clubs and
implicitly advocates for a militant vision of the path to communism, guided from above.
The second aspect of the note relates to the MOC’s oversight of the cultural recreation
network, with his censure evincing a desire to protect bureaucratic turf against an
unwelcome incursion. The references to the Kaluga “Torch” club hints at this local
struggle achieving the status of a point of conflict within the central government itself
over the course of cultural policy. This gives more weight to the Party TsK Propaganda
Department’s condemnation of the Kalugan oblast Party committee.
These instances exemplify the many early attempts of hard-line officials to
hamper the development of youth initiative clubs. Still, the promotion of such clubs by
soft-line top-level bureaucrats in the Party and Komsomol, and their popularity among
youth, ensured the expansion of these institutions. Indeed, the Party TsK and the
672 For the original report to the Minister of Culture, see RGALI, f. 2329, op. 10, d. 183, ll. 28-31. For the
copy forwarded to the Komsomol TsK, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 830, ll. 11-14.
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Komsomol leadership generally continued to support youth initiative clubs during the
brief swing away from more pluralistic, tolerant policies from late 1956 to early 1958.673
By 1959, the MOC seems to have accepted their existence, with a textbook for club
managers and employees published under its oversight mentioning youth initiative clubs
as a new form of club work.674 In 1962, the clubs reportedly acquired “a mass character”
and their main concerns transformed from questions of their continued existence to a
search for space and financial support.675 The 1962 Fourteenth Komsomol Congress
mentioned that 214 youth initiative-based collectives existed in Moscow alone.676 The
Komsomol’s archivists even devoted separate archival folders in 1966 and 1967 to
documents on such institutions, indicating their prominence.677 Although a careful search
of the Komsomol archives did not reveal summary statistics on the number of
participants in these clubs, reports from individual clubs indicate that they had anywhere
from several dozen to several hundred members, with 172 for the Kaluga “Torch,” 200
for the Moscow “Torch,” and 400 for the “Kuybishev city youth club.” Given that, in
1967, 12,000 such institutions functioned across the Soviet Union, total membership
ranged anywhere from a few hundred thousand to over a million youth.678
673 For an example of the impact of this turn on youth cultural policy, see Bittner, The Many Lives of
Khrushchev’s Thaw, 84.
674 G. G. Karpov and N. D. Sintsov, Klubnoe delo: Uchebnoe posobie (Moscow, 1959), 26.
675 According to a Komsomol TsK-sponsored conference: RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1096, ll. 3-16.
676 S. P. Pavlov, Otchet Tsentral’nogo Komiteta VLKSM i zadachi komsomola, vytekaiushchie iz reshenii
XXII s’’ezda KPSS (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1962), 37.
677 These files included: RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 68, and RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 141.
678 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 141, l. 95.
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Owing to their growing acceptance and integration into the state-sponsored
popular culture system by the late 1950s and early 1960s these organizations proved
increasingly capable of defending their interests against militant local officials who
disliked youth initiative. “Archimedes” serves as a good example. From the first
performance in 1960, its organizers had to deal with a multitude of obstacles from the
physics department administration, which, according to Kovaleva, “tried to use various
means to limit youth activism.” The Party committee and department administration
demanded a demonstration of the opera rehearsal, after which “passionate debate” broke
out, with parts of “Archimedes” censored.679 Still, some of it continued to inspire official
disapproval, such as hints of official corruption, implicit mockery of university
administrators, daring costumes, and the implication that dancing the twist and
intoxication were widespread among physics students.680 In 1961, the second year of
“Archimedes,” the department Party committee “was aiming to shut down” the Physicists
Day celebration until the participants in “Archimedes,” led by the new physics
department Komsomol secretary Gaponov, and with the assistance of Landau, managed
to invite the visiting Niels Bohr to the opera (Figure 9).
679 Kovaleva, Ty pomnish, fizfak?, 81-82.
680 T. M. Tkacheva, born 1945, interviewed January 20, 2009.
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Figure 9.  A photograph of Niels Bohr giving a speech after the “Archimedes”
performance. Landau is to his right. Courtesy of the private archive of S. N.
Shchegol’kova.
After watching “Archimedes,” Bohr famously said “if these students are capable of the
same creativity and brightness in physics, then I am not worried about its future.” Despite
continuing opposition from some figures in the university administration, Physicists Day
and the “Archimedes” opera received praise in the 1963 MGU university-wide
Komsomol conference, with the university Komsomol secretary calling it “a shining
phenomenon in the life of the physics department, and even the whole university.”681
That same year, G. S. Titov, the second man to orbit the Earth, appeared at the Physicists
Day celebration, almost causing a mass stampede by star-struck students. In 1964,
MGU’s Physicists Day event was shown on Soviet television, and received coverage in
681 TsAOPIM, f. 6083, op. 1, d. 52, l. 18.
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the press and radio broadcasts. A number of physics departments in other higher
educational institutions held celebrations based on MGU’s model.682
The Thaw-era leadership’s decision to shift course from Stalinist practices by
offering room for grassroots initiative and seeking to satisfy youth cultural consumption
desires received unambiguous support from many members of the “Archimedes”
collective. They also approved other de-Stalinizing reforms and the revival of the drive to
build communism. “Archimedes” participants frequently described themselves as having
believed in a vision of communism “with a human face,” romantic and initiative-based,
during their youth. This correlates will the spirit of optimism suffusing the USSR in the
beginning of the 1960s, as Khrushchev pronounced the upcoming achievement of
communism within a generation in the Third Party Program at the 1961 Twenty-second
Communist Party Congress.683 According to A. N. Krichevich, an “Archimedes”
member, when he was young, “it seemed that communist ideology could be cleaned up
and made into something decent,” something “romantic, positive.”684 Tkacheva recalled
her faith and that of her friends in constructing communism.685 Miliaev attributed the
popularity of “Archimedes” to the opera fitting “the liberal spirit of the time, a spirit of
freedom of expression.”686 The physicist Landau is well known for inviting reforms and
opposing ideologically militant colleagues and university administrators. Other evidence
682 Kovaleva, Ty pomnish, fizfak?, 91-95.
683 On the spirit of optimism and its relationship to the Third Party Program, see Vail and A. A. Genis, 60-
e. For more on the program itself, see Alexander Titov, “The 1961 Party Programme and the Fate of
Khrushchev’s Reforms,” in Ilic and Smith eds., Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev, 8-25.
684 A. N. Krichevich, born 1950, interviewed December 12, 2008.
685 T. M. Tkacheva, born 1945, interviewed January 20, 2009.
686 V. A. Miliaev, interviewed February 28, 2009.
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supports these pluralistic sentiments. The letter about the Kaluga “Torch” deployed
rhetoric unambiguously critical of the Stalinist trope of “vigilance” and praised the post-
Stalinist emphasis on “lively creativity.” So did the Komsomol Propaganda Department
in its censure of the Moscow city Komsomol for its suspicion of youth initiative.
Consequently, my analysis confirms that the traditional historiographical
paradigm’s spotlight on struggles in the Thaw between hard-liners and soft-liners has
some validity, despite recent criticism from scholars including Miriam Dobson and
Stephen Bittner.687 While far from suggesting that post-Stalin society was dominated by
two camps, the evidence indicates that advocacy of youth initiative and appeal to popular
interests proved controversial stances and inspired much opposition from conservatives
who wanted to maintain late Stalin-era practices. Furthermore, the Thaw-era conflicts
over youth initiative clubs bear parallels to 1920s debates over NEP-era Komsomol-
managed clubs. Setting Thaw-era conflicts within this historical context highlights the
fact that prerevolutionary and early Soviet tensions over spontaneity and consciousness
continued to exert a powerful impact on the postwar USSR. This points to long-standing
fractures at the heart of official ideology over the appropriate path to communism.
Certainly, the position of various bureaucrats on the question of youth initiative
evolved over time. The example of youth debates discussed earlier shows that, especially
during periods of domestic and international tensions, Party-state authorities reigned in
what they perceived as excessive autonomy. At the same time, the possibilities for youth
grassroots activism and agency rose substantially throughout the Khrushchev years. If in
the mid-1950s the default position of officials toward youth initiative and youth initiative
687 See Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 156-85, and Bittner, The Many Lives of Khrushchev’s Thaw,
1-13.
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clubs was rather hesitant by the end of the 1950s, only a minority of militant-oriented
bureaucrats expressed skepticism of youth initiative clubs. Nonetheless, conflicts over
youth initiative between officials holding divergent perspectives continued throughout all
the vicissitudes in the Thaw and had a powerful impact on youth everyday experience.
While such debates were ongoing, youth initiative institutions had the potential to
push the boundaries of the permissible without crossing them and to deploy Aesopian
language to express viewpoints unacceptable in direct speech, going beyond the
intentions of the Khrushchev leadership in the process. The “Kuibyshev city youth club”
seems to have acquired more legitimacy than the local Komsomol among at least certain
young club members, a result that certainly contradicted the goals of authorities for youth
initiative clubs. “Archimedes” provides another case in point. A major point of conflict
between the department Party committee and the “Archimedes” collective unfurled over
the Greek god Apollo’s backup dancers, who, in a scene designed to seduce the students
of Archimedes into following Apollo into music and art instead of physics, performed a
cabaret in daring costumes (Figure 10).
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Figure 10.  A photograph of the “Archimedes” scene with Apollo’s backup dancers.
Courtesy of the private archive of M. A. Lebedeva.
Shchegol’kova, one of the dancers in the photograph, related that the students made the
attire by shortening their gymnastics costumes, and even wanted to dance the charleston
or twirl a baton, but decided against it. When university and Party officials saw the
costumes at the rehearsal, “of course, their jaws dropped” (oni, konechno, akhnuli). Many
officials found the costumes excessive and frivolous, and tried to get the dancers to at
least take off the gloves for a more “sport-like look.” Yet with the support of more
pluralistic members of the Party committee, the students managed to talk their way into
leaving the costumes unchanged by insisting that they sought to depict the spirit of the
young Greek women dancing for Apollo. Another, unvoiced motive for the costumes and
the number itself, according to Shchegol’kova, was for the chance to publicly dance a
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foreign cabaret in appropriate garb.688 Kovaleva recalls that the style of the dance
constituted another reason for the indignation of the Party committee, as the “dance is not
ours, it is western.” Still, they allowed the dance and, unsurprisingly, the student audience
“liked it very much, girls with such figures.”689
Similarly, the opera outwardly depicted dancing the twist as something negative.
Many members of the audience may have understood it as such, with the co-author of
“Archimedes” Valerii specifically commenting that he disliked stiliagi, and intended no
irony in the scene where the students danced the twist as an embodiment of bad
behavior.690 Nonetheless, regardless of the author’s meaning, Gaponov emphasized that
such scenes were deliberately included both in “Archimedes” and other performances as
a means of exhibiting officially censured dances in sanctioned venues.691 Plenty of
students, as Gal’tsov recalled, welcomed a chance to see the kinds of dances they
engaged in at unofficial student parties performed in shows on stage.692 Sergei liked that
scene most of all both for its “beautiful young women, dancing well,” as well as for its
realistic depiction of everyday life in the physics dormitory.693 While the risqué costumes
of the backup dancers challenged norms in regard to appropriate garb for women in
official student performances, both the cabaret and especially the twist undermined the
688 S. N. Shchegol’kova, born 1937, interviewed February 19, 2009. For more on the outrage of the Party
committee about the costume and the argument about the gloves, see Kovaleva, Ty pomnish’, fizfak?, 82.
689 S. K. Kovaleva, interviewed March 3, 2009. For how such activities constituted efforts to engage with
an “Imaginary West,” see Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever,  until It Was No More: The Last
Soviet Generation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 158-237.
690 V. A. Miliaev, interviewed March 1, 2009.
691 Iu. V. Gaponov, interviewed April 29, 2009.
692 D. V. Gal’tsоv, born 1942, interviewed February 20, 2009.
693 S. V. Semenov, born 1948, interviewed March 18, 2009.
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state-prescribed mission of expunging stiliagi-like behavior in the context of the Cold
War. “Archimedes” enabled youth to exhibit officially condemned dances and functioned
to implicitly negotiate and expand the limits of tolerance for non-Soviet styles, both
reflecting and advancing youth agency in the process. Recent research on the post-
Khrushchev years demonstrates that youth clubs provided cover for various unsanctioned
activities as well.694
In rare cases, the subversive aspects of youth initiative club work in the Thaw
acquired a distinctly political cast. The youth initiative club offered by the Komsomol
authorities to the Maiakovskii Square poets came with a promise of full autonomy for its
members. They organized a literature section and also wanted to stage an exhibit of
abstract art. However, the director of the cultural establishment that provided the room
for the club refused to permit the exhibit and the Komsomol district and city committees
chose not to force the issue. The poets decided to return to the square and, soon
afterward, the government used force to disperse the poets.695 By explicitly going far
beyond the boundaries defined for culture and attempting to stretch the tolerance of the
Khrushchev authorities for youth initiative too much, the poets placed themselves in
patent opposition to the Party-state, resulting in their repression.
694 See Sergei Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet
Dniepropetrovsk (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 31-52, and Yngvar B. Steinholt, Rock
in the Reservation: Songs from the Leningrad Rock Club, 1981-86 (New York: MMMSP, 2005).
695 Polikovskaia, My predchustviie, 143-52.
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Conclusion
The post-Stalin endeavor to bring about an alternative, socialist version of a
modern consumer society involved a turn toward satisfying consumption desires and
appealing to popular interests while trying to channel these in “appropriate” directions.
Yet advocacy of initiative from below and citizen participation in managing society had
just as central a role in the Thaw-era vision of a socialist modernity. The latter marked
socialist modernity as unique and explicitly dissimilar from traditional western
consumerist modernity, with such differentiation an important aim in the Cold War’s
cultural competition. Likewise, the Khrushchev leadership intended the robust
development of grassroots initiative in its version of modernity to contribute to building
communism, when ordinary citizens would manage society. Youth played a vital role in
this narrative, as those who would construct and live in the ideal future. Indeed, the post-
Stalin authorities placed particular emphasis on inspiring social activism among young
people as part of a shift from a discipline-oriented late Stalinist ideal of a young New
Soviet Person, to a Thaw-era version characterized by initiative and enthusiasm. The
youth initiative clubs combined all of these elements. Studying them illuminates
important facets of the transition toward a Thaw-era socialist version of modernity, and
the consequences for Soviet everyday life.
This chapter shows that the post-Stalin Party-state’s advocacy of youth initiative
and satisfaction of youth desires resulted in a far-ranging impact on the lives of a number
of young club-goers. In effect, Thaw-era authorities succeeded in utilizing an approach
characterized by greater reliance on infrastructural power to ensure that the socialization
of these youth occurred in the context of an officially-approved and monitored collective.
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Although this finding supports the notion of an increasing role for official collectives in
regulating people’s everyday lives, I depart from Kharkhordin’s evaluation of such
collectives as censorious and repressive, with Soviet citizens finding real meaning only in
nonstate settings of friendship groups and the home. Instead, as seen in “Archimedes,”
the “Kuibyshev city youth club,” and other youth initiative institutions, young people
gained meaning, emotional support, self-definition, and lifelong friendships within these
official collectives, making them vital to forming personal youth identities. Such
institutions did not necessarily constitute separate spaces from what Kharkhordin termed
friendship groups, with the former surveilling and repressive and the latter supportive and
meaningful. In fact, youth clubs highlight the complex and ambiguous relationship
between the multilayered and intertwined public and private spheres, as young people
found deep meaning, friendship, and support within official, public spaces, while
participating in activities that largely conformed to Party-state strictures. The
government’s actions even contributed to the growth of a civic spirit within these clubs,
as youth debated issues of significance to their lives and undertook limited forms of
popular activism to address deficiencies they identified within the Soviet system.
The establishment of interest-based clubs that catered to diverse youth interests
and desires, and, even more so, the youth initiative clubs that gave young people
substantial room to organize cultural activities appealing to them, underscore the
differentiation of the Party-state’s cultural offerings in the post-Stalin era. Combined with
the evidence from the previous chapter of growing tolerance for western cultural
offerings, this finding suggests the need to refine Stephen Lovell’s conclusion that, in the
Thaw, cultural production for the masses continued to promote a cohesive, unified vision
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of a Soviet cultural consumer that hid the cultural and thus social differences among the
population.696 Instead, an investigation of youth clubs indicates that officialdom
acknowledged the existence of Soviet society’s diversity, cultural and otherwise.697 The
Khrushchev Party-state legitimated New Soviet Men and Women possessing differing
interests that did not directly relate to communist construction.
Youth initiative club members helped establish and participated in these
institutions, spending a great deal of time and energy in doing so, because these clubs
reflected the desires of young people for fun. Although enabled and encouraged by the
Soviet leadership and fulfilling some socialization functions, youth initiative clubs, in
their essence, relied on enthusiastic youth social activism. Here, my conclusions depart
from those of Juliane Fürst, who claimed that, from the postwar Stalin years, “despite
short flames of new enthusiasm,” youth were characterized by “consumption, subcultures
and shirking the system.”698 Moreover by having fun in youth initiative clubs, young
people developed their agency.699 In effect, these clubs brought young enthusiasts
together in a self-willed fashion to pursue cultural activities reflecting their desires.
696 He does note major changes in cultural production for elites during the Thaw: Stephen Lovell, The
Russian Reading Revolution: Print Culture in the Soviet and Post-Soviet Eras (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 2000), 46-48.
697 Also attested to by the rebirth of sociology to study social differences. See B. A. Grushin, Chetyre zhizni
Rossii v zerkale oprosov obshchestvennogo mneniia: Ocherki massovogo soznaniia rossiian vremen
Khrushcheva, Brezhneva, Gorbacheva i Eltsina v 4-kh knigakh. Zhizn’ 1-ia, epokha Khrushcheva.
(Moscow: Progress-Traditsiia, 2001); Vladimir Shlapentokh, Public and Private Life of the Soviet People:
Changing Values in Post-Stalin Russia, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Jiri Zuzanek,
Work and Leisure in the Soviet Union: A Time-Budget Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1980).
698 Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 19.
699 For how pleasure is conducive to agency, see Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural
Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 5.
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Active youth participation in the hard-line vs. soft-line struggles in the Thaw
offers further support for the idea that young people did not simply shirk the system, but
invested deep meaning, energy, emotions, enthusiasm, and a sense of self-definition into
the future of the Soviet Union. The fact that young people engaged in public debates with
higher-up officials, whether in the case of the Kaluga “Torch” or “Archimedes,”
underscores that rhetorical battles over appropriate degrees of initiative meant a great
deal to young people. This complicates Alexei Yurchak’s argument for the increasing
irrelevancy of official discourse for everyday youth experience in the Soviet Union from
1953 onward, at least for many of those young people actively involved in initiative-
based club activities. In this regard, Yurchak’s argument is a better fit for the 1970s and
1980s than the 1950s and 1960s.700 For other young people, as chapter 3 demonstrated,
the distancing between official discourse and youth lives began already in the late 1940s
with the ban on jazz and western dancing. This indicates the need to tease out the
distinctions between the experience of different groups of youth, with some actively
involved in promoting their interests within the channels permitted by the system and
others side-stepping such officially-approved paths.
The conflicts over youth activism, as well as those over a more tolerant approach
to western popular culture described in the previous chapter, helps illustrate that struggles
between hard-liners and soft-liners had a great deal of importance for everyday cultural
life in the Thaw. They also highlight the significance of long-standing tensions at the
heart of Soviet ideology and discourse over whether to build communism by relying on
700 Thus, for the 1970s, Yurchak describes how official discourse did not permit room for conflict, leading
to young people telling officials one thing, while in reality doing another. See his Everything was Forever,
36-76.
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mass spontaneity and popular support, or an ideologically consciousness vanguard and
forceful methods.
The stress on satisfying youth desires and developing their initiative in official
discourse and policy during the early Thaw, along with the growing prominence of youth
in public life, arguably resulted in young people acquiring a more cohesive sense of
themselves as a distinct social group, one whose opinions and interests deserved attention
and respect. All of these contributed to the formation of a recognizable generational
consciousness of an age cohort that I suggest is best termed a “post-Stalin generation,”
the people who grew up in the whirlwind of changes during the 1950s following the
dictator’s death.701 In contrast to Stalin’s last generation, the post-Stalin one was what
Jane Edmunds and Brian Turner called “active.” Its members had much more room to
unite with each other and engage in grassroots community leadership to pursue their
goals, uplifted by the validation provided by top-level advocacy of initiative from below
and participation in governance.702 Youth initiative clubs served as important spaces for
the formation of the post-Stalin generation’s sense of unity with other members of their
age cohort. Their resultant generational consciousness, in combination with the civic
spirit promoted in the clubs, resulted in public activism that sought to achieve the goals
and desires of young people, although one quite limited in scope and oriented primarily at
cultural activities as opposed to overtly political ones.
701 I do not use the term “Thaw generation,” as the Thaw covered a long period, with more than one
generation. For more on the term “Thaw generation,” see Alekseeva and Goldberg, The Thaw Generation.
702 See Jane Edmunds and Bryan S. Turner, “Introduction,” in Jane Edmunds and Bryan S. Turner eds.,
Generational Consciousness, Narrative, and Politics (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002),
1-12, and Edmunds and Turner, Generations, Culture and Society (Philadelphia: Open University Press,
2002), 16-23.
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Notably, top-level advocacy of youth initiative and interests occasionally served
to challenge the goals of the Thaw-era leadership in its shift away from despotic power.
In some cases, youth went too far, from the authorities’ perspective, in expressing their
agency, whether through their critical comments, unruly activities, provocative conduct,
or adoption of too many elements of western culture. The Party-state also faced a broader
problem. The stress its discourse placed on youth desires and grassroots activism
legitimated having young people pay more conscious attention to their personal needs
and wants, and validated them by deploying their initiative to achieve these desires,
without ensuring that this matched the Party-state’s own aims. The leadership, then, had
to find some way to achieve a socialist version of modernity characterized by limited but
growing consumption and social engagement with communist construction via official
collectives, without permitting an “excessive” orientation at individualist consumption,
particularly as relating to western cultural forms.
Chapter 6
The Hard-Line Shift and the Aesthetic Upbringing Campaign, 1956-1958
Starting in late 1956 and early 1957, the Soviet leadership temporarily shifted to a
more hard-line approach to managing the country, narrowing the boundaries of
acceptable self-expression. This method of governance, dominant until mid-1958,
represented the Kremlin’s reaction to the wide turmoil spurred by Khrushchev’s Secret
Speech in the USSR and in the allied socialist states. In addition, the opening of the
Soviet Bloc to western Europe and the United States during the early Thaw brought what
top officials perceived as an excess of western influence. This chapter examines the
impact of the Kremlin’s hard-line turn on organized cultural activities for youth, as
embodied by a campaign launched in 1957 that focused on a particular form of cultural
enlightenment–aesthetic upbringing (esteticheskoe vospitanie). An attempt to mold young
people’s conception of what is tasteful and beautiful in cultural expression, aesthetic
upbringing contrasted to the emphasis in the early Thaw on organized activities that
appealed to extant cultural consumption desires and permitted youth to enact their own
cultural preferences via grassroots activism within certain limits defined by the Party-
state.
Aesthetic upbringing constituted part of a broader top-level push to inculcate
officially-prescribed norms among Soviet youth during the late 1950s. I term this the
drive for a “Thaw-era culturedness,” which had some similarities to the government’s
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endeavors to instill culturedness in the population during the 1930s. In that period,
culturedness for the masses encompassed a series of behavioral norms that included
cleanliness, sobriety, and diligent work. The elites and those seeking upward mobility
had a higher standard to meet in order to be considered cultured, such as appropriate
manners and dress. Besides this, they had to possess normative aesthetic tastes and some
cultural knowledge.703 The Thaw-era campaign for aesthetic upbringing likewise called
for appropriate cultural tastes and knowledge. In the late 1950s, however, the Soviet
leaders wanted all youth, not just elites, to adopt normative aesthetic tastes and cultural
desires. Furthermore, the Kremlin’s motivation stemmed not only from the drive to
construct communism, but also the need to fight the Cold War on the cultural front.
An investigation of the drive for aesthetic upbringing also offers further insights
on the post-Stalin Kremlin’s efforts to build a socialist version of a modern consumer
society. The early Thaw efforts to solicit initiative from below brought out one important
aspect of what differentiated an alternative, socialist modernity from the western one. In
this chapter, another major difference comes to the fore, namely the attempt to shape
popular cultural tastes and desires as a means of governing a socialist consumer society.
Recent works on post-Stalin policies explore how the state sought to supervise material
consumption as a form of managing the citizenry, in other words a modern population
politics. Most prominently, Susan Reid has argued that Party-state consumption policies
aimed to ensure stability and legitimacy for the Soviet leadership, while also fighting the
703 On Stalin-era culturedness, see David L. Hoffman, Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet
Modernity, 1917-41 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2003), 15-87; Vadim Volkov, “The Concept of
Kul’turnost’: Notes on the Stalinist Civilizing Process,” in Sheila Fitzpatrick ed., Stalinism: New Directions
(New York: Routledge, 2000), 210-30; and Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in
Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 75-88.
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Cold War on the domestic front through competing over consumption with western
states.704
Building on the insights of Reid and other scholars, who largely draw on material
consumption, this chapter focuses on the management of cultural consumption wants
through organized cultural leisure activities. My work confirms the significance of the
Kremlin’s desire for political stability and legitimacy, as the leadership intended the drive
for aesthetic upbringing to help convince the population that the Party-state successfully
satisfied consumption needs. Cold War concerns played an even more central role in
cultural than in material consumption, since the aesthetic upbringing initiative directly
targeted western popular culture, especially jazz. Furthermore, a study of cultural
consumption is particularly well suited for spotlighting another crucial motivating factor
for the Khrushchev leadership’s policies in consumption management: the ideological
aspect. The Thaw-era Kremlin hoped that the USSR’s population could be guided to
consume their way into communism by adopting the subject position of model
communist consumers who derive pleasure and meaning from consuming Party-
prescribed cultural activities during their free time. Ideally, such young New Soviet
Individuals would then use the leeway provided for activism from below during the early
Thaw to organize normative cultural forms at the grassroots level.
704 Susan E. Reid, "Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and the De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the
Soviet Union," Slavic Review 61.2 (Summer 2002): 211-52; David Crowley and Susan E. Reid,
“Introduction: Pleasures in Socialism,” in David Crowley and Susan E. Reid eds., Pleasures in Socialism:
Leisure and Luxury in the Eastern Bloc (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010), 3-52; David
Crowley, “Warsaw’s Shops, Stalinism and the Thaw,” in Susan E. Reid and David Crowley, eds., Style and
Socialism: Modernity and Material Culture in Post-War Eastern Europe (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 25-48;
György Péteri, “The Occident Within – or the Drive for Exceptionalism and Modernity,” Kritika 9.4 (Fall
2008): 929-37; and L. V. Zakharova, “‘Naibolee raspostranennoi iavliaetsia forma priamogo pal’to s
odnoborotnoi zastezhkoi’: O sovetskoi mode epokhi ‘ottepeli,’” Neprikosnovennyi Zapas: Debaty o
Politike i Kul’ture 45.1 (2006), http://magazines.russ.ru/nz/ [Accessed December 31, 2009].
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Although the Khrushchev leadership narrowed the range of permissible cultural
events and grassroots activism, it mainly focused on providing “appropriate” cultural
options through the aesthetic upbringing drive. It poured resources into increasing the
amount of orthodox organized cultural activities and establishing “universities of culture”
(universitety kul’tury), didactic cultural institutions, across the USSR. Through these
initiatives, the Kremlin tried to convince youth to adopt its prescribed cultural cannon,
composed of Soviet cultural products, the Russian and foreign classical cannon, folk arts
of the peoples of the USSR and allied socialist states, and Marxist-Leninist aesthetics. It
promoted this cannon as superior to, more refined, and more cultured than western
popular culture, which official discourse derided as vulgar and unseemly. All this formed
part of a broader effort by the Kremlin in late 1956 and 1957 to forge a young generation
whose desires, tastes, and values proved conducive to fully engaging with communist
construction and living in a communist society. The Soviet leadership, however, met with
many challenges in trying to achieve its goals.
The Hard-Line Turn in Late 1956 and 1957
In his Secret Speech at the 1956 Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev
condemned Stalin’s crimes, provoking controversy in the Soviet Union. The Kremlin
condoned some limited discussion and debate of Stalin’s “cult of personality,” but
insisted that any conversations come to “appropriate” conclusions. This meant placing the
blame for the “excesses” of the Great Purges squarely on the shoulders of Stalin himself,
as well as some political police cadres, and absolving the Communist Party and the
Soviet system of any guilt. Nonetheless, some college students, members of the
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intelligentsia, and other citizens went beyond the boundaries of the permissible, publicly
suggesting that the Great Purges resulted from systemic failures and calling for
fundamental reforms in the USSR. Moreover, some especially ideologically militant
officials and citizens openly rejected the Khrushchev leadership’s criticism of Stalin.
Furthermore, in the Soviet republic of Georgia, Stalin’s birthplace, nationalistic
Georgians perceived censure of Stalin as an attack on Georgians as a whole. They
participated in mass protests in defense of Stalin, which the Soviet authorities put down
by force.705
The top-level criticisms of Stalin and revelations of his misdeeds spurred more
extreme reactions in the allied socialist states, especially Poland and Hungary. Poland, in
comparison to other Soviet Bloc states, allowed an unusually open discussion of the
Secret Speech in the spring and summer of 1956, as part of a contest between hard-line
and soft-line factions within the hierarchy. Popular disturbances took place in the summer
and fall of 1956, provoked by economic and political demands. In October 1956, the
Polish Party-state found a way out of this tense situation by, without consulting the
Kremlin, placing the previously-imprisoned moderate Wladyslaw Gomułka in charge.
Despite Moscow’s initial wariness, Gomułka proved capable of calming the situation in
Poland. Hungary also experienced wide-ranging public debates and mass protests.
705 Polly Jones, “From the Secret Speech to the Burial of Stalin: Real and ideal Responses to De-
Stalinization,” in Polly Jones ed., The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social
Change in the Khrushchev Era (New York: Routledge, 2006), 41-63; Cynthia Hooper, “What Can and
Cannot Be Said: Between the Stalinist Past and New Soviet Future,” The Slavonic and East European
Review 86.2 (April 2008): 306-27; and V. A. Kozlov, Mass Uprisings in the USSR: Protest and Rebellion
in the Post-Stalin Years, trans. Elaine M. MacKinnon (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2002). Specifically on
students going beyond the permissible in criticizing the Soviet system, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 821,
ll. 96-99, and A. N. Shelepin, Otchetnyi doklad Tsentral’nogo Komiteta Vsesoiuznogo leninskogo
kommunisticheskogo soiuza molodezhi XIII s’’ezdu komsomola (15 aprelia 1958 g.) (Moscow: Molodaia
gvardiia, 1958), 33.
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Hungary, following the Polish example, rehabilitated the moderate Imre Nagy and
appointed him prime minister. He, however, took a different path than Gomułka. After
mass street protests, Nagy announced his intention to leave the Warsaw Pact, declaring
Hungarian neutrality. Moscow decided to intervene militarily and crushed the Hungarian
Revolution.706
 This confluence of events spurred a more hard-line approach by the Soviet
leaders at home. Such unexpected domestic and foreign reactions to the Secret Speech
gave powerful ammunition to the militants who opposed de-Stalinizing reforms in the
first place. They also helped convince the many centrists who had mixed feelings about
changing the status quo that de-Stalinization went too far and too fast. Furthermore, they
gave pause to those officials inclined toward a more pluralistic approach, including
Khrushchev himself, who naively presumed that the population would act
“appropriately” when given the autonomy to do so and more accurate information on
which to base decisions. As a result, by late 1956 and early 1957 the Kremlin began to
pull back from the greater openness of the early Thaw and instituted tougher top-down
controls. For example, in literature, V. D. Dudintsev’s novel Not by Bread Alone,
published in the soft-line Novyi Mir journal in early 1956, at first received praise in the
press for denouncing corruption. By the end of 1956, official discourse began to censure
Dudintsev for an excessively negative depiction of Soviet reality. B. L. Pasternak came
under severe criticism for publishing his Doctor Zhivago abroad.707 This dynamic also
706 William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 270-324, and
Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Insider Story of an American
Adversary (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), 114-32.
707 Denis Kozlov, “‘I Have Not Read, but I Will Say’: Soviet Literary Audiences and Changing Ideas of
Social Membership, 1958-66,” Kritika 7.3 (Summer 2006): 557-97; Deming Brown, Soviet Russian
Literature since Stalin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 253-309; and Stephen Lovell, The
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applied to the state’s position on western popular culture, as fears of excessive western
influence led to a tightening of the restrictions that Soviet authorities relaxed from late
1953 to early 1956.
The opening of the USSR to foreign visitors also raised concerns among the
hierarchy already before late 1956. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs recorded one
problematic instance, when a member of a 1955 visiting delegation of students from
England returned home and published an article in the English newspaper Observer about
Soviet youth. Entitled “Speculators and Hooligans,” this story related how a small
minority of Soviet youth tried to emulate western ways in a “vulgar and loud” manner
and attempted to purchase western products from foreign visitors. The ministry suggested
that youth organizations deal with the problems described in this article in order to
prevent the publications of such articles in the future, especially due to the upcoming
1957 Sixth International Youth Festival in Moscow.708 Foreign visitors, thus, brought
western cultural products into the USSR and returned home with their impressions of the
country, with the Party seeking to manage both of these.
From late 1956, the Komsomol hierarchy began to pay substantially more
attention to managing western influence. This comes through clearly in a fall 1956
internal document of the Komsomol Propaganda Department. The department censured
Komsomol’skaia pravda for its “very weak” reporting on “the imperialist essence of
modern capitalism.” The authors disparaged the lack of articles targeting
“cosmopolitanism,” meaning foreign influence, and pointed out the rising need to combat
Russian Reading Revolution: Print Culture in the Soviet and Post-Soviet Eras (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 2000), 45-71.
708 RGANI, f. 5, op. 30, d. 179, l. 87.
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it since the USSR’s ties with “foreign bourgeois countries continue to grow.”709 Several
months later, the Party Propaganda Department filed a report that also criticized youth
papers for failing to conduct a “frontal assault against bourgeois ideology.” Additionally,
it denounced the papers for providing youth with “light, entertaining reading” instead of
articles that mobilized young people to help achieve economic and political goals, as
journalists wrongly considered stories on plan fulfillment and love for the Motherland
“boring and uninteresting.”710 Thereby, the report condemned pieces that corresponded to
popular interests and desires, in contrast to the orientation toward the satisfaction of the
population’s wants during the early Thaw. These two reports illuminate conflicts between
higher-up ideologically militant officials and the more pluralistic approach of some
lower-level newspaper editors. Besides a personal ideological preference for a pluralistic
editorial style, editors may also have been motivated by the desire to sell more papers, an
increasingly important concern in those years.711 Still, the filing of these reports
illustrates the growing dominance of the hard-line approach by late 1956.
By the end of 1956 and early 1957, such sentiments began to be expressed in the
Komsomol’s public rhetoric as well. After the criticism from the Komsomol Propaganda
Department, Komsomol’skaia pravda regularly published articles denouncing western
propaganda. In one January 1957 piece, it condemned Allen Dulles, the head of the
Central Intelligence Agency, and the CIA–sponsored radio station “Radio Free Europe,”
for lying about mass disorders among Soviet youth and conflicts among the Komsomol
709 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 821, ll. 47-50.
710 RGANI, f. 5, op. 34, d. 17, ll. 41-43.
711 Thomas C. Wolfe, Governing Soviet Journalism: The Press and the Socialist Person after Stalin
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 33-70.
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leadership.712 A little over a week later, it mocked the BBC for its efforts to begin radio
broadcasts in Ukrainian.713
The key public event signaling the hard-line shift in youth cultural policy came at
the February 1957 Seventh Plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee. In his keynote
speech, First Secretary of the Komsomol A. N. Shelepin condemned attacks by
“bourgeois” propaganda, commenting that although most Soviet youth do not fall for
“Dulles’ fairy tales,” some do accept such “bourgeois lies.” Komsomol cells, according
to Shelepin, “need to struggle against blind kowtowing to everything western.” He
decried the fact that “a part of our youth is excessively interested in western dances and
light jazz music, and buys records underground.” In Shelepin’s view, the preparation for
the 1957 Moscow youth festival led to the creation of too many jazz ensembles, “often
with a poor, light-minded program.”714 Therefore, he sent the signal that a limited degree
of jazz and western dancing may be appropriate, but that the explosive growth in such
western popular culture since 1953 went too far for the leadership’s liking.
This message reflected not only the escalating hard-line turn by the Kremlin, but
also behind-the-scenes battles between the Komsomol and other Party-state
bureaucracies. In an early 1957 letter to the Party TsK’s Cultural Department, Shelepin
complained about a speech made by First Secretary of the Soviet Composers’ Union T.
N. Khrennikov. Apparently, Khrennikov accused Komsomol TsK representatives of
putting unwarranted effort into promoting jazz collectives in preparation for the 1957
712 “Eshche odna ‘utka’ ‘Svobodnoi Evropy,’” Komsomol’skaia pravda, January 9, 1957.
713 “Senk iu, babka Bibisishka,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, January 18, 1957.
714 A. N. Shelepin, Ob uluchshenii ideino-vospitatel’noi raboty komsomol’skikh organizatsii sredi
molodezhi (Doklad na VII plenum TsK VLKSM 1957 g.) (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1957), 7-9, 45-48.
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festival. According to Shelepin, this phrase was inserted into Khrennikov’s speech by B.
M. Iaroslavskii, a high-ranking cultural official. Shelepin insisted that this
characterization of the Komsomol TsK’s actions did not match reality. He listed cases
where the Komsomol TsK censured “inappropriate” music, and highlighted the fact that
the TsK specifically condemned excessive preoccupation with creating jazz ensembles
for the upcoming festival. In response, Iaroslavskii claimed that, over the last year, the
most widespread form of youth concert activity was an “Americanized form of western
jazz,” a revealing comment on the popularity of this music among youth. According to
Iaroslavskii, the Komsomol TsK assisted this development through its cultural policies
and financial support. Furthermore, the TsK encouraged jazz groups comprising only
brass and percussion instruments, therefore guaranteeing a particularly “cacophonic
sound.” They often performed songs in English and Spanish, or jazz versions of Soviet
folk songs. All of this “negatively impacted the development of young people’s artistic
tastes.” Iaroslavskii acknowledged that the Komsomol TsK censured the spread of such
jazz ensembles at its February 1957 Seventh Plenum, but insisted that previously some
cadres in the Komsomol TsK’s apparatus had actively encouraged the organization of
jazz ensembles for the upcoming festival.715 This heated exchange demonstrates the
relatively soft-line position occupied by the Komsomol TsK before late 1956 and its
efforts to protect its authority from attacks by other Soviet institutions after this shift.
Such evidence also underscores the tensions inspired by the international youth
festival, which the Komsomol organized and managed. On the one hand, the Komsomol
TsK wanted foreign visitors to perceive the Soviet Union as a progressive and appealing
715 RGANI, f. 5, op. 36, d. 46, ll. 51-56.
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alternative to the western version of a consumer society. This required presenting a
degree of jazz and western dancing. On the other hand, especially due to the growing
wariness over western influence, the Komsomol did not want youth to partake in an
“excessive” amount of western popular culture. Such competing priorities resulted in
broad and vague definitions of what constituted an “appropriate” amount of jazz and
western dancing, and what went beyond the limits. Consequently, while the Komsomol
TsK and other central institutions narrowed the boundaries of permissible cultural
practices for model New Soviet People, local officials and ordinary youth had
considerable leeway in getting ready for the youth festival.
Owing to this, many jazz collectives appeared in preparation for this event. As the
exchange between Iaroslavskii and Shelepin indicates, the Komsomol TsK’s policies and
representatives assisted their formation. The Komsomol TsK’s January 1956 decree on
the amateur music competitions for the upcoming youth festival included a contest for
jazz and light music ensembles, which contributed to the widespread formation of such
groups. Komsomol TsK representatives took action to build up the number of jazz
collectives as well. A case in point, an official working for the Komsomol TsK
recommended that the Moscow Conservatory establish a jazz ensemble.716
Other central agencies also helped promote jazz in the months preceding the
festival. In August 1956 the Council of Ministers of the USSR decreed the need to have
amateur competitions of jazz and light music for the festival.717 Responding to such
716 RGANI, f. 5, op. 36, d. 46, ll. 54-56.
717 TsAGM, f. 429, op. 1, d. 517, ll. 24-25.
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signals, clubs established jazz-style variety ensembles in droves.718 Indeed, the hard-
liners in the Moscow House of Folk Creativity complained that out of thirty-six variety
ensembles that took part in a competition in preparation for the youth festival, thirty-three
played “in the spirit and style of a western jazz ensemble.”719 Since the ideological
militants at the Moscow DNT controlled the jury for that particular contest, they
permitted only those three groups that did not perform explicitly western music to
advance further.720 Pluralistically-oriented festival juries, however, had a more open
attitude toward groups whose repertoire included American-style jazz, as described for
Iurii Saul’skii’s ensemble in chapter four. In another example, L. A. Figlin, a Saratov jazz
musician, recalled playing music with jazz elements in a competition for the festival.
Although his ensemble did not advance further, Figlin emphasized that his jazz-style
group receiving permission to participate in the competition was itself indicative of the
greater room for jazz.721 Consequently, despite the growing censure of western popular
culture in top-level policy rhetoric by early 1957, the wave of jazz-style amateur groups
that sprang up due to the liberalization of state-sponsored popular culture after Stalin’s
death continued to grow. This opens the curtain on the challenges experienced by the
Kremlin in reversing its course and enacting a new cultural policy that went against
extant youth cultural consumption desires.
718 For instance in the Gor’kii House of Culture. See TsAGM, f. 44, op. 1, d. 55, l. 43.
719 TsAGM, f. 2987, op. 1, d. 58, l. 23.
720 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 873, ll. 105-26.
721 L. A. Figlin, born 1938, interviewed May 25, 2009.
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Furthermore, the festival itself prominently featured jazz music.722 Saul’skii’s
collective impressed both Soviet citizens and visitors from abroad and came in second
overall, winning a silver medal. Its participants, including G. A. Garanian, received
invitations from abroad to perform. Other Soviet ensembles with western musical
elements also lit up the scene while inspiring hard-line opposition.723 For instance, in a
jury debate about light music performances at the festival, a militant member lambasted
the Uralmash factory collective as “the most vulgar expression of western popular music”
and stated that, if he had his way, the group would not have been allowed to perform in
the first place. But other jury members, including a representative from the Komsomol
TsK, commended the Uralmash ensemble for its superb performance and proposed
awarding it the second-place prize in its category. The hard-liner on the jury complained
that doing so might encourage youth to turn toward unworthy music. Nonetheless, with
the endorsement of soft-line members of the jury, the Uralmash collective received its
prize.724
Jazz enthusiasts came from all over the USSR to participate in or just take in the
atmosphere of the festival and began to form jazz networks. Concomitantly, foreign jazz
bands from allied socialist states and capitalist countries powerfully impacted the Soviet
jazz scene, with a Czechoslovak group just beating out Saul’skii’s ensemble to win the
722 For more on the festival, see Pia Koivunen, “Overcoming Cold War Boundaries at the World Youth
Festivals,” in Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Katalyn Miklossy eds., Reassessing Cold War Europe (New York:
Routledge, forthcoming in 2011), and Kristin Roth-Ey, “‘Loose Girls’ on the Loose: Sex, Propaganda and
the 1957 Youth Festival” in Melanie Ilič, Susan E. Reid and Lynne Attwood eds., Women in the
Khrushchev Era (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 75-96.
723 G. A. Garanian, born 1934, interviewed February 4, 2009, and S. Frederick Starr, Red and Hot: The
Fate of Jazz in the Soviet Union, 1917-1980 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 248-51.
724 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 874, ll. 44-51.
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festival’s gold medal in this genre. These foreign jazz groups played the newest forms of
jazz, such as bop and cool jazz, thereby enabling Soviet jazz musicians to make contacts
with foreigners that paved the way for later exchanges.725 Such cultural influence from
eastern Europe shows that western Europe and the US did not represent the only external
“Other” for the USSR.
Nonetheless, the immediate post-festival future looked gloomy for jazz. For one,
the Komsomol TsK no longer needed to support jazz in order to demonstrate a modern
face to the outside world. Likewise, the impact of foreign jazz ensembles, as part of a
broader inflow of western cultural influence during the festival, inspired a backlash that
turned Soviet authorities even more toward a hard-line position. For instance, L. K.
Baliasnaia, the former Komsomol TsK secretary, recalled that Komsomol officials at the
time perceived the opening to the outside world as bringing a number of negative
phenomena, “which needed to be opposed.”726 Furthermore, the next major celebration
held only several months later, on the fortieth anniversary of the 1917 October
Revolution, proved conducive to more conservative musical styles, with pieces oriented
toward political propaganda and military marches.
As a result of all this, jazz experienced a renewed attack during late 1957. A case
in point, soon after the festival ended, the journal Sovetskaia kul’tura denounced Iurii
Saul’skii’s ensemble as “musical stiliagi” who played vulgar jazz music. Despite winning
the festival’s silver medal, Saul’skii’s group was soon disbanded. Garanian had to join
725 G. A. Garanian, born 1934, interviewed February 4, 2009; V. E. Kleinot, born 1941, interviewed
February 14, 2009; A. S. Kozlov, “Kozel na sakse”: I tak vsiu zhizn’ (Moscow: Vagrius, 1998), 100-16;
and Starr, Red and Hot, 248-51.
726 L. K. Baliasnaia, born 1927, interviewed April 5, 2009.
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Oleg Lundstrom’s variety band, which Garanian complained played only one or two jazz
pieces out of every twenty-five numbers it performed.727 A Komsomol Propaganda
Department report on the outcomes of the festival decried that “some variety collectives
exhibit insufficient care in selecting their repertoire and copy western styles.”728 This
report, mailed to all oblast-level Komsomol organizations, sent a clear message on the
need to curb jazz. At the November 1957 conference of the Komsomol organization of
Kirov neighborhood in Saratov, the keynote speaker censured the fact that many amateur
music circles “are not under the control of the Komsomol,” and consequently “perform
pieces lacking in ideological content.” As an example, the speaker cited repertoires that
had numbers by the Soviet jazz musician Eddie Rosner and by the American swing-style
jazz trumpeter Harry James.729 Moscow’s Komsomol also censured jazz bands. For
instance, the Krasnopresnenskii neighborhood Komsomol cell condemned jazz groups
that played “wild music, squeals and shrieks, instead of folk music.”730
Many club managers disbanded their jazz collectives under pressure from
militants. The amateur competitions that preceded the 1957 youth festival played an
important role in enabling the Moscow DNT to identify and target the groups that
performed American-style jazz music.731 The cultural bureaucracy’s increase of the
DNT’s control over amateur circle directors enabled this activism, as the DNT acquired
727 G. A. Garanian, born 1934, interviewed February 4, 2009, and Starr, Red and Hot, 250-51.
728 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 861, l. 83.
729 GANISO, f. 3234, op. 13, d. 96, l. 8.
730 TsAOPIM, f. 667, op. 3, d. 26, l. 58.
731 For example, at the Serafimovich club. See TsAGM, f. 2987, op. 1, d. 58, l. 31.
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the right to confirm all of the directors for Moscow’s amateur collectives in 1958.732 This
exemplified the strengthening of control organs in the sphere of state-sponsored popular
culture as part of the hard-line turn. Ideologically militant lower-level Komsomol
members also pressured clubs. Reviving a practice of the anticosmopolitan period, groups
of hard-line Komsomol youth began to check the repertoires of amateur and professional
music ensembles, denouncing those that played American-style jazz. Later, these
activities became formalized under the name of “music patrols” (muzykal’nyi patrul’),
paralleling the Komsomol groups that patrolled the streets against crime.733
This does not mean that top-level cultural policy swung back to the full rejection
of western popular culture characteristic of late Stalinism. Shelepin wrote a letter to the
Council of Ministers in 1957 asking for an increase in the production of musical
instruments for wind orchestra and variety ensembles. He noted the need to provide more
saxophones, among other instruments, to raise youth participation in amateur circles.734
Such a request of the instrument symbolizing jazz is hardly imaginable in the period of
the anticosmopolitan campaign.
Instead of a ban, 1957 witnessed a limitation on jazz, as the Party-state’s cultural
policy narrowed the space permitted for jazz elements in musical performances within
state-sponsored popular culture. It disbanded some of the more daring ensembles such as
Saul’skii’s, but the existing jazz groups dealt with the hard-line turn by making some
732 TsAGM, f. 2987, op. 1, d. 64, ll. 9-10.
733 Although we do not know when these efforts first began on a local and less formal basis, the institution
of “music patrols” received its first endorsement from the Komsomol leadership in 1960, based on earlier
Kiev activities: RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1011, l. 11; “Muzykal’nyi patrul’,” Komsomol’skaia pravda,
July 1, 1960; and L. Tiutikov and M. Sishigin eds., Sila obshchestvennogo pochina (Moscow: Molodaia
gvardiia, 1962), 29-39.
734 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, l. 137.
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accommodations to the Party-state’s new limitations. They played a mix of jazz and
nonjazz music, and performed jazz in a Sovietized style, not relying only on brass and
percussion instruments that Iaroslavskii condemned, but also including string instruments
and others. The Saratov jazz musician I. P. Zhimskii’s ensemble combined a saxophone,
clarinet, piano, drums, accordion, maracas, and a guitar (Figure 11).
Figure 11.  A photograph of a jazz-style variety ensemble performance at the
Saratov Pedagogical Institute. Courtesy of the private archive of I. P. Zhimskii.
K. A. Marvin related that his quartet combined jazz pieces with what he termed “patriotic
songs.”735 As before, some used deceptive tactics to get around restrictions.736 Still, the
735 K. A. Marvin, born 1934, interviewed May 13, 2009.
736 G. A. Garanian, born 1934, interviewed February 4, 2009; I. P. Zhimskii, born 1936, interviewed May
27, 2009; and A. A. Kuznetsov, born 1941, interviewed February 21, 2009.
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state’s initiatives curbed the previously rapid growth of jazz ensembles and more
controversial American-style repertoires.
Such developments in the official musical scene illustrate the ambiguities in the
post-Stalin leadership’s relationship to western popular culture. The opening to western
influence during the early Thaw narrowed in times when cultural militancy
predominated. In these periods, official rhetoric even deployed tropes that evoked late
Stalinist antiwestern language, such as censure of cosmopolitanism and kowtowing to the
“west,” although the attacks on jazz never approached the stridency or impact of the
anticosmopolitan campaign. Those holding soft and hard-line positions constantly
struggled to enact their divergent visions, with the militant view generally predominant
within the bureaucracy from late 1956 until mid-1958 due to the backlash over the Secret
Speech and Cold War concerns. Nonetheless, worries over the Cold War did not
inevitably lead to hard-line outcomes. In some cases, as in the lead-up to the international
youth festival, Soviet efforts to present an appealing socialist alternative to western
modernity in the eyes of the outside world counterbalanced the Party’s concerns over
excessive western influence. In most cases, though, Cold War tensions prompted a
clampdown on western popular culture in the USSR.
In addition to the attacks against jazz, the Party-state’s hard-line turn in 1957
resulted in some hesitancy regarding youth agency and social activism. In his Seventh
Komsomol TsK Plenum speech, Shelepin praised grassroots initiative by local
Komsomol cells, but also noted the need to maintain unity of purpose in the Komsomol’s
work on socializing youth.737 In their reports on the implementation of this plenum’s
737 Shelepin, Ob uluchshenii, 52.
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resolutions, some oblast Komsomol committees went further. The Kemerovo Komsomol,
for instance, stated that “youth initiative requires a degree of direction and close
management.”738 While many mid-level Komsomol cadres who came to power under
Stalin may have thought so privately, making such claims in official internal documents
constituted a radically hard-line position. Most oblasts that reported on their
implementation of the plenum’s decrees instead underlined their attempts to develop
youth initiative instead of managing it from above.739 However, at least in some
instances, the Komsomol hierarchy placed more controls on youth initiative-based
cultural institutions. A case in point, a number of youth initiative clubs opened up in
Minsk during 1956 and early 1957. Yet, after the hard-line shift, the city Komsomol
committee created an umbrella “Central Komsomol Club” to unify such activities, which
resulted in closer oversight from above.740
Launching the Campaign for Aesthetic Upbringing
The tactics outlined above represent despotic power methods associated with the
late 1956 and early 1957 hard-line turn in the cultural sphere. However, the Soviet
authorities placed much more stress and invested many more resources into strategies that
aimed to convince youth to adopt normative aesthetic tastes. During the first decade after
World War II, the Komsomol leaders, while talking extensively about raising cultural
levels through conveying cultural knowledge to youth, did not acknowledge the
738 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 838, l. 131.
739 For one instance, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, l. 144.
740 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, ll. 159-63.
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possibility of any inherent problems with young people’s cultural tastes. Consequently,
top-level policy discussions paid little attention to the question of managing youth
aesthetic tastes. Within the Komsomol Propaganda Department, documents rarely
mentioned youth cultural tastes before 1956.741 An examination of the Komsomol TsK
Bureau’s archive from 1944 onward shows that the first mention of youth tastes as an
issue of concern appeared in 1957.742 Instruction booklets for cultural officials started to
focus on young people’s tastes only after the launch of the campaign for aesthetic
upbringing in 1957.743
The earlier lack of concern with youth aesthetic tastes is not surprising. The late
Stalinist leaders’ concerns centered on conveying political and ideological propaganda
through organized cultural activities and they cared little for the actual cultural
preferences of young people. In turn, many of the post-Stalin top officials naively
presumed that, once offered the chance to express and satisfy their own desires after the
oppressive atmosphere of late Stalinism, Soviet youth would naturally exhibit tastes in
concordance with the leadership’s view of model communist citizens. Thusly, the
Komsomol hierarchy in the early Thaw encouraged young people to take responsibility
for the development of their own cultural standards within the limits permitted by the
Soviet system. The Khrushchev administration even allowed room for a degree of
western popular culture. The unexpectedly explosive growth of jazz and western dancing
from 1953 to 1957, combined with the backlash from the Secret Speech and the context
741 For example, RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 710, l. 7.
742 In RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 930, l. 12.
743 For a case in point, see G. G. Karpov and N. D. Sintsov, Klubnoe delo: Uchebnoe posobie (Moscow:
Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1959), 90-112. An exception that mentioned cultural tastes before 1957 is T. Kutasova,
Samodeiatel’nyi tantseval’nyi kollektiv (Moscow: Profizdat, 1954), 20-26, 53.
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of the ongoing Cold War, convinced the Khrushchev Kremlin by late 1956 that it had
made a mistake. Retreating from its previous emphasis on satisfying young people’s
interests and trusting grassroots spontaneity, the leadership underlined the need to mold
the tastes of the young generation, turning toward the model of an ideologically
conscious vanguard leading the population.
Although reports and local Komsomol conferences began to discuss aesthetic
tastes in 1956, the February 1957 Seventh Plenum of the Komsomol TsK marked the
Komsomol leadership’s public launch of the aesthetic upbringing campaign.744 At the
plenum, Shelepin underlined the need for increasing the “cultural level” of youth as part
of the progress toward communism. He specified that the term “cultural level” included
“one’s outward appearance, one’s behavior at home, in public, and at work, and how one
follows the rules of socialist society and communist morals,” acknowledging that the
Komsomol had paid little attention to such issues previously.745 These standards closely
paralleled the culturedness guidelines for elites under Stalin, now expanded to the youth
masses as a whole in a Thaw-era version of culturedness, similarly to the extension of the
consumerist social contract to the young during the early Thaw.
Shelepin highlighted that an important component of this policy involved the
Komsomol and other Soviet institutions “decisively improving the aesthetic upbringing
of young people” by developing their “aesthetic taste.” In Shelepin’s words, this would
not only contribute to achieving communism, but also respond to the “propagandists of
western culture who constantly strive to impose foreign views and tastes among Soviet
744 For one such internal bureaucratic report from late 1956, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 821, ll. 55-56.
For a 1956 Komsomol conference, see TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 484, l. 33.
745 Shelepin, Ob uluchshenii, 43.
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youth,” resulting in many “emulating the bad tastes of the bourgeois West.” Komsomol
cells, according to him, needed to strengthen their struggle with western tastes by helping
young people to “figure out what is truly artistic and beautiful.”746 Interviews with former
Komsomol administrators likewise demonstrate the weight of the 1957 Komsomol TsK
Seventh Plenum’s messages.747 Khrushchev’s speeches in May 1957 at meetings with
members of the cultural intelligentsia reinforced the plenum’s message.748
Shelepin’s speech accentuates the Komsomol’s attempt to instill a Thaw-era
version of culturedness from 1957 onward. This policy built on and further advanced the
Party’s early Thaw efforts to transform everyday life as a means of reaching
communism.749 The 1957 aesthetic upbringing initiative correspondingly sought to build
the communist tomorrow, but also focused on fighting the Cold War on the domestic
front as a central goal. Cold War concerns played a particularly important role in the
attempt to shape youth aesthetic preferences, as illustrated by Shelepin’s admission that
“many” young Soviet citizens exhibited western tastes. Consequently, the drive for
aesthetic upbringing combined one of the traditional goals of state-sponsored popular
culture, cultural enlightenment for the population, with the new task of winning the
cultural competition between the superpowers.
746 Ibid., 48-49.
747 Baliasnaia underscored the powerful impact of Shelepin’s speech in organizing youth cultural activities.
See L. K. Baliasnaia, born 1927, interviewed April 5, 2009.
748 For how Khrushchev’s speeches impacted Komsomol policy see, for example, a Komsomol conference
that referred to Khrushchev’s message: GANISO, f. 4529, op. 12, d. 24, l. 203. For the complex
relationship between the Khrushchev leadership and cultural intelligentsia, see M. R. Zezina, Sovetskaia
khudozhestvennaia intelligentsiia i vlast’ v 1950-e – 60-e gody (Moscow: Dialog-MGU, 1999).
749 Deborah A. Field, Private Life and Communist Morality in Khrushchev’s Russia (New York: Peter
Lang Publishing, 2007); Polly Jones, “The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization,” in Jones ed., The Dilemmas of
De-Stalinization, 1-18; and Melanie Ilic, “Introduction,” in Melanie Ilic and Jeremy Smith eds., Soviet State
and Society under Nikita Khrushchev (New York: Routledge, 2009), 1-8.
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The plenum resolutions provide further insights on the anxieties expressed by top
officials over the post-Stalin generation. According to them, this generation grew up in a
time when socialism triumphed and young people won many rights and privileges. The
“current generation did not pass through the harsh school of revolutionary battle” as had
the older generation. Consequently, some among this young generation did not value the
price paid “in blood and sweat” for its current situation, accepting their benefits and
lifestyle as a given: “demanding much from the state and giving it little in return.” The
resolutions criticized Komsomol organizations for failing to pay sufficient attention to
this problem, as well as to the allegedly intense western propaganda against the Soviet
Union. This document also underscored the need for “moral and aesthetic upbringing” of
young people.750
These resolutions make clear the Party’s own perception of and willingness to talk
about generational tensions within the USSR. My finding challenges Juliane Fürst’s
argument that the Soviet leadership avoided dealing with generational conflict as the
USSR matured in the postwar decades, with official discourse proclaiming the unity of all
generations.751 As shown by the plenum resolutions published in youth papers and
discussed at Komsomol meetings, problems relating to generations certainly figured
within the Party-state’s public rhetoric during the Thaw.752 The 1958 Thirteenth
750 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 930, ll. 4-6.
751 Juliane Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism, 1945-56
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 16, 232-33.
752 Embodying their public nature, the plenum resolutions were printed in youth newspapers, for instance in
Saratov: “Ob uluchshenii ideino-vospitatel’noi raboty komsomol’skikh organizatsii sredi komsomol’tsev i
molodezhi,” Zaria molodezhi, March 1, 1957. They were also discussed in local Komsomol meetings. For
an example in Moscow, see TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 546, ll. 6-62. For one in Saratov, see GANISO, f.
4529, op. 14, d. 2, l. 19.
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Komsomol Congress also spotlighted generational tensions in Soviet society, using
language similar to the Seventh Komsomol TsK Plenum, as did discussions of this
congress at local Komsomol conferences.753 Through an unprecedented move, namely
openly acknowledging the existence of a generation gap, the Komsomol TsK stressed its
determination to solve this problem.
Implementing the Aesthetic Upbringing Campaign, Part 1: The March for Culture
The 1957 Seventh Plenum of the Komsomol TsK made suggestions regarding
how to deal with the troubling issues it identified. For example, in educating youth about
beauty and taste in cultural activities, Shelepin proposed assisting young people in
“appropriately evaluating literature, art, sculpture, and music.” To do so, local Komsomol
organizations would organize youth meetings with cultural professionals, lectures on
cultural topics, and collective visits of varied cultural venues. Higher-level Komsomol
bodies would create commissions on such issues.754 Soon, the Komsomol TsK passed a
decree establishing working groups that brought together Komsomol and cultural
officials, writers, artists, professors and others to assist in using cultural activities for the
aesthetic upbringing of young people.755 Other central agencies joined this effort. In
November 1957, the Soviet Ministry of Culture ordered all cultural institutions to make
the aesthetic upbringing of youth and children an obligatory part of their plan.756
753 For the congress, see Shelepin, Otchetnyi doklad, 32. For local Komsomol conferences, see GANISO, f.
4529, op. 14, d. 2, l. 19.
754 Shelepin, Ob uluchshenii, 48-49.
755 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 967, ll. 13-15.
756 This quote came from an order by the minister, reprinted in M. A. Solov’ev, Materialy po kul’turno-
prosvetitel’noi rabote (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1959), 78-82.
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The Komsomol hierarchy quickly took up the promulgation of aesthetic
upbringing. If previous annual conferences of the Saratov city Komsomol did not speak
about young people’s tastes, the 1957 one stressed the need to work on youth aesthetic
upbringing.757 Saratov’s Third State Ball-Bearing Factory held a Komsomol conference
that condemned western tastes and directed the Komsomol committee to fight against
them through aesthetic upbringing: “instilling in young people the essence of what is
beautiful and appropriate tastes.”758 The 1958 Komsomol conference of Saratov State
University called for “aesthetically educated” (esteticheski gramotnye) young people.759
At a meeting of Moscow city Komsomol cadres, Shelepin himself gave a speech that
essentially repeated the points he made at the 1957 Komsomol TsK Seventh Plenum.760
The “Petrograd Side” youth initiative club “placed a great deal of significance on the
aesthetic upbringing of young people.”761 The 1957 conference of the Moscow
Krasnopresnenskii neighborhood Komsomol noted the problem of young people “lacking
good musical tastes and expressing too much interest in jazz.”762 Such western tastes
likewise received censure at the university-wide Komsomol conference of Moscow State
757 GANISO, f. 4529, op. 12, d. 24, l. 203.
758 GANISO, f. 654, op. 1, d. 24, l. 65.
759 GANISO, f. 652, op. 1, d. 31, l. 24.
760 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 546, ll. 6-62.
761 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, l. 217.
762 TsAOPIM, f. 667, op. 3, d. 26, l. 85.
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University.763 Komsomol newspapers at all levels published articles with analogous
messages.764
To implement this top-level policy shift, the Komsomol hierarchy launched what
official discourse termed the “Komsomol march for further elevating the cultural level of
young people.”765 Oblast-level Komsomol organizations then reported to the TsK on how
they intended to enact the new “march for culture” campaign. The Bashkiriia Komsomol
committee provided the most detailed plan came from, which revals much about the way
that top-level Komsomol decrees were supposed to be implemented in the regions, at
least ideally. After receiving the TsK’s directive in 1957, the Bashkiriia Komsomol
committee drew up a plan on what each level of this region’s hierarchy had to accomplish
in order to achieve the new drive’s goals, down to the individual Komsomol member.
The Bashkiriia Komsomol indicated that, over the next two years, each Komsomol youth
would participate in an amateur art circle, interest-based association, or sport section, and
get at least one other youth involved as well. All Komsomol members would “learn how
to dance,” implying dancing in a normative manner. They would watch movies about
once a week, visit the theater once or twice a month, go to the museum once a year, and
read actively. Another directive would have each member volunteer four times a month
for construction work of relevance to the march for culture, such as building clubs.
Furthermore, those who received a higher education would have training in directing an
763 TsAOPIM, f. 6083, op. 1, d. 5, l. 142.
764 For examples from a local newspaper, see “Zametiki ob esteticheskom vospitanii,” Leninskii put’, April
13, 1957, and “Lektsiia-kontsert,” Leninskii put’, March 22, 1958.
765 In Russian, the actual phrase is “pokhod komsomol’tsev za dal’neishii pod’’em kul’turnogo urovnia
molodezhi,” RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 967, ll. 113-14.
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amateur circle or sport section.766 This list demonstrates the kind of behavior that the
Bashkiriia Komsomol saw as congruent with culturedness in regard to cultural tastes, as
well as the personal duties placed on Komsomol members as part of the new aesthetic
upbringing drive.
The Bashkiriia Komsomol organizations also took on a set of obligations related
to state-sponsored popular culture. Over the two years, each Komsomol organizations
had to organize a set number of amateur circles, youth clubs, and local movie festivals.
At the regional level, the Bashkiriia Komsomol promised to help build 150 new clubs and
renovate 300 clubs, create and equip over 100 sport complexes, and purchase cultural
equipment such as musical instruments, radios, record players, televisions, and so on,
using the financial means provided by volunteer youth labor. Besides this, it would direct
1,000 Komsomol members into working in the sphere of state-sponsored popular culture.
It also intended to organize a series of cultural events, including a large amateur
competition, and a youth festival.767
The plans from other regions generally set aims similar to those in Bashkiriia. The
Voronezh Komsomol organization took on the responsibility of having youth participate
in building 200 rural clubs, 5 district houses of culture, 30 movie theaters, 15 libraries,
and several theaters, along with sport and educational institutions. The Komsomol also
intended to hold a youth festival and varied cultural competitions, while helping train
directors of amateur circles and cultural workers.768 In Rostov, the oblast Komsomol
766 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, ll. 138-39.
767 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, ll. 139-44.
768 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 967, ll. 113-15.
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drew up plans to organize amateur competitions, lectures, movie festivals, youth clubs,
and an oblast youth festival, as well as to build clubs and sport complexes.769
By 1958, the Komsomol Propaganda Department assessed the impact of the new
march for culture in a report for the Komsomol TsK. Apparently, all oblast and republic-
level Komsomol committees had clearly laid out two- and three-year plans for raising
youth cultural levels (dvukhletka kul’tury or trekhletka kul’tury). Altogether, they took on
the obligation to use youth volunteer labor to help build over 25,000 clubs and other
buildings used for cultural activities, as well as renovate and beautify (blagoustroit’)
40,000 such structures. They would also prepare over 30,000 cultural workers.770 The
strong emphasis on training young people to work in the mass cultural network or to
serve as volunteer directors of amateur collectives resulted from the growing need for
such cadres due to the Komsomol’s construction of clubs. Likewise, with the launch of
the aesthetic upbringing initiative, the Komsomol wanted trained cultural workers at the
grassroots level who could appropriately distinguish between what was “beautiful and
tasteful,” and what was not.
Regional Komsomol committees had some success in enacting a number of goals
in the Komsomol’s march for culture. Saratov’s oblast Komsomol recorded that, in 1957,
it took on the obligation to participate in constructing 350 clubs and libraries over the
next two years. By 1958, youth volunteer labor helped complete 204 of these projects. It
also assisted in preparing over 150 new cultural workers, but acknowledged that the
problem of cadres “is only partially solved.” The Saratov Komsomol newspaper regularly
769 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 839, ll. 22-27.
770 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 943, ll. 39-42.
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published articles under the heading of “The Two-Year Cultural Plan in Action.”771 In
1959, the Saratov city Komsomol reinforced the importance of the march for culture,
castigating Komsomol organizations and cultural institutions in the city for inadequate
participation. It maintained that the failure to spread officially-prescribed “cultural habits
(kul’turnye navyki) and aesthetic and artistic tastes” led to some youth “bowing down
before bourgeois culture.”772 Other oblasts, for example Rostov, also detailed their
achievements in implementing the February 1957 Komsomol TsK plenum’s decisions.
By December 1957, the Rostov oblast Komsomol indicated that it already improved its
work on state-sponsored popular culture, held youth festivals and amateur competitions at
all levels, took part in constructing many clubs, and helped increase participation in
amateur collectives.773 The Bashkiriia Komsomol’s efforts proved so exemplary that the
Komsomol’s press, Molodaia gvardiia, published an instruction booklet written by the
Komsomol secretary of Bashkiriia about its Komsomol march for culture.774 In addition,
the Komsomol TsK sent its representatives throughout the Soviet Union to check up on
and assist the work of regional Komsomol organizations on implementing the plenum’s
resolutions.775
The Komsomol documented significant advances in state-sponsored popular
culture during the march for culture. According to the Eighth Komsomol TsK Plenum in
771 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 902, l. 51; RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 946, ll. 164-70; and GANISO, f.
4529, op. 14, d. 2, l. 27.
772 GANISO, f. 4529, op. 14, d. 7, l. 258.
773 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 839, l. 26.
774 R. Kh. Migranov, V pokhod za kul’turu (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1959).
775 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 943, l. 42.
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1960, young volunteers participated in building over 12,000 clubs and 16,000 movie
theaters, renovating over 40,000 cultural structures, and preparing 25,000 cultural
workers. Komsomol cells also took a central role in organizing youth festivals, youth
initiative clubs, and amateur competitions.776 This largely matched the intended goals of
the Komsomol Propaganda Department’s 1958 report. However, as the Saratov
Komsomol indicated in 1959, the plans to ensure that individual Komsomol youth
engaged in prescribed cultural activities proved more difficult to implement.
Overall, the Komsomol TsK’s Seventh Plenum in 1957 turned the Komsomol’s
focus to enacting aesthetic upbringing through conservative and noncontroversial forms
of state-sponsored popular culture. The two- and three-year cultural plans resulted in
much more orthodox organized cultural activities for young people. The Komsomol
leadership reinforced its intentions at the 1958 Thirteenth Komsomol Congress, where
the organization of youth cultural leisure received strong support from Khrushchev and
Shelepin. The latter particularly endorsed the idea of two- and three-year cultural plans
and directed all oblast Komsomol committees to adopt it.777 Other central agencies
likewise promoted the Komsomol’s cultural march. The RSFSR Minister of Culture, for
instance, issued a circular in February 1958 to the oblast-level organizations of the
ministry calling on them to support the Komsomol’s efforts.778
The Soviet leaders intended this rise in normative organized cultural activities to
accomplish several things. First, the Kremlin wanted to maintain its post-Stalin shift
776 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1011, l. 3.
777 On the congress, see Shelepin, Otchetnyi doklad, 43-44, and Khrushchev, Vospityvat’ aktivnykh i
soznatel’nykh stroitelei kommunisticheskogo obshchestva, 35-37.
778 Reprinted in Solov’ev, Materialy po kul’turno-prosvetitel’noi rabote, 86-88.
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toward satisfying cultural consumption desires. It hoped that the growth in the provision
of more orthodox state-sponsored cultural activities would function as a counterbalance
to the top-level limitations set on western popular culture. This would continue to serve
the goal of presenting the Soviet Union as an appealing socialist version of a modern
consumer society to domestic constituents, while also helping to legitimate the post-
Stalin leaders. After all, unlike the Stalinist state’s emphasis on lectures about politics
and production, the Khrushchev leaders offered activities that many young people
genuinely found interesting, such as initiative and interest-based clubs, youth festivals,
and amateur collectives, along with the less appealing lectures.
Second, by supplying much more noncontroversial state-sponsored popular
culture, officials intended to shape youth tastes and desires. Komsomol cadres considered
youth participation in orthodox cultural activities as itself shaping and reinforcing
normative aesthetic tastes. A letter to the Party TsK from the First Secretary of the Soviet
Composers’ Union clarifies top-level thinking on this matter. Khrennikov wrote that a
“minimum of musical knowledge is necessary for each cultured person,” adding that
amateur collectives “play a major role in the ideological and aesthetic upbringing of a
member of the new communist society.”779 At the 1958 Thirteenth Komsomol Congress,
Shelepin made clear that fighting against western cultural propaganda and promoting
youth aesthetic upbringing and “good tastes” involved creating amateur music, dance,
and other types of circles, among other measures.780 At a joint conference of Komsomol,
club, and other officials in Donetsk, Ukraine, a high administrator at the Donetsk Palace
779 RGANI, f. 5, op. 36, d. 141, ll. 116-18.
780 Shelepin, Otchetnyi doklad, 44-45.
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for Children and School Students stated that those participating in the palace’s amateur
circles “receive necessary knowledge and skills regarding aesthetic upbringing.” A
speech by a director of a palace of culture at this meeting also highlighted the importance
of amateur circles for “raising cultural levels.”781 Officials, therefore, considered the
growth of youth participation in amateur cultural activities as leading to aesthetic
upbringing, and thereby to culturedness.
Many aspects of the aesthetic upbringing drive continued into the end of the
1950s and early 1960s. At the Twenty-first Communist Party Congress in 1959, the
Khrushchev leadership spoke of the need to promote aesthetic upbringing.782 The 1960
Eighth Komsomol TsK Plenum’s decree on leisure organization stated that “it is
necessary to ensure that young men and women feel an everyday need to study, read
books, visit theaters and movies, participate in amateur arts, practice sports,” a list that
defined how a cultured New Soviet Youth spent leisure time. The plenum accentuated the
need for aesthetic upbringing in music via “developing love for worthy examples of
musical art.”783 The keynote speech of the 1962 Fourteenth Komsomol Congress
reflected similar messages.784
781 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1098, ll. 51, 73.
782 A. Dimentman, Kul’turu v massy: Iz opyta raboty pervykh universitetov ku’tury (Moscow: Iskusstvo,
1960), 5.
783 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1011, ll. 8-9.
784 S. P. Pavlov, Otchet Tsentral’nogo Komiteta VLKSM i zadachi komsomola, vytekaiushchie iz reshenii
XXII s’’ezda KPSS (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1962), 46-47.
312
Implementing the Aesthetic Upbringing Campaign, Part 2: Universities of Culture
Besides increasing the provision of traditional conformist cultural activities, the
aesthetic upbringing campaign also promoted innovative cultural forms. Universities of
culture best embodied the didactic elements of this initiative. Largely established in
clubs, they offered courses on cultural topics and combined education and entertainment.
These universities, a cultural form with prerevolutionary and early Soviet precedents,
received endorsement from the Komsomol TsK, the Party TsK, the MOC, trade unions,
as well as the All-Union Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific
Knowledge (Vsesoiuznoe obshchestvo po rasprostraneniiu politicheskikh i nauchnykh
znanii, Knowledge Society), and spread quickly throughout the Soviet Union.785
Official rhetoric invariably described the mission of universities of culture as
cultural enlightenment and aesthetic upbringing. The Communist Party Propaganda
Department of Arkhangel’sk oblast reported that these institutions provided the
population with musical, theatrical, and artistic cultural knowledge and refined their
“artistic tastes,” in order to create “fully developed and prepared members of communist
society.”786 A joint circular by the heads of the Komsomol, MOC, and Knowledge
Society similarly underlined the benefit of universities of culture for conveying cultural
knowledge and forging artistic tastes appropriate for model communist citizens.787
785 The Knowledge Society was dedicated to advancing official propaganda, largely through providing
lecturers on various topics.
786 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 943, ll. 72-73.
787 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 973, l. 1.
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Instruction guidebooks on establishing universities of culture, reports from clubs, and the
by-laws of these universities repeated this trope.788
Structurally, universities of culture consisted of courses on a variety of cultural
topics. The university at Saratov’s Enterprise No. 447 Palace of Culture had a two-year
course of study with weekly meetings of four hours each. The academic year lasted from
mid-September to mid-April.789 Most universities in Arkhangel’sk had a two-year course
of study in 1958, and met two to three times a month.790 Other universities of culture had
slightly different schedules, for example one with a year-long class that held three
monthly meetings.791
Each course covered a set of themes considered requisite for cultured New Soviet
Women and Men. Those who wanted to attend a university of culture signed up for a
particular department (fakul’tet), including music, theater, literature, art, and cinema, with
the typical university offering three departments.792 In 1959, the MOC presented a
recommended model of an educational plan for each course. For the music department,
this plan called for a total of 114 hours of educational activities. Of these, the most time
went to topics on Russian classical music (28 hours), followed by foreign classical music
788 For an instruction booklet, see Dimentman, Kul’turu v massy, 3. For a report from the Moscow’s “Red
Star” House of Culture, see TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 398, l. 18. For the by-laws of a university of culture in
Saratov, see GASO, f. 2520, op. 2, d. 104, l. 58.
789 GASO, f. 2520, op. 2, d. 104, ll. 11-12.
790 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 943, l. 73.
791 Dimentman, Kul’turu v massy, 9.
792 In Gomel’, the Lenin Palace of Culture’s university had a musical, theatrical, and artistic department.
See Informatsionnyi biulleten’ Ministerstva kul’tury SSSR (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1959), 32. The university at
Enterprise No. 447 included a musical, literary, and cinema and theater department. See GASO, f. 2520,
op. 2, d. 104, ll. 11-12. The Likhachev House of Culture’s university of culture had a musical, theatrical,
literature, and artistic department. See Dimentman, Kul’turu v massy, 9.
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and Soviet music (20 hours each). Music basics and theory received 18 hours and the
music of other socialist states got 10 hours. An additional 10 hours went to the
ideological theme of Marxist-Leninist aesthetics, and 8 hours to political themes with
some relation to culture, such as the Twenty-first Communist Party Congress’s decisions
on culture. The theater department spent 44 hours on Soviet theater, 26 on
prerevolutionary Russian theater, 8 each on theater in socialist and non-Socialist states,
and 6 on theater basics and theory. It also had the same 18 hours devoted to Marxist-
Leninist aesthetics and political themes. All other departments had a similar political and
ideological component.793 With some variations, the curriculums of other universities
generally corresponded to this one.794 The program of these universities, featuring a mix
of Russian and foreign classical traditions, Soviet cultural products, folk themes from the
peoples of USSR and other socialist states, and a Marxist-Leninist take on aesthetics,
sheds light on the officially prescribed cultural cannon for New Soviet People.
Furthermore, some of the lessons in the model universities of culture presented by
the Ministry of Culture bulletin explicitly or implicitly targeted western popular culture.
A case in point, one class meeting bore the title “Modern Ballroom Dances and the
Struggle with Foreign Influence in Dancing,” and another encompassed “Criticism of the
Reactionary View of Bourgeois Art Theorists.” Lectures on “How to Listen to and
Evaluate Musical Compositions,” and similar ones on theatrical performances, dancing,
793 Informatsionnyi biulleten’ Ministerstva kul’tury SSSR, 36-45.
794 GASO, f. 2520, op. 2, d. 104, ll. 11-12, and Dimentman, Kul’turu v massy, 22-23.
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painting, and literature explicitly differentiated between appropriate and inappropriate
cultural works, most directly aiming to shape youth tastes.795
Nonetheless, the universities of culture spent the brunt of their time on less
politicized cultural topics that combined educational lectures with cultural events. A joint
circular by the heads of the Komsomol, MOC, and Knowledge Society described how
model universities, besides lectures, also held seminars, organized conferences, disputes,
lecture-concerts, meetings with artists, and collective discussion of artistic exhibits,
movies, and music. According to these agencies, “the diversity of themes and methods of
instruction” served to “draw in thousands of listeners to the universities.”796 For instance,
the first day of a university of culture in a club for young construction workers in
Leningrad featured a lecture, concert, art exhibit, movie, and meetings with musicians
and artists. The courses of study generally combined lectures with cultural activities,
along with excursions to cultural events and debates on a variety of cultural topics.797 A
university in Moscow hosted collective trips to museums, theaters, and exhibits, as well
as musical, literary, and theatrical events.798 In Severodvinsk’s Gor’kii House of Culture,
a university organized concerts, seminars, reader conferences, and meetings with cultural
figures. It supplemented the lectures with reproductions of paintings, records played on
gramophones, movies, and performances by artists.799 A class in the Gomel’ Lenin House
of Culture’s university on “Musical Forms and Genres” featured a lecture accompanied
795 Informatsionnyi biulleten’ Ministerstva kul’tury SSSR, 46-49.
796 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 973, l. 2.
797 V. I. Travin, Deistvennoe sredstvo vospitaniia molodezhi (Leningrad: LDNTP, 1968), 3-9.
798 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 398, l. 61.
799 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 943, l. 73.
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by performances of folk instruments, wind instruments, and others, provided by the
amateur collective of the house of culture and students at a local music college.800
Universities of culture also set up book kiosks and similar activities.801 The combination
of lectures on cultural topics, enlivened with music, movies, and paintings, along with
visits to cultural events and other activities appealed to the many hundreds of thousands
who signed up for classes.
Besides providing general cultural edification, the universities helped prepare
youth for working as volunteer directors of amateur collectives. Some specifically
focused on training such directors, as did one in Moscow and another in Khar’kov.802 The
Saratov City University of Culture’s theater department specialized in preparing amateur
theatrical collective leaders. The university gave a certificate to those who faithfully
attended its courses, likely useful for those who wanted to serve as directors.803 In 1960,
the Komsomol TsK explicitly called on those who attended such universities to serve as
“active propagandists of culture among youth masses.”804
The Growth and Structure of Universities of Culture
Universities of culture had antecedents before the launch of the campaign for
aesthetic upbringing, although the Stalinist Komsomol hierarchy did not pay much
800 Klub - stroiteliam kommunizma (Moscow: Profizdat, 1961), 184.
801 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 943, l. 75.
802 Dimentman, Kul’turu v massy, 7.
803 GASO, f. 2520, op. 2, d. 104, l. 58.
804 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1011, l. 12.
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attention to such activities previously.805 In existence already in imperial Russia, courses
that provided cultural knowledge to the masses received promotion by Bolshevik cultural
organs during the Civil War.806 During the 1920s, some Soviet clubs offered lecture
series called “evening universities” or “Sunday universities,” which focused on literacy
and basic knowledge, including in the cultural sphere.807 They faded away under Stalin in
favor of individual lectures on culture that lacked entertaining components, although a
few combined lectures and performances.808 Very rarely, Stalin-era clubs offered long-
term lecture series on their own initiative.809
The Thaw-era university of culture movement originated in lower-level
Komsomol organizations during the early post-Stalin years, but did not find endorsement
at the top until the hard-line shift in 1957. As an example, the Perm’ oblast Komsomol
organization reported to the Komsomol Propaganda Department about establishing such
institutions in 1956, as a means of responding to the Komsomol TsK’s promotion of
organized cultural activities to deal with juvenile “delinquency” during the early Thaw.810
Officials in the Komsomol Propaganda Department likely simply ignored this cultural
form as not responding to their needs in 1956. Shelepin’s speech at the 1957 Seventh
805 In one exception, the Komsomol Propaganda Department in 1944 suggested organizing universities of
culture directed at artists, but did not discuss universities for the general population: RGASPI, f. M-1, op.
32, d. 269, l. 8.
806 Donald J. Raleigh, Experiencing Russia’s Civil War: Politics, Society, and Revolutionary Culture in
Saratov, 1917-1922 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 208-15, 231-36.
807 Molodezh’ v rabochem klube (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1927), 48, and Saratovskii voskresnyi
universitet (Saratov, 1928), 1-15.
808 For example, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 630, l. 90, and RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 676, l. 13.
809 For one rare instance, see V. M. Abramkin, Universitet literatury i iskusstva: Programmy, plany lektsii,
bibliografiia. 1948-49 uchebnyi god (Leningrad, 1948), 3.
810 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 811, l. 219.
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Komsomol TsK plenum did not mention universities of culture as a way of enacting the
Komsomol’s goal of aesthetic upbringing.811 However, the Bashkiriia Komsomol
organization indicated to the Komsomol Propaganda Department that, as part of its
enactment of the 1957 Komsomol TsK Seventh Plenum’s resolutions, it established a
university of culture.812 The Voronezh oblast Komsomol also planned to establish a
university of musical culture in response to the plenum.813 This time, central Komsomol
officials paid attention to the idea of such a cultural form, with this concept percolating
up to the Komsomol leadership. Consequently, in his keynote address at the April 1958
Thirteenth Komsomol Congress, Shelepin spoke of the universities of culture as a
praiseworthy new form. He also singled out the Bashkiriia and Voronezh Komsomol
organizations as providing good models for organizing cultural activities.814 The
Komsomol cadres from these regions, therefore, received credit for an innovation that the
Komsomol TsK found worthy.
The center taking up and promoting innovations from below when they fit its
needs resembled what took place with youth initiative clubs in 1956. Thaw-era
Komsomol patrols, youth construction brigades, and other post-Stalin innovations likely
followed a similar course.815 Baliasnaia also confirmed that the Komsomol leadership
sought out worthy grassroots innovations and promoted them as recommended best
811 Shelepin, Ob uluchshenii.
812 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 858, l. 143.
813 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 3, d. 967, ll. 114-15.
814 Shelepin, Otchetnyi doklad, 43-44.
815 On patrols, see Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 167-49. On brigades, see Benjamin K. Tromly, “Re-
Imagining the Soviet Intelligentsia: Student Politics and University Life, 1948-1964” (Ph. D. diss., Harvard
University, 2007), 370-424.
319
practices.816 This shows the potential for the initiatives of local officials to have a
widespread impact during times of innovation and change in the Soviet Union. It also
bears similarities to how the leadership of other authoritarian states introduced new
developments into their own governance, suggesting intriguing parallels between the
ways different autocratic governments functioned.817
The Komsomol TsK’s endorsement of the universities of culture led to efforts by
local Komsomol organizations to spread these institutions across the USSR. By
September 1958 a number of Komsomol cells participated in establishing universities of
culture in their locale, including in the Stalingrad, Kuibyshev, and Kiev oblast.818
Komsomol newspapers praised local efforts to organize such universities of culture, for
example one in SGU devoted to music.819 Instruction booklets published by the
Komsomol press provided guidance on establishing such universities of culture.820
If the Komsomol’s cultural drive in the late 1950s and the youth initiative club
movement of the mid-1950s represented primarily Komsomol activities with some
support from other central agencies, the universities of culture proved more of a shared
enterprise, even though the universities largely targeted youth. In 1959, the Komsomol,
MOC, and Knowledge Society sent out a joint circular to all oblast- and republic-level
816 L. K. Baliasnaia, born 1927, interviewed April 5, 2009.
817 For an example far from culture top-level Nazi German officials took up innovative practices from some
local cadres related to the Holocaust, and implemented them throughout the Eastern Front. See Christopher
R. Browning, with contributions by Jürgen Matthäus, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of
Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press; Jerusalem: Yad
Vashem, 2004), 244-308.
818 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 943, l. 42.
819 “Universitet muzykal’noi ku’tury,” Leninskii put’, November 6, 1959, and “Muzyka! Vechnoe
chudo...,” Leninskii put’, November 14, 1959.
820 Migranov, V pokhod za kul’turu, 7-15.
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organizations of each agency. This documented promoted the widespread establishment
of universities of culture.821 Republic-level institutions, in turn, promoted these
universities in letters to their subordinate institutions. A 1959 memo from the RSFSR
minister of culture and the chairman of the RSFSR Knowledge Society called universities
of culture a “new form of cultural-enlightenment work that contributes to the aesthetic
upbringing of workers, especially youth.”822 For local cultural institutions, such
instructions indicated not only the need to establish these universities, but also that doing
so would promote youth aesthetic upbringing. They hoped that the opening of
universities of culture would satisfy the new requirements imposed in 1957 by the MOC
to make achieving youth aesthetic upbringing an obligatory part of the plan for cultural
institutions. The MOC reinforced this message with a February 1959 decree, which again
accentuated the need to focus on aesthetic upbringing and sanctioned the universities as
one way of achieving this goal.823
The top-level promotion of these universities continued in the early 1960s. The
RSFSR MOC sent a June 1960 letter to the Komsomol TsK indicating its plan to create
an interagency council on universities of culture, and invited the Komsomol to provide a
representative.824 The All-Union MOC passed a decree in August 1960 on improving the
work of these universities.825 Even more significantly, in October 1960 the Communist
821 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 973, ll. 1-6.
822 Reprinted in: Solov’ev, Materialy po kul’turno-prosvetitel’noi rabote, 76-78.
823 Informatsionnyi biulleten’ Ministerstva kul’tury SSSR, 30-50.
824 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1011, l. 125.
825 GASO, f. 2520, op. 2, d. 104, l. 9.
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Party TsK itself enacted a similar resolution.826 This decree from the very top
communicated the leadership’s conviction of the importance of these new cultural
institutions, making universities of culture an even higher priority for the Komsomol,
MOC, Knowledge Society, trade unions, and other agencies.
Such top-level endorsement and interagency collaboration led to the rapid growth
of these universities throughout the Soviet Union. Twenty-two universities of culture
served the population of Arkhangel’sk oblast in 1958. One of these, at the “Red Anvil”
Factory House of Culture, had 203 long-term attendees.827 Krasnopresnenskii
neighborhood organizations created four in 1959, which together served 1,700 people.828
Saratov’s Enterprise No. 447 established a university of culture in 1959, with 555
attending it.829 Another one in Saratov, created that same year, drew 190 attendees.830
Many other locales organized such universities in 1959.831
Statistics likewise illustrate the explosive increase in the universities of culture. In
1959, over 2,200 such universities functioned within the USSR, roughly 500 of them in
Ukraine and nearly 1,200 in the RSFSR.832 By June 1960, 1,850 universities of culture in
826 RGALI, f. 2329, op. 10, d. 652, l. 4.
827 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 943, l. 73.
828 TsAGM, f. 1988, op. 1, d. 72, l. 24.
829 GASO, f. 2520, op. 2, d. 104, ll. 11-12.
830 GASO, f. 2520, op. 2, d. 104, ll. 28-29.
831 For instance, the Urensk’s House of Culture, as shown in M. E. Nepomniashchii ed., Entuziasty: Sbornik
o peredovikakh kul’turno-prosvetitel’noi raboty (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1959), 6. Another example
is Moscow’s Gor’kii House of Culture. See TsAGM, f. 44, op. 1, d. 62, l. 5. The city of Engels in Saratov
oblast established one as well. See O. I. Volkova, Narodnye universitety (Saratov: Saratovskoe knizhnoe
izdatel’stvo, 1962), 5.
832 Dimentman, Kul’turu v massy, 6.
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the RSFSR served 500,000 people.833 In October 1961, the USSR had 8,000 such
universities: 5,000 in the RSFSR with 1,000,000 registered participants, and 1,819 in
Ukraine with 250,000 signed up.834 Their growth rate continued at a slower pace, with
10,000 functioning in the USSR by 1963.835
The statistics on university of culture audience members supports qualitative
statements from official sources suggesting that these institutions had popular appeal. The
MOC maintained that the universities have “acquired a deserved respect and love among
audience members.”836 Workers at Moscow’s “Kommunar” machine construction plant
apparently held the university at their factory in high esteem.837 Officials at the Enterprise
No. 447 club observed that, at an end-of-year meeting, the university audience
“expressed satisfaction with the university’s work.”838 In Gomel’, the university at the
Lenin House of Culture “won enormous popularity.”839
The Structure, Challenges, and Impact of Universities of Culture
Club managers generally took on the organizational tasks related to setting up
universities of culture, with assistance from Party, Komsomol, Knowledge Society, and
trade union officials, as well as cultural professionals and professors. Such cadres served
833 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1011, ll. 125-26.
834 RGALI, f. 2329, op. 10, d. 652, l. 1.
835 RGALI, f. 2329, op. 10, d. 652, l. 37.
836 RGALI, f. 2329, op. 10, d. 652, l. 34.
837 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 398, l. 18.
838 GASO, f. 2520, op. 2, d. 104, l. 24.
839 Klub - stroiteliam kommunizma, 183.
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on volunteer councils that planned and managed university activities. For example, a
university in a palace of culture for railroad workers in Vologodsk included
representatives from the local drama theater, philharmonic, art gallery, and a Soviet
Writers’ Union member. A university council in the village of Ol’ginskoe consisted of
the collective farm director, a local club official, a teacher, doctor, engineer, swineherd,
and others. Members of the cultural intelligentsia helped create the educational plans for
universities of culture, which local Party, Komsomol, and trade union cells then
reviewed. Experts in music, literature, theater, painting, and cinema, who sometimes
served on the university councils and helped write the educational plans, led the classes.
In many universities of culture, audience members formed a bureau that kept attendance
records and assisted in preparing lessons.840
Official rhetoric presented the universities as relying on the volunteer labor of
Party-state cadres and cultural professionals. A report from Saratov Enterprise No. 447’s
university underscored that all council members served as volunteers and did not receive
any honorariums. They did get formal recognition, with Enterprise No. 447 rewarding
four with a certificate honoring their work.841 Universities of culture in Leningrad
apparently functioned only on a “volunteer basis” (na obshchestvennykh nachalakh), with
lectures led by retired cultural experts and teachers.842 The phrase “volunteer basis”
840 This description draws on: RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 943, l. 73; RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 973, l. 2;
GASO, f. 2520, op. 2, d. 104, l. 24; GASO, f. 2520, op. 2, d. 104, l. 58; Karpov and Sintsov, Klubnoe delo,
282; and Dimentman, Kul’turu v massy, 14.
841 GASO, f. 2520, op. 2, d. 104, l. 26.
842 RGALI, f. 2329, op. 10, d. 652, l. 8.
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regularly featured in many other depictions of universities.843 The MOC praised
universities of culture in a report to Minister of Culture E. A. Furtseva by calling them
“an illustrative example of grassroots activism in educational work.”844 Consequently,
these universities not only served the goal of aesthetic upbringing, but also contributed to
the Khrushchev leadership’s endeavor to mobilize the population into active societal self-
management in order to transfer governing functions from the state to the citizenry.
Such volunteer labor helped these universities offer free or heavily subsidized
courses, which certainly contributed to their popularity. The Komsomol, MOC, and
Knowledge Society circular stated that most universities of culture did not charge any
fees. Some charged a nominal fee, and provided those who signed up for classes with a
subscription card (abonement) that served as an entry ticket to university classes.845 In
Gomel’, the Lenin House of Culture’s university of culture did not ask for payments, and
this, it reported, helped draw a larger audience.846 The Saratov City University of Culture
charged thirty rubles to cover the cost of movies, theater shows, concerts, and other
cultural activities.847 A. A. Vygnanov, a mid-ranking Komsomol official at a Moscow
technical institute from 1958 to 1963, recalled that students received inexpensive
subscription cards to the institute club’s university of culture, and some received the
843 For instance, in the Saratov City University of Culture’s by-laws: GASO, f. 2520, op. 2, d. 104, l. 58.
Also, see an instruction booklet’s portrayal of Kuibyshev oblast universities: Klub - stroiteliam
kommunizma, 180. Likewise, see another booklet’s description of a model university in Belarus: V. E.
Bondarenko, Propaganda iskusstva v klube (Moscow: Minkul’t RSFSR, 1963), 64.
844 RGALI, f. 2329, op. 10, d. 652, l. 34.
845 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 973, l. 3. Other sources similarly indicate that some universities of culture
charged their audience members. See Karpov and Sintsov, Klubnoe delo, 282, and Informatsionnyi
biulleten’ Ministerstva kul’tury SSSR, 34.
846 Klub - stroiteliam kommunizma, 184.
847 GASO, f. 2520, op. 2, d. 104, l. 58.
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cards for free as rewards.848 Overall, official rhetoric discouraged the universities from
charging fees, and limited acceptable payments to cultural events accompanying lectures,
as opposed to providing salaries for lecturers or charging for entrance to the club.
Consequently, such universities did not help the club’s financial plan, in contrast to
dances and other paid events. These new institutions represented unfunded mandates,
with club managers obliged to organize them due to top-level pressure.
At the same time, established cultural institutions helped the function of the
universities. Concert halls, music colleges, theaters, movie theaters, museums, and other
cultural establishments frequently helped universities of culture as part of their public
service. They offered universities of culture subsidized or free tickets to events, sent
cultural professionals to perform at lecture-concerts or to give the lectures themselves,
and provided musical instruments, movie reels, and other forms of cultural equipment.
For instance, a Moscow factory club’s university of culture gratefully acknowledged
assistance from the Bureau for the Propaganda of Soviet Cinema (Biuro propagandy
Sovetskogo kinoiskusstva).849 In Gomel’, the Music Institute, the oblast’s drama theater,
and various amateur and professional artists contributed to the university’s activities.850
Many cultural figures from established institutions served on the university of culture
volunteer councils. A series of decrees by the MOC and its subsidiaries encouraged such
help by local cultural institutions.851 Instruction booklets also called on cultural
848 A. A. Vygnanov, born 1942, interviewed February 13, 2009.
849 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 398, l. 64
850 Klub - stroiteliam kommunizma, 184.
851 RGALI, f. 2329, op. 10, d. 652, l. 11.
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institutions to assist the universities.852 Consequently, official discourse presented
universities of culture as not draining club budgets, although acknowledging that some
clubs purchased educational materials.853
In many cases, enterprises, trade unions, Party cells, and other organizations
provided direct financial assistance to clubs for the costs associated with hosting
universities of culture. Instruction booklets portrayed this as a typical practice.854
Saratov’s Enterprise No. 447 and its trade union organization directly sponsored the
university at the enterprise club. For the 1959-60 academic year, they gave 58,000 rubles
to pay the university’s expenses, with eleven concerts costing 37,000 rubles, a theater
visit 4,000 rubles, and so on.855 Such financial support helped ensure that many
universities of culture offered heavily subsidized or free activities. Owing to this,
universities of culture drew in a substantially larger audience than would otherwise have
been the case. This enabled local Party-state cadres to claim success in meeting the goals
of top-level directives, which these officials considered a worthwhile use of their
financial resources.
Local Party-state officials widely publicized the universities in order to ensure a
good audience. An instruction booklet depicting a model university at a Leningrad
construction enterprise gives some insight into what such promotion entailed. The
enterprise newspaper systematically published materials portraying the university’s
activities and inviting the young construction workers to visit a class meeting. The
852 Dimentman, Kul’turu v massy, 10.
853 Informatsionnyi biulleten’ Ministerstva kul’tury SSSR, 34.
854 See Karpov and Sintsov, Klubnoe delo, 282, and Dimentman, Kul’turu v massy, 12.
855 GASO, f. 2520, op. 2, d. 104, l. 25.
327
supervisors of worker dormitories organized a number of meetings where representatives
from the university council and varied officials described the university. Party and
Komsomol cells at this enterprise encouraged their members to consider enrolling in the
university.856 Furthermore, Komsomol, Party, and trade union cells also distributed some
free or discounted subscription cards to the universities that charged fees.857 Saratov’s
Enterprise No. 447 university purportedly put much effort into getting the enterprise’s
workers to attend.858 Another booklet highlights the need to endorse these universities in
the press, in meetings, on the radio, and through leaflets.859 Such advertising helped draw
in a sizable audience to attend classes at the universities. In some places, universities of
culture even began to limit their audience members. For instance, one model university in
Riga described in 1959 how it accepted only those youth who completed their education
and had a recommendation from a Komsomol, Party, or trade union organization.860
Official policy soon criticized such practices, however, as the Party-state wanted
universities of culture to put more efforts into targeting workers and collective farmers in
a Soviet version of affirmative action.861 The 1959 joint circular by the MOC,
856 Travin, Deistvennoe sredstvo vospitaniia molodezhi, 6.
857 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 398, ll. 63-64.
858 GASO, f. 2520, op. 2, d. 104, ll. 11-12.
859 Dimentman, Kul’turu v massy, 8.
860 Informatsionnyi biulleten’ Ministerstva kul’tury SSSR, 48.
861 At this time, the Khrushchev leadership introduced other reforms meant to uplift workers and peasants
as well, such as giving them a more preferential status in higher educational institutions than previously.
The Kremlin even sought to have those from the middle class work before going to college. To a significant
extent, opposition from students, parents, and educators undermined these controversial reforms. For more
on these reforms and college education in general, see Benjamin K. Tromly, “Re-Imagining the Soviet
Intelligentsia: Student Politics and University Life, 1948-1964” (Ph. D. diss., Harvard University, 2007),
310-48; L. V. Silina, Nastroeniia sovetskogo studenchestva, 1945-1964 (Moscow: Russkii mir, 2004), 138-
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Komsomol, and Knowledge Society discouraged the universities from admitting narrow
categories of audience members, such as those with a higher education or model workers.
The circular suggested that the universities give preference for matriculation to those with
less interest in the arts, with the implication that they needed cultural education the
most.862 Officials continued to express concerns over too few workers and collective
farmers studying at these institutions. In 1960, workers made up only 20 percent of those
attending Moscow’s universities of culture.863 The MOC criticized the inadequate work
in getting workers and collective farmers to visit the universities in 1963.864 Although the
leaders wanted to enroll more members of the working class, perceived as needing
particularly intense cultural enlightenment, into universities of culture, those from
middle-class backgrounds, with a better education and more interest in cultural activities,
apparently took more advantage of these institutions.
The issue of attendance represented another point of concern for the hierarchy.
Some universities maintained audience interest well. In the university at Enterprise No.
447, during the first academic year, the literature department had 60 percent attendance,
the music department 85 percent, and the theater and movie one had 91 percent.865
Another Saratov university likewise recorded what it termed a good rate of attendance.866
41; and S. L. Merzliakov, “Saratovskii gosudarstvennyi universitet v gody voiny i mira (1941-1964 gg.)”
(kand. diss., Saratov State University, 2008).
862 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 973, l. 5.
863 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1011, l. 129.
864 RGALI, f. 2329, op. 10, d. 652, l. 38.
865 GASO, f. 2520, op. 2, d. 104, l. 13.
866 GASO, f. 2520, op. 2, d. 104, ll. 28-29.
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In contrast, a 1960 report identified a “significant proportion” of the universities as
having poor attendance. For example, in Stalinsk oblast, less than 50 percent of those
who signed up to study stayed in the courses through the end of the academic year.867 To
an extent, this probably resulted from the heavy-handed propagation of the universities.
Some people likely signed up to get credit for helping implement the top-level campaign
and then avoided the class meetings.
Inadequate attendance also stemmed from poorly designed lessons. The report
cited above acknowledged that “the low quality of lectures” led to audience
dissatisfaction and lack of interest in continuing their study.868 In 1960, the Komsomol
TsK called for universities of culture to combine lectures with cultural activities that
illustrated the lecture topic.869 This demonstrates that some universities did not do so at
the time. The MOC complained in 1963 that most universities of culture failed to
organize “active learning,” including seminars, conferences, discussions, debates, and
collective excursions.870 An investigation of a Saratov university identified similar
problems.871 Apparently, lecturers who learned their craft under Stalin found it hard to
change their methods, even in the face of pressure from above.
Additionally, investigations by higher agencies and reports from universities of
culture often linked low-quality lectures to inadequate aid from local cultural and
educational institutions. The Komsomol TsK drew attention to this problem in 1960,
867 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1011, l. 130.
868 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1011, l. 130.
869 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1011, l. 12.
870 RGALI, f. 2329, op. 10, d. 652, l. 38.
871 GASO, f. 2520, op. 2, d. 104, l. 29.
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calling for the provision of better qualified lecturers for the universities. It also demanded
that concert halls, cinemas, museums, and other cultural establishments provided the
universities with more art exhibitions, movie reels, concert brigades, etc.872 Universities
of culture at the grassroots level made similar appeals. For instance, officials at the
university at Enterprise No. 447 had to cancel several class meetings because lecturers
failed to show up or lacked appropriate illustrations for lecture topics. The university’s
officials requested that the oblast MOC bureaucracy supply artists to talk with and
perform for the university audience–without requiring fees–and also that the
philharmonic discount prices for the university’s students.873 Such reluctance to sponsor
the universities stemmed from the resistance of some concert halls, museums, and similar
cultural institutions to voluntarily invest resources into activities that did not help them
meet their financial plans. This demonstrates the difficulties that the Kremlin experienced
in enacting unfunded mandates in cultural policy at the grassroots level, even with strong
top-down pressure.
Financial issues proved a particularly sore point for the universities. The
Komsomol Propaganda Department admitted in 1960 that “the call for cultural and
scientific professionals to volunteer their time for universities of culture did not find the
needed response among writers, artists, painters, musicians, and cinema experts.” In fact,
some cultural workers saw giving lectures as “a means of financial support,” with a
number of lecturers in Leningrad apparently demanding very high sums for their
872 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1011, ll. 11-12.
873 GASO, f. 2520, op. 2, d. 104, ll. 11-12.
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services.874 This practice continued into the early 1960s. In 1963, a Moscow
metallurgical enterprise’s university complained that the local branch of the Knowledge
Society and concert organizations “reduce work with the university of culture to financial
deal-making.” According to the university, these organizations placed themselves in a
ludicrous position by propagandizing Soviet ideology for money: “a despicable practice
that causes significant harm to ideological work.” Such demands forced the university to
charge fees, which upset audience members who expected free classes. When students
found out about the required payments, they “openly called the university of culture a
‘feeder’ for those who lecture in it,” and a number dropped out.875 Thus consumption
motives conflicted with and undermined the ideological goals of cultural officials, who
had to use financial incentives to motivate many cultural professionals to respond to
ideological exhortations.
Universities of culture faced internal problems when university councils did not
function well. At an agricultural institute in Saratov, many of those elected to the council
failed to take part in the required activities.876 A Moscow university of culture faced a
similar problem of a dysfunctional university council. The club director had to take on
the burden of managing the university’s activities.877 In 1963, the MOC censured the
“weakening of societal initiative and unsatisfactory organizational work” in universities
of culture.878
874 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1011, ll. 129-31.
875 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 398, ll. 64-66.
876 GASO, f. 2520, op. 2, d. 104, l. 30.
877 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 398, l. 64.
878 RGALI, f. 2329, op. 10, d. 652, l. 38.
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Facing all of these issues, it is no wonder that, behind closed doors, some club
managers grumbled over having to establish universities of culture. At a 1962 conference
of Moscow club workers, the assistant director of Moscow’s Zuev Club criticized the fact
that “all clubs are obliged to establish these universities of culture.” He claimed that this
initiative fit less well in some clubs than others. Furthermore, the assistant director
complained that clubs have so many obligations that they cannot possibly succeed in all
of them.879
Although these universities embodied the aesthetic upbringing initiative
associated with the militant turn in 1957, they still constituted a place of conflict. This
comes through most clearly in the censure of some universities as placing too much
emphasis on cultural activities and not enough on political propaganda. The Komsomol,
MOC, and Knowledge Society already in 1959 critiqued the many university educational
plans that primarily stressed cultural themes. The three agencies instead stated that,
together with cultural topics, the universities had to address science and technology, the
Seven-Year Plan, and the general goals of communist construction.880 In 1960, the
Komsomol Propaganda Department criticized some universities of culture for focusing
too much on prerevolutionary cultural themes and not enough on Soviet ones.881 Local
records echoed these complaints. An investigation into an agricultural institute’s
university of culture in Saratov censured its program for the predominance of cultural and
prerevolutionary topics and insufficient attention to the political position of the Party and
879 TsAGM. F. 718, op. 1, d. 257, l.
880 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 973, l. 4.
881 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1011, l. 129.
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the achievements of Soviet technology.882 In contrast, a 1961 report by the MOC noted
that “some Party and government officials have acquired the wrongheaded opinion that
the widespread study of the arts in the universities of culture is an expression of ‘cultural
excess’ (kul’turnichestvo) condemned by the Communist Party.” This improper view,
according to the MOC, led to the “artificial limitation of the growth of universities of
culture that harmed the communist upbringing of the population.”883
These documents show the desire of ideologically militant-oriented officials to
insert a heavier dose of political propaganda into university of culture curriculums,
bringing these new institutions closer to the late Stalinist model that saw such propaganda
as a panacea for all social ills. More soft-line cadres disagreed with this approach for a
number of reasons. First, doing so would have resulted in a smaller audience and
consequently undermine the original purpose of the universities of culture–shaping
aesthetic tastes. Second, the universities would have been less effective in satisfying the
desires of youth for cultural knowledge, and consequently undermine the goal of
appealing to popular desires by the post-Stalin Party-state. Local officials responsible for
managing the universities of culture had a specific institutional motivation for avoiding a
heavy politicization of the curriculum, as this would have led to lower attendance and
therefore reflect badly on their work in the reports they sent to their supervisors.
While the problems described above undermined the impact of universities of
culture to a degree, official sources reported that the universities often proved effective in
reaching their goal of aesthetic upbringing for their students. The Arkhangel’sk “Red
882 GASO, f. 2520, op. 2, d. 104, l. 29.
883 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1055, l. 9.
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Anvil” Factory’s university apparently helped its audience members develop an interest
“in serious musical compositions and paintings,” according to the head of the volunteer
council. If previously, “symphony concerts seemed boring and incomprehensible to
many, now they try not to miss any performances by well-known musicians.” In his view,
this displayed the usefulness of universities of culture for improving the cultural level of
workers.884 A worker from the Uralmash factory credited his attendance of a university
class with increasing his cultural horizon and enriching his knowledge of literature and
the arts. Two workers at a clothing enterprise in Moscow underlined how they learned a
great deal about art at a university class.885
Interviews with former youth help confirm that classes that combined educational
and cultural activities appealed to and influenced youth who desired cultural growth. N.
A. Popkova described how she and her friends went to “unforgettable” free courses on art
in Saratov’s Radishchev State Art Museum. She greatly enjoyed lecture-concerts offered
by the Saratov State Philharmonic, which cost a nominal sum. She and her clique “went
there with great pleasure,” and “learned a great deal about music.” Later, N. A. Popkova,
as a librarian at SGU, delivered lectures on literature at a university of culture in the mid-
1970s.886 I. V. Sokolov, a worker who came from Kaluga to attend the Moscow Energy
Institute, recalled feeling that he and others who came from outside of Moscow felt
culturally inferior to Muscovites: “I had a big gap in that area.” The institute’s house of
culture, however, provided many superb educational and cultural activities. Sokolov
884 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 943, l. 75.
885 Dimentman, Kul’turu v massy, 6-7.
886 N. A. Popkova, born 1936, interviewed May 20, 2009.
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underlined that the events, free for students, gave him more than the institute itself in
regard to cultural growth.887
Moreover, interviews with local officials and cultural activists who worked
directly with youth attest to their perception of the importance and impact of aesthetic
upbringing, both through universities of culture and amateur activities. Vygnanov, for
example, believed his Moscow technical institute needed to produce engineers who had
some knowledge of poetry, literature, and the arts. The university of culture at the
institute’s club, in his view, “gave [students] serious knowledge of the art of dance,
cinema, theater, and so on.” He expressed pride in the fact that the students who left
Moscow for work in the regions carried this cultural knowledge with them wherever they
went.888 The former secretary of the university Komsomol committee at SGU, L. E.
Gerasimova, underlined the central role of aesthetic upbringing to the SGU club’s
enthusiasts, who sought to provide cultural activities at a high level while not doing
anything ideologically questionable.889 V. E. Sobolev led a dance collective for
adolescents and indicated that this circle enabled participants to acquire good cultural
tastes in other areas of culture as well, such as art appreciation.890 The former director of
a theater collective stated that, by performing in shows, youth broadened their interests
and obtained an artistic upbringing.891 Baliasnaia called universities of culture a form of
887 I. V. Sokolov, born 1940, interviewed April 16, 2009.
888 A. A. Vygnanov, born 1942, interviewed February 13, 2009.
889 L. E. Gerasimova, interviewed May 27, 2009, born 1936-38. K. K. Il’in, an activist at the SGU club,
also noted that the club organized cultural events aimed at the aesthetic upbringing of students. See K. K.
Il’in, born 1944, interviewed May 20, 2009.
890 V. E. Sobolev, born 1953, interviewed April 29, 2009.
891 N. A. Troitskii, born 1931, interviewed May 22, 2009.
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organized activity that molded the culture of young people and appeased their demands in
the arts and other fields.892
Conclusion
The impact of the Khrushchev leadership’s hard-line shift in late 1956 and early
1957 expressed itself within state-sponsored popular culture policy in a variety of ways.
The Kremlin used despotic power to limit the range of permissible organized cultural
activities, most notably by cracking down on American-style jazz, especially after the
1957 international youth festival in Moscow. Still, in carrying out the hard-line turn, the
Soviet top officials placed substantially more emphasis on less coercive methods, namely
in the campaign for aesthetic upbringing, illustrating a movement away from despotic
power even during periods of ideological militancy. The aesthetic upbringing initiative
stressed teaching young people about what is beautiful and tasteful in culture, both by
providing more noncontroversial organized cultural activities in the Komsomol’s march
for culture and by launching the universities of culture movement.
The campaign for aesthetic upbringing helped to satisfy the desires for cultural
knowledge and shape the aesthetic tastes of at least some youth. High participation rates
in the universities of culture and other activities associated with the aesthetic upbringing
campaign illustrate the desire for cultural knowledge among many young citizens. The
USSR’s fast-paced urbanization, with more urbanites than rural residents by the midpoint
of Khrushchev’s reign, contributed to this demand.893 So did the growing percentage of
892 L. K. Baliasnaia, born 1927, interviewed April 5, 2009.
893 On urbanization, see Jones, “The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization.”
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youth enrolled in higher education, including those coming from the working class.894
Millions chose to study at universities of culture to satisfy this desire for cultural
edification, willingly taking in the Party-state’s guidance on what constituted appropriate
cultural knowledge and aesthetic tastes: an admixture of Soviet cultural products, the
Russian and foreign classical cannon, folk arts of the peoples of the USSR and allied
socialist states, and Marxist-Leninist aesthetics. Many youth perceived themselves as
becoming cultured owing to their education in the Party’s cultural cannon and
participation in normative cultural activities, accepting important elements of the official
discourse’s definition of culturedness. This demonstrates that the Kremlin met with some
success in its endeavor to mold young people’s aesthetic tastes, and thereby shape their
personal identities. The aesthetic upbringing initiative formed part of a broader effort by
the post-Stalin leaders to instill cultural knowledge, tastes, values, and behavior
considered necessary for New Soviet Women and Men. This drive for what I call a
Thaw-era version of culturedness was differentiated from the vision of culturedness
pursued in the NEP and Stalin years via extending to all youth as opposed to elites and
via seeking to advance the Soviet struggle on the Cold War’s cultural front.
The ideologically militant turn in 1957 resulted in the temporary narrowing of
boundaries for the cultural practices of model young communists, with significantly less
room for western popular culture and wariness of “excessive” grassroots initiative. Those
young people who actively engaged in the aesthetic upbringing campaign, garnering
pleasure and meaning from their consumption of orthodox cultural activities, publicly
enacted the newly limited subjectivity of New Soviet People associated with the hard-line
894 On higher education, see Tromly, “Re-Imagining the Soviet Intelligentsia,” 40-93.
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shift. They exhibited a more conformist agency that better fit the intentions of militant
officials, in the context of an overall lessening of the space for youth agency within state-
sponsored popular culture during late 1956 and 1957. In regard to these youth, the Party-
state’s hard-line shift had some success in using cultural consumption management to
strengthen its political stability and legitimacy, advance the construction of communism,
and fight the Cold War on the domestic front.
The Soviet leadership’s effort to convince young people of the superiority of
orthodox state-sponsored popular culture via the aesthetic upbringing campaign bears
similarities to what occurred in other socialist contexts, as shown by Paulina Bren’s
depiction of Czechoslovakia after the Soviet invasion in 1968. She found that the post-
1968 Czechoslovak government, in competing with western Europe over living
conditions, did not try to produce more consumer goods. Rather than striving for
economic superiority, the Czechoslovak Party-state offered better working conditions,
more leisure time, and a variety of social welfare benefits, claiming that these resulted in
a superior lifestyle to the western one.895 My research on the campaign for aesthetic
upbringing illustrates that rhetoric concerning socialist superiority to a western way of
life played a prominent role in some socialist contexts already before 1968, as part of the
Cold War’s “peaceful competition.” Instead of trying to compete by providing youth with
more options to engage in western popular culture, the Kremlin in 1957 chose to
emphasize the official cultural cannon and normative cultural activities as uplifting,
enlightening, and superior. It condemned jazz and western dancing as uncultured and
895 Paulina Bren, “Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall … Is the West the Fairest of Them All? Czechoslovak
Normalization and Its (Dis)Contents,” Kritika 9.4 (Fall 2008): 831-54.
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vulgar cultural practices that hindered communist construction and undermined the Cold
War’s domestic cultural front.
 The Party-state’s vigorous attempt in 1957 to take charge over youth cultural
practices and desires in the campaign for aesthetic upbringing bears significance for non-
Socialist historical contexts as well, especially for our understanding of the societal role
of taste. Pierre Bourdieu argues that cultural tastes denote class boundaries, while Sarah
Thornton insightfully points out the significance of tastes in building status hierarchies
within youth cultures.896 These scholars, however, relied exclusively on analyses of
capitalist states. This chapter’s examination of a socialist setting underscores the need to
expand our understanding of the function of taste. My analysis illustrates that shaping
taste could also serve as an instrument in the government’s arsenal of social engineering
tools, as the Soviet Party-state tried to create a citizenry whose aesthetic tastes suited the
Kremlin’s needs. Still, the challenge of organizing successful universities of culture,
owing to the Khrushchev leadership’s failure to appreciate the grassroots reality of many
local cultural institutions and intelligentsia figures being reluctant to get involved without
financial compensation, diluted some of the impact of the aesthetic upbringing initiative.
In the top-level blindness to local realities on the ground, the university of culture
movement faced problems similar to those of many other modern social engineering
schemes.897
896 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, Richard Nice trans. and ed.
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 466-85, and Sarah Thornton, Club Cultures: Music, Media
and Subcultural Capital (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1996), 163-68.
897 Such problems even plagued very different modern social engineering schemes that relied on despotic
instead of infrastructural power. See James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve
the Human Condition Have Failed (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1998), 1-8.
340
Certainly, cultural forms related to the aesthetic upbringing initiative did impact
many young people. Upwardly mobile workers such as Sokolov, who perceived a lack of
cultural awareness and tastes as hampering social ambitions, gratefully attended didactic
cultural activities. Some young people from middle-class backgrounds also took
advantage of such activities in order to improve their cultural knowledge. Popkova is one
example. For them, the universities likely only reinforced existing aesthetic tastes that
already matched university offerings. Moreover, no guarantee existed that those who
attended universities of culture would reject the boogie-woogie or Americanized jazz.
Still, their voluntary engagement with the Party’s cultural propaganda indicates a
substantial degree of concordance with official cultural tastes.
Authorities, however, struggled to reach those youth who did not wish to attend
the universities or participate in other cultural forms associated with the aesthetic
upbringing initiative. Young members of the working class who did not enjoy such
cultural activities or strive for upward mobility had little reason to attend educational-
oriented cultural events, despite top-level affirmative action efforts to target them.
Perhaps more problematic, a large proportion of youth who enjoyed western popular
culture found the aesthetic upbringing drive contrary to their cultural consumption desires
and aesthetic tastes. The attacks on western cultural influence and the limitations on jazz
hardly appealed to such young people. They generally did not attend the universities and,
as the next chapter shows, spent less leisure hours in club spaces compared to the early
Thaw, decreasing their exposure to “communist time.” The Khrushchev leadership,
thereby, proved unable to use the aesthetic upbringing initiative to convince large
segments of youth of the superiority of organized cultural activities in the universities of
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culture over western popular culture. The Czechoslovak state that Bren described
suffered a similar fate regarding its efforts to depict its living conditions as superior
during the 1970s and 1980s.
Furthermore, in its efforts to do so, the Khrushchev Kremlin likely exacerbated
generational differences. By publicly criticizing the young generation at the highest level
of policy rhetoric in 1957, top officials introduced generation as a category for
commentary in Komsomol, trade union, and Party meetings, as well as youth newspapers,
educational institutions, and other venues. The discussion about generational differences
likely drew the attention of many young people to this issue, and contributed to their
seeing themselves as part of a separate generation. Moreover, global youth movements at
this time, combined with the greater exposure of Soviet young people to the outside
world, exacerbated a sense of generational difference.898 The attacks on western popular
culture in 1957, along with the hesitancy expressed over youth grassroots initiative, also
played a role in youth perceptions of generational tensions. The emphasis on youth
activism and satisfaction of youth interests from 1953 to 1956 already set the basis for the
development of a generational consciousness. The events narrated in this chapter built on
these early Thaw tendencies, contributing to the formation of a full-scale generational
consciousness among the active post-Stalin generation.899
898 On global youth movements, see John Springhall, Youth Popular Culture, and Moral Panics: Penny
Gaffs to Gangsta-Rap, 1830-1996 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); Claire Wallace and Sijka
Kovatcheva, Youth in Society: The Construction and Deconstruction of Youth in East and West Europe
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); Steven Mintz, Huck’s Raft: A History of American Childhood
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 310-33; Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson eds., Resistance
through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-war Britain (New York: Routledge, 2006 [1975]); and Jeremy
Varon, Michael S. Foley, and John McMillian, “Time is an Ocean: The Past and Future of the Sixties” The
Sixties 1.1 (June 2008): 1-7.
899 On active and passive generations, see Jane Edmunds and Bryan S. Turner, Generations, Culture and
Society (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2002), 16-23. For the formation of generational
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consciousness, the classic work is Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, Paul
Kecskemeti trans. and ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), 276-320.
Chapter 7
Organized Cultural Activities during the Socialist Sixties, 1958-1968
At the May 23-24, 1962, Leningrad conference of club workers, L. I. Likhodeev,
a journalist from Literaturnaia gazeta (Literary Newspaper), stirred up controversy.
Repeating the themes raised in his article published in the newspaper on March 1, 1962,
he criticized traditional club events for being overly organized, and lacking room for
youth initiative. This resulted from the fact that club workers “find it hard to imagine that
an individual can be trusted to control himself,” that “a person would not rip out a
microphone, tip over chairs, kill a police officer, or gnaw through trolleybus cables.”
Having panned orthodox club events, Likhodeev threw his support behind a new cultural
form, youth cafes (molodezhnye kafe), as creating the opportunity for “the natural human
condition” by encouraging obshchenie, meaning free-flowing discussions on engaging
topics in an intimate atmosphere.900 At a late March 1962 Moscow club conference,
Likhodeev made similar claims. Challenged on whether youth cafes constituted a western
form, he replied that the cafes “are a new stream that came from the West, but it does not
matter where they came from.” He censured club workers who accused youth cafes of
kowtowing to western influence and said that “it may be kowtowing, but so what?”901
900 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1096, ll. 29-32.
901 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 257, ll. 48-49.
344
At both conferences, many participants expressed support for the soft-line view
championed by Likhodeev, while others criticized his positions. Yet the vociferous
support for Likhodeev’s ideas, unimaginable in the period of hard-line dominance from
late 1956 to early 1958, spotlights the changes that took place in youth-oriented cultural
activities from mid-1958 to 1962. This chapter begins with an overview of the
continuities and changes in the state’s cultural policy during the end of the 1950s and
early 1960s, takes an in-depth look at youth cafes, and then briefly discusses club
activities during the late 1960s.
From mid-1958, the Khrushchev administration adopted a more tolerant cultural
policy on organized cultural activities. This did not result from the dissipation of
concerns over western cultural influence or youth misbehavior during periods of leisure.
In reality, the Kremlin grew more concerned over how young people spent their free time
owing to the shift to a shorter workweek. Consequently, the Khrushchev leadership
continued to pour resources into universities of culture and other orthodox and didactic
cultural forms. Yet, top officials realized some of the miscalculations associated with the
earlier ideologically militant approach, namely the decreased exposure of youth to
“communist time.” Consequently, they backed away from the attacks on jazz and western
dancing and opened up much more space for such activities in the mass cultural network,
legitimating the expression of a degree of interest in western popular culture for model
New Soviet Individuals. Youth initiative in state-sponsored popular culture once again
received full endorsement. All this denoted the Kremlin’s further movement away from
despotic power and incorporation of infrastructural power elements, as embodied by
negotiation with society.
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Taken together, such youth cultural policies embody the Khrushchev leadership’s
approach during the mid-Thaw, 1958 to 1964, to enacting a socialist modern consumer
society. The goal consisted of having consumption grow in a controlled manner, while
actively molding cultural consumption desires and aesthetic tastes in a fashion conducive
to forging communism.902 Just as significant, soliciting grassroots initiative in state-
sponsored popular culture aimed to prepare youth to govern themselves in the communist
future. Striking the right balance in cultural leisure activities had particular relevance due
to the growth in free time offered by the Kremlin as part of its effort to provide an
appealing socialist modernity.
As it did earlier, the Party-state continued to try to convince youth that cultural
activities associated with a socialist consumer society represented a superior option to a
capitalist modernity. To reach those youth who did not wish to participate in more
orthodox state-sponsored popular cultural events, however, the Soviet leadership tried a
somewhat different tactic than previously. Compromising with youth consumerist wishes
for western culture, the Komsomol’s cultural policy met them halfway by borrowing a
western form, youth cafes, whose atmosphere of obshchenie and an entertainment
program of jazz and other engaging cultural events appealed to youth. The Khrushchev
Kremlin intended the cafes to promote first and foremost communist construction by
activating youth community activism while increasing “communist time.” This caused
strains between with young cafe activists, who placed more emphasis on preserving the
902 For more on this balancing act, especially regarding material consumption, see David Crowley and
Susan E. Reid, “Introduction: Pleasures in Socialism,” in David Crowley and Susan E. Reid eds., Pleasures
in Socialism: Leisure and Luxury in the Eastern Bloc (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010), 3-
52, and György Péteri, “The Occident Within – or the Drive for Exceptionalism and Modernity,” Kritika
9.4 (Fall 2008): 929-37.
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atmosphere of obshchenie and satisfaction of young people’s desires within cafes, than
on using these institutions to directly advance communist construction. Such tensions
came to the fore in the last years of Khrushchev’s reign.
After L. I. Brezhnev came to power in October 1964, youth organized cultural
activities underwent a transformation. The Kremlin continued to increase the supply of
noncontroversial activities and even allowed more room for western culture than
permitted in the last years under Khrushchev. Yet, as part of a gradual hard-line turn
during the late Thaw, 1964 to 1968, the new leaders underscored discipline as a central
value instead of youth initiative.
Continuities in Cultural Policy during the Mid-Thaw Period, 1958-1964
After having granted more free time to the populace in the early Thaw, 1953-
1958, the Khrushchev leadership further augmented leisure hours during the mid-Thaw
period. In 1960, it announced a transition to a seven-hour workday. The Third Party
Program, a central guiding document for the Communist Party adopted at the 1961
Twenty-second Communist Party Congress, further augmented the population’s free
time. The state promised to shorten the workweek to only five days from six in 1964. An
instruction booklet for club workers stated that “the right to leisure is one of the most
substantial rights won by the Soviet people,” linking this to the Third Party Program.903
Likewise, the government endeavored to replace domestic chores associated with
903 Z. A. Petrova and M. P. Rymkevich eds., Novoe v rabote klubov (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1962),
84-85. For the relevance of the Third Party Program to the Komsomol’s activities, see S. P. Pavlov, Otchet
Tsentral’nogo Komiteta VLKSM i zadachi komsomola, vytekaiushchie iz reshenii XXII s’’ezda KPSS
(Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1962), 5-6, 35. For the program itself, see Programma Kommunisticheskoi
partii Sovetskogo Soiuza (Moscow: Politizdat, 1974). For an analysis of this program, see Alexander Titov,
“The 1961 Party Programme and the Fate of Khrushchev’s Reforms,” in Melanie Ilic and Jeremy Smith
eds., Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev (New York: Routledge, 2009), 8-25.
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cooking, cleaning, and child rearing, performed largely by women, with collective social
services, including crèches, community kitchens, and so on. The state also made efforts
to offer domestic appliances that eased women’s “double burden.”904 These and similar
policies expanded the free time of the citizenry perhaps by as much as twenty-five
percent.905
Like other central agencies, the Komsomol trumpeted this achievement in its
external discourse, presenting the growth in free time as illustrative of the Party’s concern
for the populace and the superiority of socialist modernity over capitalist modernity.
Komsomol’skaia pravda printed a page of articles on this topic in the summer of 1960.
The lead story lauded the Party’s decision to transition to a shorter workweek while
maintaining the same salary and compared the length of the Soviet workweek favorably
to those of the US, U.K., France, and West Germany.906 A front-page editorial in
Moskovskii komsomolets made similar points.907
While offering the Party-state a way to present a socialist modernity as better than
a western one, the growth of free time also served as a source of concern, especially in
904 For the state’s efforts regarding the “double burden,” see the contributors to Melanie Ilič, Susan E. Reid
and Lynne Attwood eds., Women in the Khrushchev Era (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). For more
on social services, see E. R. Iarskaia-Smirnova, P. V. Romanov, and Natalia Lebina, “Sovetskaia
sotsial’naia politika i povsednevnost’, 1940-85,” in E. R. Iarskaia-Smirnova and P. V. Romanov eds.,
Sovetskaia sotsial’naia politika: Stseny i deistvuiushchie litsa, 1940-1985 (Moscow: Variant, 2008), 7-33.
On appliances, see N. B. Lebina and A. N. Chistikov, Obyvatel’  i reformy: Kartiny povsednevnoi zhizni
gorozhan v gody nepa i khrushchevskogo desiatiletiia (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2003).
905 For example, Jiri Zuzanek references two Soviet time surveys of Krasnoiarsk oblast, one in 1959 and
another in 1963 designed to emulate the 1959 one. They show an increase in free time from 1959 to 1963
for men from more than twenty-four to over thirty-five hours, and for women from more than nineteen to
over twenty-three hours. See Jiri Zuzanek, Work and Leisure in the Soviet Union: A Time-Budget Analysis
(New York: Praeger, 1980), 41.
906 “Arifmetika dvukh sistem,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, July 29, 1960.
907 “U nas kazhdyii imeet pravo: Na trud, na otdykh, na obrazovanie, na material’noe obespechenie,”
Moskovskii komsomolets, December 5, 1963.
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regard to youth. The Komsomol conveyed this most clearly in policy documents and
Komsomol conferences. A case in point, in the words of the 1960 Moscow city
Komsomol conference keynote speech, “the workday is growing shorter and there is
more leisure time, but the time span of ‘communist influence’ should not decrease.”
Therefore, “we need to think about how to extend our communist influence to the street,
the home, and the back yard, and thus to improve the bad reputation of the street,” a
reference to youth misconduct on street corners.908
The Komsomol also voiced concern over western influence. In December 1960,
L. V. Karpinskii, the head of the Komsomol Propaganda Department, prepared a frank
internal memo for a Komsomol Central Committee report to the Party TsK concerning
the struggle with “bourgeois ideology.” He suggested that the Komsomol TsK inform the
Party TsK that “contemporary bourgeois influence” was generally tied to “pleasure and
culture,” and expressed itself as “ideological subversion through satisfying leisure
desires.”909 The Komsomol TsK’s report to the Party TsK included a statement to that
effect.910 Such western influence through leisure gave rise to top-level concerns over the
subversion of a key goal pursued by the Party in offering more free time in the first
place–making a socialist modernity seem an appealing alternative to the western modern
consumer society. These notes of wariness in the internal rhetoric translated into
condemnation of western propaganda in external discourse. At the Thirteenth Komsomol
Congress in 1958, Shelepin had already critiqued Komsomol cells that did not struggle
908 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 14, d. 313, ll. 149-50.
909 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1024, l. 79. Karpinskii served from as the head of the department from July
1959 to May 1962. See A. A. Alekseeva, Stroka v biografii (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2003), 78.
910 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1025, l. 1.
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against the “influence of the mad imperialist propaganda” deployed by capitalist states
against the USSR.911 At the 1962 Fourteenth Komsomol Congress, Khrushchev
articulated a similar sentiment against the “main tool of imperialists–ideological
diversion.”912
To deal with concerns about juvenile “delinquency” and excessive western
influence, the Komsomol placed a new emphasis on teaching young people how to “relax
properly.” This initiative took off in association with the transition to a shorter workday
in 1960, most notably with the 1960 Eighth Komsomol TsK Plenum’s resolution on
organizing youth leisure. The plenum censured Komsomol committees that did not
express concern over the “ideological content of leisure,” doing an inadequate job in
opposing the “expression of bourgeois ideology and morals” among some young people.
The decree insisted that Komsomol cells had to ensure that all youth know how to spend
their free time “correctly.”913 The 1962 Komsomol Congress reinforced this plenum’s
message. S. P. Pavlov’s keynote speech obliged Komsomol organizations to ensure that
young people did not fret away their leisure.914 After the 1960 plenum resolution and
throughout the early 1960s, a series of youth newspaper articles carried similar tropes, as
illustrated by a typical title: “Leisure is Serious Business.”915 Instruction booklets
911 A. N. Shelepin, Otchetnyi doklad Tsentral’nogo Komiteta Vsesoiuznogo leninskogo
kommunisticheskogo soiuza molodezhi XIII s’’ezdu komsomola (15 aprelia 1958 g.) (Moscow: Molodaia
gvardiia, 1958), 32-34.
912 N. S. Khrushchev, “Sluzhit’ delu kommunizma (rechi na XIII i XIV s’’ezdakh VLKSM)” (Moscow:
Molodaia gvardiia, 1963), 73.
913 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1011, l. 4, 22.
914 Pavlov, Otchet Tsentral’nogo, 52-53.
915 “Otdykh – delo ser’eznoe,” Moskovskii komsomolets, July 10, 1963. Also see “Tvoi dosug – tvoe
bogatstvo,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, August 7, 1960, and “Chasy tvoego dosuga,” Komsomol’skaia
pravda, July 29, 1960.
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likewise stressed teaching youth how to value their free time and use it wisely, not
wastefully.916
In the mass cultural network, such rhetoric found its reflection in some
continuities with the policies of late 1956 to early 1958, including the further increase of
orthodox and noncontroversial cultural activities. The 1960 Eighth Komsomol TsK
plenum resolved to continue the Komsomol’s march for culture begun in the late 1950s.
It instructed Komsomol cells to use volunteer youth labor to build 15,000 clubs and
renovate 50,000 cultural institutions.917 In 1962, the Komsomol TsK asked the Party TsK
for stricter monitoring of the construction of apartment complexes in order to ascertain
that they contain sufficient club spaces for cultural activities, a request made particularly
relevant by the Thaw-era apartment building campaign.918
As suggested by the explosive growth in the number of universities of culture
discussed earlier, the Party-state also continued to pour resources into aesthetic
upbringing. In addition, club workers created other cultural forms to teach youth about
beauty and taste in culture. One instruction booklet specifically highlighted the crucial
role played by clubs in the aesthetic upbringing of youth through music. To achieve this
916 M. M. Roshchin, Chto ty delaesh’ vecherom? (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1961), 16-17; A.
Komissarova, 10 vecherov molodezhi (Moscow, Molodaia gvardiia, 1963), 5-7; and Petrova and
Rymkevich eds., Novoe v rabote klubov, 85-86.
917 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1011, l. 16.
918 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1101, l. 68. For more on the housing campaign, see Christine Varga-Harris,
“Forging Citizenship on the Home Front: Reviving the Socialist Contract and Constructing Soviet Identity
during the Thaw,” in Polly Jones ed., The Dilemmas of De-Stalinization: Negotiating Cultural and Social
Change in the Khrushchev Era (New York: Routledge, 2006), 101-16; Steven E. Harris, “‘I Know all the
Secrets of My Neighbors’: The Quest for Privacy in the Era of the Separate Apartment,” in Lewis H.
Siegelbaum ed., Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2006), 171-190; Mark B. Smith, “Individual Forms of Property in the Urban Housing Fund of the Soviet
Union, 1944-64,” The Slavonic and East European Review 86.2 (April 2008): 283-305; and Lynne
Attwood, “Housing in the Khrushchev Era,” in Ilic, Reid, and Attwood eds., Women in the Khrushchev
Era, 177-202.
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goal, the authors recommended a mix of older and newer cultural activities, such as
combinations of lectures and concerts, a university of culture on music, debates on music,
music discussion evenings, music interest clubs, and music festivals.919 In a 1964
conference on club work among young people, a speaker described how her club opened
up a musical salon, which mixed elements of an amateur music circle and a university of
culture. The salon involved free weekly meetings where the young audience members
learned how to sing, listened to lectures on music, and saw performances by musicians.920
Pavlov explicitly tied aesthetic upbringing to modernity at the 1962 Fourteenth
Komsomol Congress. In his words, “nowadays, there is much debate over what is modern
and what is not modern in youth aesthetic upbringing.” According to him, the only
appropriate “modern style” in culture involved a rejection of traditional capitalist styles
and the expression of the “spirituality and worldview of the new person.” 921 The latter
quote referred to the Third Party Program’s Moral Code of the Builder of Communism,
the model for New Soviet People from 1961 onward.922
Reaching out beyond traditional club spaces, the Komsomol also promoted
cultural “work where one lives” (rabota po mestu zhitel’stva) from the end of the 1950s
as a means of managing youth leisure time.923 For instance, in 1960 the Komsomol
919 V. E. Bondarenko, Propaganda iskusstva v klube (Moscow: Minkul’t RSFSR, 1963), 1-6, 40-65. For the
history of one music club, see G. S. Frid, Muzyka, obshchenie, sud’by: O Moskovskom molodezhnom
muzykal’nom klube. Stat’i i ocherki (Moscow: Sovremennyi Kompozitorov, 1987).
920 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 536, ll. 26-27. For more on musical salons, see L. Tiutikov and M. Sishigin
eds., Sila obshchestvennogo pochina (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1962), 39-43.
921 Pavlov, Otchet Tsentral’nogo, 47.
922 For more on this code and its implementation, see Deborah A. Field, Private Life and Communist
Morality in Khrushchev’s Russia (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2007).
923 Other scholars have briefly commented on such work where one lives, though without focusing on
cultural activities as such. See Christine Varga-Harris, “Constructing the Soviet Hearth: Home, Citizenship
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Propaganda Department called for the “wide development” of such work, including
through an innovative experiment of establishing Komsomol groups in the apartment
complexes of major cities.924 The department explicitly tied such cultural leisure
organization with the struggle against misbehavior.925 At the Third Komsomol TsK
Plenum in July 1963, Pavlov underlined the crucial role of such work “in order to fully
fill up and control [youth] free time.”926 Komsomol cells took up the implementation of
this initiative, with the Saratov oblast Komsomol indicating in 1960 that it established
committees on organizing youth leisure in apartment blocs.927 In 1960 and 1961, the
Moscow city Komsomol committee held conferences of Komsomol cadres on leisure
organization where children and youth lived.928 These activities also received support
from Komsomol newspapers and instruction booklets.929
The cultural activities depicted above came to the fore during the hard-line turn in
late 1956 and 1957. The continued growth and diversification of didactic and
noncontroversial forms of state-sponsored popular culture continued in the early 1960s.
and Socialism in Russia, 1956-1964” (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2005), 132-
86, and Elena Zhidkova, “Praktiki razresheniia semeinykh konfliktov: Obrashcheniia grazhdan v
obshchestvennye organizatsii i partiinye iacheiki,” in Iarskaia-Smirnova and Romanov eds., Sovetskaia
sotsial’naia politika, 266-89.
924 As opposed to only at the place of work or study as previously. See RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1024, l.
62.
925 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1101, l. 82.
926 S. P. Pavlov, Ob itogakh iun’skogo Plenuma TsK KPSS “Ocherednye zadachi ideologicheskoi raboty
partii” i roli komsomol’skikh organizatsii v vospitanii sovetskoi molodezhi na sovremennom etape
stroitel’stva kommunizma. Doklad pervogo sekretaria TsK VLKSM tov. Pavlova S. P. na III plenume TsK
VLKSM 9 iulia 1963 g. (Moscow:  Molodaia gvardiia, 1963), 34.
927 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1018, l. 32.
928 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 330, ll. 64-84, and TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 370, ll. 44-48.
929 “Komsomol’skim organizatsiam po mestu zhitel’stva – byt’!,” Moskovskii komsomolets, September 2,
1962, and E. Murav’ev, Ot vse dushi – liudiam (Smolensk: Smolenskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1963), 3-29.
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They aimed to impose social control over youth leisure in order to limit western influence
and juvenile “delinquency,” while also instilling aesthetic tastes and cultural consumption
desires consonant with the New Soviet Woman and Man.
Breaks in Cultural Policy, Part 1: Youth Initiative, 1958-1964
Nonetheless, as Soviet authorities came to realize, such orthodox cultural
activities could not impact those young people who avoided these events. For instance,
the 1960 Eighth Komsomol TsK Plenum’s decree on organizing youth leisure required
Komsomol organizations to pay particular attention to those who shunned amateur circles
and other collective activities and led “an improper personal life.” The TsK directed
Komsomol cells to escalate its efforts to involve such youth in the social life of
collectives and “help them deal with bad habits.”930 Such tropes did not appear in policy
statements associated with the militant turn, for instance Shelepin’s speech at the 1957
Seventh Komsomol TsK Plenum.931
The Komsomol TsK acted to guarantee that Komsomol organizations paid
attention to such young people by directing its representatives sent to the oblasts to
monitor this issue. An inquiry into Voronezh oblast by a brigade from the Komsomol
TsK found that the oblast Komsomol organizations worked primarily with those youth
who attended cultural events without any additional encouragement. Young people who
spent their time in “bad company” or who simply “lacked the taste for acquiring
knowledge” and avoided lectures, debates, and concerts remained outside of the
930 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1011, l. 22.
931 A. N. Shelepin, Ob uluchshenii ideino-vospitatel’noi raboty komsomol’skikh organizatsii sredi
molodezhi (Doklad na VII plenum TsK VLKSM 1957 g.) (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1957).
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Komsomol’s influence. The brigade recorded that frequently “young people subjected to
bourgeois influence through foreign films, literature, anti-Soviet radio programs and
rumors are left to fend for themselves.” As a result of the incompetent socializing work
by the oblast Komsomol, “some young people leave the Komsomol’s influence,” and
occasionally even committ crimes. Partially due to this, the Komsomol TsK passed a
resolution censuring the Voronezh Komsomol’s socializing work and imposed a strong
reprimand on the oblast Komsomol’s first secretary. It also sent this resolution to all
oblast- and republic-level Komsomol cells.932 Such actions reinforced the importance of
the Komsomol TsK’s instructions in this regard.
To draw youth into state-monitored collective leisure and thereby under the
influence of communist time, the Komsomol leadership took steps to make organized
cultural activities more appealing, including by offering young people more space for
initiative from below. After expressing some hesitancy over youth initiative during the
hard-line turn of late 1956 to early 1958, the Komsomol TsK once again accentuated
grassroots activism as a core value from 1958 onward. At the 1958 Thirteenth Komsomol
Congress, Shelepin strongly emphasized the development of grassroots activism in the
Komsomol.933 Khrushchev’s speech similarly stressed the need to strengthen youth
community leadership.934 Lower-level Komsomol committees repeated these themes. At
the 1958 Saratov city Komsomol meeting devoted to this congress, the keynote address
932 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 67, d. 41, ll. 40-41, 44-47.
933 Shelepin, Otchetnyi doklad, 63.
934 N. S. Khrushchev, “Vospityvat’ aktivnykh i soznatel’nykh stroitelei kommunisticheskogo obshchestva
(rech’ na XIII s’’ezde VLKSM 18 aprelia 1958 goda)” (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1961), 33-34.
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highlighted social activism, particularly in organizing cultural leisure activities.935 The
1958 Moscow city Komsomol’s annual conference overtly connected “unworthy
behavior” with a “lack of trust and excessive organizational control by adults, where
Komsomol members do not feel themselves to be truly in charge of their own cell.”936 In
the 1960 Eighth Komsomol TsK Plenum’s decree on youth, the TsK accentuated the need
for initiative-based organized cultural activities, linking them to the call at the 1959
Twenty-first Communist Party Congress for developing activism.937
Promoting grassroots initiative received further support from the 1961 Twenty-
second Communist Party Congress and the Third Party Program it adopted, which
stressed the need for more volunteer work. In fact, youth initiative club activists
referenced this congress in advocating for more support to such clubs.938 Instructional
booklets quoted the program’s advocacy of societal self-management and cultural
growth, tying this to developing grassroots activism in clubs.939 After the congress, the
Komsomol TsK further decentralized the Komsomol by strengthening the power of
primary Komsomol cells vis-à-vis higher-level ones.940
Along with previously voiced motivations for developing grassroots initiative–
satisfying youth desires and helping prepare young people to manage the upcoming
communist society–a new one appeared in the mid-Thaw. Komsomol leaders, such as
935 GANISO, f. 4529, op. 14, d. 2, ll. 44-45.
936 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 14, d. 240, l. 23.
937 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1011, ll. 12-18.
938 For example, in RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1096, l. 7.
939 Petrova and Rymkevich eds., Novoe v rabote klubov, 3-4.
940 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 67, d. 16, l. 216.
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Pavlov at the Fourteenth Komsomol Congress, began to emphasize that western
propaganda attempted to undermine the young generation’s construction of communism
“by advertising false bourgeois freedoms and democracy.941 In his 1960 memo described
earlier, Karpinskii wrote that foreign ideology influences youth through appealing to their
morality, “by presenting the idea of freedom of behavior” as attractive. He asserted that
the Komsomol’s “reliance on prohibitions in its moral upbringing work” could not
compete successully with the deceptive image of freedom and democracy offered by the
United States and western Europe. Karpinskii censured extant methods of socializing
youth by noting that these approaches “do not match Lenin’s understanding of the active
and historical creativity of the masses,” and that they “resemble religion” in relying on
proscriptions.942 In other words, certain Komsomol higher-ups advocated offering youth
opportunities for initiative from below within the constraints of state-managed settings as
a better means of fighting western influence than simple bans on jazz and dancing.
Another new motivation for soliciting youth activism in organized cultural
activities came from the effort to deal with what authorities described as the excessively
consumerist outlook of some youth. Official discourse also associated this with western
propaganda. For instance, Pavlov’s Fourteenth Komsomol Congress speech blamed
foreign propaganda for presenting “illusions of personal enrichment” and chided those
who thought that, under communism, individuals would have all the consumer goods
they desired while doing light and easy labor for short periods.943 At the congress,
941 Pavlov, Otchet Tsentral’nogo, 39-40.
942 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1024, l. 86.
943 Pavlov, Otchet Tsentral’nogo, 40.
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Khrushchev underlined that “communism, first of all, presumes material and spiritual
abundance for each individual,” nonetheless, he also criticized those “parasitic elements”
that wanted to “live well without working for it.”944 Such public pronouncements
reflected internal worries over the failures of the Komsomol’s socializing work,
particularly in cultural activities, as illustrated by Karpinskii’s 1960 memo. He tied such
concerns over consumption to poorly organized cultural activities for young people, ones
that lacked sufficient space for initiative from below. Karpinskii concluded that the
ideological struggle with western propaganda was “coming to center on leisure, pleasure,
and aesthetics,” and that “the forms of our propaganda and cultural work are not up to
par.”945 In other words, he advocated giving youth more room for grassroots activism as a
way of competing with the western consumer society’s offering of “false bourgeois
freedoms” and “illusions of personal enrichment.”
Such top-level support paved the way for an upswing in youth initiative within
state-sponsored popular culture from the end of the 1950s. Amateur cultural activities
garnered more support and a grander scale. The cultural bureaucracy approved the
transformation of some elite amateur theaters into people’s theaters (narodnye teatry).946
Some amateur classic music circles became volunteer philharmonics and symphony
944 Khrushchev, “Sluzhit’ delu kommunizma (rechi na XIII i XIV s’’ezdakh VLKSM),” 47. For more on the
campaign against “parasites,” see Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Social Parasites: How Tramps, Idle Youth, and Busy
Entrepreneurs Impeded the Soviet March to Communism,” Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique 47.1-2
(2006): 377-408, and Leon Lipson, “Hosts and Pests: The Fight Against Parasites,” in Richard Cornell ed.,
The Soviet Political System: A Book of Readings (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), 323-33.
945 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1024, l. 87.
946 For the by-laws of narodnye teatry, see TsAGM, f. 2987, op. 1, d. 81, l. 1. For more on such institutions,
see Susan Costanzo, “Amateur Theatres and Amateur Publics in the Russian Republic, 1958-71,” The
Slavonic and East European Review, 86.2 (April 2008): 372-94, and Costanzo, “Reclaiming the Stage:
Amateur Theater-Studio Audiences in the Late Soviet Era,” Slavic Review 57.2 (Summer 1998): 398-424.
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orchestras.947 Besides the prestige associated with their new titles, such institutions
gained more financial resources, with clubs hiring staff devoted to managing them.
Likewise, novel initiative-oriented cultural forms appeared, such as volunteer
clubs (kluby na obshchestvennykh nachalakh). These institutions with no paid staff went
beyond youth initiative clubs that struggled to find room in cultural institutions managed
by trade unions and other institutions. Soviet authorities assigned the new volunteer clubs
individual spaces, under the control of the club itself. The first such club in Moscow,
“Aktivist” (Activist) in the Krasnopresnenskii neighborhood, provides an example of
these new organizations. Created in October 1959 with the help of a local house of
culture, “Activist” targeted young people and had a space of its own at 10 Oktiabr’skoe
pole Street, which included a hall for 200 people, 7 rooms for various cultural activities, a
library with 6,000 titles, and a photography lab. The club’s volunteer activists chose the
motto “We have one paid staff member–enthusiasm.” It organized meetings with
notables, youth leisure evenings, carnivals, and other events. “Activist” reportedly
“became the favorite place for rest and leisure of the youth in the Oktiabr’skii pole
microdistrict.”948
At an April 1962 club conference, the volunteer director of the “Entuziast”
(Enthusiast) club stressed that giving young club members responsibility for organizing
leisure activities formed the basis for the success of “Enthusiast.” This club had a well-
maintained hall for 120 people and 14 small rooms. According to the director, the
“Enthusiast” club’s fine appearance resulted from its young club members voluntarily
947 Petrova and Rymkevich eds., Novoe v rabote klubov, 8.
948 TsAGM, f. 1988, op. 1, d. 114, ll. 38-39.
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spending their free time to renovate the run-down basement space assigned to
“Enthusiast.” As an example of this volunteer club’s appeal, he described how a group of
amateurs who enjoyed composing and singing songs felt uncomfortable in trade union
clubs when the management directed them to write certain songs (chto-to po zakazu
napisat’). Furthermore, these clubs refused to dedicate a room for youth to just hang out.
“Enthusiast,” however, did not place demands on young people to write certain songs,
offering them the scope to indulge their creative talents. It also provided them with club
spaces to spend time talking and relaxing with one another, engaging in obshchenie
instead of conducting directed cultural activities. As a result, these talented amateurs
relocated to “Enthusiast” and wrote a series of songs that became popular among
Moscow youth.949
These amateur singer-composers represented part of the bard movement, who
composed and performed poetic songs accompanied by guitar music. This guitar poetry
struck a powerful chord with Soviet audiences from the late 1950s onward, at first
primarily with the cultural intelligentsia and college students, and later more broadly as
well. Some of the bards wrote edgy and daring songs that challenged the limits of the
tolerable for the authorities. The new availability of tape recorders enabled the rapid
spread of such songs without going through official organs, allowing individual singer
poets to achieve national fame.950 While scholars have placed the brunt of their attention
on the controversies surrounding the most daring bards, plenty of young people
949 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 258, ll. 34-36.
950 See Richard Stites, Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment and Society since 1900 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 134, and Gerald S. Smith, Songs to Seven Strings: Russian Guitar
Poetry and Soviet “Mass Song” (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984).
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composed guitar poetry that did not provoke official ire, such as the amateurs in
“Enthusiast.” They even served as a target of competition between different club
managers, underlining the prestige associated with hosting young bards who write
popular and noncontroversial songs. These amateurs represent part of a broad movement
of guitar poetry that occurred within club spaces, with circles and amateur competitions
devoted to this genre drawing mass involvement by young Soviet citizens.951
Both “Enthusiast” and “Activist” made youth activism central to their activities,
while the substantial spaces occupied by these volunteer clubs, a particularly scarce
resource in Moscow, illustrates the support for these new cultural forms from above.
Moreover, in his speech at the 1962 Fourteenth Komsomol Congress, Pavlov drew
attention to “Enthusiast,” “Activist,” and other such clubs, as embodying the renewed
emphasis on social activism and on work where youth reside.952 Official discourse
explicitly linked volunteer clubs to building communism. An instruction booklet about
these novel institutions termed them “the cells of the communist future,” as they
constituted “the prototype of social organizations that will be in place at the completion
of the complex process of the development of socialist governance into communist
societal self-management.”953
Volunteer clubs also faced a number of challenges. According to the director of
“Enthusiast,” the biggest one consisted of getting prominent actors and writers to visit the
951 For more on such bards who did not write explicitly controversial songs, see my interview with a
prominent bard and later organizer of guitar poetry competitions, S. A. Krylov, born 1941, interviewed
March 2, 2009. For another prominent bard who similarly did not challenged authorities, see V. А. Miliaev,
born 1937, interviewed February 28, 2009.
952 Pavlov, Otchet Tsentral’nogo, 37.
953 V. I. Brudnyi, V klube gde vsem interesno: Iz opyta raboty kluba na obshchestvennykh nachalakh
(Moscow: Profizdat, 1962), 3-4.
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club without paying an honorarium, a problem similar to the one faced by universities of
culture. In another financially-related issue, he expressed the desire for minimal
independent financing to take care of minor club needs without having to appeal to
various agencies. As an alternative, he suggested allowing volunteer clubs to hold paid
performances. The director also called for trade union clubs to assist the activities of
volunteer clubs.954
Despite such obstacles, with the support of youth enthusiasm from below and top-
level advocacy from above, volunteer-based cultural forms grew rapidly in the early
1960s. The Moscow trade union hierarchy sent a signal to factories in 1962 on the
desirability of shifting club activities to a volunteer basis. As a result by September 1962
the “Kommunal’nik” factory created a volunteer club council and transferred the former
club director to work in one of the factory workshops.955 By the end of 1962, twenty-six
volunteer clubs served Moscow residents, with sixteen of them opening up that year.956
Krasnopresnenskii neighborhood cultural institutions set up a volunteer body to
coordinate amateur cultural activities.957 Volunteer movie theaters appeared, too.958
Archival reports from clubs now often included specific sections and even whole reports
on how they developed grassroots activism, demonstrating that the cultural hierarchy
954 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 258, ll. 39-41.
955 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 269, l. 12. Note that the volunteer club council elected the former director as its
leader. This may have been a way to formally comply with top-level pressure for more volunteerism, while
in reality freeing the club manager from any obligations except running the club. Factory managers used
such tactics for the athletes on factory teams, and they may well have applied this tactic here as well. On
athletes, see Robert Edelman, Spartak Moscow: A History of the People’s Team in the Workers’ State
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).
956 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 254, ll. 13-14.
957 TsAGM, f. 1988, op. 1, d. 114, ll. 34-35.
958 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 269, l. 7.
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asked clubs to document their efforts.959 Volunteer cultural forms arose in rural areas as
well. The 1960 Eighth Komsomol TsK Plenum commended several collective farm clubs
in Belgorod oblast for shifting to an all-volunteer staff.960
These examples reflect the renewed commitment of the leadership to grassroots
initiative, one even stronger than in the early Thaw. Pavlov confirmed this support at the
1963 Komsomol TsK Third Plenum, stating that the Party’s measures to “restore Leninist
norms,” a euphemism for de-Stalinization, “gave wide room for the development of the
creativity, activism, and initiative of the masses.” He rebuked traditional, heavy-handed
organized activities “characterized by a mix of voluntary and coercive elements
(dobrovol’no-prinuditel’nye).” Instead, he called for “democratization,” so that young
people “have the widest possible choice of forms of leisure and the satisfaction of their
artistic interests.”961 For local institutions, besides satisfying a top-level policy drive,
reliance on volunteers likely served as a welcome cost-cutting measure.
Nonetheless, tensions between hard-liners and soft-liners over youth initiative in
organized cultural activities manifested themselves in many settings, most notably at
several club worker conferences held in 1962. According to the director of the Rusakov
House of Culture, many club events were “excessively organized,” which led to
“boredom” among youth. He advocated that trade union clubs give young people more
room to organize cultural activities on their own.962 Another speaker denounced
959 For instance, TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 269, ll. 2-12.
960 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1011, ll. 12-18. Also see Z. A. Petrova, Resheniia XXII s’’ezda KPSS
pretvoriaiutsia v zhizn’ (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1963), 87-98.
961 Pavlov, Ob itogakh, 39-40.
962 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 258, l. 20.
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“conservatives among club officials” who refused to provide space and financing to
youth initiative clubs and support youth activism.963 Similarly, the assistant director of
the Zuev club regretted that 90 percent of club events centered on upbringing and
ideology, while only 10 percent emphasized fun. He suggested that club workers reverse
this ratio, offering cultural activities that primarily stress interesting and pleasurably
activities.964 L. S. Zhuravleva, the organizer of the November 1962 conference, supported
the soft-line position, stating that “some of our club workers are still beholden to old
traditions: youth have already stepped beyond [these traditions], but we are somewhat
behind.” She instead called for “finding new forms” of working with young people, ones
“in step with life.”965 Such approaches aimed to attract youth into clubs and develop
youth abilities to manage society through encouraging grassroots leadership.
Hard-liners took a different view. The manager of the “Red Proletarian” Press’
House of Culture criticized the idea that “we need to break old traditions and transition to
new forms of work,” and expressed her disagreement with the “many that let youth take
the lead.” At her club, activities centered on ideology and propaganda, such as lectures
and book discussions. She refused to host dances, censuring the practice of “promoting
Maiakovskii between evening dances,” meaning using fun activities to get young people
into clubs and then exposing youth to a degree of political and cultural propaganda in the
club itself. Facing the problem of small audiences, her club applied pressure to get young
people to attend propaganda-oriented club events. They took attendance, listing young
963 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1096, l. 108.
964 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 257, l. 58.
965 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 262, l. 52.
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workers from each workshop coming to the book discussions and lectures, and publicly
critiqing those workshops that had low attendance. This caused the Party and Komsomol
cell officials of each workshop to pressure workers to attend. The club director
acknowledged that many of those at the club worker conference would disagree with this
strategy.966 Indeed, her position on such social pressure proved extreme, with no other
speaker voicing support for this approach. However, others also strongly promoted
lecture propaganda. One speaker, for instance, disparaged the idea that lectures “as a
method of propaganda have ceased to be useful,” and called for more such activities.967
Overall, however, hard-liners who opposed youth initiative in state-sponsored popular
culture occupied defensive positions at these 1962 conferences, where soft-liners
generally predominated, supported by top-level policies.
Breaks in Cultural Policy, Part 2: Western Popular Culture, 1958-1964
A more radical shift in the strategies used by Soviet authorities to get more young
people into state-managed cultural institutions and consequently into the sphere of
communist time involved allowing greater room for western culture in club activities.
According to L. K. Baliasnaia, the 1957 Sixth International Youth Festival brought in so
much western cultural influence that “stubbornly opposing all of it” on the leadership’s
part “was simply unreasonable.” She regretted that youth wanted western dances and
966 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 262, ll. 58-60.
967 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1096, l. 68.
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jazz, but noted that Komsomol cadres, including her, “accommodated their wishes,”
because “if only the waltz was offered, no one would come to the evening dances.”968
Recognizing the reality of this situation, the Soviet leadership abandoned the
hard-line approach in 1958. That May, the Party TsK enacted a decree on correcting the
mistakes in the February 1948 Party TsK resolution censuring the opera “Great
Friendship.” The 1958 decree critiqued Stalin’s “subjective approach” toward artistic
activities, as expressed by the 1948 resolution.969 Since the latter had formed the basis for
the attacks on western popular culture and remained in force until the new statement, the
Party TsK’s 1958 resolution opened up much more room for jazz and western dancing in
clubs.
Consequently, jazz elements curbed during the hard-line turn of late 1956 and
1957 acquired a more prominent place in the repertoire of amateur variety orchestras at
the end of the 1950s. The example of the ideologically militant administration of the
Moscow House of Folk Art casts light on this trend at the grassroots level. The Moscow
DNT complained in 1959 that amateur variety ensembles “have sprung up in large
numbers” with these groups “trying to copy western jazz bands,” particularly variety
groups in educational institutions. Youth, “having barely learned to play an instrument,
try to find a gig at a dance hall.” The latter statement demonstrates the high demand at
evening dances at this time for jazz players, even beginners. The Moscow DNT censured
the directors of jazz-oriented variety collectives for following the lead of young people,
968 L. K. Baliasnaia, born 1927, interviewed April 5, 2009.
969 Reprinted in M. A. Solov’ev, Materialy po kul’turno-prosvetitel’noi rabote (Moscow: Sovetskaia
Rossiia, 1959), 43-45.
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instead of socializing them into appropriate musical tastes.970 The latter illustrates the
connections between a pluralistic stance toward western popular culture and permitting
youth room for initiative from below: allowing young people to take the lead resulted in
more western dancing and jazz playing.
The DNT tried to impose more controls over variety ensembles. For instance, in
1960 it created a department devoted to managing these ensembles, which held meetings,
carried out inspections, and issued certifications.971 These steps did not help much, as
shown by the Moscow cultural department’s 1962 criticism of the “especially
problematic situation” in variety orchestras, which “have recently become widespread,”
but often “try to emulate bad western jazz groups.”972 At the March 1962 club
conference, the director of the Moscow DNT complained that, “under the pretense of
performing folk pieces, variety ensembles play many Negro and American songs.” He
explicitly tied this music to western Cold War cultural propaganda, describing how West
Germany promoted such music among East German youth as a means of turning them
toward the western way of life, and implying that similar processes were at work in the
USSR.973 The director’s words attest both to official worries about, and the reality of, the
actual grassroots impact of western cultural propaganda in the GDR, the USSR, and other
970 TsAGM, f. 2987, op. 1, d. 70, l. 32.
971 TsAGM, f. 2987, op. 1, d. 75, ll. 2-3.
972 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 254, l. 11.
973 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 257, l. 26.
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socialist states.974 Karpinskii’s and Pavlov’s statements described earlier show that the
Komsomol leaders shared some of these concerns.
Nonetheless, at the end of the 1950s top Komsomol officials decided that getting
young people into state-monitored spaces constituted a more important goal than their
fears over the subversive impact of western popular culture. As a result, Komsomol
newspapers began to publish articles voicing open-mindedness toward jazz. A 1960
editorial in Komsomol’skaia pravda suggested that Soviet musicians may play jazz but
write their own compositions instead of copying western ones.975 Regional newspapers
followed suit. In September 1962, the Moscow Komsomol organ ran an article by the
controversial writer V. P. Aksenov, entitled “Please Come In, Comrade Jazz.” Aksenov
defended jazz as a “true folk art,” and listed a variety of different jazz styles:
“‘dixieland,’ ‘modern,’ mainstream,’” as well as “cool jazz” and “hot jazz.” He spoke of
the many amateur jazz bands in Moscow, Leningrad, Talinn, Novosibirsk, Odessa, and
other cities. Going against those who condemned jazz as a western Cold War weapon,
Aksenov mocked the view that cultural forms created in the United States necessarily
served imperialist goals. The article also had several quotes from prominent Soviet
artistic figures supporting jazz.976 Moreover, the protagonists in Aksenov’s literary works
974 For more on western cultural propaganda, see Reinhold Wagnleitner and Elaine Tyler May, eds., “Here,
There and Everywhere: The Foreign Politics of American Popular Culture (Hanover: University Press of
New England, 2000); Michael Nelson, War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in
the Cold War (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997); and Uta G. Poiger, Jazz, Rock, and Rebels:
Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2000).
975 For this article and a discussion of its context, see S. Frederick Starr, Red and Hot: The Fate of Jazz in
the Soviet Union, 1917-1980 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 262.
976 “Dobro pozhalovat’, tovarishch Dzhaz,” Moskovskii komsomolets, September 9, 1962.
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frequently listened to jazz.977 At the local level, the Saratov State University paper
published a story about a university evening event devoted to jazz, which included a
graduate student describing the history of this music. The article noted that “youth like
jazz,” but spoke about the need to develop appropriate musical tastes in this area and
“struggle with vulgarity and primitivism in music, such as ‘rock,’” setting jazz music
against rock and roll.978 This and similar pieces functioned to legitimate the newest
American-style jazz, such as cool jazz and bop, in organized cultural activities. At the
same time, the journalist placed rock music beyond the limits of the acceptable.
The new tolerance for jazz paved the way for the creation of jazz interest-based
clubs. Apparently, the first sprang up in Leningrad in 1958, where a group of jazz
enthusiasts in their early twenties received permission from the administration of the
Kirov House of Culture to create a jazz association. The club, named “D-58,” held
lectures on jazz and played jazz music.979 Other jazz interest-based clubs opened up in
Leningrad at the end of the 1950s. In 1960, jazz enthusiasts established the first Moscow
club at the Energy Engineer’s House of Culture, which also held jazz lectures and
concerts.980 Other clubs soon opened their doors in major cities, for instance Kalinin,
Novosibirsk, Tashkent, and Voronezh.981 The Komsomol sponsored these jazz clubs.982
977 For example, in his 1963 novel Apelsiny iz Marokko, reprtinted in V. P. Aksenov, Sobranie Sochinenii,
Vol. 1 (Moscow: Iunost’, 1994), 353.
978 “Tem, kto liubit muzyku,” Leninskii put’, March 2, 1963.
979 See a March 2006 BBC interview with one of the club founders, E. S. Barban, “Dzhaz v epokhu
Khrushcheva: ‘Na kostiakh’ i tol’ko na tantsakh,”
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/in_depth/newsid_4753000/4753692.stm [Accessed March 24, 2011].
980 Starr, Red and Hot, 263. Also see the memoir account of a jazz enthusiast, Mikhail Kull’, Stupeni
Voskhozhdeniia. http://www.jazz.ru/books/kull/default.htm [Accessed March 24, 2011].
981 Starr, Red and Hot, 263.
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The Kremlin went further and invited western jazz musicians to tour the Soviet
Union.983 The first tour by a western band officially invited to play jazz in the USSR took
place in the summer of 1962. A swing-style big band led by the clarinetist Benny
Goodman visited five Soviet cities. According to historian Penny von Eschen, Soviet
authorities invited Goodman because he played a more traditional swing style as opposed
to the newer bop or cool jazz. Besides this, Goodman, as a white jazz band leader, did not
offer as much of a challenge to the Soviet official discourse’s stress on American racism.
Goodman met with much success among the audience and authorities alike. Khrushchev
participated in a standing ovation at one performance. Jazz enthusiasts jammed together
with Goodman’s sidemen in Leningrad, Moscow, and other cities, despite some police
intimidation.984
During this period, official tolerance also extended to new western dances. From
the late 1950s, the boogie-woogie and the charleston became increasingly visible in
clubs, and the twist, the shake, and other dances associated with rock’n’roll began to
appear. At first, only a small minority performed these dances, while the vast majority
either danced ballroom dances or the foxtrot, tango, and mamba, which by now inspired
much less controversy. Depending on the local context and individual ideological
leanings of the secretaries in local Komsomol cells, the more daring dancers occasionally
982 A. S. Kozlov, "Kozel na sakse’’: I tak vsiu zhizn’ (Moscow: Vagrius, 1998), 112-13.
983 western jazz musicians already performed at the 1957 Moscow International Youth Festival. One group,
under Michel Legrand, received permission to tour the Soviet Union after the festival, with the cultural
bureaucracy apparently not realizing that Legrand’s band played both jazz and nonjazz compositions. In its
tour premier in Leningrad, the big band played only jazz and had a powerful impact on Leningrad jazz
musicians. See Barban: “Dzhaz v epokhu Khrushcheva: ‘Na kostiakh’ i tol’ko na tantsakh.”
984 Penny M. Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 92-120, and Starr, Red and Hot, 270-72.
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received censure. However, the expanded authority gained by primary-level Komsomol
cells during the Thaw sometimes served to protect such youth. A. S. Derzhavets, who
served as a Komsomol secretary for his class at his Moscow technical college, simply
ignored suggestions from the department Komsomol to publicly criticize the western
dancing of his cell members at the class-level Komsomol meetings. The department
Komsomol did not press the issue. Still, some other primary Komsomol cells in his
college did censure such youth.985 Musical patrols also targeted controversial western
dances, visiting evening dances and reporting on those that went beyond the permitted
tango and foxtrot dancing.986 In addition to official organizations, parents criticized
children dancing the twist and similar dances.987
By the early 1960s, official tolerance increasingly extended to the charleston,
twist, boogie-woogie, and other dances as young people began to adopt them en masse.
Many of those I interviewed recalled youth eagerly dancing them, whether in private
settings or in state-sponsored events.988 Although neither the Komsomol nor parents
placed much pressure on youth regarding these dances, some young people found the
twist and the charleston hard to accept. As a schoolgirl in the early 1960s, I. B.
Sokol’skaia initially disliked the twist, considering it ugly and vulgar. Furthermore, she
had a problem with the twist due to the fact that each individual danced it alone, as
opposed to the waltz or tango, danced in pairs. Sokol’skaia thus saw dancing the twist as
985 A. S. Derzhavets, born 1935, interviewed April 28, 2009.
986 Stites, Russian Popular Culture, 133, and Starr, Red and Hot, 262.
987 I. B. Sokol’skaia, born 1947, interviewed November 8, 2008.
988 I. V. Sokolov, born 1940, interviewed April 16, 2009; V. E. Sobolev, born 1953, interviewed April 29;
and D. V. Gal’tsоv, born 1942, interviewed February 20, 2009.
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separating individuals from the collective, something that for her went against Soviet
ideological precepts. She did eventually come to like the twist through watching her
friend, an amateur gymnast, perform it in an appealing manner. Sokol’skaia also made
what she called “an ideological leap” to get over her discomfort regarding the perceived
separation from the collective involved in learning how to twist.989 Her difficulties in
overcoming ideological challenges of embracing the twist illuminates the impact of
official propaganda on many youth.
A major impetus for these western dances came from the influx of foreigners to
the USSR in the late 1950s, with universities in the main Soviet cities that hosted many
international students a particularly potent area of contact and learning. S. K. Kovaleva at
Moscow State University remembered learning about both western dances and fashion
from foreign students at the university. She visited Czechoslovakia as part of an amateur
student troupe, learned the jive, and brought it back with her to the USSR.990
During the early 1960s, wide-ranging debates arose among club workers over the
appropriate stance toward these dances. At the club conferences in 1962, some officials
express a tolerant stance toward the twist, the charleston, and other controversial dances.
A representative from the “Red Star” House of Culture expressed surprise over the recent
revival in the popularity of the charleston and recalled dancing it himself when young,
implying that doing so would not harm Soviet youth.991 In his speech, the assistant
managed of the Zuev club asked the audience to recall that, before 1953, the official line
989 I. B. Sokol’skaia, born 1947, interviewed November 8, 2008.
990 S. K. Kovaleva, interviewed March 3, 2009.
991 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 262, l. 20.
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precluded all western dances, and asked “why are we so scared that someone will dance
rock’n’roll?” He observed that the intolerant stance of many club officials “drove young
people away into private apartments,” where they danced the twist anyway.992 His
remarks spotlight the compromise that many officials called for, permitting western
culture in clubs as a means of getting youth into state-monitored spaces. The goal of
fulfilling financial plans remained another motive for permissive views of western
dances, as many young people eagerly paid the fees to visit the dance halls of clubs that
played the twist and the charleston. Other officials rejected this soft-line stance on
western dances. An administrator from the Rusakov House of Culture criticized the
tolerant stance toward the charleston expressed by the representative from the “Red Star”
House of Culture.993 Another official, described as an “elder club worker” in the
conference transcript, called new dances, where “people shake instead of dancing,” an
example of “true bourgeois ideology, which enters our souls through the feet, through
shaking.”994 A representative from the Leningrad city Komsomol committee associated
modern dances with youth vulgarity and improper relationships with women.995
These differences of opinion underscore the tensions between militant-oriented
and pluralistic approaches to youth cultural activities and communist construction as a
whole. In fact, those who expressed permissiveness toward western dancing at these
conferences invariably advocated for youth initiative from below, while those opposed to
such dances tended to call for more direction from above. Be that as it may, much room
992 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 257, ll. 56-57.
993 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 262, l. 72.
994 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 258, l. 13.
995 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1096, ll. 55-56.
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opened up for western culture in organized cultural activities during the early 1960s,
despite the opposition of some hard-line bureaucrats. Still, the clubs whose
administrations held hard-line viewpoints on this matter avoided offering the newer
western dances in spite of the potential financial gains. This made it hard for young
people living near or belonging to these clubs to access the twist, the charleston and other
dances in official settings, driving many to dance them in private apartments, as the Zuev
club representative noted.
Some youth also opted to dance recent western dances in nonofficial contexts to
avoid any state monitoring altogether, especially when practicing activities that even the
most soft-line officials would not accept. According to the Komsomol Propaganda
Department, in 1960 a group of young people in Orsk, composed of factory workers,
technical and pedagogical college students, and school teachers, began to gather in
private apartments for “drunken orgies.” There, they drank, played cards, and “danced
rock’n’roll without any clothes on.” News about the group spread to Sverdlovsk,
Kuibyshev, and other nearby cities, and young people began to come to Orsk to
participate in these activities. The police shut this group down in early 1962.996 It would
be an understatement to say that no club in the USSR would have agreed to sponsor such
activities, which bore some parallels to hippie communes in the United States.997
The discovery of this group served as one of many factors that aroused official
concerns about the impact of western cultural influence and drove authorities to another
996 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1102, ll. 150-51.
997 For more on parallels between Soviet countercultural youth and western hippies, see William J. Risch,
“Soviet ‘Flower Children’: Hippies and the Youth Counter-culture in 1970s L’viv,” Journal of
Contemporary History 40.3 (July 2005): 565-584.
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brief hard-line swing in the last years of Khrushchev’s reign, from late 1962 onward.
However, the most important motive for this shift came from Cold War developments.
The Soviet humiliation during the Cuban Missile Crisis placed Khrushchev on the
defensive. China’s growing rift with the USSR proved even more vital. The Chinese
leadership condemned the Khrushchev Kremlin for abandoning revolutionary rigor and
adopting an intolerably soft-line approach toward building communism, causing the
Soviet top officials to swing toward ideological militancy to address these criticisms.
Besides these, the Soviet Party leader’s signature domestic programs, the drive to develop
the Virgin Lands and to plant corn, increasingly appeared to be serious
miscalculations.998 All this inspired anxiety among the Khrushchev leadership over
whether it had chosen the correct path toward communism.999 As a result, the Kremlin
sought support among hard-liners with a turn toward militancy.
This change in direction impacted the cultural sphere, including state-sponsored
popular culture. During his December 1962 tirade against formalist art at the Manege
exhibit, Khrushchev mentioned his dislike for jazz and the newer western dances. At an
early March 1963 meeting with cultural figures, Khrushchev spoke out against abstract
art, literature that did not fit the strictures of Socialist Realism, avant-garde architecture,
and innovative American-style jazz and modern western dances, though clearly leaving
998 See Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Insider Story of an
American Adversary (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), 469-528, and Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire:
The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2007), 123-91.
999 William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 529-619. On
the role of anxiety in the Khrushchev leadership’s decisions, see Miriam Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold
Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, and the Fate of Reform after Stalin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2009), 156-214.
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room for Sovietized jazz.1000 Following Khrushchev’s lead, Komsomol leaders made
similar claims. Pavlov, speaking in July 1963, criticized the fact that dance halls featured
so many “‘boogies,’ ‘rocks’, and ‘twists.’” As an example, he cited dance halls in
Ivanovo that featured “a boisterous orgy of delirious bodily movements to the wail of
jazz music.”1001 Cultural institutions, such as Moscow’s cultural department, imposed
stricter controls over the repertoire of amateur jazz bands and the music played in dance
halls.1002 An internal Komsomol Propaganda Department memo critiqued those youth
who listened to foreign jazz radio broadcasts and sent letters to these radio stations
making song requests and asking for gramophone records and instructions on dancing.
The department accused these stations of “using the interest of young people toward
these dances to spread skeptical and philistine attitudes among Soviet youth.”1003 This
report also illustrates the perlustration of letters sent abroad by Soviet youth.
Nonetheless, this change in policy did not have nearly as much of a grassroots
impact as the one in late 1956, both because the Khrushchev leadership did not swing
nearly as far toward the hard line in late 1962 and because of bottom-up factors. Some of
the more prominent and innovative jazz institutions suffered. The Moscow Jazz Club was
shut down and touring big bands had to limit the number of jazz pieces in their
1000 Vladislav Zubok, Zhivago’s Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia (Cambridge: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 2009), 193-225; Susan E. Reid, “In the Name of the People: The Manege Affair
Revisited,” Kritika 6.4 (Fall 2005): 673-716; Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 215-36; M. R. Zezina,
Sovetskaia khudozhestvennaia intelligentsiia i vlast’ v 1950-e – 60-e gody (Moscow: Dialog-MGU, 1999);
Starr, Red and Hot, 273-75; and Stites, Russian Popular Culture, 146.
1001 Pavlov, Ob itogakh, 43-44.
1002 TsAGM, f. 429, op. 1, d. 803a, ll. 6-17, 44.
1003 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1055, l. 13.
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repertoires.1004 Clubs expressed more hesitancy over hosting western music and dancing.
Still, the explosion of amateur and professional jazz bands and the mass demand among
young people for the charleston, the twist, and similar dances hampered top-level efforts
to limit western popular culture. Simultaneously, administrators found it challenging to
make a serious case for jazz as a source of degeneracy after the tolerant attitude of the
previous years. Indeed, while many Komsomol papers published articles censuring jazz,
some local-level ones expressed tolerance.1005 Clubs with soft-line officials, as well as
ones seeking to achieve high financial goals, continued to play new western dances.
Crucially, the Soviet leadership maintained its commitment to youth community
leadership and social activism.1006 Thus, many jazz interest-based clubs met, discussed
jazz, and played jazz records. Youth initiative clubs hosted western popular culture as
well. The increasing number of youth cafes offered more and more venues for novel jazz
styles and, in some cases, western dancing. Consequently, most young people retained
access to western music and dancing in state-sponsored popular culture, although these
grew somewhat more limited during this period.
Youth Cafes, 1960-1964
During the early 1960s, young Soviet urbanites acquired a new place to spend
their leisure time: youth cafes. Local Komsomol cells managed youth cafes, which
explicitly targeted young people and soon proved immensely popular. This new cultural
1004 Starr, Red and Hot, 275.
1005 For criticism of jazz, see “Dzhaz i molitvennyi ekstaz,” Moskovskii komsomolets, October 1, 1963. For
support of jazz, see “Tem, kto liubit muzyku,” Leninskii put’, March 2, 1963.
1006 For example, see Pavlov, Ob itogakh, 39-40.
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institution best embodied the soft-line turn toward youth initiative and tolerance of
western popular culture in organized cultural activities.
In their appearance and program, youth cafes departed from the precedents of
trade union clubs. Youth cafes had large, well-decorated halls with tables and chairs,
where young people talked, drank coffee and, at some cafes, wine, ate light and
inexpensive meals. This contrasts with trade union clubs, whose halls had rows of chairs
faced the stage for lectures, concerts, and theater performances, and which offered only
snack bars. The youth cafe set-up shifted the center of gravity to the interactions between
cafe visitors themselves, as opposed to the stage. On most days, the entertainment largely
consisted of jazz ensembles playing American-style jazz. Several times a month, or more
often depending on the cafe, they also held special events that resembled those at youth
initiative clubs, such as youth debates, meetings with prominent musicians, artists, and
writers, and other engaging activities, with no political propaganda lectures. Some cafes
had dance floors. Some had rooms where youth hung out, talked, and played ping-pong,
chess, and billiards.1007
Local Komsomol cadres proved most crucial to the creation of youth cafes. They
took on the task of gaining permission for these new cultural forms, carving a niche for
them within the Soviet system, and managing many of the day-to-day cafe activities. The
first serious official discussions over youth cafes likely took place in the Moscow
Komsomol during 1959. The Timiriazev neighborhood Komsomol officials convinced
higher-ups to try out youth cafes as a new experimental form that would appeal to
1007 See TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 257, ll. 30-39. 45-53; RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 69, ll. 15-30; and G.
Dubrova and N. Proshchunin, Sputnik komsomol’skogo aktivista: Spravochnaia knizhka (Moscow:
Molodaia gvardiia, 1962), 234-36.
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youth.1008 The Komsomol leadership offered potent support for youth cafes in the July
1960 resolution of the Eighth Komsomol TsK Plenum. The TsK called for Komsomol
cadres to take on the organization of youth leisure in food establishments, and
specifically called for the creation of “interest-based cafes that organize meetings,
musical and dance programs, competitions, and exhibits.”1009 In a 1960 Moscow
conference of Komsomol cadres, “The Struggle for the Culture of the Young Muscovite,”
the First Secretary of the Kirov Komsomol neighborhood called for creating exemplary
forms of youth cultural leisure, including cafes.1010 Komsomol’skaia pravda published a
series of articles promoting youth cafes in 1961.1011
With such support, the first youth cafes soon opened their doors in 1960 and
1961. Many failed due to the obstacles involved in organizing such novel volunteer-run
institutions that provided both food and a cultural program within the bureaucratized
Soviet system. Others survived and thrived, owing to the tremendous efforts of cafe
enthusiasts.  The first in Moscow included “Molodezhnoe kafe” (Youth Cafe) and
“Aelita,” overseen by neighborhood Komsomol committees and run primarily by
Komsomol activists.1012 In Batumi, Georgia, the youth cafe “Vesna” (Spring) functioned
already in 1960 under the oversight of the Batumi city Komsomol.1013 In Leningrad,
1008 Starr, Red and Hot, 269.
1009 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1011, l. 20.
1010 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 14, d. 329, l. 3.
1011 For example, see a series of published letters to the editor on youth cafes that responded to
Komsomol’skaia pravda articles on March 29 and April 2, 1961: “Do vstrechi za stolikom,”
Komsomol’skaia pravda, May 20, 1961.
1012 V. E. Kleinot, born 1941, interviewed February 14, 2009; TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 257, ll. 30-39; A. A.
Kuznetsov, born 1941, interviewed February 21, 2009; and Starr, Red and Hot, 269.
1013 “Prikhodite zavtra v ‘Vesnu,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, January 14, 1961.
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several opened up as well, such as “Aeroflot” and “Nord.”1014 The cafe “Iunost’” (Youth)
and “Veterok” (Little Wind) were established in Saratov.1015
A look at one of the most well-known of these institutions, “Youth Cafe” in
Moscow, presents an example of cafe activities. Like many others, the “Youth Cafe”
partnered with a traditional food establishment. It functioned as a regular cafe in the
morning and afternoon, run by the food bureaucracy. In the evening, the Komsomol
transformed it into a club that combined food service with entertainment. Each evening
began with jazz music.1016 Later in the evening, the cafe held some special events. On
many occasions, artistically-inclined college students, especially from MGU, offered
their talents, singing, acting, and playing music. Many of the same students regularly
visited the cafe as audience members. Prominent artists performed in “Youth Cafe,” for
example, from the “Sovremennik” theater and from the “Mul’tfil’m” studio. One
discussion on the controversial issue of art included “young artists from the most leftist to
the most rightist, and passionate debate ensued.” Sometimes, audience members came on
stage and read their own poetry.1017
The “Vostochnoe” (Eastern) cafe in Moscow offers an example of a smaller and
more typical cafe, with a less rich program. The cafe worked in the evening from seven to
eleven. During most days, the cafe had music. Each Wednesday and Saturday, the
“Eastern” held special events, such as a cycle of lectures on the history of jazz. The
1014 These cafes had no formal names, so their habitual visitors gave them informal names that came to
eventually define these cafes: Viktor Krivulin, “Nevskii do i posle velikoi kofeinoi revoliutsii,” Pchela 6
(October 1996), http://www.pchela.ru/podshiv/6/coffee.htm [Accessed February 3, 2009.
1015 K. K. Il’in, born 1944, interviewed May 20, 2009, and GANISO, f. 652, op. 1, d. 4, l. 253.
1016 Kozlov, “Kozel na sakse,”, 157-58.
1017 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 257, l. 36.
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“Bolshevik” clothing factory demonstrated its new clothing lines. Amateurs from a
technical institute performed on another occasion. A house of culture hosted this cafe, as
opposed to a restaurant.1018
Some cafes provided more targeted activities for distinct audiences. The
“Pateticheskoe” (Pathos) cafe, for instance, served writers and poets. Prominent writers
from the Writers’ Union visited this cafe and held discussions with cafe visitors. Poets
read their poetry to the select cafe audience. This cafe acquired a prominent name among
all the literary associations (literaturnye ob’edineniia) in Moscow.1019
The personnel structure of youth cafes differed markedly from trade union clubs
or food establishments. For all work that did not involve food preparation or service,
youth cafes relied on a volunteer cafe council. Its members came mostly from the ranks
of lower-level Komsomol cadres and to a lesser extent officials from other agencies, as
well as from among jazz enthusiasts, cultural figures, white-collar professionals, and
others.1020 Most of those serving on cafe councils expressed passionate support for the
youth cafe movement, spending long hours and much energy on organizing and
implementing cafe activities. The “Eastern” youth cafe had a council described by a
speaker at the March 1962 conference as an “initiative-based group of comrades who are
avid supporters of the cafe,” including two officials from the neighborhood Komsomol
committee. The cafe council did all the work necessary to “ensure that cafe visitors get a
1018 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1096, l. 39.
1019 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1096, ll. 100-101.
1020 See Dubrova and Proshchunin, Sputnik komsomol’skogo aktivista, 234-36, and RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34,
d. 69, ll. 15. Also, see an interview with a former member of a Voronezh cafe council: “Istoriia s
geografiei: Molodezhnye kafe 60-kh” http://www.nestor.minsk.by/jz/articles/2000/ad/av1201.html
[Accessed March 26, 2011].
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positive experience from visiting the cafe.”1021 A 1962 instruction booklet intended for
Komsomol activists suggested that cafe council members need to possess organizational
talents, but also personal or professional connections with members of the cultural
intelligentsia.1022 V. E. Sadykhov, a jazz musician with close contacts to Moscow youth
cafes, described how one council, comprising Komsomol cadres, did all the necessary
organizational work for jazz evenings. These Komsomol officials had good relationships
with jazz musicians and hung out with them during performance breaks.1023 Another jazz
enthusiast, V. E. Kleinot, also portrayed the work of cafe councils in a positive light,
adding that they even monitored events and maintained order as needed.1024 Although
most members of cafe councils were true enthusiasts, some officials sat on the council as
representatives of trade unions, the cultural network, and food enterprises, with the
organizational work left largely to Komsomol activists passionate about youth cafes.
The Komsomol leadership’s willingness to launch these experimental youth cafes
stemmed from a number of reasons, including appealing to youth desires. According to
an internal report by the Komsomol Propaganda Department, these cafes interested young
people by enabling them to listen to new music, to dance, to laugh, to hang out with other
youth, to talk with famous people, and to discuss and argue about important questions of
everyday life. Thus, the “brunt of attention in the evening youth cafes stressed the
organization of fun cultural youth leisure, while also conducting a certain degree of
1021 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1096, ll. 35-39.
1022 Dubrova and Proshchunin, Sputnik komsomol’skogo aktivista, 234.
1023 V. E. Sadykhov, born 1946, interviewed February 24, 2009.
1024 V. E. Kleinot, born 1941, interviewed February 14, 2009.
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upbringing and political work.”1025 This highlights the entertainment orientation of cafes
at satisfying cultural consumption wants.
Moreover, the department underlined the fact that youth cafes increase communist
time, praising these institutions for “providing the Komsomol with more time to intensely
influence young people in a relaxed, unrestrained atmosphere.”1026 In other words, cafes
aimed to fulfill the Komsomol leadership’s goal of getting the young into spaces of
collective influence and state monitoring. The Komsomol, aware of its missteps during
the hard-line turn, particularly targeted young people who avoided traditional forms of
youth organized cultural activities. A 1961 published letter to the editor in
Komsomol’skaia pravda insisted that, if the Komsomol set up fun and exciting youth
cafes, then “youth would stop getting together in private apartments.”1027 The Komsomol
Propaganda Department wanted youth cafes to emulate gatherings at private apartments,
with the implication that cafes should replace these meetings.1028 For young people
frequenting such private gatherings as opposed to club events, the divisions between a
private and public sphere proved more relevant. Still, the willingness of many such young
people to spend their leisure in youth cafes demonstates the porous boundaries between
public and private. Indeed, the Komsomol authorities in these years arguably sought to
elide these borders through creating an atmosphere in youth cafes that emulated private
apartment gatherings, and more broadly through giving young people more room for
grassroots activism and self-determination in organized cultural activities.
1025 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 69, ll. 16-18.
1026 Ibid.
1027 “Uiut, a ne roskosh’,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, May 20, 1961.
1028 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 69, l. 16.
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Instruction booklets published by the Komsomol press also advocated
establishing youth cafes as a means of targeting “inappropriate” behavior. One described
cafes as assisting in the struggle with stiliagi.1029 Another depicted these new institutions
as helping deal with youth “bad habits.”1030 Former members of youth cafe councils also
spoke of this goal as important in the Komsomol’s decision to patronize youth cafes.1031
The cafes, consequently, advanced the soft-line approach of fighting with “deviance”
through providing normative leisure activities as opposed to using coercion.
For the Komsomol leadership, cafes likewise aimed to advance the goal of
aesthetic upbringing. The Komsomol Propaganda Department claimed that the cafes
“developed good tastes” in culture. They helped youth “acquire a deeper sense of the
beautiful, instill an interest in the arts, literature, music, and choose appropriate aesthetic
perspectives.”1032 The proposed model of by-laws for youth cafes listed the goal of
inculcating a desire to study the cultures of the peoples of the USSR and other socialist
countries, as well as world culture more broadly.1033
Transitioning to social self-management and increasing youth initiative
constituted another crucial motive for youth cafes. As part of the Third Party Program,
the Soviet leadership placed even more priority on transferring government functions to
social organizations. Youth cafes provided the Kremlin with a means to further this
effort, shifting both cultural leisure and food provision to social. An instruction booklet
1029 Tiutikov and Sishigin eds., Sila obshchestvennogo pochina, 121.
1030 Roshchin, Chto ty delaesh’ vecherom?, 16-17, 32-33.
1031 O. V. Chernyaev, born 1946, interviewed February 22, 2009.
1032 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 69, ll. 2-16.
1033 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 69, ll. 64-67.
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from the Komsomol’s press explicitly associated youth cafes with the Third Party
Program’s advocacy of novel forms (novye formy), and praised the cafes as “a new type
of mass-political work with young people,” one “based on the volunteer initiative of
Komsomol enthusiasts.”1034 The Komsomol Propaganda Department emphasized that
amateur musicians voluntarily performed at the cafes and that enthusiasts managed cafe
activities, maintained order, decorated the interior, and undertook other necessary tasks.
In some cafes, young volunteers even served the food and drinks.1035 Model by-laws for
youth cafes spotlighted their function of “getting young people widely involved in the
organization of active and healthy leisure.”1036 At a 1962 club conference, the volunteer
director of Moscow’s “Youth Cafe” insisted that “young people themselves are the
owners” of the “Youth Cafe,” with young activists designing and building the cafe and
organizing and implementing cafe events.1037 The Komsomol Propaganda Department
ascribed the popularity of cafes to young enthusiasts taking ownership of cafe events.
They did everything necessary to run the cafe, which “developed the activism, initiative,
creativity, and inventiveness” of each cafe activist.1038
All this helps explain why the Komsomol leadership experimented with youth
cafes, despite the widespread perception that these new cultural institutions were based
on foreign models. Indeed, both supporters and detractors of youth cafes considered them
1034 Tiutikov and Sishigin eds., Sila obshchestvennogo pochina, 121.
1035 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 69, l. 18.
1036 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 69, ll. 64-67.
1037 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 257, l. 33.
1038 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 69, l. 60.
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as explicitly borrowed from the “west,” as seen at the late March 1962 conference.1039 In
May 1961, the national Komsomol organ published a story on a well-run foreign college
student youth cafe and suggested that this cafe deserves to be emulated in the USSR.1040
Baliasnaia described youth cafes as “not our idea,” and attributed their creation to the
search for new methods and principles of socializing youth into building communism.1041
The Saratovite K. K. Il’in, in commenting on the opening of youth cafes in Saratov,
stated that this represented “the breach of the western way of life” into the USSR.1042
These youth cafes, therefore, constituted the most daring step yet on the path of
trying to build a socialist version of a western modern consumer society through state-
sponsored popular culture. The Komsomol leadership intended youth cafes to appeal to
what youth imagined about western cultural life, while offering a socialist alternative
whose form in many ways resembled foreign cafe-clubs, but whose essence contributed
to building communism.1043 Consequently, like previous efforts along this path, the
Komsomol hierarchy set the goal of having youth cafes satisfy youth desires while
activating societal initiative, increasing communist time, and promoting aesthetic
upbringing. Official discourse claimed that youth cafes provided Soviet authorities with
the opportunity to depict the USSR as modern and progressive by offering a new form
that borrowed from western ones but advanced beyond them.
1039 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 257, ll. 48-49.
1040 “Uiut, a ne roskosh’,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, May 20, 1961.
1041 L. K. Baliasnaia, born 1927, interviewed April 5, 2009.
1042 K. K. Il’in, born 1944, interviewed May 20, 2009.
1043 For the importance of the imagination in constructing images of western reality, see Alexei Yurchak,
Everything Was Forever, until It Was No More: The Last Soviet Generation (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2006), 158-237.
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Youth cafes were successful in that they had immense appeal among young
people. A 1962 instruction booklet portrayed them as immensely popular, with “lines
forming long before the cafe opens,” as “unfortunately, there are many less places behind
the tables of youth cafes than those who want to get one.”1044 Other sources also confirm
that, due to their popularity, getting into youth cafes proved a challenge in the early
1960s, when only a few youth cafes existed in major cities. The director of “Youth Cafe”
admitted as much in his speech at the March 1962 conference.1045 So did Likhodeev,
while waving off this criticism as irrelevant.1046 Interviews with and memoirs by former
youth cafe visitors confirm the challenge of getting into these institutions, with only those
possessing connections to the management, jazz musicians, or prominent notables
admitted easily.1047
By promoting youth cafes in the pages of Komsomol newspapers before their
widespread establishment, the Komsomol created a widescale consumer demand that it
had trouble satisfying in the short run, since it took time to create successful youth cafes.
This illustrates the difficulties involved in appealing to youth consumer desires.1048
Moreover, youth cafes posed a unique challenge. Owing to the potential threat of going
too far in borrowing from the “west,” along with the logistical obstacles in organizing
these institutions, the Komsomol proceeded slowly with the creation of youth cafes. This
1044 Dubrova and Proshchunin, Sputnik komsomol’skogo aktivista, 234.
1045 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 257, l. 35.
1046 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 257, ll. 46-47.
1047 V. E. Kleinot, born 1941, interviewed February 14, 2009, and Kozlov, “Kozel na sakse,” 158.
1048 For the problems resulting from creating consumer demands in socialist contexts, see Crowley and
Reid, “Introduction: Pleasures in Socialism.”
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further limited the supply of space in these establishments during the early 1960s.
Consequently, in their early years, youth cafes largely served members of the cultural
intelligentsia and college students, who either had the connections to get in quickly or the
dedication to wait in long lines. Cafes associated with trade union clubs proved an
exception, as they offered some evening events specifically targeted at the workers of
their enterprises.1049
What drew young people to youth cafes? Certainly, the western aspects of the
cafe set-up, with the chance to drink coffee at a table while taking in exciting cultural
entertainment, appealed to many. The American-style jazz in particular drew plenty of
young jazz fans. Others went to the cafes to check out the new and exotic nature of these
institutions.1050 Yet, most former cafe visitors and activists recall the atmosphere and
spirit of these cafes as the fundamental element in their appeal, namely the opportunity to
hang out and talk with other young people in an intimate and unconstrained atmosphere–
obshchenie. G. A. Garanian described the cafes as having “true obshchenie.”1051 In
Kozlov’s words, “at that time, the obshchenie of two strangers in a public setting where
one’s words might be recorded constituted a very new and exciting phenomenon.”1052
Sadykhov recalled the atmosphere of youth cafes as centering on obshchenie, which he
1049 For one cafe that invited factory workers, see TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 262, l. 8.
1050 V. А. Miliaev, born 1937, interviewed February 28, 2009; V. E. Kleinot, born 1941, interviewed
February 14, 2009; and K. K. Il’in, born 1944, interviewed May 20, 2009.
1051 G. A. Garanian, born 1934, interviewed February 4, 2009
1052 Kozlov, “Kozel na sakse,” 157-58.
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called wonderful.1053 The Saratovite M. I. Ryskin found the “spirit of freedom”
exciting.1054 Many others referenced obshchenie as crucial to youth cafes.1055
This focus on obshchenie paralleled the sentiments expressed during the early
1960s by some of the cafe activists. At the March 1962 club conference, the director of
Moscow’s “Youth Cafe” proclaimed that young people “need a cafe-club where they can
have debates, meet with interesting people in a relaxed [neprinuzhdennaia] atmosphere,”
and “talk with a friend.”1056 Likhodeev’s eloquent commentary at this meeting forcefully
promoted youth cafes as essential, since, when young people go to cafes, “they engage in
obshchenie and behave themselves like human beings should.” According to him, this
obshchenie held the key to youth upbringing in the spirit of the Twenty-second Party
Congress, which he described as having at its heart the idea that “human beings are
friends, comrades, and brothers to each other,” a frequently-used slogan.1057 He advanced
a similar proposition at the May 1962 conference. According to Likhodeev, “we have an
extremely low culture of obshchenie and we do not respect each other.” He called youth
cafes “the natural human condition” for their promotion of obshchenie.1058 Likhodeev’s
rhetoric skillfully tied obshchenie in youth cafes to the Party’s overarching goals. He and
1053 V. E. Sadykhov, born 1946, interviewed February 24, 2009
1054 M. I. Ryskin, born 1938, interviewed June 1, 2009.
1055 For example, V. E. Kleinot, born 1941, interviewed February 14, 2009, and Krivulin, “Nevskii do i
posle velikoi kofeinoi revoliutsii.”
1056 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 257, l. 32.
1057 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 257, ll. 47-52. For the use of this slogan in official Komsomol discourse, see
Pavlov, Otchet Tsentral’nogo, 40.
1058 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1096, ll. 27-32.
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other cafe activists listed other benefits of cafes as well, such as improving youth cultural
levels and dealing with juvenile “delinquency.”1059
Nonetheless, for most cafe activists and visitors, the atmosphere of obshchenie in
cafes represented the main element in an ideal pluralistic space of socialist sociability and
civic spirit that they saw as fully compatible with communist construction. Likhodeev’s
passionate comments attest to this well, illustrating the viewpoint later associated with
the effort to forge “communism with a human face” in Czechoslovakia. Interviews with
cafe patrons and activists also bear out this proposition, as many revealed their belief in
building communism during the early 1960s, for example Kleinot.1060 Sadykhov
associated his faith in a Thaw-era vision of communism with youth cafes.1061
To an extent, obshchenie fit the intentions of the Komsomol hierarchy.
Karpinskii’s 1960 note called for aiming “our best political forces at small audiences and
intimate conversations.”1062 Official sources, such as instruction booklets, depicted youth
cafes as providing an opportunity for youth obshchenie.1063 The Komsomol Propaganda
Department itself instructed local Komsomol cadres that youth cafe events “should not be
excessively organized by filling them with performances and political materials.” Instead,
it called for these events “to have an unrestrained and free form,” so that the visitors have
1059 For examples of other motivations, see RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1096, l. 32, and RGASPI, f. M-1,
op. 32, d. 1096, ll. 94-95.
1060 V. E. Kleinot, born 1941, interviewed February 14, 2009.
1061 V. E. Sadykhov, born 1946, interviewed February 24, 2009. Kozlov represents one exception, depicting
himself as rejecting communist ideology from an early age: Kozlov, “Kozel na sakse,” 68-100.
1062 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1024, l. 78.
1063 Dubrova and Proshchunin, Sputnik komsomol’skogo aktivista, 234.
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the “opportunity to hold interesting conversations, discussions, and debates with other
youth around the table.”1064
For the Komsomol leadership, however, providing youth with the opportunity for
obshchenie served as the means of getting youth into official, collective, and state-
managed spaces and placing them under what official discourse termed “communist
influence.” In contrast, for youth cafe activists obshchenie itself represented the primary
goal. This divergence of emphasis between the soft-line cafe activists and the Komsomol
leadership did not pose a serious problem during the early 1960s, when the leadership
adopted a generally tolerant course. Still, it created the potential for conflicts if the
leadership chose to pursue a militant line.
The tension between hard-line and soft-line visions of the communist future, as
embodied by youth cafes, came to the fore in the 1962 club worker conferences, where
the cafes were a central topic of discussion. Cafe activists pushed clubs to adopt cafe-like
forms or even transform themselves into youth cafes, as did the director of “Youth
Cafe.”1065 A representative from the “Eastern” cafe stated that “we need not one or two
youth cafes, but hundreds.”1066 Not suprisingly, those club officials holding a militant
position spoke out against youth cafes and their emphasis on obshchenie. A characteristic
comment censured the rejection of lectures by youth cafe activists and called for
“directed political work” in club activities.1067 Another speaker, a representative from the
House of Culture of the Moscow Aviation Institute (Moskovskii aviaitsionnyi institut),
1064 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 69, l. 22.
1065 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 257, l. 38.
1066 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1096, l. 35.
1067 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 257, ll. 78-79.
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criticized individualized obshchenie in cafes. Instead, the speaker underlined the need for
the cultural and aesthetic upbringing of the masses through widescale cultural events in
clubs, which he called the best form of obshchenie.1068 When the “Youth Cafe” director
spoke, one militant critic inquired how the cafe propagandized the decisions of the
Twenty-second Party Congress. The director replied that the cafe did not propagandize
them.1069 The Moscow Komsomol organ endorsed the “Youth Cafe” director’s position
on this question in an article published after the conference, showing the Moscow
Komsomol’s soft-line.1070 Notably, the critics of cafes at the conferences tended to
express hard-line views on other issues, such as youth initiative.
More open-minded club officials at the conference offered a sympathetic hearing
to youth cafes. The Zuev club’s assistant manager criticized lectures for failing to reach
young people, as the latter preferred to “express their own opinions,” which drove young
people to go to youth cafes instead of clubs. He suggested instead organizing youth cafe-
like events in the clubs themselves.1071 The manager of the house of culture at the
“Kauchuk” factory expressed a willingness to experiment with youth cafe-like forms.1072
A representative from the club of the “Dorkhimzavod” plant described his successful
cooperation with the local Komsomol to establish a youth cafe at the club.1073 Club
1068 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 257, ll. 62-63.
1069 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 257, l. 37.
1070 “Rozy i shipy,” Moskovskii komsomolets, March 28, 1962.
1071 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 257, ll. 54-56.
1072 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 262, l. 7.
1073 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 262, l. 9.
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officials who supported youth cafes generally adopted soft-line positions on other issues,
too.1074
Still, even though some club workers expressed a willingness to establish youth
cafes, these cafes ran into obstacles. Club officials voiced concerns over the challenges of
getting coffee, wine, and appropriate food into clubs.1075 Acquiring fitting chairs and
tables presented another problem.1076 The fact that many fewer people fit into halls with a
youth cafe set-up of tables and chairs concerned club workers, many of whom preferred
mass events for their wide impact, and, undoubtedly, for helping fulfill the attendance
plan.1077 Moreover, the club directors retained some oversight of the cultural offerings in
cafes associated with clubs, with the young activists unable to take full managerial
control over the cafe entertainment program.
All this explains why, after an initial stage of experimentation, most youth cafes
located themselves in food establishments. The food enterprise hierarchy expressed little
concern over the cultural program and allowed young cafe enthusiasts to control cafe
cultural activities. It also had the tables, chairs, food, and drink necessary for the cafes,
although it often needed to acquire coffee-makers.1078
Another problem for youth cafes consisted of getting decor consistent with a post-
Stalin Thaw-era style of design, as restaurants and cafeterias hardly provided the modern
1074 The Zuev club manager, for instance, expressing tolerance of rock’n’roll: TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 257,
ll. 56-57.
1075 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 258, ll. 14-15.
1076 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 257, l. 56.
1077 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 257, ll. 32, 78-79, and RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1096, l. 33.
1078 On coffee-makers, see Krivulin, “Nevskii do i posle velikoi kofeinoi revoliutsii.”
393
feel sought by youth cafes.1079 For instance, a guidebook for Komsomol activists stressed
that youth cafes needed to have “a beautifully decorated, comfortable hall,” with an
appropriately renovated space and fitting paintings, decorations, and furniture.1080 The
Komsomol Propaganda Department instructed Komsomol cells creating youth cafes to
renovate food establishments in order to create “maximum comfort” and provide
appropriate inventory and cultural materials.1081 Nonetheless, as illustrated by Moskovskii
komsomolets in March 1962, decorating and renovating the first Moscow cafes, “Youth
Cafe” and “Aelita,” occurred “with enormous and unjustified expenditure of energy and
nerves,” with young people having to nag numerous bureaucrats for their needs. The
newspaper proposed creating an agency that would help in acquiring records,
decorations, light fixtures, food, and other necessities for the many new youth cafes
slated to open in Moscow. The journalists also criticized the Moscow food enterprise
hierarchy for failing to attend to the specific needs of youth cafes in this regard.1082
Youth cafes in food establishments faced another issue as well, namely the
pressure from the food enterprise hierarchy to fulfill financial plans. Especially in the
early days of youth cafes, this bureaucracy pushed youth cafes to serve expensive
restaurant-style meals. This challenged the desire of cafe enthusiasts to make youth cafes
cheap and accessible to young people. The director of the “Youth Cafe” frankly admitted
that “we are not sustainable financially,” and called for the Komsomol to provide
1079 For more on the Thaw-era style, especially in furniture, see Susan E. Reid, "Cold War in the Kitchen:
Gender and the De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the Soviet Union," Slavic Review 61.2 (Summer
2002): 211-52.
1080 Dubrova and Proshchunin, Sputnik komsomol’skogo aktivista, 234.
1081 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 69, l. 4.
1082 “Rozy i shipy,” Moskovskii komsomolets, March 28, 1962
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financial support for youth cafes.1083 Likhodeev drew attention to the problem faced by
youth cafes in meeting the financial plans proposed by bureaucrats from the food
enterprises when the cafes aimed to serve “young people with 12 kopeks.” Accordingly,
cafe enthusiasts “have to think hard about how to fool the bureaucrats.” He expressed
confidence that the cafes would find appropriate financing, waving off challenges from
critics from the audience who expressed skepticism.1084 Instruction booklets and
newspapers made a variety of suggestions on how to achieve financial parity.1085
With Komsomol support for youth cafes and the grassroots enthusiasm of young
cafe activists, the obstacles slowly grew more manageable. Responding to the censure of
the Moscow Komsomol, the chief of the Moscow food enterprise bureaucracy obliged its
branches to provide youth cafes with needed food and decor and to give the Komsomol a
more prominent role in the construction and renovation of youth cafes. The chief also
directed the financial department to revise the financial plan norms for youth cafes.1086
Similar decrees likely passed in other cities taking up the organization of youth cafes.
Youth cafes faced fewer challenges in getting artists to perform in them that did
universities of culture of volunteer clubs. Jazz musicians expressed particular enthusiasm
over playing in cafes. Enjoying the atmosphere of obshchenie and the western-style form,
as well as the appreciative audiences and the chance to hang out with other jazz
musicians, they performed for free or with minimal payments. Sadykhov recalled that
1083 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 257, l. 35.
1084 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1096, ll. 30-34.
1085 See Dubrova and Proshchunin, Sputnik komsomol’skogo aktivista, 235. Also see “Prikhodite zavtra v
‘Vesnu,” Komsomol’skaia pravda, January 14, 1961.
1086 “‘Rozy i shipy,’” Moskovskii komsomolets, May 30, 1962.
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jazz musicians came to “Youth Cafe,” spent time hanging out with other musicians and
audience members, played several pieces, and then listened to other jazz performances.
For musicians, playing in this atmosphere “was a celebration for the soul.”1087 The jazz
guitarist Kuznetsov, who mostly played in Moscow’s “Siniia ptitsa” (Blue Bird) and also
a bit in “Youth Cafe,” valued the audience “that greatly desired to listen to jazz” and paid
“careful attention” to jazz players, “rewarding them with applause.”1088 Garanian also
praised the caliber of the audiences in cafes.1089 A. S. Kozlov helped Komsomol activists
organize the “Youth Cafe,” where his jazz band became a habitual fixture.1090 N. I.
Butov, a Komsomol functionary who rose to the rank of assistant director of the
Komsomol Propaganda Department, explicitly associated “Youth Cafe” and “Aelita”
with jazz.1091 In fact, a prominent scholar of Soviet jazz called these youth cafes “jazz
cafes.”1092
Members of the cultural intelligentsia also frequented the cafes, particularly the
younger ones inclined toward a soft line, attracted by the atmosphere of obshchenie,
western forms, and jazz music. “Youth Cafe,” according to Sadykhov, had a variety of
patrons, from jazz musicians to cultural figures from the theater, cinema, and musical
fields, to ordinary cafe visitors.1093 This cafe had regular performances by actors from the
1087 V. E. Sadykhov, born 1946, interviewed February 24, 2009.
1088 A. A. Kuznetsov, born 1941, interviewed February 21, 2009.
1089 G. A. Garanian, born 1934, interviewed February 4, 2009.
1090 Kozlov, “Kozel na sakse,” 152-53, 157-58.
1091 N. I. Butov, born 1944, interviewed February 16, 2009.
1092 Starr, Red and Hot, 267.
1093 V. E. Sadykhov, born 1946, interviewed February 24, 2009.
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progressive and controversial Taganka Theater, including the well-known actor-bard V.
S. Vysotskii.1094 Leningrad cafes were oriented less toward jazz, focusing more on
prominent avant-garde poets, painters, and other members of the progressive cultural
intelligentsia. An abstract-style painter reportedly painted the tiles of Leningrad’s famous
“Saigon” cafe.1095 Likhodeev, at the Leningrad club conference in early 1962, observed
that traditional cultural figures, such as V. P. Solov’ev-Sedoi, would not come to and
perform at youth cafes. Instead, Likhodeev stated that he and others like him would
come, for instance N. V. Bogoslavskii, a prominent cultural figure who liked the
atmosphere of youth cafes, the “laughing and making witty comments.”1096 Still, some
smaller youth cafes had challenges in attracting a steady stream of cultural figures.1097
Gradually overcoming initial organizational problems, youth cafes by mid-1962
appeared slated for rapid growth. The cafes acquired more support from the leadership,
the cultural and food bureaucracy, and the cultural intelligentsia. Young people clamored
for more youth cafes, not only in major cities but also in smaller towns and even rural
settings. This resulted from the positive depiction of cafes in the Komsomol press and
other media. For instance, the “Blue Flame” (Goluboi Ogonek) television program drew
on the Moscow “Youth Cafe” format and adapted it for broadcasting, garnering
1094 V. E. Kleinot, born 1941, interviewed February 14, 2009.
1095 Viktor Toporov, “My vypivali kazhdyi den’,” Pchela 6 (October 1996),
http://www.pchela.ru/podshiv/6/drink.htm [Accessed March 28, 2011], and Krivulin, “Nevskii do i posle
velikoi kofeinoi revoliutsii.”
1096 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1096, l. 33.
1097 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1096, l. 37.
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widespread popularity in the Soviet Union.1098 According to Moskovskii komsomolets,
besides the youth cafes already established in Moscow in March 1962, twenty more
aimed to open their doors in 1962, a number built specifically as youth cafes.1099
Nonetheless, the swing toward a hard-line approach in late 1962 and early 1963
slowed the development of the youth cafes, bringing into the open previously submerged
tensions between the goals of young cafe activists and the Soviet leadership. These
fractures are illustrated by an internal report from the Komsomol Propaganda
Department. According to this document, although the cafes had spread widely across the
Soviet Union by late 1963, they suffered from a series of problems, especially in
Moscow. For example, it censured a November 1963 evening at “Youth Cafe,” where the
orchestra “played only jazz music and Jewish songs and dances.” From the stage, one
heard remarks such as “a simple Soviet Jewish hairdresser will now perform a national
Jewish dance” The same month, in “Aelita,” a member of the cafe council distributed
poetry that defended Y. A. Yevtushenko from official criticism, while making
accusations of anti-Semitism in the USSR, including the claim that “anti-Semitism comes
from the ‘top.’” The “Eksprompt” (Impromptu) and “Youth Cafe” held exhibits of
abstract art. “Youth Cafe” showed foreign films that the cafe council head borrowed from
foreign embassies on his own, without going through appropriate channels. Frequent
visitors to the cafe included illegal traders in western goods and “loose women.” The
document accused the head of the council of “Youth Cafe” of “sexual depravity,” most
1098 Valentina Shatrova, “Tot samyi ‘Goluboi Ogonek’,” “Zhurnalist” 5 (May 2008), 49. For more on
Soviet television, see Kristin Roth-Ey, “Mass Media and the Remaking of Soviet Culture, 1950s-1960s”
(Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2003).
1099 “Rozy i shipy,” Moskovskii komsomolets, March 28, 1962, and RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1096, l. 35.
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likely a reference to homosexuality, and also denounced other members of the council for
drunkenness and theft. 1100 At the February 1964 Moscow city Komsomol conference, the
keynote speaker also associated “Aelita” and “Youth Cafe” with immorality,
drunkenness, hooliganism, and religion, which “provided the soil for bourgeois ideology
to plant the seeds of nihilism, apolitical attitudes, and a petit bourgeois [meshchanin]
understanding of happiness and freedom.”1101 This and other attacks led to the ouster of
some cafe council heads, for instance the manager of “Aelita,” and the toning down of
jazz in some cafes, including Kiev’s “Mechta” (Dream) cafe, along with other activities
associated with western cultural influence.
Still, most youth cafes continued to play American-style jazz and provide a
western atmosphere, if to a lesser extent than previously. Moreover, other cafes opened
up, if more slowly than planned. In December 1963, the Krasnopresnenskii neighborhood
Komsomol praised the recent establishment of the “Aist” (Crane) youth cafe.1102 That
same year, the Gorbunov House of Culture received censure for failing to establish its
planned “Globus” (Globe) youth cafe.1103 The most famous youth cafe in Leningrad,
“Saigon,” opened its doors in September 1964.1104 Besides this, likely inspired by the
“Blue Flame” television program, clubs organized youth cafe-like events termed “To the
Flame,” for instance at the “Red Star” House of Culture and also the house of culture at
1100 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 32, d. 1055, ll. 135-37.
1101 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 15, d. 188, l. 50.
1102 TsAOPIM, f. 667, op. 4, d. 1, l. 31.
1103 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 398, l. 9.
1104 Toporov, “My vypivali kazhdyi den’.”
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Moscow’s “Trekhgornaia Manufaktura” factory.1105 Interviews with cafe activists and
jazz enthusiasts illustrate that most did not perceive a substantial break associated with
1963.1106 Consequently, I suggest that the brief hard-line swing in 1963 and 1964 had
much more impact on Soviet cultural elites than it did for young cultural activists in
amateur arts. This enriches the historical narrative that so far focused on elite cultural
policy and did not sufficiently examine the broader Soviet official cultural field.1107
State-Sponsored Popular Culture during the Early Brezhnev Years, 1964-1968
The first four years after the coup against Khrushchev and the rise to power of the
Brezhnev leadership constitute an ambiguous and contradictory period. Many members
of the cultural intelligentsia hoped that Brezhnev would reverse the antagonistic stance
adopted by the Khrushchev Kremlin toward daring forms of artistic expression in its last
years. The Brezhnev authorities soon sorely disappointed writers who hoped for more
openness and freedom of expression by placing the authors A. D. Siniavskii and Iu. M.
Daniel on trial for their writings published abroad. A major propaganda campaign against
Daniel and Siniavskii accompanied the proceedings, underlining the role of this episode
as a show trial that signaled a new course and contributed to the increasingly gloomy
mood among writers.1108
1105 TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 398, l. 20, and TsAGM, f. 718, op. 1, d. 406, l. 44.
1106 V. E. Sadykhov, born 1946, interviewed February 24, 2009; A. A. Kuznetsov, born 1941, interviewed
February 21, 2009; and V. E. Kleinot, born 1941, interviewed February 14, 2009.
1107 An example of a focus on cultural elites is Vladislav Zubok, Zhivago’s Children: The Last Russian
Intelligentsia (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 193-225.
1108 Mark Sandle, “A Triumph of Ideological Hairdressing? Intellectual Life in the Brezhnev Era
Reconsidered,” in Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle eds., Brezhnev Reconsidered (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2002), 135-64; Deming Brown, Soviet Russian Literature since Stalin (New York: Cambridge
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Yet the mid-1960s marked a shift toward more tolerance for jazz. Prominent
newspapers, such as Izvestiia (News), carried articles that expressed support for
developing this music. Moscow Radio established a weekly half-hour segment on Soviet
jazz. For the first time, “Melodiia,” the state’s recording enterprise, produced records of
current Soviet jazz bands. Fans of this music received the support to establish more jazz
clubs. Jazz enthusiasts gained the opportunity to have their commentary on jazz
published in the Soviet press and even foreign jazz periodicals, most notably the famous
Polish magazine Jazz.1109
The tolerance for jazz reflected the Brezhnev Kremlin’s emphasis on appealing to
youth aspirations for fun cultural consumption options. It likewise responded to the
growing popularity of rock’n’roll in the Soviet Union. Slowly gaining from the end of the
1950s, rock music witnessed explosive growth with the wave of Beatlemania in 1963-64.
Perceiving jazz as much less potentially subversive than rock’n’roll, the Brezhnev
leadership decided to endorse the first while rejecting the second, at least in its western
format. Soviet officials did permit the formation of official VIA (vokal’no-
instrumental’nyi ansambl’) groups in the mid-1960s that played popular music and jazz,
with some rock elements. Some jazz musicians also incorporated aspects of rock music,
although the large majority rejected it.1110
University Press, 1978), 331-52; and Denis Kozlov, “‘I Have Not Read, but I Will Say’: Soviet Literary
Audiences and Changing Ideas of Social Membership, 1958-66,” Kritika 7.3 (Summer 2006): 557-97.
1109 Starr, Red and Hot, 275-77.
1110 On Soviet rock’n’roll, see Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City, 65-106; Risch, “Soviet ‘Flower
Children’”; Yngvar B. Steinholt, Rock in  the Reservation: Songs from the Leningrad Rock Club, 1981-86
(New York: MMMSP, 2005); Sabrina P. Ramet, “Rock: The Music of the Revolution (and Political
Conformity),” in Sabrina P. Ramet, ed., Rocking the State: Rock Music and Politics in Eastern Europe and
Russia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 1-14; Timothy W. Ryback, Rock Around the Block: A History of
Rock Music in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 50-65;
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An open-minded approach toward jazz proved conducive to renewed leadership
support for youth cafes. The Komsomol TsK explicitly blessed these institutions with a
1966 resolution that called for the creation of youth cafes in rural regions. The TsK
praised the work of extant rural youth cafes in Vologda and Volgograd oblast and in
Latvia, and noted that that “many Komsomol organizations do not pay sufficient attention
to the creation of these youth cafes.” The decree highlighted the need for Komsomol cells
to “develop the practice of organizing youth cafes” in food establishments in rural
areas.1111 This resolution acknowledged the transformation of youth cafes from an
experimental and daring institution to a regular and normal component of Komsomol
work, not only approved by but also promoted from the top.
Many new youth cafes began to function as a result of that endorsement. In
Voronezh, the “Rossiianka” (Russian Woman) cafe, built specifically as a youth cafe
from the start, featured a modern architectural style heavy on glass, aluminum, and
concrete.1112 According to the head of its council, O. V. Cherniaev, the cafe’s program
consisted mainly of jazz performances. He specifically linked the organization of this
cafe to the Komsomol TsK’s directive on the need to establish youth cafes.1113 The
Thomas Cushman, Notes From Underground: Rock Music Counterculture in Russia (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1995), 17-88; Artemy Troitskii, Back in the USSR: The True Story of Rock
in Russia (Winchester: Faber and Faber, 1988); and Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, until It Was no
More, 158-237. For rock’n’roll in Yugoslavia, see Sabrina P. Ramet, “Shake, Rattle, and Self-
Management: Rock Music and Politics in Socialist Yugoslavia, and After,” in Sabrina P. Ramet and
Gordana P. Crnkovic eds., KAZAAM! SPLAT! PLOOF! The American Impact on European Popular
Culture since 1945 (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 173-97. For rock’n’roll in
East Germany, see Mark Fenemore, Sex, Thugs and Rock’n’Roll: Teenage Rebels in Cold-War East
Germany (New York, Berghahn Books, 2007), and Thomas Fuchs, “Rock’n’roll in the German Democratic
Republic, 1949-61,” in Wagnleitner and May eds., “Here, There and Everywhere,” 192-206.
1111 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 69, l. 2.
1112 For a description of this cafe, see “Istoriia s geografiei.”
1113 O. V. Cherniaev, born 1946, interviewed February 22, 2009.
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history department at MGU created a youth cafe.1114 The 1967 SGU university-wide
Komsomol conference supported the physics department Komsomol’s efforts to open one
youth cafe.1115 Other youth cafes appeared in Saratov as well.1116 Although a careful
search of the Komsomol archives did not reveal statistical data on the number of youth
cafes, the evidence overall shows that cafes became increasingly prevalent throughout the
USSR, and accessible for working-class young people in large cities, as well as small
town and even rural youth.
This expansion, resulting from top-level support, came with a price: the
Komsomol hierarchy now had more influence over youth cafes than previously, lessening
the role of grassroots enthusiasts. Consequently, some of the special spirit of the first
wave of youth cafes was lost, disenchanting some visitors. The Saratovite Ryskin stopped
going to youth cafes after his initial excitement, as the “air of freedom” he enjoyed so
much began to dissipate.1117 Moreover, Komsomol officials began to use cafes to host
informal “drunken bashes” (p’ianki) for Komsomol cadres, for instance in “Blue Bird” as
Kleinot described.1118 The access to alcohol, food, modern decor, tables and chairs, jazz
music, a dance floor and other benefits of Komsomol-run youth cafes undoubtedly made
them an attractive place for such private Komsomol activities. These cafes, therefore,
1114 TsAOPIM, f. 6083, op. 1, d. 109, l. 231.
1115 GANISO, f. 652, op. 1, d. 31, ll. 27-28.
1116 “Prikhodite!” Leninskii put’, January 30, 1965, and “‘Mezon-kholl,’” Leninskii put’, September 11,
1965.
1117 M. I. Ryskin, born 1938, interviewed June 1, 2009.
1118 V. E. Kleinot, born 1941, interviewed February 14, 2009.
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represent the antecedent to the corruption of Komsomol-managed organized cultural
activities in the 1970s as identified by Sergei Zhuk.1119
The tolerant attitude toward jazz in the mid-1960s also paved the way for the
Komsomol to organize jazz festivals. Prominent jazz musicians from all over the Soviet
Union and other socialist states, came to these festivals to perform before appreciative
audiences. The jazz festivals originated in the Baltic states during the late 1950s. The first
ones in the Soviet heartland took place in Moscow’s “Youth Cafe” in 1962, with five jazz
groups performing for over three hours. Another occurred the same year in Leningrad.
However, the Khrushchev leadership’s more orthodox approach toward the cultural
sphere from the end of 1962 put a temporary stop to the further organization of festivals
in the non-Baltic regions.
The Brezhnev administration’s flexible approach toward jazz in the mid-1960s
resulted in a major jazz festival organized in 1965 by the Moscow Komsomol, with the
cooperation of the Union of Soviet Composers in the “Youth” hotel. This large event
involved sixteen bands performing over three days, with many of the best Soviet jazz
players competing for the festival’s top prizes. Newsweek even published a story about
this festival. This Moscow festival led to a series of oblast-level jazz festivals organized
by the Komsomol in Novosibirsk, Voronezh, Donetsk, Riga, Khar’kov, Kuibyshev, and
other cities.1120 Saratov held a number of festivals, starting in 1965.1121 In Garanian’s
1119 Sergei Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: The West, Identity, and Ideology in Soviet
Dniepropetrovsk, 1960-1985 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 291.
1120 V. E. Kleinot, born 1941, interviewed February 14, 2009; N. I. Butov, born 1944, interviewed February
16, 2009; O. V. Cherniaev, born 1946, interviewed February 22, 2009; Kozlov, “Kozel na sakse,” 174-74;
and Starr, Red and Hot, 282-85.
1121 I. P. Zhimskii, born 1936, interviewed May 27, 2009, and L. A. Figlin, born 1938, interviewed May 25,
2009.
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words, jazz festivals represented “major events,” with tickets “impossible to get,” and the
audiences loved the performances.1122 The evening concerts of the 1967 festival in Talinn
took place in the Palace of Sports and had up to 3,000 audience members.1123 These
festivals depended on soft-line local Komsomol and Party officials. A jazz enthusiast and
festival organizer in Donetsk, V. A. Dubiler, confirmed this, and gave the example of
how a new hard-line Party city committee leader in Donetsk forbid a jazz festival.1124
Cherniaev, who organized jazz festivals in Voronezh, also accentuated the importance of
supportive officials.1125 Furthermore, the festivals offered the Komsomol financial profit.
Dubiler described how he had to provide a portion of the festival ticket sales to the
Komsomol’s budget in order to gain support for the organization of the festival.1126 Still,
orthodox administrators refused to support jazz festivals despite their revenue potential,
making the support of sympathetic soft-line officials vital for these events.
The festivals provided jazz musicians with exiting opportunities to travel the
country and perform, with the Soviet government picking up the tab for their travel and
providing lodging, although the musicians received no or minimal payments for the
performance itself. Most important, they had the chance to meet other jazz musicians and
learn about and from each other. At the festivals, jazz enthusiasts from different cities
formed networks centering on jazz. Dubiler established contacts with other jazz
enthusiasts by writing letters to them. The festivals offered him the opportunity to build
1122 G. A. Garanian, born 1934, interviewed February 4, 2009.
1123 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 146, l. 4.
1124 V. A. Dubiler, born 1941, interviewed February 22, 2009.
1125 O. V. Cherniaev, born 1946, interviewed February 22, 2009.
1126 V. A. Dubiler, born 1941, interviewed February 22, 2009.
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on these initial written contacts and establish direct relationships. He invited jazz
musicians from across the Soviet Union and abroad to visit Donetsk jazz festivals, and
they invited him in turn to theirs.1127 Cherniaev similarly recalled that jazz festivals
facilitated jazz-related exchanges and networks in various Soviet cities.1128 Kuznetsov
greatly enjoyed going to and performing at these festivals in different cities.1129
Furthermore, jazz festivals enabled Soviet jazz enthusiasts forming relationships
with foreign jazz musicians. Garanian and other elite Soviet jazz musicians, at least those
that authorities perceived as not likely to embarrass the USSR, visited jazz festivals in
eastern European states, establishing international jazz networks.1130 Dubiler’s extensive
network included foreign jazz musicians and specialists.1131 Foreign jazz musicians came
to Soviet jazz festivals and jammed with local jazz players in youth cafes and jazz
clubs.1132 As the Komsomol developed its international tourism enterprise, “Sputnik,” it
also brought foreign visitors to youth cafes. Kleinot recalled that “Youth Cafe” served as
a frequent destination for Komsomol-organized group excursions for foreign tourists,
who listened to jazz and drank wine in the unique atmosphere of this and other youth
cafes.1133 Having Soviet jazz musicians go to eastern European jazz festivals, inviting
foreign jazz players into the USSR, and the western-style atmosphere of cafes all aimed
1127 V. A. Dubiler, born 1941, interviewed February 22, 2009.
1128 O. V. Cherniaev, born 1946, interviewed February 22, 2009.
1129 A. A. Kuznetsov, born 1941, interviewed February 21, 2009.
1130 V. E. Kleinot, born 1941, interviewed February 14, 2009, and G. A. Garanian, born 1934, interviewed
February 4, 2009.
1131 V. A. Dubiler, born 1941, interviewed February 22, 2009.
1132 Starr, Red and Hot, 271.
1133 V. E. Kleinot, born 1941, interviewed February 14, 2009.
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to achieve the leadership’s goal of presenting the Soviet Union as an appealing
alternative to the western way of life in the eyes of foreigners. The socialist version of a
modern consumer society was presented as having the glamor of a western consumer
society without the social problems associated with individualism and class struggle, a
message aimed at advancing the Soviet way of life in the Cold War’s cultural battle.
The new leaders also tried to satisfy youth by providing more traditional
organized cultural activities. The Komsomol leadership continued to promote the
organization of amateur arts and the construction of clubs. As a result, by the end of the
1960s, the Soviet Union had over 133,000 club institutions and 700,000 amateur
circles.1134 The Komsomol TsK passed a resolution in 1966 on strengthening work where
young people resided. It paid a great deal of attention to adolescents (podrostki), calling
for more interest-based clubs targeted at them.1135 In part, this focus on adolescents
resulted from the growing proportion of this age group in the Soviet population.1136
Likewise, aesthetic upbringing remained a priority. Pavlov’s keynote address at
the Fifteenth Komsomol Congress in 1966 articulated the need for Komsomol cells to
“inculcate elevated artistic tastes among youth,” helping them “choose the right aesthetic
perspectives,” and “fight against vulgarity and poor tastes.”1137 The Komsomol TsK’s
1966 decree stressed that, as a result of improvements in the organization of cultural
leisure where youth lived, adolescents expressed more “appropriate” cultural desires than
1134 XVI s’’ezd Vsesoiuznogo Leninskogo Kommunisticheskogo Soiuza Molodezhi: Stenograficheskii otchet
(Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1971), 56, and V. K. Krivoruchenko, XIV – XVI s’’ezdy VLKSM (Moscow:
Molodaia gvardiia, 1989), 134-35.
1135 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 121, ll. 3-4.
1136 XV s’’ezd vsesoiuznogo leninskogo kommunisticheskogo soiuza molodezhi, 43-44.
1137 Ibid., 52.
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previously, such as wanting to participate in noncontroversial amateur artistic
collectives.1138 Moreover, the Komsomol continued to use state-sponsored popular
culture to manage youth free time, which had particular importance due to the shortening
of the workweek and corresponding growth of leisure.1139 The Komsomol TsK
specifically emphasized activities for misbehaving adolescents, censuring several oblast
Komsomol organizations in March 1967 for “serious problems” in organizing adolescent
leisure, especially in the evenings, and on Sundays and holidays, when adolescents
“commit the highest number of crimes.”1140 According to another TsK decree, “the right
organization of adolescent leisure” had “a telling impact on their attitude to work and
study.”1141
The Komsomol hierarchy also began to stress militarized leisure activities. In
doing so, it helped enact the Brezhnev leadership’s efforts to co-opt the memory of
World War II and use it as a new legitimating basis of authority.1142 For instance, in the
context of the renewed celebration of the Soviet victory in World War II, the Komsomol
TsK enacted a decree in 1965 establishing all-union tourist trips to sites of major Soviet
battles.1143 The Komsomol organized militarized sports games, such as “Zarnitsa,” where
1138 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 121, l. 5
1139 XVI s’’ezd Vsesoiuznogo Leninskogo Kommunisticheskogo Soiuza Molodezhi, 29.
1140 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 163, l. 56.
1141 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 121, l. 5.
1142 On these efforts by the Brezhnev leadership, see Nina Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead: The Rise
and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 95-157, and Mark Edele,
Soviet Veterans of the Second World War: A Popular Movement in an Authoritarian Society, 1941-1991
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 129-52.
1143 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 98, ll. 134-35.
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youth competed in military skills.1144 The Komsomol TsK adopted a decree on the
Komsomol’s collaboration with military preparation organizations, and another on
improving Komsomol sport and athletics activities.1145 A February 1968 TsK resolution
called for “the further growth in the role of the Komsomol in the preparation of youth for
the protection of the socialist Motherland.”1146
An increased emphasis on youth discipline and downgrading of initiative
accompanied such militarization, all policies that recalled the state’s approach toward
young people during the late Stalin years. If Khrushchev’s speech at the 1958 Thirteenth
Komsomol Congress made developing grassroots initiative an important priority,
Brezhnev’s speech at the Fifteenth Komsomol Congress in 1966 spoke of youth activism
only in the context of labor and economic development.1147 Pavlov’s speech at the
congress did not list strengthening youth initiative as one of the Komsomol’s main goals.
Instead, he underscored discipline: “the most important goal in the current conditions is
the further strengthening of the Komsomol and its discipline, the unity of its ranks.”1148
The Komsomol changed its by-laws in 1966, embodying its shift in course, explicitly
accentuating disciplined behavior: “the Komsomol needs to constantly improve the
organization and conscious discipline among its ranks.” Other editions to the by-laws
promoted militarism and patriotism. One called for strengthening the might of the Soviet
1144 L. K. Baliasnaia, born 1927, interviewed April 5, 2009, and RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 216, l. 19.
1145 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 137, ll. 16-20, and RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 146, ll. 16-25.
1146 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 188, l. 67.
1147 For the relevant sections of Khrushchev’s speech, see N. S. Khrushchev, “Vospityvat’ aktivnykh i
soznatel’nykh stroitelei kommunisticheskogo obshchestva,” 33-40. For Brezhnev’s speech, see XVI s’’ezd
Vsesoiuznogo Leninskogo Kommunisticheskogo Soiuza Molodezhi, 16-31.
1148 XVI s’’ezd Vsesoiuznogo Leninskogo Kommunisticheskogo Soiuza Molodezhi, 89-90.
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army. In another alteration, the phrase “the Komsomol accepts young men and women”
was changed to “the Komsomol accepts young people devoted to the Soviet
Motherland.”1149 Oblast Komsomol conferences emulated such themes in their
proceedings.1150
The focus on discipline and militarization reached its culmination with the
Warsaw Pact’s invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. This decision resulted from the
Brezhnev leadership’s refusal to countenance the Czechoslovak efforts to build a liberal
version of “communism with a human face.”1151 Fears of subtle “western” propaganda
undermining Warsaw Pact relations and subverting socialist youth, especially as enacted
through US President Lyndon Johnson’s foreign policy, also motivated the Soviet Bloc
assault on what came to be known as Prague Spring.1152 For the USSR’s youth policy, the
invasion meant a decisive rejection of youth social activism, as the Kremlin feared that
young people would adopt a similar outlook to the Czechoslovak soft-liners. Thus, the
new First Secretary of the Komsomol E. M. Tiazhel’nikov, speaking at the 1971
Sixteenth Komsomol Congress, failed to list youth grassroots activism as an important
goal. He instead stressed the “strengthening of Komsomol discipline,” along with youth
militarism and the struggle with western propaganda. His speech devoted little space to
amateur arts and clubs, in comparison to sports and military preparation, showing the
1149 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 131, ll. 38-39.
1150 For example, the Moscow city Komsomol’s meeting in 1966: TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 16, d. 295, ll. 77-
78.
1151 Mike Bowker, “Brezhnev and Superpower Relations,” in Bacon and Mark Sandle eds., Brezhnev
Reconsidered, 90-109.
1152 Mitchell Lerner, “‘Trying to Find the Guy Who Invited Them’: Lyndon Johnson, Bridge Building, and
the End of the Prague Spring,” Diplomatic History 32.1 (January 2008): 77-103.
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shift in priorities.1153 The meetings of lower-level Komsomol cells illustrate similar
trends.1154 Jazz music also suffered in a brief period of official censure.1155 Not so for
societal management from below, which did not gain top-level endorsement until M. S.
Gorbachev came to power.1156
This turn away from grassroots activism in the late 1960s had a powerful impact
on those organized cultural activities that relied on youth enthusiasm. Speeches by
Komsomol leaders paid less and less attention to youth clubs and cafes, especially those
intended for young people beyond their teens.1157 The attempts by some top-level
Komsomol officials to create a national association that would unify adolescent-oriented
clubs went nowhere.1158 In the central Komsomol bureaucracy, the separate archival
folders devoted to initiative-based cultural institutions in the mid-1960s disappeared by
1968, underlinging the move away from these organizations.1159 According to a Soviet-
era historian of the Komsomol, such wariness resulted from the fears at the time that
1153 XVI s’’ezd Vsesoiuznogo Leninskogo Kommunisticheskogo Soiuza Molodezhi: Stenograficheskii otchet
(Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1971), 36-39, 56, 72.
1154 The Saratov city Komsomol conference in January 1968 illustrates how these themes grew paramount
even before the invasion. See GANISO, f. 4529, op. 17, d. 1, ll. 196-97. So does a July 1968 meeting of the
Saratov Ball-Bearing Plant Komsomol. See GANISO, f. 654, op. 1, d. 68, ll. 30-31. In Moscow, the city
Komsomol conference held in March 1968 shows similar themes: TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 17, d. 50, ll. 43-
71. For a post-invasion conference, see the 1969 MGU university-wide Komsomol meeting: TsAOPIM, f.
6083, op. 1, d. 147, ll. 216-26.
1155 Starr, Red and Hot, 289-90.
1156 For the Gorbachev years, see A. G. Borzenkov, Molodezh’ i politika: Vozmozhnosti i predely
studencheskoi samodeiatel’nosti na vostoke Rossii (1961-1991 gg.), Chast’ 2 (Novosibirsk: Novosibsirskii
Gosudarstvennyi Universitet, 2002), 166-67.
1157 For Pavlov’s speech at the 1966 XV Komsomol Congress, see XVI s’’ezd Vsesoiuznogo Leninskogo
Kommunisticheskogo Soiuza Molodezhi, 52-83. For Tiazhel’nikov’s speech at the XVI Congress, see XVI
s’’ezd Vsesoiuznogo Leninskogo Kommunisticheskogo Soiuza Molodezhi, 33-74.
1158 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 67, d. 127, ll. 139-42.
1159 These files included: RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 68, and RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 141.
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associations based on youth voluntarism and enthusiasm would slip out of Komsomol
control.1160
At the grassroots level, this led to growing pressure against the more daring and
controversial initiative-based collectives. From the mid-1960s, the “Archimedes” studio
at MGU faced a shifting landscape. Iu. V. Gaponov, the head of the studio, related that a
hard-line faction took control of the physics department’s Party committee. This
coincided with a weak-willed Komsomol secretary, who did not offer serious opposition
to the Party committee’s efforts to reform the structure of the physics department
Komsomol in a fashion that seriously undermined the Komsomol’s organizational
capacity. As a consequence, there was no “Physicists Day” in 1965, one of a number of
victories for the militant Party officials. Despite the administration’s strong support for
the compromise-oriented Komsomol secretary at the 1966 physics Komsomol
conference, a core group of physics students decided to fight back by electing a new
Komsomol secretary who would stand up for the students. V. Gertsik, a member of
“Archimedes” and later a prominent poet, recalled that he, Gaponov, and others
strategized in the dormitories about how to agitate their fellow students and what to say at
the election conference itself. They managed to achieve their goals, and were rewarded
with a renewed “Physicists Day” in 1966, along with the staging of the “Archimedes”
opera at its conclusion.1161 This revival proved brief, however, as the hard-line members
of the administration and Party committee gained more authority and placed increasingly
stringent restrictions on the members of this artistic collective. In 1969, the ideologically
1160 Krivoruchenko, XIV – XVI s’’ezdy VLKSM, 139-40.
1161 Iu. V. Gaponov, interviewed April 29, 2009, and V. Gertsik, born 1946, interviewed November 10,
2008.
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militant faction gained enough power to forbid the celebration of “Physicists Day” and
the staging of the “Archimedes” opera, and banished the “Archimedes” studio from
MGU altogether.1162
Other controversial enthusiast-based cultural institutions shared similar fates. The
MGU administration expelled the youth theater “Nash dom,” (Our Home) that same
year.1163 In 1968, Novosibirsk authorities closed down the “Pod integralom” (Under the
Integral) youth cafe for its controversial program, with the performance of the
controversial bard A. A. Galich serving as the final straw. A report sent to the Komsomol
Propaganda Department expressed regret over the fate of this “wonderful experiment,”
while recording that young Akademgorodok scientists still had access to several jazz
clubs, such as “Specter” (Spectrum).1164 The late 1960s also marked the peak of jazz
festival fever. No subsequent festivals reached the scale of Talinn’s in 1967, at first
because of the more wary stance of the Komsomol authorities to jazz festivals, and later
because of the growing popularity of rock’n’roll among youth.1165
Former Komsomol officials confirm the more challenging environment for youth
initiative in cultural leisure organization. According to Butov, the official line switched
from the need to support youth grassroots initiative in the 1960s to expressing wariness
over the possible consequences of doing so in the 1970s. As a high-level Komsomol
1162 S. K. Kovaleva, Ty pomnish’, fizfak? Neformal’nye traditsii fizfaka MGU (Moscow: Pomatur, 2003),
98, and S. K. Kovaleva, interviewed March 3, 2009.
1163 Costanzo, “Amateur Theaters and Amateur Publics in the Russian Republic, 1958-71.”
1164 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 34, d. 69, ll. 24-31. For more on “Under the Integral,” see Paul R. Josephson, New
Atlantis Revisited: Akademgorodok, the Siberian City of Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1997), and Borzenkov, Molodezh’ i politika, 170.
1165 V. E. Kleinot, born 1941, interviewed February 14, 2009, and Starr, Red and Hot, 286.
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cultural official, he frequently struggled against administrators from other Party-state
bodies who, when seeing youth doing something they disapproved, “sat there at the top
and waved their hand and forbid it.”1166 Baliasnaia also admitted that “not very wise
Party functionaries” used “forceful directives,” which put youth off.1167 Furthermore, the
end of the 1960s and early 1970s witnessed the growing systematization of cultural
leisure activities, as both Baliasnaia and Butov related. This systematization constituted
part of a broader effort by the Komsomol from the mid-1960s onward to create a
cohesive system of youth upbringing. The Komsomol, trade unions, MOC, and schools
worked together to organize youth free time, with such activities increasingly in the
hands of professionalized specialists.1168  While supplying more opportunities for youth
leisure, this systematization and professionalization posed a further challenge to young
enthusiasts who wanted to organize their own innovative cultural activities.
Conclusion
The late 1950s witnessed a new departure in the Khrushchev Kremlin’s attempt to
build a socialist version fof a western consumer society in the context of the Cold War.
The leadership realized that the didactic-oriented aesthetic upbringing campaign, along
with traditional and stodgy amateur activities, failed to reach many young people and
attract them to state-monitored spaces where they would be exposed to communist time.
This was especially true for those it wanted to reach most, youth who moved away from
1166 N. I. Butov, born 1944, interviewed February 16, 2009.
1167 L. K. Baliasnaia, born 1927, interviewed April 5, 2009.
1168 Krivoruchenko, XIV – XVI s’’ezdy VLKSM, 133.
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engaging with the system. By the end of the 1950s, high officials such as Karpinskii
came to understand that censorship could not succeesfully compete on the Cold War
cultural front’s new battleground of leisure, pleasure, and consumption. Not only that, the
hard-line policies of late 1956 and 1957, in particular the attacks on jazz and western
dancing, undermined the Khrushchev administration’s goal of acquiring social legitimacy
through satisfying popular desires. An orthodox approach to state-sponsored popular
culture likewise proved incompatible with strengthening youth leadership from below.
These factors informed the Khrushchev leadership’s change in strategy in mid-
1958, when the Kremlin decided to compromise with western popular culture, permitting
official discourse to depict listening to some American-style jazz and occasionally
engaging in western-style dances as acceptable to model young communists. Grassroots
activism received even more support than previously. In both areas, top-level officials
overrode the opposition of hard-line administrators to endorse the activities of soft-line
cadres. This policy denoted a further move away from despotic power and greater
emphasis on infrastructural power elements in the Khrushchev leadership’s governing
style.
Youth cafes embodied the new course on youth cultural activities. Young cafe
activists, mostly lower-level Komsomol cadres, enthusiastically invested a great deal of
time and energy into establishing these institutions. Cafes played bop and cool jazz, and
often featured western dancing, abstract art, foreign movies, and even visitors from
abroad. The Komsomol’s endeavor to create a modern feel to the cafe style reflects the
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Soviet authorities’ growing attention to the importance of consumer design.1169 At first
largely limited to well-educated young urbanites in large cities, these cafes eventually
served broad swaths of youth throughout the USSR. Furthermore, youth cafes were
explicitly perceived as a western form adopted for the Soviet Union’s environment by
local Komsomol enthusiasts. This makes them represent the kind of conjugation of native
and global that Yves Cohen and Stephen Lee call attention to in their investigation of
circulation, meaning how external patterns are combined with and adapted to local needs,
creating innovative hybrid forms.1170
The Kremlin intended the youth cafes to be capitalist in form but socialist in
content, promoting communist construction through getting young people into official
settings of communist time, advancing aesthetic upbringing, and eliciting grassroots
initiative. This did not match the main aims of the soft-line cafe enthusiasts, who
primarily valued the atmosphere of obshchenie in the cafes, seeing intimate and personal
interactions between individuals in a relaxed and unconstrained setting as the ideal sphere
of public life, one conducive to building a soft-line vision of communism, as expressed
by Likhodeev. Such divergent emphases led to conflicts between the cafe activists and
the many orthodox-oriented officials in the club network during the first years of the
cafes, as well as the Khrushchev leadership when it adopted a more hard-line policy in
late 1962 and early 1963, censuring western popular culture. Each cafe constituted its
own unique space that melded private and public elements, combining individual and
1169 Susan E. Reid, “Making Oneself at Home in the Soviet Sixties,” paper presented at the Association for
Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies national convention, Los Angeles, CA, November 18-21,
2010, and Crowley and Reid, “Introduction: Pleasures in Socialism.”
1170 Yves Cohen and Stephanie Lin, “Circulatory Localities: The Example of Stalinism in the 1930s,”
Kritika 11.1. (Winter 2010): 11-45.
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semi-private obshchenie around cafe tables with the public setting of a Komsomol-run
establishment.
After coming to power, the Brezhnev administration opened more room for
American-style jazz and recent western dances and permitted some rock music elements
in the VIA groups. The mid-1960s witnessed the flowering of domestic jazz festivals and
tours by jazz bands, and even visits by Soviet musicians to foreign jazz festivals, all of
which contributed to the formation of jazz networks and exchanges. This, together with
the appearance of official jazz radio programs, records, studies of jazz, and the
mushrooming growth of jazz clubs and youth cafes, served to further legitimize jazz.
The growing state tolerance for jazz from the late 1950s onward irrevocably
changed the Soviet jazz scene, as jazz moved closer to the mainstream, although still seen
as excessively western by many. Many amateur jazz musicians now joined professional
ensembles in state agencies and played jazz-style variety music commercially, while
performing for minimal payments in youth cafes and at jazz festivals to appreciative
audiences. Other jazz enthusiasts chose to not make jazz their full-time career, although
many pursued jazz during their free time as promoters, critics, amateur musicians, or
simply avid fans, who now could follow jazz through officially-sanctioned sources. The
jazz enthusiast alternative youth culture gradually transformed into a professional cultural
milieu and a jazz fan community.1171 The jazz festivals, touring bands, and other forms of
jazz exchanges helped integrate the Soviet jazz music community, which expanded from
1171 For more on fan communities, see Simon Frith, “The Cultural Study of Popular Music,” in Lawrence
Grossburg, Cary Nelson, and Paula A. Treichler eds., Cultural Studies (New York: Routledge, 1992), 174-
86; John Storey, Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: An Introduction (Essex, Pearson Education Ltd.,
2009), 223-25; and Eckhardt Derschmidt, “The Disappearance of the Jazu-Kissa: Some Considerations
about Japanese ‘Jazz-Cafés’ and Jazz-Listeners,” in Sepp Linhart and Savine Frühstück eds., The Culture of
Japan as Seen through Its Leisure (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), 285-302.
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semi-underground local scenes in each city to a national and even international scale.
These jazz activities, together with youth cafes, enabled official discourse the opportunity
to depict the USSR as a modern and progressive socialist alternative to domestic and
foreign audiences, one with the attractive features of a western consumer society and
without its faults.
Despite the accomodation with jazz, the Brezhnev Kremlin also pursued a number
of more hard-line policies already from the start. Youth leisure organization grew
increasingly militarized, focusing on sports, patriotic activities, and military preparation,
with less attention paid to state-sponsored popular culture. Within the sphere of organized
cultural activities, top-level policy deemphasized youth initiative and spontaneity, while
underscoring youth discipline to leadership by the ideologically conscious vanguard–the
Party. The growing professionalization and systematization of youth cultural leisure
reinforced this trend. By downscaling youth grassroots leadership and offering largely
ready-made cultural consumption options, the Brezhnev leadership moved away from the
Khrushchev approach to building a socialist consumer society. Instead, it adopted a
different model, where the emphasis lay on satisfying youth consumption wants while
getting them into officially-monitored spaces, shaping their tastes, and instilling
discipline and patriotism. The Brezhnev Kremlin put aside a central goal of the
Khrushchev administration–developing grassroots initiative–and thereby retreated from
the aim of activating youth for communist construction.
The year 1968, therefore, brought to a close not only the Thaw but also what
might be called the “socialist sixties.”1172 An analysis of organized cultural activities for
1172 Scholars have begun to pay attention to the socialist sixties as a discrete historical epoch in the Soviet
Union and other socialist states. See Diane P. Koenker, “Mad Men in Moscow: Sex and Style in the Soviet
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young people suggests that the period from 1958 to 1968 can be treated as a distinct
period, defined by the predominance of the model of a socialist consumer society
described above. The growing prominence of consumption, the attention paid to young
people, and the innovative efforts at reforming social structures connect the socialist
sixties to developments around the globe.1173 This suggests intriguing parallels between
socialist and capitalist contexts during this period, perhaps unsurprising due to the rise in
contacts and exchanges across the Iron Curtain.
1960s,” paper presented at the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies national
convention, Los Angeles, CA, November 18-21, 2010; Reid, “Making Oneself at Home in the Soviet
Sixties”; and Julie Hessler, “The Soviet Reception of Exhibits and Performances from the Third World,”
paper presented at the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies national convention,
Los Angeles, CA, November 18-21, 2010. Also see the contributors to a workshop organized by Diane
Koenker and Anne Gorsuch on “The Socialist 1960s: Popular Culture and the City in Global Perspective,”
Urbana-Champaign, Il, June 24-26, 2010. For an earlier work that treats the Soviet sixties as a distinct
period, see P. L. Vail and A. A. Genis, 60-e. Mir sovetskogo cheloveka (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1988).
1173 Jeremy Varon, Michael S. Foley, and John McMillian, “Time is an Ocean: The Past and Future of the
Sixties” The Sixties 1.1 (June 2008): 1-7.
Conclusion
Many Soviet youth deeply enjoyed organized cultural events. They found
pleasure and meaning in them, investing their time, energy, and emotions into state-
sponsored popular culture. Some had a great deal of fun participating in conformist mass
cultural activities oriented toward political propaganda and cultural enlightenment, such
as Stalin-era choruses and universities of culture. Some of these young people were true
believers, and such activities reinforced their faith. Others lacked better options for
amateur theater, music, singing, and acquiring cultural knowledge. For them, “singing
Bolshevik” bred political apathy and doubt. Most Soviet youth probably fell somewhere
between these two ends of the spectrum. At the same time, a large segment of young
people enjoyed more controversial activities in the sphere of state-sponsored popular
culture. This included not only western music and dancing, but also acceptable criticism
of Soviet reality, for instance, in the “Archimedes” opera and in debates at youth
initiative clubs and youth cafes. These contributed to the development of a civic spirit
and provided the basis for the growth of civil society under Gorbachev.1174 Skillfully
maneuvering within the confines of the mass cultural network, young people who
organized and participated in these activities played with and stretched the boundaries of
the permissible in a fashion familiar to the young in any society. The confidence of these
1174 For how club spaces served as a crucial base for civil society in the Gorbachev years, see A. G.
Borzenkov, Molodezh’ i politika: Vozmozhnosti i predely studencheskoi samodeiatel’nosti na vostoke
Rossii (1961-1991 gg.), Chast’ 2 (Novosibirsk: Novosibsirskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet, 2002), 166-67.
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youth in undertaking such testing of the limits within clubs and other cultural institutions
illuminate youth socialization into the official cultural system. At the same time, it was
expressed in a fashion at odds with the diary writers who sought to write themselves into
the Soviet political and cultural order in a fully conformist fashion during the 1930s.1175
In other words, I argue that young people’s willingness to challenge state cultural policy
in “acceptable” ways, ones that they knew did not carry the risk of outsize punishment,
could testify to youth integration into and comfort with Soviet society, as opposed to
necessarily expressing hidden resistance to its tenets. My study consequently opens the
curtain on the everyday public cultural leisure activities of the vast majority of young
people who did not openly deviate from the Soviet mainstream. In doing so, it questions
the vision presented by Oleg Kharkhordin of Soviet official collectives as inherently
coercive and repressive, with Soviet people drawing meaning, pleasure, and self-
definition only from nonofficial and fully private settings, such as the home, family, and
friendship cliques.1176
These findings indicate that state-sponsored cultural activities provided
substantial room for youth agency. The fact that many young people found pleasure in
partaking of cultural consumption offerings within clubs speaks to their agency since,
according to Arjun Appadurai, consumption, pleasure, and agency are inextricably
intertwined qualities: “where there is consumption, there is pleasure, and where there is
pleasure there is agency.”1177 Furthermore, the voluntary and enthusiastic youth
1175 Jochen Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2006), 4-5.
1176 Oleg Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1999), 279-302.
1177 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 7.
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engagement with organized cultural activities, particularly in the years after Stalin,
further underscored how state-sponsored popular culture provided space for the
development of youth agency and autonomy. Millions of young people willingly
performed in and helped organize amateur cultural activities that reflected the top-level
cultural policy at the time. This demonstrates that, for a substantial proportion of Soviet
youth, individual agency was not at all incompatible with conforming to cultural events
fully sanctioned by the Kremlin. My conclusion questions much of the current writing on
Soviet youth agency that emphasizes agency as inherently resistant.1178 Nonetheless,
while some expressed conformist agency, others knowingly engaged in cultural activities
within the mass cultural network that departed from the cultural policy at that time, most
frequently western music and dancing. Their actions challenged the prescribed cultural
norms advocated by the leadership, while still remaining within the broader official
Soviet cultural field, since they took place in club establishments. Sometimes, the same
young people enjoyed both conformist and nonconformist organized cultural activities,
easily crossing the boundaries set by official discourse, which suggests that the politics of
popular culture mattered less to them than the aesthetic pleasure they received. Others
more clearly associated their participation in organized cultural activities with their
political outlook. These findings on conformist and nonconformist youth agency and the
ambiguities involved therein suggest that we should be wary of using fixed subject
1178 See, among many, Robert Edelman, Spartak Moscow: A History of the People’s Team in the Workers’
State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 1-9; Lynne Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin:
Collectivisation and the Culture of Peasant Resistance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 45-66;
and Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: Free
Press, 1994), 227-350. However, for other examples of conformist agency in the Soviet context, see Anna
Krylova, Soviet Women in Combat: A History of Violence on the Eastern Front (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 20-26, 38-70, 87-120; Igal Halfin, From Darkness to Light: Class, Consciousness,
and Salvation in Revolutionary Russia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 1-38; and
Hellbeck, Revolution on My Mind.
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positions, such as Alexei Yurchak’s “svoi,” in analyzing youth identities.1179 Instead of
thinking in terms of fixed categories of subject positions, a more productive heuristic tool
might involve envisioning a spectrum of constantly changing positions that range from
conformism to nonconformism. Individual agency emerged when young people adopted
positions along this spectrum, choices mediated by the structures of official culture, the
social background of individuals, their exposure to alternative sources of knowledge, as
well as the contingency of personal preference.
The availability of a spectrum of diverse positions within the Soviet cultural
mainstream resulted from major tensions between hard-line and soft-line policy
approaches to organized cultural activities. From the early Soviet years, those inclined
toward ideological militancy struggled with those favoring pluralism and tolerance over
divergent visions of the correct path to an ideal communist future. In state-sponsored
popular culture, these battles centered over whether to stress political propaganda or
entertainment; disciplined obedience to an ideological conscious vanguard or the
initiative and spontaneity of the masses; rejection or acceptance of western popular
culture; and finally, the use of harsh coercion or club activities to deal with juvenile
“delinquency.” Many officials stood close to the center of the spectrum on these issues,
while others pushed for either a more soft-line or more hard-line course, with the
Moscow House of Folk Art exemplifying the latter.
1179 Alexei Yurchak presents the subject position of “svoi” as referring to those who believed in
communism overall and faithfully reproduced official discourse, while reinterpreting its meaning to
accommodate their own: Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, until It Was No More: The Last Soviet
Generation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 77-125. For other criticism of the subject
positions deployed by Yurchak, see Peter J. Schmelz, Such Freedom, if Only Musical: Unofficial Soviet
Music during the Thaw (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 3-25.
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Top-level cultural policy resulted from a combination of conflicts between those
favoring either ideological militancy or pluralism, along with domestic and foreign
developments that convinced moderates to support one or the other at various times. My
conclusions here challenge recent accounts of state policies in the Thaw, most notably
Miriam Dobson’s. She cast doubt on the impact of hard-line versus soft-line rivalries to
argue that officials changed their outlooks due to an evolving mixture of optimism and
anxiety.1180 While she correctly identified optimism and anxiety as central to Thaw
policymaking, I contend that struggles between militant and pluralist-oriented cadres had
just as much significance to shaping cultural policy and the everyday cultural reality of
youth in clubs, best illustrated by the 1962 club worker conferences. These and other
examples of extensive debates within official rhetoric by young and older advocates of
western popular culture, youth initiative clubs, youth cafes, and other daring cultural
forms undermines Yurchak’s notion of the growing irrelevance of public discourse for
everyday youth lives after 1953.1181 Moreover, if the struggles for hegemony within
capitalist popular culture overwhelmingly revolve around social class, my investigation,
while fully acknowledging the role of class, emphasizes that in the Soviet context
ideological differences over perspectives on the future communist society played a large
part as well.1182
1180 Miriam Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer: Gulag Returnees, Crime, and the Fate of Reform after
Stalin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 156-85, and Dobson“Contesting the Paradigms of De-
Stalinization: Readers’ Responses to One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich,” Slavic Review 64.3 (Fall
2005): 580-600.
1181 His argument may better describe the 1970s and 1980s than the Thaw: Yurchak, Everything was
Forever, 36-76.
1182 On capitalist contexts, see Tony Bennett, “Introduction: Popular Culture and the ‘Turn to Gramsci,’” in
Tony Bennett, Colin Mercer, and Janet Woollcott eds., Popular Culture and Social Relations (Philadelphia:
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The battles between hard-line and soft-line advocates suggest the lack of cohesion
within the Party-state and the consequent difficulties in enacting central policies.
Certainly, the leadership’s stance played a defining role in setting the terms of cultural
policy on a broad scale and in determining the official discourse’s expression of what
constituted appropriate and recommended cultural activities. This public rhetoric
demonstrates the shifting definitions of the New Soviet Man and Woman over time, with
model young communist citizens having greater scope to practice a wide variety of
cultural forms and to engage in grassroots activism during more tolerant periods.
Nonetheless, top-level cultural policy and its accompanying discourse did not fully
determine state-sponsored popular culture at the grassroots level where state policy met
everyday experience. Local cultural officials, such as club managers, had significant
scope to adopt more or less flexible cultural policies than the Party line at the time. On
the one hand, these divergent positions resulted from the individual ideological
perspective of cultural officials. On the other hand, systemic incentives facing those
managing cultural institutions, namely the need to meet financial plan demands,
established conditions that sometimes weighed against the Kremlin’s explicit desires,
generally in a more moderate direction. The Soviet leadership obliged club directors both
to fulfill financial plans, based on fee-paying customers, and to enact the Party’s
recommended cultural program, with different control agencies often responsible for
ensuring each of these goals.1183 This arrangement set the stage for inevitable conflicts in
Open University Press, 1986), xi-xix, and Stuart Hall, “Popular Culture and the State,” in Bennett, Mercer,
and Woollcott eds., Popular Culture and Social Relations, 22-49.
1183 For another example of such tensions, see Kiril Tomoff, Creative Union: The Professional
Organization of Soviet Composers, 1939-1953 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 1-10.
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cases where the Party line failed to match popular youth desires for club activities. Some
club managers, usually the ones already leaning toward a more flexible ideological
viewpoint, chose to provide revenue-generating western dances that went beyond the
limits set by top-level cultural policy. An understanding of Soviet official culture, thus,
cannot be reduced to examining the leadership’s cultural policy, but must also encompass
the reality of its implementation at the grassroots level.
Such analyses should capture both central and regional contexts.1184 Comparing
Moscow and Saratov reveals that, during periods of intolerant cultural policy at the top,
club institutions within capital cities suffered from more stringent oversight by
ideological control organs. Thus, in Saratov and other provincial cities, young people
generally had more opportunities for pursuing western popular culture during the
crackdown of the late Stalin years. However, when the Kremlin pursued a more soft-line
course, capital cities often proved the first to launch innovations, such as youth initiative
clubs and youth cafes, with these cultural activities reaching the provinces only after
initial experimentation in Moscow and Leningrad. A comparison of different locales also
underscores the importance of the individual proclivities of those officials in charge of
cultural activities in that area to determining the kinds of activities encouraged therein,
highlighting the diversity inherent in the Soviet system.
My examination sheds light on the tensions between consumption and ideology
within Soviet official culture. On one level, club managers strove to achieve the financial
aspects of the plan and consequently benefit materially, whether through attaining
1184 For more on the importance of regional-oriented analysis, see Donald J. Raleigh, “Introduction,” in
Donald J. Raleigh ed., Provincial Landscapes: Local Dimensions of Soviet Power, 1917-1953 (Pittsburgh:
Pittsburgh University Press, 2001), 1-14.
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bonuses or keeping their job. On another level, the cultural consumption desires of young
people themselves undermined the Kremlin’s cultural policies during periods of
militancy, illustrating how the agentive actions of individual youth shaped the Soviet
cultural field.1185 My findings here question Stephen Lovell’s conclusion that popular
consumption desires played an insignificant role in the provision of official cultural
products and services in the USSR.1186
A study of organized cultural activities helps underscore the absence of clearly
defined and separate Soviet public and private spheres.1187 In trade union clubs, youth
cafes, and other mass cultural institutions, young people engaged in fun, pleasurable, and
deeply meaningful activities often associated with private life, such as obshchenie and
courting. Concomitantly, these establishments undeniably represented public and state-
managed settings, sponsored by the Party to ensure that youth spend their leisure in
socialist spaces. Each organized cultural activity can then be said to represent a separate
layer in the broader Soviet space, one that combined facets traditionally associated with
either the public or private sphere. This mixture of multiple elements parallels recent
1185 For how individual youth agency shaped broader historical processes, see Lawrence Grossberg, We
Gotta Get Out of This Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture (New York: Routledge,
1992), 113-27.
1186 Stephen Lovell, The Russian Reading Revolution: Print Culture in the Soviet and Post-Soviet Eras
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 18.
1187 Lewis H. Siegelbaum, “Introduction: Mapping Private Spheres in the Soviet Context,” in Lewis H.
Siegelbaum ed., Borders of Socialism: Private Spheres of Soviet Russia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2006), 1-21. For the opposing position, see Vladimir Shlapentokh, Public and Private Life of the Soviet
People: Changing Values in Post-Stalin Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), and
Kharkhordin, The Collective and the Individual in Russia, 1-34, 75-122.
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work on public and private in western contexts, indicating the need to reassess the
concept of “public sphere” altogether.1188
Within the socialist public spaces of the Soviet mass cultural network, youth who
played and listened to western music and engaged in western dancing during the postwar
decades inevitably participated in the Cold War’s cultural front, as part of the larger
superpower battle for the hearts and minds of domestic and foreign audiences. Jazz,
rock’n’roll, the foxtrot, the twist, the charleston and other cultural activities associated
with the US and western Europe had many fans among young Soviet citizens. Militant
Soviet ideologues inveighed against western cultural forms for undermining the Cold
War struggle and communist construction. Tolerant cultural figures, as embodied by L. I.
Likhodeev and V. P. Aksenov, rejected such claims, calling for cultural pluralism and the
adoption of western cultural genres if they fit Soviet needs and popular desires. This
debate represented a fundamental part of the broader Soviet dialogue about young people
and the appropriate path to communism. Therefore, western popular culture had a
powerful impact both on discourse and policy regarding young people and on youth
everyday life. In part, this resulted from the efforts of western governments to use
cultural propaganda to appeal to Soviet youth.1189 Such Cold War endeavors played a
1188 For work on the public and private in western contexts, see for example Victoria de Grazia,
“Introduction,” in Victoria de Grazia and Ellen Furlough eds., The Sex of Things: Gender and Consumption
in Historical Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 1-10. For a more extensive
discussion of “public sphere,” see Peter U. Hohendahl and Marc Silberman, "Critical Theory, Public
Sphere and Culture. Jurgen Habermas and His Critics," New German Critique 16 (Winter 1979): 89-118.
1189 David Caute, The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy During the Cold War (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 441-67; Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda,
Culture, and the Cold War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 121-228; and Michael Nelson, War of the
Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War (Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press, 1997), 46-136.
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central role in the globalization of US culture during the second half of the twentieth
century.1190
My investigation of organized cultural activities likewise draws attention to the
soft-line shift associated with Stalin’s death and the ascendance of new leaders to the
Kremlin. Soon after March 1953, top officials offered young people a consumerist social
contract, increasing the provision of organized cultural activities, making them more
entertaining and less politicized, and tolerating a degree of western content, in exchange
for youth social support. Likewise, the Kremlin now aimed to use club events to reign in
juvenile “delinquency.” Not least, the Thaw-era leadership rejected the Stalinist emphasis
on discipline and militarism to highlight youth initiative and spontaneity, both to develop
youth capacities for self-governance in the communist future and to appeal to youth
desires. Doing so inspired enthusiastic participation by young people in the Soviet
system, with these youth investing a great deal of their free time, energy, and emotions
into club activities, for instance, in youth initiative clubs and youth cafes. This finding
disputes Juliane Fürst’s claim that Soviet youth from 1945 onward generally shirked the
system and focused on subcultures and consumption.1191 Taken together, such evidence
challenges recent scholarship that downplays the significance of Stalin’s death and
1190 For more on the globalization of US culture as tied to US foreign policy, see Penny M. Von Eschen,
Satchmo Blows up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2004); Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters (New
York: The New Press, 1999); Reinhold Wagnleitner and Elaine Tyler May, eds., “Here, There and
Everywhere: The Foreign Politics of American Popular Culture (Hanover: University Press of New
England, 2000); and Reinhold Wagnleitner, Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of
the United States in Austria after the Second World War, trans. Diana M. Wolf (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1994).
1191 Specifically, she claimed that from the postwar Stalin years, “despite short flames of new enthusiasm,”
youth were characterized by “consumption, subcultures and shirking the system.” See Juliane Fürst,
Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism, 1945-56 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010), 19.
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attributes changes in the mid-1950s largely to broad social developments such as the
completion of postwar reconstruction.1192
These reforms during the early Thaw spotlight how, in an effort to win the Cold
War competition for the hearts and minds of the population while also advancing
communist construction, the post-Stalin leadership attempted to build a socialist
alternative to a western modern consumer society. This socialist consumer society would
offer the worthy aspects of a western consumer society, including fun entertainment and a
progressive feel, without suffering from the problems of class struggle, individualism, or
excessive consumerism. The Party-state, furthermore, intended to actively compete with
western offerings by presenting Soviet cultural options as superior to and as more refined
than supposedly vulgar, unworthy, and inferior western ones.1193 By the late 1950s, the
Kremlin decided that it needed not simply to appeal to but also to actively shape young
people’s aesthetic tastes. It launched the aesthetic upbringing campaign, aimed at socially
engineering a population whose cultural preferences fit the Soviet leadership’s vision.1194
Going beyond previous scholarship on western contexts that has shown how cultural
tastes created social status hierarchies, my examination draws attention to how cultural
1192 Julie Hessler, A Social History of Soviet Trade: Trade Policy, Retail Practices, and Consumption,
1917–1953 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 296-336; Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 20-29;
and Fürst, Polly Jones and Susan Morrissey, “The Relaunch of the Soviet Project, 1945–64: Introduction,”
The Slavonic and East European Review 86.2 (April 2008): 201-07.
1193 In similarity to the policies of the Czechoslovak state after 1968. See Paulina Bren, “Mirror, Mirror, on
the Wall … Is the West the Fairest of Them All? Czechoslovak Normalization and Its (Dis)Contents,”
Kritika 9.4 (Fall 2008): 831-54.
1194 On Thaw-era management of material consumption wants, see Susan E. Reid, “Cold War in the
Kitchen: Gender and the De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the Soviet Union,” Slavic Review 61.2
(Summer 2002): 211-52.
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tastes can also serve as a tool of modern governance and population politics.1195 The
aesthetic upbringing campaign constituted part of a broader endeavor to instill a Thaw-
era version of culturedness, one expanding beyond elites to aim at all youth, and having
the Cold War struggle as a key motivating factor along with communist construction.
Realizing the failure of didactic aesthetic upbringing activities to reach many young
people, at the end of the 1950s the authorities once again endeavored to appeal to youth
desires while trying to deal with the challenge of preventing uncontrollably rapid growth
of consumption wants, for example in the demands for more youth cafes.1196 In sum, the
post-Stalin leadership’s venture to build a socialist consumer society represented a Soviet
“multiple modernity,” one marked as unique by a conscious effort of the political
leadership to appeal to consumer wants, while trying to elicit initiative from below, to
control leisure time, and to shape aesthetic tastes.1197 In the process, the Thaw-era
Kremlin moved away from the late Stalinist reliance on despotic power and introduced
more infrastructural power elements into its ruling style. However, true infrastructural
power remained elusive, as illustrated by the top-level efforts to control and manage the
population through culture and leisure in the post-Stalin years.
These Thaw-era transformations in the Soviet leadership’s youth policies played a
central role in the creation of a post-Stalin generation, one with a distinct generational
1195 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, Richard Nice trans. and ed.
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 466-85, and Sarah Thornton, Club Cultures: Music, Media
and Subcultural Capital (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1996), 163-68.
1196 For more on this challenge, see David Crowley and Susan E. Reid, “Introduction: Pleasures in
Socialism,” in David Crowley and Susan E. Reid eds., Pleasures in Socialism: Leisure and Luxury in the
Eastern Bloc (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2010), 3-52.
1197 On “multiple modernities,” see Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yitzak Sternberg, “Analyzing Our Time: A
Sociological Problématique,” in Eliezer Ben-Rafael with Yitzak Sternberg eds., Identity, Culture, and
Globalization (Boston: Brill, 2001), 3-17.
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consciousness. Undeniably, broader social processes that began in the late Stalin years,
such as postwar reconstruction and the growth of higher education, contributed to
creating this generation. Nonetheless, the fact that the post-Stalin leadership directed
official discourse and youth policy to focus on developing youth initiative, to underline
the importance of satisfying youth cultural and material consumption wants, and
generally to spotlight the role of youth in society proved more essential to creating a
sense of unity, cohesion, and shared consciousness among the post-Stalin generation.
These ideas, conveyed at the grassroots level of Komsomol and trade union meetings,
and in the press, cinema, radio, and other media helped convince many young people of
their special and prominent status, their right to have their desires satisfied, and their
ability to participate in the system through community activism. The generational
consciousness of the post-Stalin generation was further strengthened in the late 1950s by
the explicit discussion of generational differences and tensions as part of the hard-line
shift. Consequently, unlike what Fürst identified as the last Stalin generation, the post-
Stalin generation constituted an active one, with its members ready to press openly for
what they wanted and thought they deserved.1198 Their willingness to do so expressed
itself in youth enthusiasm for and extensive voluntary efforts on behalf of youth initiative
clubs and youth cafes. At the same time, the global context of youth activism throughout
the 1950s and 1960s locates young Soviet citizens within a worldwide pattern.1199 Of
1198 On active and passive generations, see Jane Edmunds and Bryan S. Turner, “Introduction,” in Jane
Edmunds and Bryan S. Turner eds., Generational Consciousness, Narrative, and Politics (New York:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 1-12, and Edmunds and Turner, Generations, Culture and Society
(Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2002), 16-23.
1199 On global youth movements at this time, see John Springhall, Youth Popular Culture, and Moral
Panics: Penny Gaffs to Gangsta-Rap, 1830-1996 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); Claire Wallace and
Sijka Kovatcheva, Youth in Society: The Construction and Deconstruction of Youth in East and West
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course, hardly all youth in the post-Stalin generation demonstrated such grassroots
initiative and willingness to publicly challenge traditions; enough did, however, to create
a perception of a distinct generation, both among the age cohort growing up after Stalin
and in Soviet society as a whole.1200
With members spanning the last Stalin and the post-Stalin generation, the jazz
enthusiast alternative youth culture provides insights on the impact of top-level policy on
cultural practices on the margins of acceptability. The late Stalinist censure of jazz as an
unacceptably western cultural form in the context of the escalating Cold War struggle
made previously fully acceptable conduct illegitimate. This inspired the rise of a
counterculture of jazz fans, who united to undertake illegal activities to access the newest
forms of jazz and to engage in deceptive practices to play this music. The Soviet
leadership’s cultural policy, therefore, created deviance, with jazz enthusiasts labeled as
“deviant” regardless of whether they consciously sought to oppose the authorities or not.
In this, the jazz enthusiast alternative youth culture differed from many other youth
countercultures that centered on deliberate and conscious spectacular opposition to the
cultural mainstream, whether Soviet stiliagi or western Mods and Rockers, Halbstarken,
or beatniks.1201 The stiliagi alternative youth culture provided a much better outlet for
Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); and Steven Mintz, Huck’s Raft: A History of American
Childhood (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 310-33.
1200 For the Thaw being associated with and focusing on youth, see L. B. Brusilovskaia, Kul’tura
povsednevnosti v epokhu “ottepeli”: Metamorfozy stilia (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo URAO, 2001), 169-74.
1201 On stiliagi as deliberately oppositional, see Fürst, Stalin’s Last Generation, 220-22. For non-Soviet
countercultures, see John Clarke, Stuard Hall, Tony Jefferson, and Brian Roberts, “Subcultures, Cultures
and Class,” in Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson eds., Resistance through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-
war Britain (New York: Routledge, 2006 [1975]), 3-59; Michael Brake, Comparative Youth Culture: The
Sociology of Youth Cultures and Youth Subcultures in America, Britain, and Canada (New York:
Routledge, 1985), 1-29; Andy Bennett and Keith Kahn-Harris, “Introduction,” in Andy Bennett and Keith
Kahn-Harris eds., After Subculture: Critical Studies in Contemporary Youth Culture (New York: Palgrave
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those youth who wanted to express their discontent with the USSR. After Stalin’s death,
jazz enthusiasts streamed into official organized cultural activities as the new authorities
expressed tolerance for jazz, which underlines the lack of oppositional motivation among
jazz enthusiasts. These youth eagerly performed within state-monitored spaces and
helped organize variety and jazz bands, jazz clubs, youth cafes, jazz festivals, and other
state-sponsored cultural activities, further illustrating their focus on aesthetics as opposed
to intentional subversion and nonconformism. Many jazz enthusiasts report having
believed in a Thaw-era reformist vision of communism when young. This challenges the
notion that evidence of socialist youth showing a deep interest in some facets of western
culture should be read as a rejection of Soviet reality and preference for a western way of
life. In other words, Soviet youth could like both Khrushchev and Coltrane.1202
As jazz slowly moved into the mainstream during the 1960s, musicians gained the
opportunity to form extensive domestic and international jazz networks, partake in jazz
exchanges, and join professional groups where they made a living playing this music.
Jazz fans enjoyed jazz music in official venues, listened to jazz on the Soviet radio,
purchased state-produced records, garnered information on jazz from jazz clubs, and read
pieces on jazz appreciation published in newspapers and magazines. The jazz enthusiast
alternative youth culture became transformed into a professional cultural milieu and a
jazz fan community, once again as a result of a shift in top-level cultural policy.
Macmillan, 2004), 1-18; and Uta G. Poiger, Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American
Culture in a Divided Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).
1202 John W. Coltrane, a prominent and innovative US saxophonist of the 1940s-60s, played in the bebop,
hard bop, and free jazz styles. Just like jazz enthusiasts in the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet rock fans in the
1970s could “be passionate about both Lenin and Led Zeppelin,” in the words of Yurchak. See his
Everything was Forever, 219.
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Although jazz received more room in the mid-1960s after the brief chill of the last
Khrushchev years, the Brezhnev leadership increasingly deemphasized youth grassroots
initiative and stressed discipline and militarism as part of a hard-line shift, which reached
its apogee with the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Along with this came a growing
professionalization and systematization of state-sponsored popular cultural provision for
young people. By removing support for youth community leadership in organized
cultural activities and other spheres of life, while offering largely ready-made cultural
consumption options, the Brezhnev administration retreated from the goal of activating
youth. In doing so, it moved away from the Khrushchev model of building a socialist
alternative to a western consumer society through satisfying youth desires while shaping
youth tastes and leisure habits and eliciting grassroots initiative. We can then equate the
“socialist sixties,” 1958 to 1968, with the dominance of this model of building a socialist
alternative consumer society. The Brezhnev Kremlin abandoned arguably its most crucial
element: getting young people actively involved in the Soviet system. Without soliciting
meaningful youth community engagement, without young people having the opportunity
to feel like true stakeholders in communist construction, the Brezhnev leadership left
itself in an unenviable position. Youth, lacking an appealing means of engaging in
communist construction that made them feel like true participants in the Soviet project,
grew apathetic and focused on consumerism and nonofficial activities. For the 1970s and
1980s, the heuristic model of more distinct and less porous public and private spheres, as
depicted in the traditional narrative, may be more applicable than for the 1950s and
1960s, with further research needed to cast light on this topic. By effectively abandoning
the project of building communism, the Brezhnev leadership, I argue, moved toward a
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model of a consumer society that hardly differed in any meaningful and attractive fashion
from those in western Europe and America. Under Brezhnev, the Soviet Union was
forced to compete with western states only in its ability to provide cultural and material
consumption products and services. This was a struggle it would find a challenge to win.
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